Employment contracts in public education

Employment contracts in public education
Brousseau v Shenendehowa CSD, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education #14193

The Shenendehowa Central School District and its Director of Finance, Susan M. Martin, signed an “employment agreement” for the period May 13, 1998 through June 30, 1999 setting out the terms and conditions of Martin’s employment with the district. The agreement also provided that it could be “renewed annually thereafter.”

Eugene Brousseau challenged the authority of the school board to enter into such an agreement with its Director of Finance. He asked Commissioner of Education Richard P. Mills to rescind the agreement. The district, in support of its action, argued that it had authority under Education Law Section 1709(33) “to enter into employment agreements establishing the terms of employment for its employees.”

The Commissioner commenced his analysis by commenting that “there are a limited number of provisions in the Education Law that expressly authorize a board of education to employ specified individuals” such as librarians, “qualified teachers,” an auditor and a superintendent.

However, said the Commissioner, the fact that there are no express provisions for the employment of individuals other than those specifically provided for by law “does not foreclose a board from employing individuals in such positions as are necessary to operate and maintain the school district, because the employment of such persons is a reasonable and necessary means for the board to fulfill its duty to superintend, manage, and control the affairs of the district pursuant to [Education Law] Section 1709(33).”

The Commissioner dismissed Brousseau’s appeal noting that:

1. The authority to contract with employees is implicit in the act of employing such individuals -- hiring an individual “itself creates a contract, whether express or implied, oral or written;”

2. A board of education, “as a public authority,” has a common-law right to contract with teachers and other necessary personnel;” and

3. A board of education may enter into contracts with its employees “to the extent the contract is not inconsistent with other statutory conditions,” citing Courtemanche v Enlarged City School District of Middletown, 686 F.Supp.2d 1025.

Therefore, the Shenendehowa board’s entering into a contract with Martin concerning the terms and conditions of her employment “is authorized as an implicit, reasonably necessary power of the board ... and in addition is authorized pursuant to the board’s common law right to contract.”
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Suspended employee found to have submitted required documents at the earliest date practicable

Suspended employee found to have submitted required documents at the earliest date practicable
NYC Department of Sanitation v McCaffrey, OATH Index #2518/10

OATH Administrative Law Judge Alessandra Zorgniotti recommended dismissal of charges that a sanitation worker, John McCaffrey, had failed to report to the clinic on two days as ordered and had failed to submit adequate documentation of his claim that he was unable to travel on those dates.

Judge Zorgniotti found McCaffrey had a legitimate medical excuse, which prevented him from traveling on those days.

Under Department rules the worker had five business days from the date he was ordered to appear and supply the clinic with a note, but McCaffrey was not permitted to submit one because he was on suspension.

Instead, McCaffrey submitted the note on the day his suspension was lifted. Because McCaffrey had submitted the note at the earliest practicable time following the termination of his suspension, Judge Zorgniotti said she found the submission timely under relevant circumstances.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-2518.pdf
NYPPL

School Board to provide representation to school employee sued for striking a student in violation of Board policies in lawsuit that followed

School Board to provide representation to school employee sued for striking a student in violation of Board policies in lawsuit that followed
Matter of Sagal-Cotler v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of NY, 2010 NY Slip Op 32657(U). September 22, 2010, Supreme Court, New York County, Judge: Carol E. Huff [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

Deborah Sagal-Cotler, a paraprofessional employed by the New York City School District, was supervising and escorting a class to the school cafeteria when one of the students repeatedly failed to follow her instructions. Sagal-Cotler then “yelled [the student’s] name and struck him in the face.”

The student’s commenced a civil action based on this incident [Watson v City of New York, Index No. 17534/09 (Sup Ct, Kings County)] in which Sagal-Cotler was a named respondent. Sagal-Cotler’s request for legal representation in the matter was denied in a letter from the City of New York Law Department.

In response, Sagal-Cotler filed an Article 78 petition seeking an order requiring the New York City Board of Education to provide her with legal representation, indemnification, reimbursement for attorneys' fees, and to hold her harmless for any financial losses resulting from the civil action, citing Education Law §3028 in support of her demand.

The Board, contending that Education Law §3028 was inapplicable and that §2560 of the Education Law controlled in this instance, opposed Sagal-Cotler’s motion. The Board argued only §2560 applied and provides that “[I]n a city of having a population of one million or more, the members of each community school board in such city, the teaching or supervising staff, officer or employee of such board . . . shall be entitled to legal representation and indemnification pursuant to the provisions of. . . section fifty-k of the general municipal law.”

The Board argued that although General Municipal Law §50-k(2) provides for such representation and indemnification it is applicable only with respect of acts or omissions that occurred “while the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment and in the discharge of his duties and was not in violation of any rule or regulation of the agency at the time the alleged act or omission occurred.” Here, said the Board, Sagal-Cotler “concedes that her action violated board rules against corporal punishment.”

Accordingly, claimed the Board, “if §50-k(2) were to apply, she would not be entitled to the relief she seeks.”

The court disagreed, holding that Education Law §3028 rather than General Municipal Law §50-k(2) controlled as “It is well settled that, in a conflict between a statute of general applicability and one of specific applicability, the special statute controls,” citing Board of Managers of Park Place Condominium v Town of Ramapo, 237 AD2d 537.

Here, said the court, Education Law §3028 is the more specific statute, because it provides specifically for situations involving disciplinary action in an education context, citing Tinmerman v Bd. of Educ. of the NYC School District, 50 AD3d 592. In Tinmerman the court held that as the “proceeding against petitioner clearly arose out of disciplinary actions that he took against pupils, respondents should reimburse petitioner for the attorneys’ fees and expenses he incurred in defending himself.”

However, this result would hinge on whether Sagal-Cotler was acting within the scope of her employment or duties during the incident. Judge Huff concluded that she was based on the ruling in Blood v Bd. o f Educ, of the City of New York, 121 AD2d 128. In Blood the Appellate Division found that “although in violation of regulations, a teacher acted within the scope of her duties where, angered by a student, she swung a book bag that injured another student.”

The court’s rationale: "Surely, it is not so unusual an occurrence that a teacher loses her temper with her class. Indeed, displays of anger in the classroom cannot be regarded as other than natural and sometimes necessary incidents of a teacher’s work. Nor can it be reasonably expected that a teacher’s anger will always be well gauged to the occasion and unaccompanied by impulsive behavior. Such behavior, although undesirable; is a generally foreseeable eventuality of teaching and, as such, must be deemed within the scope of a teacher’s employment."

Applying these rulings, Judge Huff concluded that Sagal-Cotler’s conduct “fell within the scope of her employment.”

Concluding that the Board's “misapplication of General Municipal Law §50-k(2)” was arbitrary and capricious,” that part of Sagal-Cotler’s petition seeking legal representation and reimbursement for attorneys’ fees in the Watson case was granted.

However, said the court, Sagal-Cotler’s claims for indemnification and to be held harmless are premature and were denied without prejudice pending the outcome of the Watson case.

* Education Law §3028 address “Liability of school district for cost and attorney’s fees of action against, or prosecutions of, teachers, members of supervisory and administrative staff or employees, and school volunteers.” It, in relevant part, provides “Each board of education, trustee or trustees in the state shall provide an attorney or attorneys for, and pay such attorney’s fees and expenses necessarily incurred in the defense of a teacher, member of a supervisory or administrative staff or employee, or authorized participant in a school volunteer program in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of disciplinary action taken against any pupil of the district while in the discharge of his duties within the scope of his employment or authorized volunteer duties.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2010/2010_32657.pdf
NYPPL

Denial of tenure based on failure to satisfy an advanced degree requirement in timely fashion ruled arbitrary

Denial of tenure based on failure to satisfy an advanced degree requirement in timely fashion ruled arbitrary
Aievoli v SUNY, 264 AD2d 476

The State University of New York [SUNY] denied Patrick J. Aievoli tenure because he had failed to attain his master’s degree “in a timely manner.” Aievoli sued, claiming that the tenure decision lack any rational basis.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, agreed with Aievoli and ordered SUNY to reopen its tenure process. The court said “there was no evidentiary support to substantiate [SUNY’s] claim that the denial of tenure was based upon a lack of commitment on the part of Aievoli” and that “the denial of tenure on this basis also was arbitrary and capricious.”

The Appellate Division affirmed a ruling by State Supreme Court Judge Alan Winick [Nassau County], who cited Harrison v Goldstein, 204 AD2d 451 in support of his decision.

The Appellate Division’s decision in Harrison relies on the so-called Pell standard, which holds that a court is justified in overturning an administrative decision if it finds that the decision is “shocking to one’s sense of fairness.” [Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222] Pell is more commonly cited in connection with challenges to disciplinary terminations.

In contrast to Aievoli’s case, it is well settled that where the law requires an individual to have a valid license or permit in order to practice his or her profession or duties, the loss, expiration, revocation or failure to obtain or maintain the required license or permit in a timely fashion means that the individual is not authorized to perform the duties of the position as a matter of law. Accordingly, the courts have had little difficulty in upholding the immediate suspension of a teacher without pay where the educator is unable to present a valid license or certification when asked to do so.

Although such a person may continue to be “qualified” to perform the duties of the position, he or she is typically barred from doing so unless and until a valid license or permit is obtained. In such situations the courts have upheld the employer summarily suspending the employee without pay.

Courts have deemed suspension without pay to be proper where the teacher lacks the necessary license or certification authorized [Meliti v Nyquist, 41 NY2d 183]. The legal theory in such cases is that it would be unlawful to continue a tenured but uncertified, and therefore unqualified, teacher on the payroll. [Suspension without pay is not available in disciplinary cases under Section 3020-a of the Education Law.]

Courts have also ruled that the fact that the teacher is granted a license to teach “retroactive” to the date of the expiration of his or her earlier certificate does not cure his or her “unqualified” status. The defect -- the inability to lawfully perform teaching duties -- is not remedied by the retroactive issuance of a license and the teacher’s subsequent recertification does not make his or her earlier suspension without pay unlawful. This is significant as it implies that the issuing of a “retroactive license” does not support any claim for back salary and benefits for the period during which the teacher was off the payroll.
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Excessive absenteeism basis for termination

Excessive absenteeism basis for termination
Cicero v Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., 264 AD2d 334

The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority [TBTA] terminated Rocco Cicero, a toll collector, after finding him guilty of charges alleging toll shortages, four unauthorized absences and excessive absenteeism. The finding of “excessive absenteeism” was based on Cicero being absent 80% of the time during a 22-month period. Most of this absence was because of an on-the-job injury suffered by Cicero and most of them were authorized by TBTA after periodic medical evaluations by its physicians.

After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sustained the toll shortage charge and one of the unauthorized absence charges, but dismissed the excessive absenteeism charge. The ALJ decided that although Cicero’s absences could be considered “excessive per se,” “it would be unfair to discipline employees for taking lengthy, injury-related leave” that was approved by the Authority without first giving the employee additional notice or warning as to what amount of absences would be deemed excessive and subject him or her to discipline. The ALJ recommended a 5-day suspension for the other infractions.

TBTA accepted the ALJ’s findings concerning the charges related to the toll shortage and unauthorized absences but, in addition, sustained the charge of excessive absenteeism. TBTA’s rationale: its rules explicitly authorized dismissal as a penalty for excessive absenteeism, and Cicero’s 80% absentee rate was plainly excessive.

TBTA’s appointing authority commented that Cicero’s absenteeism continued even after the charges were filed against him and that his excessive absences had resulted in serious morale and financial problems to the agency.

Cicero appealed and won an order by State Supreme Court Justice Alice Schlesinger annulling his termination and directing TBTA to reinstate him on the grounds that TBTA’s determination was arbitrary and capricious. Judge Schlesinger concluded that Cicero had been deprived of his due process rights, because he was not given notice that his approved absences could ultimately be considered “excessive”, and therefore misconduct. The Appellate Division reversed Judge Schlesinger’s ruling.

The Appellate Division decided that TBTA’s decision to terminate Cicero’s employment for excessive absenteeism “had a rational basis and should not be disturbed.” The courts said that the ALJ acknowledged that an absentee rate in excess of 50% “may be deemed excessive per se” and that Cicero’s absentee rate was well beyond that threshold. While the ALJ and Judge Schlesinger decided that Cicero had not been given “adequate notice,” the Appellate Division said that it disagreed and reversed.

The decision comments that TBTA’s rules clearly state that “excessive absence... will be cause for dismissal.” In addition, the governing collective bargaining agreement guarantees employees only 12 days sick leave per year, and TBTA issued a new policy in 1992 providing that a memorandum of unsatisfactory attendance would be issued to an employee after a 5th sick day was taken. This, said the court, meant that Cicero should have been on notice from numerous sources that excessive absences would not be tolerated.

The Appellate Division also rejected Cicero’s argument that his absences were approved and medically justified and therefore excused for the purposes of maintaining any disciplinary action against him.
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Filing a timely appeal challenging administrative decisions critical

Filing a timely appeal challenging administrative decisions critical
Decker v BOCES Monroe 2-Orleans, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education #14173

It is not unusual for a disappointed job seeker to press for reconsideration of his or her application for appointment. The Decker case demonstrates that once a “final determination” concerning the appointment is made, seeking reconsideration does not toll the statute of limitations for filing a timely appeal of the decision.

Marvin R. Decker applied for a teaching position with Monroe2-Orleans BOCES. In February 1998, he learned that another applicant had been selected and was to be appointed effective March 31, 1998. Decker then “engaged in lengthy correspondence” with the BOCES in an effort to secure his appointment to the position.

In June 1998, the district superintendent candidly advised Decker that the board was not going to change its mind and suggested that he “seek a determination” from the Commissioner of Education or the courts. Notwithstanding this suggestion, Decker continued to correspond with the BOCES through October 1998 and did not file his Section 310 appeal with the Commissioner until December 16, 1998.

The Commissioner dismissed Decker’s appeal as untimely, rejecting Decker’s request that his delay in filing the appeal be excused “because he was trying to resolve this matter with [the BOCES].” The Commissioner pointed out that there were “numerous decisions ... that an attempt to gain reconsideration of a final determination does not stop the running of the [statute of] limitations period.”

In addition, Decker’s appeal contained a fatal defect, which would have required the Commissioner to dismiss his appeal even if it were timely filed: Decker neglected to name, and serve, a necessary party to his appeal - the successful candidate.* The Commissioner noted that Decker sought an order directing his appointment effective March 31, 1998, which relief “clearly threatens the rights of the incumbent....”

Some of the technical elements to keep in mind in filing Section 310 appeals to the Commissioner of Education are:

1. Appeals must be filed within 30 days “from the making of the decision or the performance of the act complained of, unless excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown” [8 NYCRR 275.16].

2. If the agency agrees to “reconsider its original determination,” this decision would trigger a “new” statute of limitations period running from the date of the “new” final determination.

3. The appellant is required to file an affidavit proving service of a copy of the petition on the respondents [8 NYCRR 257.9; 276.8]

* Sometimes it is possible to correct this type of problem by filing a new appeal naming, and serving, all necessary parties omitted in the original appeal. Such a filing, however, must still meet the original time limits for perfecting the appeal.
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Using internal investigation reports in civil lawsuits

Using internal investigation reports in civil lawsuits
Ramirez v MBSTOA, 258 A.D.2d 326

It is not uncommon for an employer to undertake an “internal investigation” of an incident involving alleged negligence or misconduct on the part of an employee in the performance of his or her duties. For example, an internal affairs unit of a police department may conduct an “internal investigation” following allegations of negligence or misconduct filed against a police officer.

If the internal investigator finds that the employee “was at fault” and states this conclusion in his or her final report, may a plaintiff use this as an “admission” by the employer in a lawsuit for negligence?

Not necessarily. In Ramirez wanted to use an internal investigation report prepared by MBSTOA investigators that concluded that the MBSTOA’s driver who was involved in a particular accident was “at fault” in his lawsuit against MBSTOA to prove “negligence” on its part. The Appellate Division upheld a lower court’s ruling that Ramirez could not use the investigation report as evidence in the lawsuit that Ramirez brought against MBSTOA for negligence.

The court’s rationale: the admission of the report into evidence “would be unfairly prejudicial” to MBSTOA and “misleading to the jury.” The trial court had barred Ramirez’s introduction of the MBSTOA’s initial internal investigatory report because it found that the investigator’s determination was based on the Authority’s “internal rules and policies” and that those rules and policies “exceeded the applicable common-law negligence standard of care.”

In other words, MBSTOA demanded a higher standard of performance on the part of its drivers than was required under common law. The Appellate Division concurred with the Supreme Court judge’s ruling, observing that the initial report’s conclusion that the MBSTOA driver “was at fault” was changed on review to a finding of “questionable”.

The lesson here is that if an agency wishes to prevent adverse information contained in an internal investigation report from being used in a trial, it must show that the report was prepared in consideration of a standard of care that is higher than that imposed under common [or case] law.
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Filing an employer application for involuntary ordinary disability retirement on behalf of the employee

Filing an employer application for involuntary ordinary disability retirement on behalf of the employee
Oshinsky v NYC Housing Auth., USDC-SDNY

Various state retirement laws authorize an employer to file an application for retirement on behalf of an individual who is unable to perform his or her duties if the individual declines to do so. Can the filing of an employer application, resulting in the involuntary retirement of an employee, constitute an act of unlawful discrimination?

This was one of the issues considered by a federal district court judge in Oshinsky v New York City Housing Authority. The decision suggests that such a filing by an employer application could constitute unlawful discrimination if it is determined that it was in the nature of retaliation.

Abby Oshinsky, a former New York City Housing Authority [NYCHA] police officer, asked a federal district court judge to award her back pay, front pay, and $2 million in damages. She said her Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act [42 USC 2000e] rights were violated as she was subjected to “retaliatory discharge,” unlawful discrimination, and sexual harassment. She also claimed violations of the state Human Rights Law.

Oshinsky had filed nine different complaints over a period of several years, three of which were brought under Title VII. One of her Title VII claims alleged that she had been the victim of a “retaliatory discharge” based on her having been retirement on ordinary disability as a result of NYPD (which had merged with the housing authority police) filing an employer application for retirement on her behalf.

Among the significant events relevant to Oshinsky’s claims:

1. In January 1994 Oshinsky, then an employee of NYCHA, slipped and fell while at work, striking her head. Initially assigned to “limited duty,” in November 1994, NYCHA placed Oshinsky on sick leave based on her “complaining of headaches, inability to concentrate, and feelings of anxiety and depression.”

2. NYCHA police were merged into NYPD while Oshinsky was on sick leave.

3. On August 9, 1995, Oshinsky, now a NYPD employee, applied for accident disability retirement and benefits, complaining of “post-concussion syndrome.”

4. As required by New York City regulations, NYPD then submitted an employer application for ordinary disability on Oshinsky’s behalf.

Oshinsky’s application for accidental disability retirement was rejected after a finding that her disability was not the “natural and proximate result of accidental injury received in the performance of police duty.” However, the application for ordinary disability retirement filed on her behalf by NYPD was approved and in November 1996, she was retired on ordinary disability.

Oshinsky has then filed a complaint with the EEOC contending that her retirement for “ordinary disability” was, in effect, a wrongful discharge. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter on May 28, 1998 but her claims against the NYPD for “retaliatory discharge” were dismissed by Federal District Court Judge Allen G. Schwartz. The court said that in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and state law, a plaintiff must show three elements: (1) participation in a protected activity known to the defendant; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

While it was clear that Oshinsky applied for accident disability retirement and benefits based on her alleged “post-concussion syndrome,” in her Title VII complaint she contended that she had been “tricked” into filing the application. Judge Schwartz said that he assumed that for the purpose of deciding the City’s motion for summary judgment that “when the NYPD retired [Oshinsky] based upon a diagnosis of depression, and awarded her a less desirable [ordinary] retirement package, it subjected her to an adverse employment action.” Notwithstanding this, the court said that:

[w]e find, however, that [Oshinsky] has failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the sexual harassment complaints she filed while she was with NYCHA and what she refers to as her “forced” retirement by the NYPD. Plaintiff filed her complaints against NYCHA in February 1990 and January 1992. At the time she came to the NYPD, [Oshinsky] had been out on sick leave since November 1994. She was retired by the NYPD in November 1996, almost five years after the second complaint, without ever actually having performed any work for the NYPD. There is no basis to conclude that [Oshinsky’s] complaints, filed in 1990 and 1992 against one agency, led to her “forced” retirement in 1996 by another agency.

While the court in this case decided that in this instance there was no basis to conclude that NYPD’s filing an application on behalf of Oshinsky for ordinary disability retirement constituted a “retaliatory discharge,” the implication is that such a claim could serve as a basis for a Title VII action and, if proved, redress provided.

Judge Schwartz summarily dismissed the eight other claims filed by Oshinsky alleging violations of Title VII and the State Human Rights Law and various torts. With respect to Oshinsky naming her superior, Richie Aalbue, as a defendant, Judge Schwartz said that “no cause of action can lie against an individual under Title VII.” While the Title VII claims against Aalbue were dismissed, the decision notes that the Second Circuit has held that an individual who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally liable under the New York Human Rights Law, citing Matter of Tomka v Seiler Corporation, 66 F.3d 1295.
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