Correction officer charged with disobeying an order to take a post assignment
NYC Department of Corrections v Callabrass, OATH Index #1981/10
Regina Callabrass, a New York City correction officer, was served with a number of disciplinary charges alleging, among other things, that she was guilty of disobeying an order to take a post assignment.
OATH Administrative Law Judge Tynia Richard recommended that the charge that the Callabrass disobeyed an order to take an assignment be dismissed. ALJ explained that when Callabrass objected to the assignment, the supervisor did not repeat the directive but, instead, commenced looking for another correction officer to accept the assignment.
With respect to Callabrass’ threat “to call in sick” when she received the unwanted assignment, the ALJ said that this constituted “conduct unbecoming an officer.” In addition Judge Richard found that Callabrass had made a false or misleading logbook entry.
After considering Callabrass’ long service record with no prior discipline, ALJ Richard recommended the imposition of a 5-day suspension without pay as the penalty for these two acts of misconduct.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-1981.pdf
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL
August 23, 2010
Oath of office must be timely filed
Oath of office must be timely filed
Formal Opinion of the Attorney General, 98-F6
The filing of a timely oath of office is critical to an individual’s lawfully holding public office. The inter-relationship of the eligibility of a candidate to assume elective office and the filing of the required oath was addressed by the Attorney General in his Formal Opinion 98-F6.
A candidate for election to the Supreme Court, if elected, would become qualified for the position on January 24. His term of office, however, would commence on January 1. If elected, could the candidate lawfully file the required oath of office upon becoming qualified for the post on January 24?
Pointing out that Section 30 of the Public Officers Law states that an elective officer must file his or her oath of office within thirty days of the beginning of his or her term of office, the Attorney General concluded that in this instance filing the required oath between January 24, and January 30, would meet the Constitutional mandate [Section 1, Article XIII] that a public officer file his or her oath before undertaking the duties of the office.
What happens if the required oath is not filed within the 30-day period allowed under Section 30? The office is declared vacant.*
Where are such oaths to be filed?
1. The oath of every State officer must be filed with the Secretary of State; the oath of a municipal officer, including an officer of a school district, with the clerk of the jurisdiction.
2. The oath of all other officers, including library trustees, and officers of a BOCES, is to be filed with the county clerk of the county in which he or she resides. In addition, judicial officers of the unified court system must file an additional oath of office with the Office of Court Administration.
As noted above, the officer’s failure to file a timely oath results in a vacancy in the office by operation of law as the ruling in Vetere v Ponce demonstrates. Patrick A. Vetere, ready to commence his third four-year term as a member of the Harrison Town Council and Village Trustee, failed to file his oath of office within the 30-day period expiring February 1, 1996 as required by Section 30 of the Public Officers Law.
The town clerk declared Vetere’s office vacant on February 19 because of Vetere’s failure to file his oath of office. Although Vetere filed an oath of office on February 23, a few weeks later the Town Council and Village Trustees held a special meeting at which Benjamin DeForce was appointed to the vacancy.
DeForce subsequently resigned from the position and Vetere was appointed to the vacancy. Vetere then attempted to have the “certificate of vacancy” prepared by the town clerk on February 19 annulled and sought a declaratory judgment by a State Supreme Court justice that he was now entitled to a full four-year term of office as a result his reelection the previous November.
Supreme Court Justice Nicholas Colabella ruled that there was no statutory authority for issuing such a judgment. This means that Vetere will have to run for election for the remainder of the term to which he had already been elected. The decision states that “notwithstanding equitable considerations and the [Town’s] consent to reinstatement, the court can only direct reinstatement in the event it finds the petitioner was improperly removed as a matter of law.”
As Vetere’s removal was held to be proper, the Court dismissed his petition.
* Section 30 excuses the failure to file the oath within the 30-day period if the individual “was on active duty in the armed forces of the United States and absent from the county of his [or her] residence at the time of his [or her] election or appointment....”
Formal Opinion of the Attorney General, 98-F6
The filing of a timely oath of office is critical to an individual’s lawfully holding public office. The inter-relationship of the eligibility of a candidate to assume elective office and the filing of the required oath was addressed by the Attorney General in his Formal Opinion 98-F6.
A candidate for election to the Supreme Court, if elected, would become qualified for the position on January 24. His term of office, however, would commence on January 1. If elected, could the candidate lawfully file the required oath of office upon becoming qualified for the post on January 24?
Pointing out that Section 30 of the Public Officers Law states that an elective officer must file his or her oath of office within thirty days of the beginning of his or her term of office, the Attorney General concluded that in this instance filing the required oath between January 24, and January 30, would meet the Constitutional mandate [Section 1, Article XIII] that a public officer file his or her oath before undertaking the duties of the office.
What happens if the required oath is not filed within the 30-day period allowed under Section 30? The office is declared vacant.*
Where are such oaths to be filed?
1. The oath of every State officer must be filed with the Secretary of State; the oath of a municipal officer, including an officer of a school district, with the clerk of the jurisdiction.
2. The oath of all other officers, including library trustees, and officers of a BOCES, is to be filed with the county clerk of the county in which he or she resides. In addition, judicial officers of the unified court system must file an additional oath of office with the Office of Court Administration.
As noted above, the officer’s failure to file a timely oath results in a vacancy in the office by operation of law as the ruling in Vetere v Ponce demonstrates. Patrick A. Vetere, ready to commence his third four-year term as a member of the Harrison Town Council and Village Trustee, failed to file his oath of office within the 30-day period expiring February 1, 1996 as required by Section 30 of the Public Officers Law.
The town clerk declared Vetere’s office vacant on February 19 because of Vetere’s failure to file his oath of office. Although Vetere filed an oath of office on February 23, a few weeks later the Town Council and Village Trustees held a special meeting at which Benjamin DeForce was appointed to the vacancy.
DeForce subsequently resigned from the position and Vetere was appointed to the vacancy. Vetere then attempted to have the “certificate of vacancy” prepared by the town clerk on February 19 annulled and sought a declaratory judgment by a State Supreme Court justice that he was now entitled to a full four-year term of office as a result his reelection the previous November.
Supreme Court Justice Nicholas Colabella ruled that there was no statutory authority for issuing such a judgment. This means that Vetere will have to run for election for the remainder of the term to which he had already been elected. The decision states that “notwithstanding equitable considerations and the [Town’s] consent to reinstatement, the court can only direct reinstatement in the event it finds the petitioner was improperly removed as a matter of law.”
As Vetere’s removal was held to be proper, the Court dismissed his petition.
* Section 30 excuses the failure to file the oath within the 30-day period if the individual “was on active duty in the armed forces of the United States and absent from the county of his [or her] residence at the time of his [or her] election or appointment....”
August 20, 2010
Burden of proof of the charges of alleged misconduct never shifts to the individual served with disciplinary charges
Burden of proof of the charges of alleged misconduct never shifts to the individual served with disciplinary charges
NYC Department of Sanitation v Torrence, OATH Index #2015/10
Leo Torrence, a New York Department of Sanitation, worker was required to possess a valid commercial driver's license. His commercial driver’s license was suspended for over one year while he was on a long-term line-of-duty injury leave.
The Department charged Torrence with violating its rule that all required licenses must be kept valid at all times based on its General Order 2008-14 which provides that a disciplinary complaint will be filed if, after ten calendar days from the date of notification that an individual’s license has been suspended, the employee “fails to restore it.”
Although Torrence testified that he was unaware that his license had been suspended while he was on leave and did not learn of the suspension until he applied to have it renewed, Sanitation contended that it is not required to prove that Torrence had received notice of the suspension his license to sustain the charges it had filed against him.
Rather, argued the Department, Torrence was required to prove that he did not receive any notice from Motor Vehicles that his license was suspended to rebut the charge. In other words, Sanitation contended that Torrence had the burden of "proving a negative."
Oath Administrative Law Judge Faye Lewis disagreed, ruling that placing the burden of proof on Torrence in this instance would impermissibly shift the burden of proof in the disciplinary action to the accused in contrast to its being the burden of the charging party. Lewis said that Sanitation was required to show that Torrence had received appropriate notice from Motor Vehicles that his license was suspended and then did nothing within the time permitted to renew it.
Simply stated, the burden is always on the employer to prove the allegations set out in the disciplinary charges filed against the employee.
ALJ Lewis also rejected the Department’s argument that the valid license requirement is a strict liability rule as contrary to the basic precept that a finding of misconduct requires some showing of fault by the employee.
Lewis recommended that the charges filed against Torrence be dismissed.
The text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-2515.pdf
NYC Department of Sanitation v Torrence, OATH Index #2015/10
Leo Torrence, a New York Department of Sanitation, worker was required to possess a valid commercial driver's license. His commercial driver’s license was suspended for over one year while he was on a long-term line-of-duty injury leave.
The Department charged Torrence with violating its rule that all required licenses must be kept valid at all times based on its General Order 2008-14 which provides that a disciplinary complaint will be filed if, after ten calendar days from the date of notification that an individual’s license has been suspended, the employee “fails to restore it.”
Although Torrence testified that he was unaware that his license had been suspended while he was on leave and did not learn of the suspension until he applied to have it renewed, Sanitation contended that it is not required to prove that Torrence had received notice of the suspension his license to sustain the charges it had filed against him.
Rather, argued the Department, Torrence was required to prove that he did not receive any notice from Motor Vehicles that his license was suspended to rebut the charge. In other words, Sanitation contended that Torrence had the burden of "proving a negative."
Oath Administrative Law Judge Faye Lewis disagreed, ruling that placing the burden of proof on Torrence in this instance would impermissibly shift the burden of proof in the disciplinary action to the accused in contrast to its being the burden of the charging party. Lewis said that Sanitation was required to show that Torrence had received appropriate notice from Motor Vehicles that his license was suspended and then did nothing within the time permitted to renew it.
Simply stated, the burden is always on the employer to prove the allegations set out in the disciplinary charges filed against the employee.
ALJ Lewis also rejected the Department’s argument that the valid license requirement is a strict liability rule as contrary to the basic precept that a finding of misconduct requires some showing of fault by the employee.
Lewis recommended that the charges filed against Torrence be dismissed.
The text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-2515.pdf
Retiree rights under an expired collective bargaining agreement
Retiree rights under an expired collective bargaining agreement
Myers v City of Schenectady, 244 A.D.2d 845, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 812
In Myers the Appellate Division ruled that under certain circumstances retirees may be entitled to benefits flowing from collective bargaining agreements that have expired.
The case arose after the City of Schenectady decided to change its reimbursement of Medicare premiums policy. For many years the city had encouraged its retirees to enroll in Medicare as their primary health insurance carrier upon attaining age 65. Part B of Medicare required enrollees to pay a premium for coverage.
The city promised in collective bargaining agreements to reimburse the retirees the full cost of any Medicare premium. If a retiree declined to enroll in Medicare, the city would provide him or her with “the same fully paid health insurance coverage as it provided its eligible employees.”
In March 1994 the city announced that it would only pay 50 percent of the cost of Medicare Part B to those who had enrolled in Medicare. Then the city advised retirees that effective June 1994 it would cease all reimbursements for Medicare.
A number of retirees sued, contending that they had a vested contract benefit to “fully paid health insurance” and the City could not unilaterally discontinue its reimbursement of their Medicare premiums. They contended that under the terms of the several collective bargaining agreements in effect when they retired, they were entitled to “the same fully paid Health Insurance coverage” as was available to “all eligible employees.”
The Appellate Division sustained a lower court’s ruling that the city had a contractual obligation to provide the retirees with fully paid health insurance, rejecting Schenectady’s argument that “the agreements themselves had very clear durational limits.”
The court gave considerable weight to “past practice” in determining the rights of individuals claiming benefits or rights flowing from an expired agreement. The city had continued to pay benefits under expired agreements for 19 years, the court noted.
This made it difficult for the city to argue it only intended to give retirees the Medicare benefit for the duration of the contract. “[T]here is no surer way to find out what parties meant than to see what they have done,” the court said.
Schenectady’s “own 19-year practice of continuing to provide fully paid health insurance coverage to [its retirees], even after the expiration of the various collective bargaining agreements ... [constitutes] very substantial evidence that the provisions [of the expired agreements] in question were intended to provide benefits to retirees for the entire period of their retirement,” the court said.
Myers v City of Schenectady, 244 A.D.2d 845, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 812
In Myers the Appellate Division ruled that under certain circumstances retirees may be entitled to benefits flowing from collective bargaining agreements that have expired.
The case arose after the City of Schenectady decided to change its reimbursement of Medicare premiums policy. For many years the city had encouraged its retirees to enroll in Medicare as their primary health insurance carrier upon attaining age 65. Part B of Medicare required enrollees to pay a premium for coverage.
The city promised in collective bargaining agreements to reimburse the retirees the full cost of any Medicare premium. If a retiree declined to enroll in Medicare, the city would provide him or her with “the same fully paid health insurance coverage as it provided its eligible employees.”
In March 1994 the city announced that it would only pay 50 percent of the cost of Medicare Part B to those who had enrolled in Medicare. Then the city advised retirees that effective June 1994 it would cease all reimbursements for Medicare.
A number of retirees sued, contending that they had a vested contract benefit to “fully paid health insurance” and the City could not unilaterally discontinue its reimbursement of their Medicare premiums. They contended that under the terms of the several collective bargaining agreements in effect when they retired, they were entitled to “the same fully paid Health Insurance coverage” as was available to “all eligible employees.”
The Appellate Division sustained a lower court’s ruling that the city had a contractual obligation to provide the retirees with fully paid health insurance, rejecting Schenectady’s argument that “the agreements themselves had very clear durational limits.”
The court gave considerable weight to “past practice” in determining the rights of individuals claiming benefits or rights flowing from an expired agreement. The city had continued to pay benefits under expired agreements for 19 years, the court noted.
This made it difficult for the city to argue it only intended to give retirees the Medicare benefit for the duration of the contract. “[T]here is no surer way to find out what parties meant than to see what they have done,” the court said.
Schenectady’s “own 19-year practice of continuing to provide fully paid health insurance coverage to [its retirees], even after the expiration of the various collective bargaining agreements ... [constitutes] very substantial evidence that the provisions [of the expired agreements] in question were intended to provide benefits to retirees for the entire period of their retirement,” the court said.
Pre-determination hearings not required unless a deprivation of a property or liberty interest is threatened
Pre-determination hearings not required unless a deprivation of a property or liberty interest is threatened
Taylor v NYS Dept. of Correctional Services, 248 A.D.2d 799
A psychologist advised a correctional facility’s superintendent that State Corrections Officer Mark Taylor “was dangerous and may lose impulse control at any time.” Taylor “became belligerent and abusive” when the psychologist refused to give him a copy of a report that he had prepared for Family Court. Taylor refused repeated requests to leave the psychologist’s office and ultimately police officers were called and escorted him from the office.
The superintendent then prohibited Taylor from carrying a concealed weapon while off-duty.*
Taylor complained that he was denied due process because he was not provided with a “predetermination hearing” before the superintendent prohibited him from carrying a weapon while he was off duty
The rules of the state Correctional Services Department allow it to prohibit an employee from carrying a weapon while off duty if it determines “the employee’s mental or emotional condition is such that his or her possession of a weapon represents a threat to the safety of the employee, the facility or the community.”
According to the Appellate Division’s ruling in the Taylor case, the right to a pre-determination hearing depends on whether or not the individual can demonstrate that administrative decision constituted involved some deprivation of a “property interest” or a “liberty interest.” The Appellate Division said the superintendent had not deprived Taylor of any such “liberty interest.”
The Court next addressed the “property interest” aspect of the case. How does an individual establish a property interest? By showing, said the Court, that he or she has a “legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”
The Appellate Division pointed out that it had previously ruled that the exemption set out in Section 265.20 “is not a vested right.” Accordingly, it did not constitute a property interest for the purposes of invoking claims to any right of due process.
Finding that the superintendent had a rational basis for the action and thus was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the Appellate Division dismissed Taylor’s appeal.
* Section 265.20 of the State Penal Law gives State correction officers a statutory exemption from prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon.
Taylor v NYS Dept. of Correctional Services, 248 A.D.2d 799
A psychologist advised a correctional facility’s superintendent that State Corrections Officer Mark Taylor “was dangerous and may lose impulse control at any time.” Taylor “became belligerent and abusive” when the psychologist refused to give him a copy of a report that he had prepared for Family Court. Taylor refused repeated requests to leave the psychologist’s office and ultimately police officers were called and escorted him from the office.
The superintendent then prohibited Taylor from carrying a concealed weapon while off-duty.*
Taylor complained that he was denied due process because he was not provided with a “predetermination hearing” before the superintendent prohibited him from carrying a weapon while he was off duty
The rules of the state Correctional Services Department allow it to prohibit an employee from carrying a weapon while off duty if it determines “the employee’s mental or emotional condition is such that his or her possession of a weapon represents a threat to the safety of the employee, the facility or the community.”
According to the Appellate Division’s ruling in the Taylor case, the right to a pre-determination hearing depends on whether or not the individual can demonstrate that administrative decision constituted involved some deprivation of a “property interest” or a “liberty interest.” The Appellate Division said the superintendent had not deprived Taylor of any such “liberty interest.”
The Court next addressed the “property interest” aspect of the case. How does an individual establish a property interest? By showing, said the Court, that he or she has a “legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”
The Appellate Division pointed out that it had previously ruled that the exemption set out in Section 265.20 “is not a vested right.” Accordingly, it did not constitute a property interest for the purposes of invoking claims to any right of due process.
Finding that the superintendent had a rational basis for the action and thus was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the Appellate Division dismissed Taylor’s appeal.
* Section 265.20 of the State Penal Law gives State correction officers a statutory exemption from prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon.
August 19, 2010
Correction officer charged with disobeying an order to take a post assignment
Correction officer charged with disobeying an order to take a post assignment
NYC Department of Corrections v Callabrass, OATH Index #1981/10
Regina Callabrass, a New York City correction officer, was served with a number of disciplinary charges alleging, among other things, that she was guilty of disobeying an order to take a post assignment.
OATH Administrative Law Judge Tynia Richard recommended that the charge that the Callabrass disobeyed an order to take an assignment be dismissed. ALJ explained that when Callabrass objected to the assignment, the supervisor did not repeat the directive but, instead, commenced looking for another correction officer to accept the assignment.
With respect to Callabrass’ threat “to call in sick” when she received the unwanted assignment, the ALJ said that this constituted “conduct unbecoming an officer.” In addition Judge Richard found that Callabrass had made a false or misleading logbook entry.
After considering Callabrass’ long service record with no prior discipline, ALJ Richard recommended the imposition of a 5-day suspension without pay as the penalty for these two acts of misconduct.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-1981.pdf
NYC Department of Corrections v Callabrass, OATH Index #1981/10
Regina Callabrass, a New York City correction officer, was served with a number of disciplinary charges alleging, among other things, that she was guilty of disobeying an order to take a post assignment.
OATH Administrative Law Judge Tynia Richard recommended that the charge that the Callabrass disobeyed an order to take an assignment be dismissed. ALJ explained that when Callabrass objected to the assignment, the supervisor did not repeat the directive but, instead, commenced looking for another correction officer to accept the assignment.
With respect to Callabrass’ threat “to call in sick” when she received the unwanted assignment, the ALJ said that this constituted “conduct unbecoming an officer.” In addition Judge Richard found that Callabrass had made a false or misleading logbook entry.
After considering Callabrass’ long service record with no prior discipline, ALJ Richard recommended the imposition of a 5-day suspension without pay as the penalty for these two acts of misconduct.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-1981.pdf
School board meetings are open to the public
School board meetings are open to the public
Goetschius v Greenburgh 11 UFSD, 244 A.D.2d 552
The school board of the Greenburgh 11 Union Free School District barred some of its educators from attending a board meeting at which it planned to consider the termination of certain teachers.
The educators sued, contending that the board’s action violated New York’s Open Meetings Law [Article 7, Public Officers Law]. The board, citing Sections 2801 and 3020-a of the Education Law, also argued that its action was lawful as those sections “supersede the Open Meetings Law.”
The Appellate Division rejected the board’s argument, pointing out that:
1. Sections 2801 and 3020-a “do not specifically allow the Board to exclude [the educators] from Board meetings” but, rather, allow boards of education to adopt rules and regulations for the maintenance of public order on school property;
2. Section 1708(3) specifically provides that “the meetings of all such boards [of education] shall be open to the public;”
3. Section 1708(3) overrides the general provisions of Sections 2801 and 3020-a; and
4. The State’s Open Meetings Law is not superseded by either Section 2801 or Section 3020-a.
The Appellate Division also observed that Section 110 of the Public Officers Law states that “any provision of a ... rule or regulation affecting a public body which is more restrictive with respect to public access shall be deemed superseded hereby to the extent that such provision is more restrictive than this article.”
The Appellate Division indicated that the Board “engaged in a persistent pattern of deliberate violations of the Open Meetings Law through insufficient notice, unreasonable starting times, improper convening of executive sessions, and improper exclusion of members of the public. It then upheld a Supreme Court justice’s ruling annulling certain of the board’s actions and awarding attorney fees to the educators.
Goetschius v Greenburgh 11 UFSD, 244 A.D.2d 552
The school board of the Greenburgh 11 Union Free School District barred some of its educators from attending a board meeting at which it planned to consider the termination of certain teachers.
The educators sued, contending that the board’s action violated New York’s Open Meetings Law [Article 7, Public Officers Law]. The board, citing Sections 2801 and 3020-a of the Education Law, also argued that its action was lawful as those sections “supersede the Open Meetings Law.”
The Appellate Division rejected the board’s argument, pointing out that:
1. Sections 2801 and 3020-a “do not specifically allow the Board to exclude [the educators] from Board meetings” but, rather, allow boards of education to adopt rules and regulations for the maintenance of public order on school property;
2. Section 1708(3) specifically provides that “the meetings of all such boards [of education] shall be open to the public;”
3. Section 1708(3) overrides the general provisions of Sections 2801 and 3020-a; and
4. The State’s Open Meetings Law is not superseded by either Section 2801 or Section 3020-a.
The Appellate Division also observed that Section 110 of the Public Officers Law states that “any provision of a ... rule or regulation affecting a public body which is more restrictive with respect to public access shall be deemed superseded hereby to the extent that such provision is more restrictive than this article.”
The Appellate Division indicated that the Board “engaged in a persistent pattern of deliberate violations of the Open Meetings Law through insufficient notice, unreasonable starting times, improper convening of executive sessions, and improper exclusion of members of the public. It then upheld a Supreme Court justice’s ruling annulling certain of the board’s actions and awarding attorney fees to the educators.
The statute of limitations for litigating an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement is six years
The statute of limitations for litigating an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement is six years
Lagreca v City of Niagara Falls, 244 AD2d 862, leave to appeal denied, 91 NY2d 813.
The Lagreca decision points out that a law suit for an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement must be brought within six years of the act or omission claimed to constitute the breach.
When does the statute of limitations for the alleged breach of contract begin to run? On the date when the alleged breach occurred.
Bernadette J. Lagreca, the widow of a deceased city of Niagara Falls employee, sued the city because it had terminated her late husband’s life insurance policy in June 1988.
Lagreca contended that the cancellation of the policy violated the collective bargaining agreement then in effect. Lagreca, however, did not file her lawsuit until seven years after the insurance had been terminated. The court said that statute of limitation for breach of contract was six-years and had expired by the time the suit was filed.
The appellate division affirmed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Lagreca’s petition, commenting that “the cause of action for breach of contract occurred at the time of the breach when the [city] terminated life insurance coverage of [Lagreca deceased husband] ... allegedly in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.”
Lagreca v City of Niagara Falls, 244 AD2d 862, leave to appeal denied, 91 NY2d 813.
The Lagreca decision points out that a law suit for an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement must be brought within six years of the act or omission claimed to constitute the breach.
When does the statute of limitations for the alleged breach of contract begin to run? On the date when the alleged breach occurred.
Bernadette J. Lagreca, the widow of a deceased city of Niagara Falls employee, sued the city because it had terminated her late husband’s life insurance policy in June 1988.
Lagreca contended that the cancellation of the policy violated the collective bargaining agreement then in effect. Lagreca, however, did not file her lawsuit until seven years after the insurance had been terminated. The court said that statute of limitation for breach of contract was six-years and had expired by the time the suit was filed.
The appellate division affirmed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Lagreca’s petition, commenting that “the cause of action for breach of contract occurred at the time of the breach when the [city] terminated life insurance coverage of [Lagreca deceased husband] ... allegedly in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.”
Union security
Union security
Local 1095, AFSCME and Erie Community College, 30 PERB 4707
How much does it take to show that negotiating unit employees did not have “work exclusivity” with respect to a particular work site? If there is a history of work assignments being frequently switched between unit members and non-unit workers, the work is non-exclusive according to a PERB Administrative Law Judge.
Administrative Law Judge Jean Doerr ruled that Local 1095 failed to demonstrate that the union had “exclusivity” with respect to “second shift” security work being performed at an off-campus site of the college because employees of a private security company, Pro Service, had alternated with union members in providing security services at that location for a number of years.
In such cases, said Doerr, the “essential questions to be resolved are (1) has the work been performed exclusively by unit employees? and (2) are the reassigned tasks substantially similar to those previously performed by unit members? One of the points made in the decision was that “the work at issue shifted back and forth between [Local 1095] and Pro Guard from September 1995 through January 1997,” when Pro Guard again took over the entire operation.
Doerr said that given the “ever changing nature of the assignment,” it is difficult to see that [Local 1095] had any expectation that, after again resuming the work in April of 1996, the last “switch,” it would have the second shift assignment for any extended period of time.
Local 1095, AFSCME and Erie Community College, 30 PERB 4707
How much does it take to show that negotiating unit employees did not have “work exclusivity” with respect to a particular work site? If there is a history of work assignments being frequently switched between unit members and non-unit workers, the work is non-exclusive according to a PERB Administrative Law Judge.
Administrative Law Judge Jean Doerr ruled that Local 1095 failed to demonstrate that the union had “exclusivity” with respect to “second shift” security work being performed at an off-campus site of the college because employees of a private security company, Pro Service, had alternated with union members in providing security services at that location for a number of years.
In such cases, said Doerr, the “essential questions to be resolved are (1) has the work been performed exclusively by unit employees? and (2) are the reassigned tasks substantially similar to those previously performed by unit members? One of the points made in the decision was that “the work at issue shifted back and forth between [Local 1095] and Pro Guard from September 1995 through January 1997,” when Pro Guard again took over the entire operation.
Doerr said that given the “ever changing nature of the assignment,” it is difficult to see that [Local 1095] had any expectation that, after again resuming the work in April of 1996, the last “switch,” it would have the second shift assignment for any extended period of time.
August 18, 2010
Failure to exhaust available administrative remedies fatal to seeking court review
Failure to exhaust available administrative remedies fatal to seeking court review
White v Pozzi, 72 AD3d 1106*
Employee’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies coupled with his failure to demonstrate an exception to the exhaustion requirement applied in his case requires the denial of his petition seeking judicial review of the disciplinary determination.
* Text of decision e-mailed to registered readers.
White v Pozzi, 72 AD3d 1106*
Employee’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies coupled with his failure to demonstrate an exception to the exhaustion requirement applied in his case requires the denial of his petition seeking judicial review of the disciplinary determination.
* Text of decision e-mailed to registered readers.
Disciplinary suspension without pay
Disciplinary suspension without pay
Empire Hook & Ladder Co. #1 v Nyack FD, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
It is not at all unusual for an employee to challenge his or her disciplinary suspension by filing an Article 78 petition with a court.
In contrast, an Article 78 petition challenging the disciplinary suspension of a volunteer organization is not at all common. Yet a disciplinary suspension was the basis for a lawsuit filed by the Empire Hook and Ladder Company #1, a volunteer fire department, against the Nyack Fire Department.
The genesis of the action was the Village of Upper Nyack’s approval of a request submitted by a member of Empire to purchase a vehicle to be used to transport Empire members to fires as well as certain non-fire details.
The Nyack Fire Department, however, said that the member who submitted the request to the village had violated Nyack’s rules because the member had appeared before the village board without first obtaining permission to do so from Nyack’s chief. The chief declared that unless Empire apologized within 10 days “the matter would be reopened and appropriate action would be taken.”
No apology was received and Nyack told Empire it was suspended from service for 30 days for violating the department’s rules. The suspension, however, “did not include fires, emergencies or funeral detail.”
Empire sued, contending that its suspension was arbitrary and capricious. It argued that (1) it was never presented with written charges specifying the Nyack rule or regulation which it allegedly violated and (2) the penalty imposed -- suspension for 30 days -- violated General Municipal Law Section 209-i because it had not been given a hearing on the charges.*
According to the ruling, Empire was a member of the Nyack Fire Department. One of Nyack’s rules prohibited “an individual or company ... from communicating or asking to go before any village body for any type of equipment or any other reason without obtaining permission from the Chief of the Nyack Fire Department.”
Based on this prohibition, Acting Justice Weiner dismissed Empire’s petition, ruling that:
1. GML Section 209-i did not apply in this situation and therefore no “pre-suspension” hearing was required; and
2. The discipline imposed on Empire was not so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock one’s sense of fairness.
* GML 209-i authorizes fire departments to make regulations governing removal of volunteer officers and volunteer members of such departments and member companies for incompetence or misconduct. The Section also requires “notice and hearing” before a member may be removed from his or her position. In Armstrong v. Centerville Fire Company, 83 NY2d 937, however, the Court of Appeals decided that in adopting Section 209-i the legislature did not intend to interfere with discipline in connection with the conduct of the internal affairs of a fire department.
Empire Hook & Ladder Co. #1 v Nyack FD, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
It is not at all unusual for an employee to challenge his or her disciplinary suspension by filing an Article 78 petition with a court.
In contrast, an Article 78 petition challenging the disciplinary suspension of a volunteer organization is not at all common. Yet a disciplinary suspension was the basis for a lawsuit filed by the Empire Hook and Ladder Company #1, a volunteer fire department, against the Nyack Fire Department.
The genesis of the action was the Village of Upper Nyack’s approval of a request submitted by a member of Empire to purchase a vehicle to be used to transport Empire members to fires as well as certain non-fire details.
The Nyack Fire Department, however, said that the member who submitted the request to the village had violated Nyack’s rules because the member had appeared before the village board without first obtaining permission to do so from Nyack’s chief. The chief declared that unless Empire apologized within 10 days “the matter would be reopened and appropriate action would be taken.”
No apology was received and Nyack told Empire it was suspended from service for 30 days for violating the department’s rules. The suspension, however, “did not include fires, emergencies or funeral detail.”
Empire sued, contending that its suspension was arbitrary and capricious. It argued that (1) it was never presented with written charges specifying the Nyack rule or regulation which it allegedly violated and (2) the penalty imposed -- suspension for 30 days -- violated General Municipal Law Section 209-i because it had not been given a hearing on the charges.*
According to the ruling, Empire was a member of the Nyack Fire Department. One of Nyack’s rules prohibited “an individual or company ... from communicating or asking to go before any village body for any type of equipment or any other reason without obtaining permission from the Chief of the Nyack Fire Department.”
Based on this prohibition, Acting Justice Weiner dismissed Empire’s petition, ruling that:
1. GML Section 209-i did not apply in this situation and therefore no “pre-suspension” hearing was required; and
2. The discipline imposed on Empire was not so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock one’s sense of fairness.
* GML 209-i authorizes fire departments to make regulations governing removal of volunteer officers and volunteer members of such departments and member companies for incompetence or misconduct. The Section also requires “notice and hearing” before a member may be removed from his or her position. In Armstrong v. Centerville Fire Company, 83 NY2d 937, however, the Court of Appeals decided that in adopting Section 209-i the legislature did not intend to interfere with discipline in connection with the conduct of the internal affairs of a fire department.
August 17, 2010
Employer’s good faith suspicion of employee’s stealing defeats FMLA claim
Employer’s good faith suspicion of employee’s stealing defeats FMLA claim
Source: The FMLA Blog - http://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/ Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved by Carl C. Bosland, Esq. Reproduced with permission. Mr. Bosland is the author of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation.
Gwendolyn Donald worked for Arby's as an assistant manger. Shortly after being hired she suffered a series of medical problems causing intermittent periods of extreme pain. She was granted FMLA leave for related surgeries. While working the drive-through window, Donald’s cash register was over $4.00. Concerned that this might be evidence of employee theft, the company conducted an investigation, including video surveillance.
The surveillance suggested that Donald was ringing folks up at the full amount while recording the transaction in the register as discounted, and pocketing the difference. The suspicion could not be confirmed because the customers could have been handing coupons to Donald, which would explain the discrepancy. The company confronted Donald with its suspicions. When she refused to acknowledge in writing that she was stealing, she was fired.
Donald sued alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for taking FMLA leave in the past. She also claimed that her termination interferences with her right to return to work from intermittent FMLA leave in the future.
The Court initially noted that there were substantial questions regarding her FMLA retaliation/interference claims. Such questions would normally defeat the employer's motion for summary judgment. Because, however, the court found that the company established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to end Donald's employment, and that Donald had failed to establish that the reason was pretextual.
The court agreed that being $4.00 over may be evidence of theft. The court also credited the company's investigation, which confirmed the possibility of theft. The company's handbook cited theft as a reason for immediate termination. A demonstrable risk of theft, the court found, is a legitimate reason for an employer to end that person's employment.
The court rejected the non-theft explanations offered by Donald. The fact that the discrepancy could be explained because the customers could have presented discount coupons failed to diminish the legitimacy of the company's concerns. The court explained:
There may be other explanations for the discrepancies beyond the, but Plaintiff has offered no reason to believe Plum, Barocko, and Ballance fabricated their concern to cover up their unlawful discrimination. Indeed, whether Plaintiff was actually stealing or not is largely irrelevant, the relevant question is whether the evidence of theft was a sufficient reason and the actual reason for Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff's evidence does not demonstrate that Defendant made up its reason for the termination, the stated reason was not the real reason, or that the stated reason is insufficient to justify the decision. Nor is there any evidence that the inconvenience associated with her requests for FMLA lave played any role in the decision to end Donald's employment.
Mr. Bosland Comments: So long as an employer can establish that it had a good faith belief that it took an adverse action against an employee for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, the employer will likely be successful in defeating an FMLA at the summary judgment phase. The employer does not have to prove that its suspicions were, in fact, correct. It need only prove that it held those suspicions in good faith, and acted on those suspicions when it decided to terminate the employee.
To show pretext, an employee will have to demonstrate that the employer did not have a good faith belief that the employee engaged in conduct that could get them terminated. This is not an easy burden. Simply offering innocent, alternative explanations won't do it. Stated differently, the fact that the employer may not be able to prove theft "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not the standard. To defeat an FMLA claim, all the employer need prove is that it had a reasonable, good faith suspicion of theft.
Evidence of innocent, alternative explanations might, however, be used as evidence of a particularly substandard employer investigation. Coupled with some adverse comments incident to the use of FMLA leave in the past, and a short period of time between protected activity and the adverse action, and the employee can start to build a credible argument to survive the employer's inevitable summary judgment motion.
The case Donald v. Sybra Inc., No. 09-12252-BC (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2010).
The decisions is posted on the Internet on the “Leagle” law blog at:
http://www.leagle.com/unsecure/page.htm?shortname=infdco20100811b16
Source: The FMLA Blog - http://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/ Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved by Carl C. Bosland, Esq. Reproduced with permission. Mr. Bosland is the author of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation.
Gwendolyn Donald worked for Arby's as an assistant manger. Shortly after being hired she suffered a series of medical problems causing intermittent periods of extreme pain. She was granted FMLA leave for related surgeries. While working the drive-through window, Donald’s cash register was over $4.00. Concerned that this might be evidence of employee theft, the company conducted an investigation, including video surveillance.
The surveillance suggested that Donald was ringing folks up at the full amount while recording the transaction in the register as discounted, and pocketing the difference. The suspicion could not be confirmed because the customers could have been handing coupons to Donald, which would explain the discrepancy. The company confronted Donald with its suspicions. When she refused to acknowledge in writing that she was stealing, she was fired.
Donald sued alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for taking FMLA leave in the past. She also claimed that her termination interferences with her right to return to work from intermittent FMLA leave in the future.
The Court initially noted that there were substantial questions regarding her FMLA retaliation/interference claims. Such questions would normally defeat the employer's motion for summary judgment. Because, however, the court found that the company established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to end Donald's employment, and that Donald had failed to establish that the reason was pretextual.
The court agreed that being $4.00 over may be evidence of theft. The court also credited the company's investigation, which confirmed the possibility of theft. The company's handbook cited theft as a reason for immediate termination. A demonstrable risk of theft, the court found, is a legitimate reason for an employer to end that person's employment.
The court rejected the non-theft explanations offered by Donald. The fact that the discrepancy could be explained because the customers could have presented discount coupons failed to diminish the legitimacy of the company's concerns. The court explained:
There may be other explanations for the discrepancies beyond the, but Plaintiff has offered no reason to believe Plum, Barocko, and Ballance fabricated their concern to cover up their unlawful discrimination. Indeed, whether Plaintiff was actually stealing or not is largely irrelevant, the relevant question is whether the evidence of theft was a sufficient reason and the actual reason for Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff's evidence does not demonstrate that Defendant made up its reason for the termination, the stated reason was not the real reason, or that the stated reason is insufficient to justify the decision. Nor is there any evidence that the inconvenience associated with her requests for FMLA lave played any role in the decision to end Donald's employment.
Mr. Bosland Comments: So long as an employer can establish that it had a good faith belief that it took an adverse action against an employee for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, the employer will likely be successful in defeating an FMLA at the summary judgment phase. The employer does not have to prove that its suspicions were, in fact, correct. It need only prove that it held those suspicions in good faith, and acted on those suspicions when it decided to terminate the employee.
To show pretext, an employee will have to demonstrate that the employer did not have a good faith belief that the employee engaged in conduct that could get them terminated. This is not an easy burden. Simply offering innocent, alternative explanations won't do it. Stated differently, the fact that the employer may not be able to prove theft "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not the standard. To defeat an FMLA claim, all the employer need prove is that it had a reasonable, good faith suspicion of theft.
Evidence of innocent, alternative explanations might, however, be used as evidence of a particularly substandard employer investigation. Coupled with some adverse comments incident to the use of FMLA leave in the past, and a short period of time between protected activity and the adverse action, and the employee can start to build a credible argument to survive the employer's inevitable summary judgment motion.
The case Donald v. Sybra Inc., No. 09-12252-BC (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2010).
The decisions is posted on the Internet on the “Leagle” law blog at:
http://www.leagle.com/unsecure/page.htm?shortname=infdco20100811b16
Alleged violations of a "Memorandum of Understanding" to a Taylor Law agreement may not be subject to contract grievance procedures
Alleged violations of a "Memorandum of Understanding" to a Taylor Law agreement may not be subject to contract grievance procedures
Pine Plains CSD v Federation of Teachers, 248 A.D.2d 612
It is not unusual for parties to a collective bargaining agreement to agree to provisions set out in a “supplemental agreement” or to sign a “memorandum of understanding” in the course of collective bargaining pursuant to the Taylor Law.
Typically this device is used to set out provisions that although they have been agreed upon, for some reason, one or both of the parties do not wish to have the item set out in the collective bargaining agreement. In other instances, the supplemental agreement or memorandum of understanding is used to explain or modify a term or contract provision contained in the agreement or provide something after negotiations have been completed.
The Pine Plains Central School District case considers a significant issue: how does a party resolve a dispute concerning a provision contained in a supplemental agreement or in a memorandum of understanding?
The case arose when the Pine Plains Federation of Teachers demanded that its grievance concerning an alleged violation of a provision contained in a “supplemental memorandum of agreement” between the parties be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement in chief between the District and the Federation.
The District won a stay of arbitration of the alleged violation on the grounds that the supplement did not contain an arbitration clause nor was the contract grievance/arbitration procedure incorporated by reference into the supplement agreement.
According to the ruling by the Appellate Division, unless there is an arbitration process specifically set out in a supplement to a collective bargaining agreement or a memorandum of understanding, or the supplement or memorandum specifically states that the collective bargaining agreement in chief's arbitration procedure will be used to resolve disputes arising under it, a party cannot demand that the issue be submitted to arbitration as a matter of right.
Pine Plains CSD v Federation of Teachers, 248 A.D.2d 612
It is not unusual for parties to a collective bargaining agreement to agree to provisions set out in a “supplemental agreement” or to sign a “memorandum of understanding” in the course of collective bargaining pursuant to the Taylor Law.
Typically this device is used to set out provisions that although they have been agreed upon, for some reason, one or both of the parties do not wish to have the item set out in the collective bargaining agreement. In other instances, the supplemental agreement or memorandum of understanding is used to explain or modify a term or contract provision contained in the agreement or provide something after negotiations have been completed.
The Pine Plains Central School District case considers a significant issue: how does a party resolve a dispute concerning a provision contained in a supplemental agreement or in a memorandum of understanding?
The case arose when the Pine Plains Federation of Teachers demanded that its grievance concerning an alleged violation of a provision contained in a “supplemental memorandum of agreement” between the parties be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement in chief between the District and the Federation.
The District won a stay of arbitration of the alleged violation on the grounds that the supplement did not contain an arbitration clause nor was the contract grievance/arbitration procedure incorporated by reference into the supplement agreement.
According to the ruling by the Appellate Division, unless there is an arbitration process specifically set out in a supplement to a collective bargaining agreement or a memorandum of understanding, or the supplement or memorandum specifically states that the collective bargaining agreement in chief's arbitration procedure will be used to resolve disputes arising under it, a party cannot demand that the issue be submitted to arbitration as a matter of right.
Delay in issuing arbitration decision did not constitute misconduct by the arbitrator within the meaning of Article 75 of the CPLR
Delay in issuing arbitration decision did not constitute misconduct by the arbitrator within the meaning of Article 75 of the CPLR
Squillini v State of New York, App. Div., 248 A.D.2d 391
Michael A. Squillini, a maintenance supervisor, was served with disciplinary charges alleging “theft and deceit.” The arbitrator issued a decision on December 20, in which he found Squillini guilty of the charges and imposed the penalty of dismissal.
Squillini contended that he had agreed to an extension of time for issuing the arbitration award through November 17, but the award was issued more than a month after that. This delay, Squillini said, constituted misconduct by the arbitrator within the meaning of Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Squillini attempted to vacate the arbitration award alleging misconduct based on the arbitrator’s delay in his issuing the award.
The Appellate Division rejected Squillini’s petition to vacate the award, finding that “the arbitrator’s actions did not constitute misconduct.”
Further, said the court, “the arbitration award ... sustaining the penalty of dismissal from employment for theft and deceit, does not violate a strong public policy and is not irrational.”
Squillini v State of New York, App. Div., 248 A.D.2d 391
Michael A. Squillini, a maintenance supervisor, was served with disciplinary charges alleging “theft and deceit.” The arbitrator issued a decision on December 20, in which he found Squillini guilty of the charges and imposed the penalty of dismissal.
Squillini contended that he had agreed to an extension of time for issuing the arbitration award through November 17, but the award was issued more than a month after that. This delay, Squillini said, constituted misconduct by the arbitrator within the meaning of Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Squillini attempted to vacate the arbitration award alleging misconduct based on the arbitrator’s delay in his issuing the award.
The Appellate Division rejected Squillini’s petition to vacate the award, finding that “the arbitrator’s actions did not constitute misconduct.”
Further, said the court, “the arbitration award ... sustaining the penalty of dismissal from employment for theft and deceit, does not violate a strong public policy and is not irrational.”
August 16, 2010
New York Department of Correctional Services announces examination for Correction Officer
New York Department of Correctional Services announces examination for Correction Officer
Source: New York Department of Correctional Services - [Published by NYPPL as a public service].
A statewide competitive Civil Service exam for the position of correction officer trainee will be held on October 16, 2010. [Examination 25-431]
There are no minimum requirements for taking this written examination. However, at the time of appointment, applicants must have passed the written exam, must be 21 or older, a U.S. citizen and a resident of New York, and possess a high school diploma or GED. Appointees must also have passed medical and psychological screenings, as well as a background investigation.
Please note that although conviction for a felony automatically disqualifies anyone from becoming a correction officer, applicants having misdemeanor convictions are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine eligibility.
Applications must be postmarked by September 13, 2010.
The starting annual salary for a trainee is $36,420 and $43,867 after the one-year traineeship, subject to potential increase through contract negotiations, with additional geographic pay Downstate. In addition to the base salary, appointees will receive 16 college credits, a comprehensive health insurance program, retirement benefits, and pre-shift briefing and expanded duty pay which amount to $3,344 annually.
Officers working at correctional facilities in the New York City area and select Mid-Hudson areas will receive an addition to their salary - $3,210 annually for working in New York City or Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland or Westchester counties, or $1,195 annually for working in Dutchess, Orange or Putnam counties. There are also evening and night shift inconvenience pay programs.
The exam is administered by the New York State Department of Civil Service. Additional information is available at:
http://www.cs.state.ny.us/examannouncements/announcements/oc/25-431.cfm,
or by telephone toll-free at (877) 697-5627, option 2.
Corrections Commissioner Brian Fischer said that “Corrections is a great career for the men and women of New York, and I encourage anyone looking for a challenging and rewarding job, especially women and minorities, to take this exam ... The important job of Correction Officer not only provides opportunities for career advancement but carries with it the honor of playing a critical role in keeping this State and its citizens safe and secure.”
To ensure a successful recruitment for October’s competitive exam, test announcements and applications will be distributed at multiple locations as well as the Department of Civil Service’s website (http://www.cs.state.ny.us/), its Albany location, its regional Civil Service offices, local New York State Employment Offices, and all State correctional facilities.
Examination announcements and applications can be obtained by contacting the Department of Correctional Services at NYSDOCS, Correction Officer Recruitment Unit, Building 2, The Harriman State Campus, 1220 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY, 12226 or by calling DOCS at (518) 457-8131, or via the internet at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/.
NOTE: Candidates for the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination held on April 10, 2010, may apply for the State examination but such individuals will not be admitted to the written test on October 16, 2010. However, the Correction Department advises that if you apply for the State Correction Officer Examination, your results from the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination will be used to calculate your final score for the State examination.
The names of candidates scoring 70 or higher on the April 10, 2010 County Correction Officer/Trainee examination will be included on the eligible list for appointment as a New York State Correction Officer ONLY if the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination candidate files an application for the State Correction Officer Examination and pays the required non-refundable processing fee for the State Examination .
Source: New York Department of Correctional Services - [Published by NYPPL as a public service].
A statewide competitive Civil Service exam for the position of correction officer trainee will be held on October 16, 2010. [Examination 25-431]
There are no minimum requirements for taking this written examination. However, at the time of appointment, applicants must have passed the written exam, must be 21 or older, a U.S. citizen and a resident of New York, and possess a high school diploma or GED. Appointees must also have passed medical and psychological screenings, as well as a background investigation.
Please note that although conviction for a felony automatically disqualifies anyone from becoming a correction officer, applicants having misdemeanor convictions are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine eligibility.
Applications must be postmarked by September 13, 2010.
The starting annual salary for a trainee is $36,420 and $43,867 after the one-year traineeship, subject to potential increase through contract negotiations, with additional geographic pay Downstate. In addition to the base salary, appointees will receive 16 college credits, a comprehensive health insurance program, retirement benefits, and pre-shift briefing and expanded duty pay which amount to $3,344 annually.
Officers working at correctional facilities in the New York City area and select Mid-Hudson areas will receive an addition to their salary - $3,210 annually for working in New York City or Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland or Westchester counties, or $1,195 annually for working in Dutchess, Orange or Putnam counties. There are also evening and night shift inconvenience pay programs.
The exam is administered by the New York State Department of Civil Service. Additional information is available at:
http://www.cs.state.ny.us/examannouncements/announcements/oc/25-431.cfm,
or by telephone toll-free at (877) 697-5627, option 2.
Corrections Commissioner Brian Fischer said that “Corrections is a great career for the men and women of New York, and I encourage anyone looking for a challenging and rewarding job, especially women and minorities, to take this exam ... The important job of Correction Officer not only provides opportunities for career advancement but carries with it the honor of playing a critical role in keeping this State and its citizens safe and secure.”
To ensure a successful recruitment for October’s competitive exam, test announcements and applications will be distributed at multiple locations as well as the Department of Civil Service’s website (http://www.cs.state.ny.us/), its Albany location, its regional Civil Service offices, local New York State Employment Offices, and all State correctional facilities.
Examination announcements and applications can be obtained by contacting the Department of Correctional Services at NYSDOCS, Correction Officer Recruitment Unit, Building 2, The Harriman State Campus, 1220 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY, 12226 or by calling DOCS at (518) 457-8131, or via the internet at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/.
NOTE: Candidates for the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination held on April 10, 2010, may apply for the State examination but such individuals will not be admitted to the written test on October 16, 2010. However, the Correction Department advises that if you apply for the State Correction Officer Examination, your results from the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination will be used to calculate your final score for the State examination.
The names of candidates scoring 70 or higher on the April 10, 2010 County Correction Officer/Trainee examination will be included on the eligible list for appointment as a New York State Correction Officer ONLY if the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination candidate files an application for the State Correction Officer Examination and pays the required non-refundable processing fee for the State Examination .
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New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard.
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