Unit exclusivity

Unit exclusivity
CSEA and Warrensburg CSD, 30 PERB 3056
Suffolk Co Corrections Officers Assoc v PERB, App. Div., 246 A.D.2d 660

Exclusivity is an important issue to a collective bargaining unit. It sets out those tasks that may be performed only by unit members to the exclusion of all others. An employer violates its duty to negotiate under Section 209-a.1(d) of the Civil Service Law if it unilaterally transfers work “established and maintained exclusively by a collective bargaining unit” to non-unit workers.

In the Warrensburg case, CSEA Local 857 charged that the Warrensburg Central School District violated Section 209-a.1(d) when it assigned chaperoning duties at plays and concerts to employees represented by the Warrensburg Teachers Association [Association], a different negotiating unit.

The District contended that under a memorandum of understanding, members of the Teachers Association had “the right of first refusal in chaperoning all school events.”

PERB sustained its administrative law judge’s finding that District administrators regularly served in a chaperoning capacity at these events and thus CSEA did not have exclusivity with respect to performing such duties.

PERB said that collective bargaining agreements between the Association and the District dating back to 1982 specifically covered “chaperoning duties and rights,” while Local 857 agreements were silent with respect to such activities.

PERB rejected Local 857’s argument that it had “exclusivity” with respect to concerts conducted at the high school while Association members regularly chaperoned elementary school concerts, commenting that “the location of a concert, being unrelated to chaperoning duties, cannot form any discernible boundary within which to test exclusivity.”

A similar case involved the Suffolk County Court, First District, located in Hauppauge, which employed 18 correction officers who were responsible for the care and custody of detainees being held there.

In 1992 the Court was moved to Central Islip from Hauppauge and the 18 correction officers were reassigned to the Suffolk County Maximum Security facility in Riverhead. Deputy sheriffs were assigned to take care of the detainees at the Court’s Central Islip facility.

The Suffolk County Correction Officers Association [SCCOA], filed an improper practice charge against the County with PERB, contending that the County’s unilateral transferring the responsibility for District Court detainees to deputy sheriffs violated Section 201.a[1](d) and (e) of the Civil Service Law. SCCOA argued that the Taylor Law required that “prior negotiations” be undertaken before such a change could be implemented.

A PERB administrative law judge [ALJ] determined that SCCOA did not prove that its unit members had previously performed the duties reassigned to the deputy sheriffs exclusively. After PERB affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, SCCOA appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed PERB’s determination.
.

Court vacates hearing officer’s disciplinary determination after finding that it was arbitrary and capricious

Court vacates hearing officer’s disciplinary determination after finding that it was arbitrary and capricious
Trupiano v Meadow Union Free School Dist., 2010 NY Slip Op 32264(U), August 10, 2010, Supreme Court, Nassau County, Judge: Michele M. Woodard [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

From September 2004 through March 2007, the East Meadow UFSD teachers engaged in numerous activities to protest the fact that they did not have a successor collective bargaining agreement in place,* including picketing the School District's school buildings.

East Meadow, pursuant to Education Law §3020-a, preferred disciplinary charges on one of its teachers, Gina Trupiano, alleging that Trupiano “intentionally created a health and safety risk by purposefully situating her vehicle alongside the curb … in order to preclude children from being dropped off at curbside. The action resulted in children being dropped off in the middle of the street which resulted in an otherwise avoidable and unnecessary health and safety hazard.”

Hearing Officer Howard C. Edelman found that although Trupiano “did not knowingly and purposely park her vehicle alongside the curb … he concluded that by doing so, Trupiano "created a safety hazard to children” and sustained the charge. The penalty imposed: Trupiano received a counseling memo as the penalty.

Judge Woodward vacated the hearing officer’s award, finding that, in this instance, the Hearing Officer s decision that Trupiano is culpable of the charge preferred against her is not "amply supported by the evidence."

In the words of the court, “While the Hearing Officer s decision is indeed thoughtful, the irony is that the Hearing Officer therein repeatedly acknowledges that Trupiano broke no laws on March 2, 2007, was engaged in a constitutionally protected form of free speech and that she "obviously... did not wish harm to any child."

Accordingly, the court ruled that the disciplinary determination was "arbitrary or capricious."

* The terms and conditions addressing mandatory subjects of collective bargaining set out in the expired collective bargaining agreement are continued in effect pending the successor agreement in accordance with PERB’s so-called “Triborough Doctrine” promulgated in 1972.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2010/2010_32264.pdf

============================================
If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary procedures involving public officers and employees, please click here:

http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
============================================
.

Some procedural basics in perfecting an appeal to the Commissioner of Education

Some procedural basics in perfecting an appeal to the Commissioner of Education
Kathleen Vendel, et al., v the Board of Education of the Marion Central School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16,134

The decision of the Commissioner of Education in Vendel sets out a number of procedural elements that must be satisfied in order to perfect an appeal to the Commissioner. Significantly, a party's failure to comply with one or more of these requirements could prove fatal to the Commissioner's considering the merits of the appeal.

Some 100 residents of the Marion Central School District appealed the School Board decision concerning the public's participation at board meetings. The Board had adopted a policy limiting non-members of the Board interested in speaking at its meetings to three minutes. Also in Vendel's submission to the Commissioner was an appeal involving "certain interactions with the community” by the Board and an application seeking “the removal of various individuals” from the Board.

The Commissioner dismissed Vendel's appeal and application without considering the merits of the allegations, explaining:

1. The individuals filing an appeal must have standing. An individual may not maintain an appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 unless aggrieved in the sense that he or she has suffered personal damage or injury to his or her civil, personal or property rights. Merely having status as a resident and a taxpayer in a school district is not sufficient to confer standing to challenge school board policies.

Except with respect to Vendel’s allegations concerning alleged harassment, said the Commissioner, “there has been no showing that any of the petitioners are personally aggrieved by the board policy or actions complained of.” The appeal, therefore, was dismissed for lack of standing, except with respect to Vendel’s claims relating to the harassment complaint.

2. Verification of the appeal. The appeal was defective as “neither the petition nor petitioners’ reply are properly verified.”

The Commissioner noted that 8 NYCRR §275.5 of the Commissioner's Regulations require all pleadings in an appeal to the Commissioner be verified.*

3. Failure to name a necessary party. To the extent that the petition seeks removal of individual board members petitioners have failed to join them as parties.

The Commissioner pointed out that a party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such.**

4. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner. As to the “propriety of the actions of the Trooper” in the course of events leading to the appeal, the Commissioner said that the Trooper is not an officer or employee of the School District and thus is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education.

5. Statute of limitations to file an appeal. The Commissioner commented that the petitioners challenge any actions in relation to the July 13, 2009 board meeting but was not commenced until September 1, 2009.

Citing 8 NYCRR §275.16, the Commissioner said that “An appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the making of the decision or the performance of the act complained of, unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown.”

The Commissioner did make one observation concerning one of the issues presented by Vendel “for the benefit of the parties” -participation of individuals at board meetings.

Regarding taxpayers and residents of a school district participating in board meetings, the Commissioner said that a board of education should, whenever possible and appropriate, consider public input on matters under consideration. However, the Commissioner also noted that a school board has the right to control the agenda at board meetings and “there is no statutory mandate that requires a board to permit public input at its meetings.”

* The affidavit of verification was stated to have been made “on the oath of Carol Moranz” but was signed by Vendel. Moranz was not a petitioner in this appeal and the Commissioner’s regulations require the petition to be verified under oath of at least one of the petitioners (see 8 NYCRR §275.5).

** Joinder requires that an individual be clearly named as a respondent in the caption and served with a copy of the notice of petition and the petition so as to inform the individual that he or she should respond to the petition and enter a defense.

The Commissioner’s decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume50/d16134.htm
.

Full evidentiary hearing required before discontinuing GML Section 207-a benefits

Full evidentiary hearing required before discontinuing GML Section 207-a benefits
Giorgio v Bucci, Appellate Division, 246 A.D.2d 711, Motion to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 814

Thomas Giorgio, a Binghamton firefighter, began receiving disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-a effective January 13, 1996 based on his claim of a work-related injury on that date. On May 23, 1996 Binghamton told Giorgio that his benefits were being terminated, alleging that there was “newly discovered evidence that his condition predated the January 13, 1996 incident.”

Giorgio sued, but withdrew that action when the City agreed to continue his benefits and give him a “pre-termination hearing.” The City upheld the original decision to deny him Section 207-a benefits on the grounds that Giorgio’s injury was not the result of a work-related incident. Again Giorgio sued, seeking reinstatement to the payroll, restoration of his leave credits and a declaration that the administrative procedure used by the City was unconstitutional.

On the merits of Giorgio’s “due process claims,” the Appellate Division said that he had been denied “the right to a full evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of his benefits.” Why? Because, said the Court, Giorgio had not been allowed to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to offer evidence on his own behalf.

The lesson here is that when an employer holds a hearing to determine whether Section 207-a [and, presumably, Section 207-c] benefits should be discontinued, it must be a full evidentiary hearing, complying with all the requirements of administrative due process.

Claiming drug abuse as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act

Claiming drug abuse as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
D’Amico v Bruno, CA2, 132 F.3d 145

Vito D’Amico, a New York City firefighter, complained that the Department violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (an anti-discrimination law that applies to federally-funded employers) when it dismissed him from his position with the Fire Department of the City of New York (NYFD) because of his use of illegal drugs. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court’s dismissal of D’Amico charges. In so doing the Court set out a comprehensive summary of the various factors considered by the federal courts in such cases.

D’Amico joined NYFD in 1982. In April 1988, D’Amico was arrested for assault, possession of a controlled substance, and resisting arrest. Following this arrest, the NYFD referred D’Amico to counseling within the NYFD.

In September 1988, the NYFD received an anonymous letter accusing D’Amico of using and selling cocaine. NYFD ordered D’Amico to submit to a urine test on December 13, 1988. D’Amico tested positive for cocaine and NYFD suspended him without pay. The suspension was lifted in January 1989, pending the outcome of disciplinary action taken against him. D’Amico, meanwhile, had entered an inpatient drug treatment program on April 17, 1989, which it was reported that he had successfully completed on May 15, 1989.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Ray Fleischhacker presided over the disciplinary hearing held on June 23, 1989 and found D’Amico guilty of 4 of the 5 charges filed against him. The Commissioner accepted the ALJ’s findings and recommendations and terminated D’Amico effective September 5, 1989. The Commissioner said that “[i]n light of the grave responsibilities entrusted to a firefighter, [D’Amico’s] continued employment with the Fire Department presents a significant risk, both to the general public and to his fellow firefighters.”

Under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. In a case where the employer relies on the plaintiff’s handicap as the reason for the adverse employment decision, the employer may rebut the inference that the handicap was improperly taken into account by going forward with evidence that the handicap is relevant to qualifications for the position.

The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is qualified for the position despite his or her disability.

D’Amico had to establish a prima facie case by proving that: (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he was otherwise qualified for a position; (3) he was denied that position on the basis of his disability, and (4) NYFD receives federal funds.

Although it was conceded that D’Amico satisfied items (3) and (4), NYFD contended that D’Amico was neither an “individual with a disability,” nor “otherwise qualified” to be a firefighter.

Substance abuse is a recognized disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, and an employer may violate the Act by taking an adverse employment action against an employee who has overcome past substance abuse problems but the term “individual with a disability” does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs.

According to the Circuit Court, the critical issue was whether D’Amico was a “current substance abuser” is the time of his discharge. The court said the actual date of discharge was not critical but serves “rather as a guidepost from which to determine whether the employer acted with justification.” The Court defined a “current substance abuser” as an individual whose substance abuse problem is severe and recent enough that the employer is justified in believing that the employee is unable to perform the essential duties of his job.

The employer must therefore evaluate (1) the level of responsibility entrusted to the employee, (2) the employer’s applicable job and performance requirements, (3) the level of competence ordinarily required to perform the task in question, and (4) the employee’s past performance record. Further, it must consider both the type of position for which the plaintiff claims to be otherwise qualified and the consequences of a potential mishap.

The Circuit Court pointed out with approval that in DiPompo v West Point Military Academy, 770 F. Supp. 887, Federal District Court Judge Michael B. Mukasey said “[W]hat may be a reasonable risk for a postal worker ... whose job generally does not pose great hazards to those who perform it or to the public they serve, is not necessarily a reasonable risk for a firefighter, whose job is defined at almost every turn by the potential for disaster to himself and others.”
Concluding that D’Amico’s history of cocaine addiction, together with the NYFD’s judgment as to the possibility of, and the risks inherent in, a relapse, the Circuit Court said that NYFD was justified in terminating D’Amico’s employment as a firefighter.

Removing a public officer of a town from his or her position

Removing a public officer of a town from his or her position
Public Officers Law Section 36

Unhappy with their Town Supervisor, a number of residents of a town wrote to New York Governor David Paterson and asked him to remove the official from office.

According to a newspaper report,* Governor Paterson’s attorney, Peter J. Kiernan, Esq., advised the residents that “state law only provides the governor with power to remove some town officials, and town supervisors aren’t on the list.”

In any event, with respect to the removal of a town officer from his or her public office, §36 of the Public Officers Law, in pertinent part, provides as follows:

Any town… officer, except a justice of the peace, may be removed from office by the supreme court for any misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office. An application for such removal may be made by any citizen resident of such town … or by the district attorney of the county in which such town … is located, and shall be made to the appellate division of the supreme court held within the judicial department embracing such town …. Such application shall be made upon notice to such officer of not less than eight days, and a copy of the charges upon which the application will be made must be served with such notice.

* Schenectady Gazette, Saturday, September 4, 2010

============================================

If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary procedures involving public officers and employees, please click here:

http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/

=============================================
.

Employment-at-will status may be tempered by provisions in the employer’s policy manual or personnel handbook under certain conditions

Employment-at-will status may be tempered by provisions in the employer’s policy manual or personnel handbook under certain conditions
Pearce v Clinton Community College, 246 A.D.2d 775

New York State is an “employment-at-will” state. This means that unless there is some statutory or contractual right to due process, an employee may be terminated without notice and a hearing.

However, sometimes courts will deem the contents of an employer’s policy manual or personnel handbook a “contract” insofar as processing the termination of an employee is concerned. Lisa J. Pearce attempted to persuade the Appellate Division that the Clinton County Community College’s [CCC] Policy and Procedures Manual [Manual] was part of the employment contract between her and CCC following her termination by the College.

Pearce signed a letter appointing her assistant bursar at CCC for the period October 18, 1995 through August 31, 1996. According to the ruling, this position was “within the category of management confidential personnel.” Aside from some details concerning fringe benefits, Pearce’s letter of appointment did not include any statements concerning any other “terms and conditions of employment.”

About four months later CCC terminated Pearce. Pearce was awarded unemployment insurance benefits based on a finding by Workers’ Compensation that she “was discharged for incompetence and failure to meet the standards of her payroll specialist position.”

Subsequently Pearce sued CCC, contending that it had wrongfully terminated her and that it had “breached her contract” with respect to certain provisions in the Manual. Was the Manual part of Pearce’s contract of employment? The Appellate Division decided that it was not part of any contract of employment between the parties.

Further, while the Manual indicated that CCC “generally endorses progressive discipline” and provides that “management confidential personnel” may receive annual performance reviews, the Court commented that there was nothing in the Manual setting out a policy with respect to a termination for cause prior to the completion of a specified term of employment.

The Court decided that: (1) The letter of appointment was sufficiently specific to constitute a contract between the parties; (2) CCC’s Policy and Procedures Manual was not “engrafted upon this contract;” and (3) “it is only where a plaintiff can show the existence of an express written agreement limiting the employer’s right to summarily terminate an employee that the principles governing employment at will are inapplicable”. Accordingly, the Court sustained the Supreme Court’s order denying her motion for partial summary judgment.

Eleventh Amendment immunity lost should a state adopt the Fair Labor Standards Act as state law

Eleventh Amendment immunity lost should a state adopt the Fair Labor Standards Act as state law
Mueller v Thompson, CA7, 133 F.3d 1063

In Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress did not have the power to void a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts by enacting legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause.

In its ruling, the 7th Circuit pointed out that the Supreme Court said states were immune from FLSA under the Tenth Amendment [National League of Cities v Usery, 427 US 909] only to overrule that decision in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority [469 US 528]. However, in Garcia the Supreme Court said the FLSA applied to the states with respect to their performing “non-traditional” governmental functions, here a public transportation system.

If a state adopts the FLSA as state law and allows state employees to sue it for alleged violations of the state’s law, has it lost its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by its employees brought in the federal courts for alleged violations of the federal FLSA? This was the question presented to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, by the Mueller case.

The Court said that there is no waiver of a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity “unless the state has made its intention to waive its rights under the amendment clear.”

In 1971 Wisconsin copied the federal FLSA and made it part of its state law. In 1974 Congress amended the FLSA, making it applicable to the states and their political subdivisions.

On this legislative history, said the Court, there is “little reason” to concluded that Wisconsin waived its immunity by adopting a state FLSA applicable to public employees as Congress had not yet authorized suing states in federal court for alleged violations of the FLSA.

New York State, in contrast, adopted overtime provisions for state workers in an effort to comply with the overtime mandates of the FLSA after Congress made the FLSA applicable to the states. Accordingly, it could be argued that New York State, as an employer, “deliberately” waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by state workers for alleged violations of the FLSA in federal court.

==============================

We would appreciate about 1 minute of your time to evaluation NYPPL's content and focus-

Please click below to participate in this one minute survey: http://www.zoomerang.com/Survey/WEB22B53MNFEWA

====================================
.

NYS Common Retirement Fund employer contribution rates to increase in 2012

NYS Common Retirement Fund employer contribution rates to increase in 2012
Source: Office of the State Comptroller

On September 2, 2010 State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced increases over the previous year in the 2011-12 employer contribution rates for the New York State Common Retirement Fund. At the same time DiNapoli announced that he accepted the Retirement System actuary’s recommendations for the assumptions used in calculating employer contribution rates.*

The average contribution rate for the Employee Retirement System will increase from 11.9 percent of salaries to 16.3 percent. The average contribution for the Police and Fire Retirement System is increasing from 18.2 percent 21.6 percent.

Comptroller DiNapoli commented that “Unfortunately, it takes the economy a lot longer to climb out of a hole than it takes to fall in it. The markets are still recovering from the 2008-09 financial meltdown, and that recovery continues to be volatile. We handled the meltdown better than most pension funds, but we’re still feeling the impact, and, as I have consistently cautioned, the employer contribution rates I’m announcing today will reflect the impact of the financial crisis.”

The Retirement System actuary by law reviews many actuarial assumptions for the Retirement System, including: the mortality rate for members and retirees, the expected investment rate of return on pension fund investments, the rate of inflation and anticipated salary scales. The actuary prepares a report with recommendations, which is presented to an independent actuarial advisory committee.

The Retirement System’s new assumption for its investment rate of return is more fiscally conservative than the national average for public pension funds and more conservative than the average for the top 100 private U.S. pension funds, according to Milliman’s 10th annual Pension Funding Study.

The Comptroller noted that a new law was enacted earlier in 2010 that will allow a political subdivision of the State to elect to participate in a program that would allow it to budget a portion of their increased pension fund payments over ten years.**

This “employer contribution payment plan” will help those localities electing to participate to mitigate the impact the increase in costs could have on local taxpayers. Those localities opting into the plan must also build reserve accounts during periods of decreasing pension contribution rates, which reserve accounts would be used to protect taxpayers from future rate spikes.

DiNapoli characterized the program as being similar to a household utility budget plan that enables homeowners to pay one level payment throughout the year rather than payments that spike at different times of the year.

* Click on "contribution rates" for the Retirement System actuary’s recommendations for the assumptions used in calculating employer contribution rates: contribution rates

** See Retirement and Social Security Law §19-a, Employer contributions for the two thousand ten - two thousand eleven fiscal year and subsequent fiscal years.


.