Accidental disability retirement
Tuper v McCall, App. Div., 259 AD2d 941
Establishing eligibility for accidental disability retirement is not easy in New York State, as the Tuper case illustrates. State corrections officer Toni Tuper slipped on a wet floor while supervising a prison inmate mopping. She also fell on a stairway located in a building to which she was assigned, and later fell again while running with a medical bag to a medical emergency.
Tuper applied for accidental disability retirement benefits based on the injuries she sustained in each of these slips and falls. The state Employees’ Retirement System (ERS) denied her application on the grounds that none of the incidents she cited constituted accidents within the meaning of Retirement and Social Security Law (RSSL) Section 507-a(b)(3).
An accident under RSSL is an unexpected and unforeseen event whose occurrence is not the result of the ordinary, predictable risks inherent in one’s duties. For instance, a police patrol officer who is shot by a robber and is incapacitated probably would not be awarded accidental disability retirement because being exposed to gunfire is inherent risk of a patrol officer’s duty.
After exhausting her administrative remedies, Tuper sued, challenging the ultimate denial of her application by the then State Comptroller, H. Carl McCall. The Appellate Division sustained the Comptroller’s determination, noting that Tuper had failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that her disability was the result of a work-related accident.
As the Appellate Division pointed out, not every event that results in a work-related injury is an “accident” for the purposes of establishing eligibility for an accidental disability retirement allowance. In Lichenstein v Board of Trustees, 57 NY2d 1010, the Court of Appeals said that “[A]n injury that occurs without an unexpected event, as the result of activity undertaken in the performance of ordinary employment duties (considered in view of the particular employment in question) is not an accidental injury....”
In other words, if an employee is injured while he or she is performing his or her duties and the cause of the injury was not an “unexpected event,” -- that is, the injury was the result of an incident that could reasonably be anticipated or expected, considering the work being performed -- it is not an accident for the purposes of the Retirement and Social Security Law. In reviewing Tuper’s claims the Appellate Division addressed each of the events she claimed demonstrated her eligibility for accidental disability retirement benefits.
Tuper first contended that she was entitled to an accidental disability retirement allowance as the result of her slipping and falling on a wet floor while she was supervising a prison inmate mopping. The Appellate Division said that “inasmuch as a wet floor would ordinarily be anticipated in the context of [Tuper’s] supervision of the mopping detail, [the Comptroller] could rationally conclude that [Tuper’s] slip on the wet surface was not an accident ....”
Tuper fared no better with respect to her second basis for her claim. Here she contended that she had fallen on a stairway located in a building to which she was assigned. She alleged that the building had been condemned and the stairs moved up and down when in use. Tuper, however, was unable to attribute her fall to any of these defects and conceded that she was unsure of the exact cause of her fall. The court decided that under the circumstances, the Comptroller “could rationally conclude that [Tuper’s] petitioner’s fall was the result of her own misstep and did not constitute an accident....”
In her final effort, Tuper claimed that “while on light-duty status, [she] was directed to run with a medical bag to the scene of a medical emergency.” She fell while running. Again the Appellate Division sustained the Comptroller’s decision denying her accidental disability retirement benefits.
The court observed that the Comptroller “could rationally conclude that this third incident did not constitute an accident because the injury was the result of the risk of ‘exertional injury’ inherent in the activity which [Tuper] was expected to perform in the ordinary course of [Tuper’s] employment.”
As a correction officer member of the State’s Police and Firefighter Retirement System (PFRS), Tuper was eligible for disability retirement benefits pursuant to Section 507-a(b)(3). Other state and municipal employees are eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits under a different section -- Section 63 of the Retirement and Social Security Law. Section 63 provides for accidental disability retirement benefits for members of the State’s Employees’ Retirement System (ERS) who are disabled as a result of an “accidental injury” while performing official duties.
Section 363 provides similar benefits to police officers and firefighters who are members of the ERS.
Regardless of the statutory provision involved, courts use the same analysis to determine if a disability resulted from an accident for the purposes of determining eligibility for disability retirement.
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If you are interested in learning more about General Municipal Law §207-a or §207-c disability benefits and procedures please click here:
http://section207.blogspot.com/2010/03/v-behaviorurldefaultvml-o.html ============================================
NYPPL
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL
November 03, 2010
November 02, 2010
Displacement and layoff
Displacement and layoff
Yonkers Muni. Housing Auth. v Dugan, 261 AD2d 406
Typically when a position is abolished and this results in the layoff of a permanent employee, his or her name is placed on a preferred list in accordance with the provisions of Civil Service Law Section 80 [permanent employees in the competitive class] or Section 80-a [permanent employees in the noncompetitive class].
In some instances, however, the individual may be able to “displace” a less senior, lower grade employee in accordance with Section 80.6 of the Civil Service Law. Section 80.6 essentially allows a higher level, more senior individual whose position in the competitive class has been abolished to “displace” a less senior employee in a lower grade position “in the direct line of promotion” of the relevant job class.*
The Dugan case arose after the Yonkers Civil Service Commission ruled that Iliana Rodriguez, a Yonkers Housing Authority Field Representative had the right to “retreat” to another Housing Authority position -- Tenant Relations Aide -- when her position was abolished. The Commission’s decision was challenged by three Authority employees: Thomas E. Dugan, Mary E. Dorman, and Patricia Ortiz.
In the court proceeding that followed the Commission conceded that it was incorrect when it held that Rodriguez had the right to “retreat” to the title Tenant Relations Aide, and that it should have placed Rodriguez’s name a preferred list for the title of Field Representative as of the date of her termination.
The Commission then contended that the position of Tenant Relations Aide was “comparable” to the position formerly held by Rodriguez and thus her appointment from the Field Representative preferred list was authorized by Civil Service Law Section 81.
However, as the decision points out, the Commission’s initial determination contained no finding that the two titles were comparable. This was a fatal omission in the eyes of the Appellate Division. Nor could the court support the determination that Rodriguez had the right to ‘retreat’, because the Commission had admitted that it was in error with respect to that determination.
Accordingly, the matter had to be remanded [returned] to the Commission so that it could make express findings of fact, and to make whatever it deems the correct determination to be. The decision notes that “without such minimal findings, and without a concrete statement of exactly what it is the Commission intended to determine, intelligent judicial review is not possible.
Typically the price of making an incorrect personnel decision in a layoff situation is that the appointing authority must appoint or reinstate the individual who was entitled to the position with back salary and benefits as a matter of law.
* Section 80-a.6 provides displacement rights to employees in the noncompetitive class if specified conditions are satisfied.
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If you are interested in learning more about layoff procedures involving employees in the public service in New York State please click here: http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/ ============================================
NYPPL
Yonkers Muni. Housing Auth. v Dugan, 261 AD2d 406
Typically when a position is abolished and this results in the layoff of a permanent employee, his or her name is placed on a preferred list in accordance with the provisions of Civil Service Law Section 80 [permanent employees in the competitive class] or Section 80-a [permanent employees in the noncompetitive class].
In some instances, however, the individual may be able to “displace” a less senior, lower grade employee in accordance with Section 80.6 of the Civil Service Law. Section 80.6 essentially allows a higher level, more senior individual whose position in the competitive class has been abolished to “displace” a less senior employee in a lower grade position “in the direct line of promotion” of the relevant job class.*
The Dugan case arose after the Yonkers Civil Service Commission ruled that Iliana Rodriguez, a Yonkers Housing Authority Field Representative had the right to “retreat” to another Housing Authority position -- Tenant Relations Aide -- when her position was abolished. The Commission’s decision was challenged by three Authority employees: Thomas E. Dugan, Mary E. Dorman, and Patricia Ortiz.
In the court proceeding that followed the Commission conceded that it was incorrect when it held that Rodriguez had the right to “retreat” to the title Tenant Relations Aide, and that it should have placed Rodriguez’s name a preferred list for the title of Field Representative as of the date of her termination.
The Commission then contended that the position of Tenant Relations Aide was “comparable” to the position formerly held by Rodriguez and thus her appointment from the Field Representative preferred list was authorized by Civil Service Law Section 81.
However, as the decision points out, the Commission’s initial determination contained no finding that the two titles were comparable. This was a fatal omission in the eyes of the Appellate Division. Nor could the court support the determination that Rodriguez had the right to ‘retreat’, because the Commission had admitted that it was in error with respect to that determination.
Accordingly, the matter had to be remanded [returned] to the Commission so that it could make express findings of fact, and to make whatever it deems the correct determination to be. The decision notes that “without such minimal findings, and without a concrete statement of exactly what it is the Commission intended to determine, intelligent judicial review is not possible.
Typically the price of making an incorrect personnel decision in a layoff situation is that the appointing authority must appoint or reinstate the individual who was entitled to the position with back salary and benefits as a matter of law.
* Section 80-a.6 provides displacement rights to employees in the noncompetitive class if specified conditions are satisfied.
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If you are interested in learning more about layoff procedures involving employees in the public service in New York State please click here: http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/ ============================================
NYPPL
Dual employment
Dual employment
Holbrook v Rockland Co, 260 AD2d 437
Most public officers and employees serve in one position at a time. Sometimes, however, an individual may be employed by two different jurisdictions simultaneously. Such dual employments generally require the knowledge and approval of the appointing authorities involved.*
Dual employments are often suspect -- particularly when both are purported to be “full-time” posts. Another consideration: is there the appearance of, if not an actual, a conflict of interest involved in a particular “dual employment” situation. As the Attorney General advised in an informal opinion:
In the absence of a constitutional or statutory prohibition against dual-office holding, one person may hold two offices simultaneously unless they are incompatible [Informal Opinions of the Attorney General 98-17, May 11, 1998].
The opinion notes that the “leading case on compatibility of office” is People ex rel. Ryan v Green, 58 NY 295. In Ryan the Court of Appeals said that “two offices are incompatible is one is subordinate to the other or if there is an inherent inconsistency between the two offices.”
The Holbrook case involved a “dual employment” situation, but with a novel twist. Here the “appointing authority” in each instance was the voter. Charles E. Holbrook had been elected to two different Rockland County public offices, by two different electorates, and, as a result, was simultaneously serving in two different elective offices in two different jurisdictions.
However, in 1993 Rockland County had passed a local law -- the so-called “two hats” law -- barring an elected county officials from holding any other elected town or village office [Rockland County Local Laws of 1993, #6]. In other words, an individual could not hold a county elective office if in so serving he or she would be simultaneously serving as a local elected officer in another public jurisdiction.**
Holbrook, who was elected to serve in the Rockland County Legislature, had also been elected to position of town supervisor of a town in Rockland County. He challenged Local Law 1993 #6, as well as a 1997 local law providing for reapportionment of election districts, contending that both local laws were invalid because they had been enacted without a voter referendum as mandated by Municipal Home Rule Law Section 23(2)(e) and (f).
The Appellate Division affirmed a ruling by a Supreme Court justice rejecting Holbrook’s complaint, holding that both local laws had been validly adopted. The decision noted that while Section 23(2)(e) and (f) requires a referendum if the proposed local law “changes the term of an elective office”, or “curtails any power of an elective officer,” Rockland’s “two hat” laws merely prohibited Rockland County legislators from simultaneously holding a second elective office. The Appellate Division said that the local laws in question neither changed the terms of an elective office nor curtail any powers of an elective officer.
* Dual employments, in which appointments to different positions are made, are not the same as a “joint appointment.” In a joint appointment, two [or more] appointing authorities jointly authorize the employment of an individual in a single position and the two appointing authorities typically share the personnel service costs.
** Local Law 1993, #6, permitted elected county officials then holding two elective offices to continue to serve in both offices until January 1, 1998.
NYPPL
Holbrook v Rockland Co, 260 AD2d 437
Most public officers and employees serve in one position at a time. Sometimes, however, an individual may be employed by two different jurisdictions simultaneously. Such dual employments generally require the knowledge and approval of the appointing authorities involved.*
Dual employments are often suspect -- particularly when both are purported to be “full-time” posts. Another consideration: is there the appearance of, if not an actual, a conflict of interest involved in a particular “dual employment” situation. As the Attorney General advised in an informal opinion:
In the absence of a constitutional or statutory prohibition against dual-office holding, one person may hold two offices simultaneously unless they are incompatible [Informal Opinions of the Attorney General 98-17, May 11, 1998].
The opinion notes that the “leading case on compatibility of office” is People ex rel. Ryan v Green, 58 NY 295. In Ryan the Court of Appeals said that “two offices are incompatible is one is subordinate to the other or if there is an inherent inconsistency between the two offices.”
The Holbrook case involved a “dual employment” situation, but with a novel twist. Here the “appointing authority” in each instance was the voter. Charles E. Holbrook had been elected to two different Rockland County public offices, by two different electorates, and, as a result, was simultaneously serving in two different elective offices in two different jurisdictions.
However, in 1993 Rockland County had passed a local law -- the so-called “two hats” law -- barring an elected county officials from holding any other elected town or village office [Rockland County Local Laws of 1993, #6]. In other words, an individual could not hold a county elective office if in so serving he or she would be simultaneously serving as a local elected officer in another public jurisdiction.**
Holbrook, who was elected to serve in the Rockland County Legislature, had also been elected to position of town supervisor of a town in Rockland County. He challenged Local Law 1993 #6, as well as a 1997 local law providing for reapportionment of election districts, contending that both local laws were invalid because they had been enacted without a voter referendum as mandated by Municipal Home Rule Law Section 23(2)(e) and (f).
The Appellate Division affirmed a ruling by a Supreme Court justice rejecting Holbrook’s complaint, holding that both local laws had been validly adopted. The decision noted that while Section 23(2)(e) and (f) requires a referendum if the proposed local law “changes the term of an elective office”, or “curtails any power of an elective officer,” Rockland’s “two hat” laws merely prohibited Rockland County legislators from simultaneously holding a second elective office. The Appellate Division said that the local laws in question neither changed the terms of an elective office nor curtail any powers of an elective officer.
* Dual employments, in which appointments to different positions are made, are not the same as a “joint appointment.” In a joint appointment, two [or more] appointing authorities jointly authorize the employment of an individual in a single position and the two appointing authorities typically share the personnel service costs.
** Local Law 1993, #6, permitted elected county officials then holding two elective offices to continue to serve in both offices until January 1, 1998.
NYPPL
Duty of fair representation
Duty of fair representation
Matter of Beattie, 32 PERB 3023
Representation by an attorney provided by a union is an important right of membership in an employee organization. The Matter of Beattie decision makes the point that an employee organization’s duty to represent a member “in any further pursuit” of his or her claims against an employer, or in defense against any adverse action taken by the employer, ceases if the individual employs a private attorney to handle the matter.
Guilderland Teachers Aide Association member Patricia Beattie filed improper practice charges against the association with PERB in which she alleged that:
1. The association refused to file a complaint charging another school district employee with sexual harassment when asked to do so.
2. The association’s president told Beattie she would lose her job [sic] because she had employed a private attorney to represent her concerning her sexual harassment complaint.
According to the PERB decision, in response to a June 1996 complaint, Rex Trobridge, an association representative, initially determined that Beattie might have been sexually harassed by another school district employee. Trobridge later learned that in January 1996 the employee Beattie named in her complaint alleged the reverse: that Beattie had sexual harassed him. The association advised Beattie that it would provide her with legal representation in both cases.
Before the association’s attorney had filed any complaint with the Division of Human Rights or had met with the school superintendent on her behalf, Beattie hired private counsel. PERB said that at that point in time the association’s duty to represent her ceased.
Meanwhile, a private attorney named Thomas Kenney was employed by the Guilderland School District to investigate both sets of allegations. Kenney found that “each interviewee with knowledge of the events covered by the complaints corroborated [the other employee’s] claims [of sexual harassment] and offered no support for Beattie’s claims [of sexual harassment].” Ultimately Beattie was told of Kenney’s findings and was formally reprimanded by the school superintendent.
PERB sustained its administrative law judge’s dismissal of the charges Beattie filed against the association. It ruled that Beattie’s claim that her complaint “was handled in a perfunctory manner” by the association was not supported by the record.
PERB, in a footnote, observed that Association attorney Harold Beyer testified that he intended to pursue Beattie’s complaint with the State Division of Human Rights after exhausting the school district’s sexual harassment procedure.
As to Beattie’s allegation that association president Barbara Coogan violated the Taylor Law when she commented that “Beattie was crazy to hire a private attorney...,” PERB said that “there is simply nothing improper in the timing or content” of the statement.
PERB said that it viewed Cooper’s statement as “merely an expression of [her] incredulity that a union member would choose not to utilize the counsel provided by the union, at no charge, and instead choose to pay a private attorney.”
Such a statement, said PERB, in no way violated the Taylor Law since it was an expression of an opinion by Cooper, and as such, “is not actionable.
NYPPL
Matter of Beattie, 32 PERB 3023
Representation by an attorney provided by a union is an important right of membership in an employee organization. The Matter of Beattie decision makes the point that an employee organization’s duty to represent a member “in any further pursuit” of his or her claims against an employer, or in defense against any adverse action taken by the employer, ceases if the individual employs a private attorney to handle the matter.
Guilderland Teachers Aide Association member Patricia Beattie filed improper practice charges against the association with PERB in which she alleged that:
1. The association refused to file a complaint charging another school district employee with sexual harassment when asked to do so.
2. The association’s president told Beattie she would lose her job [sic] because she had employed a private attorney to represent her concerning her sexual harassment complaint.
According to the PERB decision, in response to a June 1996 complaint, Rex Trobridge, an association representative, initially determined that Beattie might have been sexually harassed by another school district employee. Trobridge later learned that in January 1996 the employee Beattie named in her complaint alleged the reverse: that Beattie had sexual harassed him. The association advised Beattie that it would provide her with legal representation in both cases.
Before the association’s attorney had filed any complaint with the Division of Human Rights or had met with the school superintendent on her behalf, Beattie hired private counsel. PERB said that at that point in time the association’s duty to represent her ceased.
Meanwhile, a private attorney named Thomas Kenney was employed by the Guilderland School District to investigate both sets of allegations. Kenney found that “each interviewee with knowledge of the events covered by the complaints corroborated [the other employee’s] claims [of sexual harassment] and offered no support for Beattie’s claims [of sexual harassment].” Ultimately Beattie was told of Kenney’s findings and was formally reprimanded by the school superintendent.
PERB sustained its administrative law judge’s dismissal of the charges Beattie filed against the association. It ruled that Beattie’s claim that her complaint “was handled in a perfunctory manner” by the association was not supported by the record.
PERB, in a footnote, observed that Association attorney Harold Beyer testified that he intended to pursue Beattie’s complaint with the State Division of Human Rights after exhausting the school district’s sexual harassment procedure.
As to Beattie’s allegation that association president Barbara Coogan violated the Taylor Law when she commented that “Beattie was crazy to hire a private attorney...,” PERB said that “there is simply nothing improper in the timing or content” of the statement.
PERB said that it viewed Cooper’s statement as “merely an expression of [her] incredulity that a union member would choose not to utilize the counsel provided by the union, at no charge, and instead choose to pay a private attorney.”
Such a statement, said PERB, in no way violated the Taylor Law since it was an expression of an opinion by Cooper, and as such, “is not actionable.
NYPPL
Criminal conviction may bar teaching if the applicant cannot satisfy the relevant criteria set out in Section 753 of the Correction Law
Criminal conviction may bar teaching if the applicant cannot satisfy the relvant criteria set out in Section 753 of the Correction Law
Arrocha v NYC Bd. of Education, 93 NY2d 361
Sometimes an individual who has been convicted of a crime applies for a license to teach or for employment as a teacher.
The Correction Law protects individuals from unlawful discrimination based on his or her conviction of a crime. In other words, an individual may not be automatically barred from teaching because of his or her previous conviction. Instead, the school board should examine the individual’s application in light of the eight criteria set out in Section 753 of the Correction Law:
a. The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses.
b. The specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the license or employment sought.
c. The bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which the person was previously convicted will have on his fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties or responsibilities.
d. The time that has elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses.
e. The age of the person at the time of occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses.
f. The seriousness of the offense or offenses.
g. Any information produced by the person, or produced on his behalf, in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct.
h. The legitimate interest of the public agency or private employer in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.”
In the Arrocha case, the Court of Appeals -- New York’s highest court -- overturned lower courts’ rulings and said the New York City Board of Education properly considered all eight factors when it refused to grant a teaching license to a person with a criminal record.
Jose Luis Arrocha asked the New York City Board of Education for a license to teach high school Spanish in 1996. He noted in his application form that he had been convicted in 1987, at age 36, of criminal sale of a controlled substance (a B felony) for selling a $10 bag of cocaine to an undercover officer, and subsequently served the minimum of a two-to-six year prison term.
Arrocha submitted a certificate of relief from disabilities. Courts have discretion to issue such certificates to ex-convicts, which are intended to remove any automatic bar to employment or licensure (Correction Law Section 701). Arrocha also submitted letters of recommendation attesting to his skill as a teacher.
His application was rejected on the grounds that his criminal conviction was “serious in nature” and that employment as a teacher “would pose a risk to the safety and welfare of the student population and Board of Education employees.”
Arrocha sued, contending that (1) it was arbitrary and capricious of the board to block his application because of a nine-year old conviction, and (2) the board’s decision violated the Correction Law.
The Court of Appeals said that as a general rule, the courts “cannot interfere [with an administrative decision] unless there is no rational basis for the exercise of discretion” by the administrative agency.
The court pointed out that Section 752.1 of the Correction Law allows an employer to reject an applicant without running afoul of the law where “a direct relationship between [the previous criminal offense] and the specific license or employment sought” exists. Also, Section 752.2 allows such a decision where granting the license or employment would “involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.” It observed that the school board detected a “direct relationship” and an “unreasonable risk,” and it was reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the board.
The Court of Appeals said the board appeared fair in its deliberations. The record showed that the board had considered all eight of the factors in reaching its conclusion, balancing elements that favored granting Arrocha a license against others that tended to mitigate against such an action.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the board was not obligated to rebut the presumption of Arrocha’s rehabilitation and was entirely justified in considering the nature and seriousness of this particular crime, a B felony cocaine sale “committed by Arrocha at the mature age of 36...” The court said Arrocha’s age when apprehended was legitimately viewed as being “of overriding significance when issuing a high school teaching license.”
The decision suggests that it is consistent with public policy of New York State to refuse to employ a person convicted of drug dealing as a teacher. Support for this view may be found in Section 3020-a of the Education Law.
Section 3020-a(2)(b) bars the suspension without pay of a teacher against whom disciplinary charges have been filed, unless otherwise permitted under an alternate disciplinary procedure negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law, except in cases where the individual has been convicted of a felony involving illegal drugs. The inclusion of this exception suggests the legislature is deeply troubled by the prospect of schoolchildren being exposed to teachers with felony drug convictions. Section 3020-a(2)(b) also allows a school district or BOCES to suspend a teacher against whom disciplinary charges have been filed without pay if he or she has been convicted of a felony involving the physical or sexual abuse of a minor or a student.
NYPPL
Arrocha v NYC Bd. of Education, 93 NY2d 361
Sometimes an individual who has been convicted of a crime applies for a license to teach or for employment as a teacher.
The Correction Law protects individuals from unlawful discrimination based on his or her conviction of a crime. In other words, an individual may not be automatically barred from teaching because of his or her previous conviction. Instead, the school board should examine the individual’s application in light of the eight criteria set out in Section 753 of the Correction Law:
a. The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses.
b. The specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the license or employment sought.
c. The bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which the person was previously convicted will have on his fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties or responsibilities.
d. The time that has elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses.
e. The age of the person at the time of occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses.
f. The seriousness of the offense or offenses.
g. Any information produced by the person, or produced on his behalf, in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct.
h. The legitimate interest of the public agency or private employer in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.”
In the Arrocha case, the Court of Appeals -- New York’s highest court -- overturned lower courts’ rulings and said the New York City Board of Education properly considered all eight factors when it refused to grant a teaching license to a person with a criminal record.
Jose Luis Arrocha asked the New York City Board of Education for a license to teach high school Spanish in 1996. He noted in his application form that he had been convicted in 1987, at age 36, of criminal sale of a controlled substance (a B felony) for selling a $10 bag of cocaine to an undercover officer, and subsequently served the minimum of a two-to-six year prison term.
Arrocha submitted a certificate of relief from disabilities. Courts have discretion to issue such certificates to ex-convicts, which are intended to remove any automatic bar to employment or licensure (Correction Law Section 701). Arrocha also submitted letters of recommendation attesting to his skill as a teacher.
His application was rejected on the grounds that his criminal conviction was “serious in nature” and that employment as a teacher “would pose a risk to the safety and welfare of the student population and Board of Education employees.”
Arrocha sued, contending that (1) it was arbitrary and capricious of the board to block his application because of a nine-year old conviction, and (2) the board’s decision violated the Correction Law.
The Court of Appeals said that as a general rule, the courts “cannot interfere [with an administrative decision] unless there is no rational basis for the exercise of discretion” by the administrative agency.
The court pointed out that Section 752.1 of the Correction Law allows an employer to reject an applicant without running afoul of the law where “a direct relationship between [the previous criminal offense] and the specific license or employment sought” exists. Also, Section 752.2 allows such a decision where granting the license or employment would “involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.” It observed that the school board detected a “direct relationship” and an “unreasonable risk,” and it was reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the board.
The Court of Appeals said the board appeared fair in its deliberations. The record showed that the board had considered all eight of the factors in reaching its conclusion, balancing elements that favored granting Arrocha a license against others that tended to mitigate against such an action.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the board was not obligated to rebut the presumption of Arrocha’s rehabilitation and was entirely justified in considering the nature and seriousness of this particular crime, a B felony cocaine sale “committed by Arrocha at the mature age of 36...” The court said Arrocha’s age when apprehended was legitimately viewed as being “of overriding significance when issuing a high school teaching license.”
The decision suggests that it is consistent with public policy of New York State to refuse to employ a person convicted of drug dealing as a teacher. Support for this view may be found in Section 3020-a of the Education Law.
Section 3020-a(2)(b) bars the suspension without pay of a teacher against whom disciplinary charges have been filed, unless otherwise permitted under an alternate disciplinary procedure negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law, except in cases where the individual has been convicted of a felony involving illegal drugs. The inclusion of this exception suggests the legislature is deeply troubled by the prospect of schoolchildren being exposed to teachers with felony drug convictions. Section 3020-a(2)(b) also allows a school district or BOCES to suspend a teacher against whom disciplinary charges have been filed without pay if he or she has been convicted of a felony involving the physical or sexual abuse of a minor or a student.
NYPPL
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CAUTION
Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the decisions summarized here. Accordingly, these summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
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New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard.
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