Means used to place candidates with tied scores on eligible list may impact on seniority for the purposes of layoff

Means used to place candidates with tied scores on eligible list may impact on seniority for the purposes of layoff
Fiffe v Cohoes Civil Service Comm., 262 AD2d 762, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 93 NY2d 819

Thomas Fiffe was one of seven candidates appointed to firefighter positions in Cohoes, all effective July 25, 1994. He was one of four candidates who had an examination score of 85 and was ranked fifth on the eligible list. But the Cohoes Civil Service Commission later revised this ranking and placed Fiffe seventh on the list. After losing his job in a layoff, Fiffe claimed this change was arbitrary and capricious, and that he had greater seniority than retained employees. The Appellate Division found in favor of the Commission, sustaining its action revising the list as rational and declined to disturb it.

The Commission claimed its original ranking was in error. It explained that at the time Fiffe applied for the examination, its seniority policy for civil service purposes differentiated applicants with the same examination score by ranking the applicants according to the date of receipt of each application and fee. As the result of an error, said the Commission, when the original eligibility list was issued, the candidates with tie scores were randomly placed on the list as among themselves rather than in the order of their application/fee date. In January 1997 -- 11 months before the layoff -- the Commission revised the eligible list “to reflect the correct date of application in accordance with its established policy.”

Fiffe contending that the issuance of a revised eligible list, and the resulting change in his rank and seniority, was arbitrary and capricious. He asked the court to change the date of his application to April 1, 1993. This, of course, would give him greater seniority for the purposes of layoff.

Fiffe argued that the April 1 date should be used because that was the date on which he had originally submitted his application for examination. His application was initially rejected by the Commission because of Fiffe’s date of birth but it was subsequently accepted and processed. The Commission used the later date rather than April 1, when determining his rank on the eligible list.

The Appellate Division sustained the Commission’s action, reflecting the fact that a local civil service commission can use any rational method of ranking to break scoring ties on eligible lists, as long as it is consistent in applying its rule.

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If you are interested in learning more about layoff procedures involving employees in the public service in New York State please click here: http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/
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Union president required to comply with a county ethics commission subpoena concerning union's employment of former county worker

Union president required to comply with a county ethics commission subpoena concerning union's employment of former county worker

The Suffolk County Ethics Commission issued subpoena* to compel Cheryl A. Felice, the President of a Suffolk County municipal employees union, to appear before it and give testimony relative to its investigation of services provided by a former county employee to the union on or after December of 2007.

Felice resisted the Committee’s efforts and the Commission filed a petition seeking a court order directing Felice to comply with its subpoena and appear before it with the relevant documents.

According to the decision, underlying Committee’s investigation was a sworn complaint alleging possible violations of Article XXX (Code of Ethics) of the Suffolk County Administrative Code** by a former county employee who was retained by the Felice's union of municipal employees as a consultant, strategist, employee or independent contractor.

In opposing the Committee’s action, the union argued:

1. The provisions in the Code of Ethics relied upon by the Commission are not applicable to the former county employee whom the union retained to assist it in its labor relations with the County.

2. The Commission failed to demonstrate that the subpoena is an appropriate exercise of the Commission's discretion.

3. The subpoena was procedurally deficient in that it does not appear to have been issued upon the unanimous vote of the members of the Commission as required by the Ethics Code.

4. Disclosure of the communications and documentation called for by the subpoena violates the "labor union leader privilege".

Judge Whelan rejected all of the union’s arguments and granted the Commission’s petition noting that “It is only where the subpoena recipient demonstrates that the subpoena is not within the authority of the issuing agency or that its scope may be fairly characterized as irrelevant, illegitimate or oppressive will the recipient's challenge be sustained. In this instance, said the court, Felice has not met her burden in this regard.

Rather, said the court, the Commission has met its initial burden of demonstrating its authority for engaging in the investigation and issuance of the subject subpoena and that the materials sought have a reasonable relationship to the subject matter under investigation as well as to the public purpose to be achieved and that the investigation has a sufficient factual predicate.

As to “the targeted former employee” not being not subject to the Committee’s reach, the issue of whether there has been a violation of the Ethic Code provision is a matter for the Commission to determine and any challenge to its ultimate determination and any challenges to the Commission’s authority are premature and beyond the scope of this “special proceeding commenced pursuant to CPLR 2308.”

Addressing Felice’s claim that subpoena was issued pursuant to a unanimous vote of the Commission, Judge Whelan observed that “The record contains due proof that the subpoena was duly authorized by the unanimous vote of three members of the Ethics Commission as required by §30-6(b) of the Ethics Code.”

Finally Judge Whelan rejected Felice’s argument that “labor union leader privilege” insulates a union's leader from disclosing communications and documents that are the target of the Commission’s subpoena as they concern union strategies, proposals, alliances and positions viz a viz the County as it is currently involved in collective bargaining negotiations with the union.

The court said that “The expansive evidentiary privilege for labor union leaders advanced by [Felice], which would immunize from disclosure, communications among union leaders and its paid staff regarding collective bargaining tactics, strategies and advice provided by such staff and other nonunion members has not been shown to be necessary to avoid the impairment of any fundamental rights of [Felice], her union, its members or its retained staff.”

In addition, Judge Whelan said that Felice did not show “that harm would inure to the public interest by reason of the disclosure of the items called for by the subpoena and that such harm far outweighs the interests of the [Commission] who seeks such disclosure.”

* The subpoena also required Felice “to produce any and all records and correspondence in her possession or in the possession of the union, by and between [Felice], other union officials and the former county employee, relative to the union's retention of the former county employee.”

** See §§A 30-4 and A 30-5

The decision, Matter of Suffolk County Ethics Commn. (Felice), 2010 NY Slip Op 20418, Decided on October 9, 2010, Supreme Court, Suffolk County, Judge Thomas F. Whelan, is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_20418.htm
NYPPL

Neglecting to advise a party of the availability of an administrative appeal defeats a failure to exhaust administrative remedies defense

Neglecting to advise a party of the availability of an administrative appeal defeats a failure to exhaust administrative remedies defense

Julie Purcell initiated an Article 78 proceeding in an effort to compel the Jefferson County District Attorney to comply with her request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law ([FOIL] Public Officers Law art 6) for documents relating to a criminal matter in which she was the complainant.

Supreme Court denied the District Attorney’s motion to dismiss Purcell’s petition on the grounds that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

The Appellate Division agreed, commenting that because the District Attorney’s office failed to advise Purcell of the availability of an administrative appeal of its refusal to supply the documents she had requested, “[the District Attorney] cannot be heard to complain that [Purcell] failed to exhaust [her] administrative remedies."

The Appellate Division also said that the award of attorney's fees by Supreme Court was appropriate as the District Attorney failed to respond to Purcell’s request or her appeal “within the statutory time" limits (see Pubic Officers Law §89[4][c][ii]). Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division concluded that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and costs in this action.

The decision, Matter of Purcell v Jefferson County Dist. Attorney, 2010 NY Slip Op 06882, Decided on October 1, 2010, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06882.htm
NYPPL

Terminated individual must repay salary received while his appeal was pending arbitration

Terminated individual must repay salary received while his appeal was pending arbitration
Rensselaer County v Hudson Valley Community College Faculty Association, Appellate Division, Third Dept., 262 AD2d 843, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 4 NY2d 753

In the Hudson Valley case, the Appellate Division decided that an arbitrator had the power to require a faculty member to repay the college for the salary it had paid to him while an appeal of his dismissal was pending arbitration.

The arbitrator had ordered the college to provide salary during this period, but apparently reserved the right to direct that the salary be repaid if she later determined that the dismissal was warranted, which she did.

Hudson Valley Community College dismissed a tenured member of its faculty, Thomas P. Neuhaus, and removed him from the payroll effective September 1, 1996.

The college alleged that Neuhaus had violated the collective bargaining agreement between the college and the Hudson Valley Community College Faculty Association when he gave each of the students in his electronics communication course a grade of 100 percent in lieu of an examination, which had been scheduled but was not administered.

Neuhaus was also charged with “improperly selling electronics equipment to students in exchange for special considerations.”

The Faculty Association filed two grievances on Neuhaus’ behalf. The first challenged Neuhaus’ termination. The second grievance concerned the college’s removing Neuhaus from the payroll and failing to continue his benefits while the disciplinary grievance was pending.

As to the salary grievance, the arbitrator ruled that the college had violated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to keep Neuhaus on the payroll during the pendency of the termination grievance. Accordingly, the college restored Neuhaus to the payroll retroactive to September 1, 1996.

The termination grievance then went to arbitration. In August 1997, the arbitrator rendered her award, concluding that:

1. Neuhaus was guilty of violating several articles in the collective bargaining agreement;

2. The penalty of termination was appropriate;

3. Neuhaus was not entitled to salary beyond August 21, 1996; and

4. Neuhaus should reimburse the college for salary paid to him after that date.

The college asked a State Supreme Court judge to confirm the arbitration award [see Section 7510, Civil Practice Law and Rules]. Neuhaus cross-petitioned the court seeking (1) to vacate the termination award and (2) to confirm the award in the salary grievance.

The Appellate Division rejected Neuhaus’ appeal seeking to overturn his termination. The court then said that it was “unpersuaded” that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in ordering Neuhaus to repay salary received for the period following August 21, 1996.

The Appellate Division ruled that the provision in the termination grievance award requiring Neuhaus to repay the salary the college had paid to him since September 1, 1996 “did not contradict” the salary grievance award. The court concluded that the salary grievance dealt exclusively with the issue of Neuhaus’ right to receive his salary pending the resolution of the termination grievance.

The court commented that in the salary grievance the arbitrator had ordered the college “to continue such payments until the matter is resolved by the issuance of an arbitration decision dealing with the merits of the dismissal, which decision shall then be controlling”. Accordingly, there was nothing to bar the arbitrator from directing Neuhaus to repay the salary he had received from the college since September 1, 1996.

However, there may be limitations with respect to the period during which a person against whom disciplinary charges have been filed may be suspended from his or her position without pay. An example of this is the statutory limitation set out in Section 75 of the Civil Service Law. Section 75 allows an individual against whom disciplinary charges have been filed to be suspended without pay for up to 30 days. The employee must be restored to the payroll after 30 days, even if he or she is directed not to report to work while the disciplinary action is pending.

In some cases a contract provision may allow the employer to suspend an individual without pay pending the determination of the disciplinary action. Such a provision is usually subjected to “narrow interpretation” by the courts. An illustration of such a narrow construction is set out in Board of Education v Nyquist (48 NY2D 97). In this case the Court of Appeals noted that the Taylor Law agreement negotiated by the parties allowed a teacher to be suspended without pay “pending an investigation and recommendation by the superintendent of schools.”

The board filed disciplinary charges against a suspended teacher after it had received the Superintendent’s recommendation. The teacher’s “suspended without pay” status was continued by the board. Some 10 months later a hearing panel found the teacher guilty of the charges. The penalty imposed: termination.

As a result of the litigation that followed, the district was directed to pay the teacher back salary for the period from the date of the superintendent’s recommendation to the board until the effective date of the dismissal. The Court of Appeals reasoned that “there (was) no authorization [in the contract] for the board’s suspending the employee without pay after the superintendent completed his investigation and made his report”.

Had the contract permitted the board to continue the teacher’s suspension without pay pending a final disciplinary decision, it appears likely that such a suspension would have been upheld by the court. The only limitation on the duration of a suspension without pay when authorized by a Taylor Law agreement appears to be that the employer may not use the suspension without pay as a sword by delaying the proceedings.

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If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary procedures involving public officers and employees, please click here: http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/

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Individuals may be disqualified for employment because of misrepresentations in employment application

Individuals may be disqualified for employment because of misrepresentations in employment application
Martin v Marchiselli, 262 AD2d 171

Section 50.4 of the Civil Service Law authorizes the state department of civil service or the responsible civil service commission to disqualify and terminate an applicant or an employee if he or she has materially misrepresented his or her qualifications on the application form. The Martin case concerns a New York City police officer who was terminated pursuant to Section 50.4 for this reason.

The New York City Civil Service Commission found New York City police officer Kevin A. Martin unfit for such employment following a post-appointment investigation where “undisputed evidence” showed that Martin had falsified his employment application “to conceal his using a social security number not his own to obtain a second New York State drivers’ license after his first license had been revoked.”

The Appellate Division ruled that the Commission’s action was neither arbitrary nor capricious since “the evidence warranted [Martin’s] retroactive disqualification for employment ... on grounds of both fraud and unsatisfactory character.”
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Absence due to incarceration

Absence due to incarceration
Karp v Comm. of Labor, App. Div., 3rd Dept., 262 AD2d 925
Matyjczuk v Delphi Automotive Sys., App. Div., 3rd Dept., 262 AD2d 847

Sometimes an employee cannot report to work because he or she is in jail. May the employee be terminated because of his or her inability to report to work because the incarceration? How far must the employer go to “accommodate” the employee’s incarceration? If terminated because of the incarceration, is the employee eligible for unemployment insurance benefits? These are some of the questions considered by the Appellate Division in the Karp and Matyjczuk cases.

The Karp decision

Susan Karp was dismissed from her position with the State Insurance Fund because she failed to “provide appropriate documentation regarding her unauthorized absence from work.” It seems that Karp had been arrested on May 27, 1998. She notified her supervisor that she could not report to work because she was in jail. Because she did not post, or arrange for, bail, Karp remained in jail.

The Fund wrote to Karp “acknowledging her arrest and informed her that because her absence from work was unauthorized, she was required to provide appropriate explanatory documentation by June 10, 1998.” Karp never replied to this letter. According to the decision, the Fund subsequently terminated her, deeming Karp to have “abandoned her employment.”

Former Section 4 NYCRR 5.3(d), of the New York State Civil Service Commission’s Rules for the Classified Service [repealed effective February 27, 1979] provided that a state employee absent for a period of ten or more days without an explanation would be deemed to have resigned from his or her position. This rule was held to violate the employee’s right to due process [Bernstein v Industrial Commissioner, 59 AD2d 678]. Such a provision, however, has been held lawful if the parties had agreed to such a result through the collective bargaining process. Typically the courts will decline to void the provisions of such agreements except in cases involving the violation of a strong public policy.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board disapproved Karp’s application for unemployment insurance, ruling that she was disqualified for benefits because she had been terminated as a result of her misconduct -- failing to respond to the letter that the Fund had sent to her.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board’s determination, pointing out that Karp conceded that she had been arrested and failed to post bail. It noted that the Unemployment Insurance Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] had asked Karp why she did not contact a bail bondsperson and she responded that “somebody said that they wouldn’t do it”. In other words she did not make any reasonable effort to be released from her incarceration.*

The Appellate Division said that it agreed with the Board that it was Karp’s “own willful or deliberate conduct [i.e., her failing to attempt to obtain bail] that rendered her unable to report to work.” This, coupled with Karp’s failing to respond to the letter sent to her, was deemed “disqualifying misconduct” for the purposes of claiming unemployment insurance benefits.


The Matyjczuk decision

The Appellate Division came to essentially the same conclusion in the Matyjczuk case -- failing to report to work because the employee was in jail under the circumstances present in this case constituted disqualifying misconduct.

Bob Matyjczuk was denied unemployment insurance benefits after he was dismissed by Delphi Automotive Systems.

Matyjczuk had been convicted of driving while intoxicated and was in jail from January 7, 1997 until September 5, 1997. Delphi initially allowed Matyjczuk to use his accrued vacation time and then granted him a 90-day leave of absence.

However, when this initial 90-day leave of absence expired on May 5, 1997, Delphi denied Matyjczuk’s request for a second leave of absence. It also refused to allow Matyjczuk to return to work under an approved county work release program because he had previously participated in a work release program during a prior incarceration.

Matyjczuk was unable to report to work upon the expiration of his leave of absence because he was still in jail. Delphi terminated him effective close of business May 5. Disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits on the basis a finding that he was terminated for misconduct, Matyjczuk sued. An unsympathetic Appellate Division dismissed his appeal.

First the Court acknowledged that Matyjczuk “suffers from alcoholism.” It then noted the Snell v General Motors, 195 AD2d 746 and Opoka v Sweeney, 232 AD2d 718, decisions, cases which set out the proposition that alcoholism can excuse disqualifying misconduct in cases such as his if there is substantial evidence to show that:

1. The individual is an alcoholic;

2. The alcoholism caused the behavior leading to the individual’s discharge; and

3. The individual was available for and capable of work.

The Appellate Division said that Matyjczuk could not satisfy the third test -- being available and capable of work -- because his incarceration precluded him from being available for work. It rejected Matyjczuk’s argument that he would have been available for work if Delphi had “again afforded him the opportunity to participate in a work release program.” It agreed with the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board that “the employer was not obligated to provide this accommodation a second time” and thus Matyjczuk could not satisfy all of the three elements essential to claiming he was eligible for an “exception” to his otherwise disqualifying misconduct.

The lesson here is that if an individual cannot report to work because he or she is in jail, the employer should attempt to determine the reason or reasons for the incarceration. It should then determine if it is possible and appropriate to make a reasonable effort to accommodate the employee’s situation. If, however, the employee fails to cooperate or if he or she has been provided with an “accommodation” related to an incarceration in the past, the employer is not required to undertake “heroic efforts” to continue the individual’s employment. Finally, unless a collective bargaining agreement so provides, a public employer may not deem an individual to have abandoned his or her position merely because he or she fails to report for work, with or without an explanation.

* When the ALJ asked her why she did not “more vigorously pursue help from her union following her termination,” Karp replied, “To tell you the truth, I really didn’t want to work there.”
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Effective date of appointment

Effective date of appointment
Challandes v Shew, Supreme Ct., Westchester Co., [not officially reported]

Which one of the following best describes when the appointment of an individual in the classified service is binding on the appointing authority?

a. The date on which the appointing authority decides to appoint the individual.

b. The date on which the individual accepts the appointment.

c. The date on which the individual is scheduled to report for duty.

d. None of the above.

According to the Challandes decision, the best answer is “none of the above.” State Supreme Court Judge Peter M. Leavitt ruled that an appointment takes effect upon the execution [signing] of the letter of appointment by the appointing authority. Further, the individual’s “acceptance of the appointment” is not a necessary element, Judge Leavitt ruled.

Judge Leavitt’s decision, in part, parallels the law concerning resignation from the public service. The state Civil Service Commission’s Rules for state workers in the classified service mandate that an individual’s resignation from his or her position be in writing [4 NYCRR 5.3].

Case law holds that such a resignation becomes operative upon its delivery to the appointing authority -- “acceptance” of the resignation is not required. At most, all that the appointing authority may wish to do is to “acknowledge” its receipt of the resignation. Further, the effective date of the resignation is the date specified but if no date is specified, it is effective upon delivery. Many jurisdictions have adopted rules and procedures that track the State Commission’s rule concerning resignation. “Delivery” is frequently critical in determining an individual’s “employment status” since the general rule is that once delivered, the individual may not withdraw his or her resignation without the approval of the appointing authority.

The case involved Joyce Challandes, a provisional Data Entry Operator with the Village of Ossining. She took and passed the examination for permanent appointment to the position. The village manager signed a letter offering her “a permanent appointment” to the position “effective January 1, 1999.” On December 30, 1998, the executed letter was faxed to Challandes’ union representative but it was never sent to Challandes.

The next day the village manager handed Challandes a different letter -- a letter informing her that she would not be appointed to the position. Challandes sued, contending that she had been lawfully permanently appointed to the position. Judge Leavitt agreed, ruling that Challandes had been unlawfully terminated from her permanent appointment. He directed that she be reinstated as a probationary employee with back salary. Judge Leavitt held that “the execution of the letter [i.e., the village manager’s signing the letter] constituted a clear, unequivocal and voluntary act by the village manager which became effective immediately upon such execution."

Judge Leavitt declared that although the faxing of the letter to the union on December 30 was evidence of its execution, “no delivery - to [Challandes] or anyone else - was required to effectuate the appointment memorialized therein.” The judge also ruled that reporting the appointment to “proper personnel and payroll officers” was not necessary to effect the appointment. Concluding that Challandes “was duly and lawfully permanently appointed” to the position, Judge Leavitt said that “she could not be removed therefrom without cause during [her] minimum probationary period.”

Case law indicates that an individual permanently appointed to a position in the competitive class is protected by the due process provisions of Civil Service Law Section 75 during his or her minimum probationary period and must be given “notice and hearing” if he or she is to be terminated before completing his or her minimum period of probation. A probationer, however, may be terminated without notice and hearing after completing his or her minimum period of probation and before the end of his or her maximum period of probation.

Notwithstanding this, it would seem that delivery, in contrast to mere execution, of a letter of appointment is as critical a step in the appointment process as is delivery of a resignation in the separation process. It could argued that the faxing of the appointment letter to the union in the course of negotiations “concerning the pay grade within which [Challandes] would be compensated” satisfied the “delivery” requirement.

Is the delivery of the letter of appointment one of the key elements in the appointment process? Case law supports this concept. For example, the refusal to “deliver” an executed commission [letter of appointment] which was essential to effecting the appointment of the individual was the genesis of one of the most famous cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch 137, [1803].

Marbury was one of the so-called “midnight judges,” individuals selected for these appointments during the final hours of the outgoing presidential administration but whose commissions were never sent to them.

The new administration’s Secretary of State, James Madison, had found the commissions among the former Secretary of State’s papers, but had refused to deliver them to the appointees thereby frustrating their ability to take office. Ultimately U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall held that Congress did not have the authority to adopt legislation compelling the delivery of the commissions, thereby establishing the precedent for the Supreme Court’s review of the constitutionality of an act of Congress.

It may be of interest to note that Marshall was the incumbent Secretary of State who had neglected to provide for the timely delivery of the commissions to Marbury and his co-appointees.

As to the question of the withdrawal of an appointment, courts have held that a written resignation may be withdrawn or canceled by the individual without the approval of the appointing authority if the notice rescinding the resignation is received by the appointing authority before delivery of the resignation. [see Wright v Town Board, 160 AD2D 1156; Informal Opinions of the Attorney General, August 23, 1974].

By analogy, it would appear that an appointment may be rescinded by an appointing authority if the appointee receives notice of the cancellation of his or her appointment prior to the “delivery of the letter of appointment”.
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Are school counselors teachers?

Are school counselors teachers?
North Tonawanda CSD v Mills, App. Div. 3rd Dept., 263 AD2d 574, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 94 NY2d 751

Teachers have many rights and entitlements under the Education Law. Should school counselors and social workers be considered teachers when determining their rights and benefits? Generally, the answer is no, as the North Tonawanda case shows.

Effective September 1996, the North Tonawanda City School District discontinued using the Orleans-Niagara BOCES to provide counseling and social work services to its special education students in favor of using its own employees to provide such services. The district appointed eight former BOCES employees for this purpose.

Seven of these former BOCES employees were certified school social workers; the eighth was a school counselor.

The appeal concerned the district’s denial of certain prior service credits for salary purposes and sick leave credits granted to the eight former BOCES employees upon their appointment by the district.

While at BOCES, the employees’ salaries reflected both their service and experience prior to their being employed by BOCES, together with their actual years of service at BOCES. When appointed by the district they were only given service credit for salary purposes for their actual BOCES service; no service credit was allowed for any pre-BOCES employment. In addition, the eight were not credited with any “BOCES sick leave” accruals.

The eight claimed that the district’s decision violated their rights under Section 3014-b (3) of the Education Law, which sets out the rights of teachers where a school district has taken over a program formerly operated by a BOCES. However, the term “teacher” is not defined in Article 61, where Education Law Section 3014-b is found.

The eight appealed to the Commissioner of Education. The then-Acting Commissioner ruled in favor of the employees and ordered the district to place them at the same salary step they had at BOCES and give them their BOCES sick leave credits.

North Tonawanda appealed the Acting Commissioner’s determination, contending that the former BOCES employees were not teachers and, therefore, not entitled to the rights given BOCES teachers by Education Law Section 3014-b. A State Supreme Court judge agreed and annulled the Acting Commissioner’s determination and the employees, together with the Department of Education, appealed. The Appellate Division concurred with the lower court, holding that counselors and social workers are not “teachers” for purposes of Section 3014-b.

The Appellate Division noted that the Legislature recently amended Section 3014-b to include “teaching assistants and teachers’ aides.” This, said the court, indicates that the term “teacher” has a very narrow meaning for the purposes of Section 3014-b.

The court also cited Fink v Avon Central School District, 207 AD2d 973, in which the Appellate Division, 4th Department, concluded that “the position of school psychologist does not fall within the scope of the term ‘teacher’ as used in Education Law Section 3014-b”. Because the positions of school psychologist, social worker and counselor are similar, the Fink decision suggested that school social workers and counselors are not “teachers.”
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School district may reassign an educator to a different location in the district and assign new duties consistent with his or her tenure area

School district may reassign an educator to a different location in the district and assign new duties consistent with his or her tenure area
Roberta-Michele Jodre v Board of Education of the Locust Valley Central School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16,162

Roberta-Michele Jodre, a tenured director of guidance services for grades kindergarten through 12. In October 2009, her primary office was relocated from Locust Valley’s high school to its middle school and her duties were modified so that she focused more of her time on the middle school.

Characterizing the change as “discipline* without due process,” the attorney for Jodre’s collective bargaining unit asked that Jodre be returned to her office in the high school and that she continute to perform her former duties. Locust Valley’s attorney responded, indicating that no disciplinary action had been taken against Jodre, her reassignment was within the authority of the school board and that “the superintendent’s discretion to have [Jodre] focus her efforts on the middle school.” Jodre appealed.

Initially the Commissioner addressed a procedural issue: was Jodre’s appeal timely.

Noting that “An appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the making of the decision or the performance of the act complained of, unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown (8 NYCRR §275.16)” the Commissioner found that Jodre’s appeal was untimely.

The Commissioner explained that Jodre’s work site and assignments had been changed in October 2009 but that she had not commenced her appeal until December 16, 2009, more than 30 days later. As to the letter dated November 4, 2009 sent by the collective bargaining agent’s attorney questioning the legality of school district’s actions, the Commissioner said that the letter “constituted a request for reconsideration” and a reconsideration request does not extend the time within which an appeal to the Commissioner must be filed.

In any event, the Commissioner indicated that even if the appeal had been timely filed he would have dismissed it on the merits as a “board of education has broad discretion in assigning members of its professional staff, so long as the employees tenure rights are not infringed.”

In this instance, said the Commissioner, although Jodre was unhappy with the change, she had been continued in her tenured position and had been assigned to duties consistent with that tenured position. Significantly, the Commissioner indicated that there is no general requirement that a school district assign a teacher to a particular classroom and changes in assignments are permissible provided the new assignments are within the same tenure area.

As to Jodre’s claim that the changes were “disciplinary in nature and required an Education Law §3020-a hearing,” the Commissioner explained that “a school board’s decision to reassign a tenured employee based on the district’s educational needs does not constitute discipline for which procedural due process must be provided under Education Law §3020-a as long as the employee’s rights are not infringed,” citing Matter of Mishkoff v Nyquist, 57 AD2d 649.

* In his decision, the Commissioner noted that Jodre failed to submit any evidence as to the conduct for which she was allegedly being disciplined.

The Commissioner’s decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume50/d16162.htm
NYPPL

Disciplinary charges filed against employee alleging refusing a post assignment

Disciplinary charges filed against employee alleging refusing a post assignment
NYC Department of Corrections v Callabrass, OATH Index #1981/10

The New York City Department of Corrections filed disciplinary charges against NYC Corrections Officer Regina Callabrass alleging that she had disobeyed an order to take a post assignment, abandoned her post while on duty and made a false logbook entry.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Tynia Richard dismissed the charge that Callabrass had abandoned her post, finding that the post was not left unsecured as another officer remained there “during the seven minutes respondent was away to use the bathroom.”

ALJ Richard also recommended dismissal of the charge that Callabrass had disobeyed an order to take an assignment. Although Callabrass had objected to it, the supervisor did not insist that she accept the assignment but instead began looking for someone else to take it.

However ALJ Richard found Callabrass guilty of a charge that she had threatened to call in sick when she received the unwanted assignment. This, said the ALJ, constituted conduct unbecoming an office but in consideration of her “long service record with no prior discipline,” recommended a 5-day suspension without pay as the penalty.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-1981.pdf
NYPPL