Arbitrator’s refusal to hear employee’s “whistle blower” defense in the course of disciplinary hearing requires the vacating of the award

Arbitrator’s refusal to hear employee’s “whistle blower” defense in the course of disciplinary hearing requires the vacating of the award
Matter of Kowaleski v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 2010 NY Slip Op 09379, Decided on December 21, 2010, Court of Appeals

Barbara Kowaleski, a correction officer employed by the New York State Department of Corrections, was served with disciplinary charges alleging that she violated provisions of the employees' manual on three separate occasions when she "made inappropriate comments of a personal nature about another staff member in the presence of staff and inmates"; argued with a fellow employee; and was "disrespectful and insubordinate" when she ignored a superior's order.
The proposed penalty: termination and the loss of any accrued leave.

Ultimately the matter was submitted to a disciplinary arbitration.

At the outset of the hearing, Kowaleski argued that the disciplinary action was only being brought to retaliate against her for reporting a fellow officer's misconduct and that she was entitled to raise this as an affirmative defense pursuant to Civil Service Law §75-b, contending that §75-b prohibits public employers from retaliating against employees for reporting their coworkers' improper conduct.

The arbitrator determined that because the Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA] limited his authority "to determinations of guilt or innocence and the appropriateness of proposed penalties," he lacked authority to consider Kowaleski's retaliation defense. The arbitrator, however, indicated that he would consider evidence of retaliation when determining witness credibility and "in the larger context of guilt or innocence."

The arbitrator found Kowaleski guilty of two of the three charges and determined that termination was appropriate and Kowaleski filed a petition pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR seeking to have the award vacated.

Although Supreme Court and the Appellate Division rejected Kowaleski’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ rulings “[b]ecause we find that the arbitrator's failure to separately consider and determine Kowaleski's affirmative defense of retaliation on the merits requires the award to be vacated”

The Court of Appeals explained that an arbitration award must be vacated if, as relevant here, a party's rights were impaired by an arbitrator who "exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made (see CPLR 7511 [b] [1] [iii]). Further, said the court, an arbitrator "exceed[s] his power" under the meaning of the statute where his "award violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power."

As the lower courts found, and Correction conceded, the arbitrator “not only had authority to consider Kowaleski's retaliation defense, but was required to do so.”

Further, the opinion indicates that Civil Service Law §75-b prohibits a public employer from taking disciplinary action to retaliate against an employee for reporting "improper governmental action" and in the event the employee reasonably believes disciplinary action would not have been taken “but for" the whistle blowing, the employee may assert such as a defense before the designated arbitrator or hearing officer." *

Whatever the terms of the CBA, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he merits of such defense shall be considered and determined as part of the arbitration award or hearing officer decision." Further, should the arbitrator or hearing officer find that the disciplinary action is based “solely on the employer's desire to retaliate,” the disciplinary proceeding must be dismissed.

Accordingly, the arbitrator's finding that he did not have authority under the CBA to consider Kowaleski's retaliation defense was not only incorrect as a matter of law, but also in excess of an explicit limitation on his power. Because he failed to consider and determine the defense, the court ruled that the award must be vacated.

Finally, the Court of Appeals noted the Kowaleski has requested that any rehearing be before a different arbitrator. That request, said the court, should be ruled on by Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion.

* Addendum to original posting: A number of e-mails concerning this ruling have been received since the summary of the decision was posted on December 22, 201. Set out below are the relevant provisions of Section 75-b of the Civil Service Law addressing the basic issue before the Court of Appeals:

3. (a) Where an employee is subject to dismissal or other disciplinary action under a final and binding arbitration provision, or other disciplinary procedure contained in a collectively negotiated agreement, or under section seventy-five of this title or any other provision of state or local law and the employee reasonably believes dismissal or other disciplinary action would not have been taken but for the conduct protected under subdivision two of this section, he or she may assert such as a defense before the designated arbitrator or hearing officer. The merits of such defense shall be considered and determined as part of the arbitration award or hearing officer decision of the matter. If there is a finding that the dismissal or other disciplinary action is based solely on a violation by the employer of such subdivision, the arbitrator or hearing officer shall dismiss or recommend dismissal of the disciplinary proceeding, as appropriate, and, if appropriate, reinstate the employee with back pay, and, in the case of an arbitration procedure, may take other appropriate action as is permitted in the collectively negotiated agreement [emphasis supplied].

(b) Where an employee is subject to a collectively negotiated agreement which contains provisions preventing an employer from taking adverse personnel actions and which contains a final and binding arbitration provision to resolve alleged violations of such provisions of the agreement and the employee reasonably believes that such personnel action would not have been taken but for the conduct protected under subdivision two of this section, he or she may assert such as a claim before the arbitrator. The arbitrator shall consider such claim and determine its merits and shall, if a determination is made that such adverse personnel action is based on a violation by the employer of such subdivision, take such action to remedy the violation as is permitted by the collectively negotiated agreement [emphasis supplied].

(c) Where an employee is not subject to any of the provisions of paragraph (a) or (b) of this subdivision, the employee may commence an action in a court of competent jurisdiction under the same terms and conditions as set forth in article twenty-C of the labor law.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09379.htm

Vacating a Section 3020-a arbitration award

Vacating a Section 3020-a arbitration award
Westhampton Beach UFSD v Ziparo, 275 AD2d 411

It is not unusual for a party to decide to challenge the determination of the hearing officer or panel following a Section 3020-a disciplinary action. Essentially a Section 3020-a decision is treated as an arbitration award and thus the provisions of Article 75 of the Civil Practice Act and Rules [CPLR] control any attempt to vacate such an award.

As the Westhampton Beach decision by the Appellate Division, Second Department, demonstrates, the grounds for vacating an award under Article 75 are very limited.

The district filed certain disciplinary charges against David Ziparo. The Section 3020-a hearing officer found him guilty of the charges. The penalty imposed: suspension without pay for one year. In addition, the hearing officer conditioned Ziparo’s return to teaching upon his obtaining a certification of psychiatric fitness.

Westhampton appealed a State Supreme Court’s confirmation of the hearing officer’s determination. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, ruling that Westhampton did not demonstrate any basis for vacating the award under CPLR 7511 and the hearing officer’s determination has a rational basis and is supported by the record.

On what basis could a court vacate a determination by a Section 3020-a hearing officer or panel? Section 7511(b)(1) of the CPLR allows a court to vacate or modify an award only if it finds:

1. Corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or

2. Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except where the award was by confession;

3. An arbitrator, or agency or person making the award exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or

4. The failure to follow the procedure set out in Article 75, unless the party applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of defect and without objection.

In addition, courts have held that an arbitration award may be vacated if it is inconsistent with a strong public policy.

Another important consideration when deciding whether to challenge a Section 3020-a disciplinary determination: the statute of limitations. Section 3020-a(5) provides that such a challenge must be filed within ten days of the receipt of the decision -- a very short period in which to perfect the appeal.

Governor David A. Paterson fined $62,125 after being found guilty of charges that he received complimentary tickets to Game 1 of the 2009 World Series

Governor David A. Paterson fined $62,125 after being found guilty of charges that he received complimentary tickets to Game 1 of the 2009 World Series
Source: The New York State Commission on Public Integrity

On December 21, 2010, the New York State Commission on Public Integrity announced that it had fined Governor David A. Paterson $62,125* after finding him guilty of charges that he solicited, accepted and received five complimentary tickets to Game One of the 2009 World Series for himself, two aides, his teenage son and his son's friend.

The Commission reports that "It is the largest fine imposed on a public official" by it.

The Commission said that “The Governor's false testimony is . . . evidence that he knew his conduct was unlawful and, thus, is one factor underlying the Commission's determination that the Governor violated Public Officers Law §§73(5)(a), 73(5)(b), 74(3)(d), 74(3)(f) and 74(3)(h).”

The Decision also noted that Governor Paterson “did not perform a ceremonial function at the game, and his attendance was not related to his duties and responsibility as a public official.” Further, the Commission indicated that “Even if the Governor had performed a ceremonial function at the game, it would not have entitled him to free tickets for his son and his son's friend.”

The Commission noted that the Yankees have “myriad and continuing business and financial interests that relate to New York State government,” including real estate, stadium development and tax matters.

“The moral and ethical tone of any organization is set at the top. Unfortunately the Governor set a totally inappropriate tone by his dishonest and unethical conduct. Such conduct cannot be tolerated by any New York State employee, particularly our Governor,” commented Michael Cherkasky, the Chairman of the Commission.

* The $62,125 civil penalty consists of the value of the tickets, $2,125, plus $25,000 for violating Public Officers Law §73(5)(a), $25,000 for violating Public Officers Law §73(5)(b), and $10,000 for violating Public Officers Law §74(3)(d). The law does not authorize a civil penalty for a violation of Public Officers Law §§74(3)(f) and §74(3)(h).

Click here to read the Hearing Officer's Decision dated 12/9/2010.

Teacher placement and the ADA

Teacher placement and the ADA
Arbitration between the United Educators of San Francisco and San Francisco [California] Unified School District, Arbitrator William E. Riker

In 1997 a hearing impaired California teacher, certified to teach deaf students at the high school level and regular students from kindergarten through eighth grade, was laid off when her position was eliminated. Her name was placed on a preferred list.

Assigned to clerical work, in April 1998, the teacher asked to be assigned to teach kindergarten or first-grade. She also asked for a reasonable accommodation, including an interpreter to translate her signed conversation. The district rejected her request and continued employing her in a clerical capacity.

Ultimately, the teacher filed a grievance contending that the district violated the collective bargaining agreement by not placing her in a classroom and that the district discriminated against her because of her disability. She also filed a disability discrimination complaint under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Arbitrator William E. Riker denied her grievance, ruling that the school district was not required to place a hearing-disabled teacher in a kindergarten or first-grade classroom unless she is able to perform the essential functions of the position.

Riker’s rationale: The ADA requires fair treatment of qualified individuals with disabilities, but it does not require the employer to change the essential functions of a job to accommodate a disabled employee who cannot perform them.

Riker ruled that kindergarten and first grade teachers must be able to carefully listen to children’s speech and help them to develop and mimic speech patterns and thought processes.

Absence of the name of an individual on a list of members as required by law deemed evidence that the individual is not a member of the organization

Absence of the name of an individual on a list of members as required by law deemed evidence that the individual is not a member of the organization
Murphy v Town of Ramapo, 2010 NY Slip Op 09233, Decided on December 14, 2010, Appellate Division, Second Department

Dennis Murphy, Jr., then a 16-year-old member of the "youth corps" of the Ramapo Valley Ambulance Corp. Inc., sued Ramapo to recover for personal injuries he suffered as a result of his being injured when a pen thrown by a member of Ramapo struck him in the eye while he was on Ramapo's premises.

Ramapo’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Murphy’s action on the grounds that it was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Volunteer Ambulance Workers' Benefit Law §19 was denied by Supreme Court.*

The Appellate Division agreed with the Supreme Court's result, but for a different reason.

Essentially the Appellate Division ruled that Ramapo failed to show that Murphy within the statutory definition of “a volunteer ambulance worker” and thus he was not barred from suing by reason of the statutory "exclusivity provision" set out in §19. Why? Because Murphy's name was not on the list of Ramapo's members.

The court pointed out that §3[1] of the Volunteer Ambulance Workers' Benefit Law defines a "[v]olunteer ambulance worker" as ‘an active volunteer member of an ambulance company as specified on a list regularly maintained by that company for the purpose of this chapter’."

Ramapo, said the court, did not submit proof that Murphy was on such a list and thus failed to meet its burden of showing that the provisions of Volunteer Ambulance Workers' Benefit Law §19 controlled insofar as Murphy’s maintaining his action against Ramapo was concerned.

N.B. "Being listed" is critical in public employment situations as well. For example, the status of an individual appointed to a position in the classified service of the State as an employer or a political subdivision of the State is determined by records of the responsible civil service commission notwithstanding the belief or intent of the appointing officer concerned making the appointment.

* §19 of the Volunteer Ambulance Workers' Benefit Law §19 provides, in pertinent part, that "the benefits provided by this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy of a volunteer ambulance worker … otherwise entitled to recover damages, at common law or otherwise, for or on account of an injury … resulting from an injury to a volunteer ambulance worker in line of duty."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09233.htm

Employee may be terminated on the grounds that he or she make a material false statement of his or her application for employment

Employee may be terminated on the grounds that he or she make a material false statement of his or her application for employment
Matter of Walsh v Kelly, 2010 NY Slip Op 09346, Decided on December 16, 2010,* Appellate Division, First Department

New York City Civil Service Commission, after a hearing, affirmed the determination of the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services to disqualify and terminate Gary Walsh as a New York City police officer.

The basis for the Department’s action, Walsh had omitted and falsified pertinent facts about his background in his application for employment.

The Appellate Division said that the determination to terminate Walsh’s employment was “rationally supported by testimony and documents adduced at the hearing” showing that Walsh had concealed that he had been a suspect in a criminal homicide while in the army and had associated with members of a gang that had committed a homicide.

Civil Service Law §50.4 provides, in pertinent part, the “The state civil service department and municipal commissions may refuse to examine an applicant, or after examination to certify an eligible:

(f) who has intentionally made a false statement of any material fact in his application; or

(g) who has practiced, or attempted to practice, any deception or fraud in his application, in his examination, or in securing his eligibility or appointment ….”

* The hearing before the Civil Service Commission was not mandated by law and, therefore, the proceeding was improperly transferred to the Appellate Division which, nevertheless, elected to decide the matter on the merits.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09346.htm

Violating the employer’s “Use of the Internet Policies” while at work

Violating the employer’s “Use of the Internet Policies” while at work
Schnaars v Copiague Union Free School District, 275 AD2d 462

Public employers are adopting policies dealing with its employees using the agency’s computers to access the Internet for personal business and transmitting and receiving personal e-mail. Some employee organizations have included demands to negotiate computer and e-mail policies among its collective bargaining proposals.

Recognizing the growing concerns of both the employer and employee organizations in this area, the Schnaars case serves to illustrate the problem and its resolution when one employee was found guilty of violating the employer’s computer policy.

The Copiague Union Free School District distributed a written memorandum advising its custodial staff that using its computers to access inappropriate material on the Internet violated district policy after it learned of the unauthorized use of its equipment by district employees.

The memorandum also cautioned that employees who violated the policy would be subject to disciplinary proceedings, which could result in suspension and/or termination.

About three months after promulgating its policy, the district learned that Robert Schnaars, the head custodian of the night crew at Copiague High School, used the school’s computers to view pornographic web sites on the Internet with his subordinates during two night shifts.

Schnaars was served with disciplinary charges and ultimately found guilty of using the District’s computers to view inappropriate material. Rejecting the hearing officer’s recommended that Schnaars be demoted from his position of head custodian, the district imposed the penalty of dismissal.

Schnaars, however, contested his termination on the grounds that the penalty imposed by the district was disproportionate to the offense. The Appellate Division agreed and remanded the matter to the district with instructions that it impose a penalty other than dismissal in light of Schnaars’ previous unblemished 13-year record of loyal service to the District with many accolades.

The court said that in its view, the District did not give sufficient weight to these mitigating factors. But for Schnaars’ unblemished 13-year record of employment with the district, the court might well have sustained his dismissal for violating the policy.

Clearly the court was neither troubled by the fact that the district had adopted a computer use policy nor that it had initiated disciplinary action when it learned that an individual had violated the policy. Its only concern in this case was the nature of the penalty imposed in view of Schnaars employment history with the district.

It appears that the courts will not treat violations of policies addressing the personal use of computers by employees lightly.

Burden of proof in disability claims

Burden of proof in disability claims
Musa v Nassau County Police Dept., 276 AD2d 851

The Musa decision demonstrates the burden place on an applicant seeking workers’ compensation death benefits.

Musa, a Nassau County police officer, committed suicide while at home. His widow, Nancy Musa, filed an application for workers’ compensation benefits death benefits.

The basis for her claim: her husband committing suicide because of work-related stress caused by the Nassau Police Department’s use of improper practices to reprimand him and to prevent his promotion.

The Workers’ Compensation Board, reversing a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge’s ruling, concluded that Musa’s death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and rejected Mrs. Musa’s application for workers’ compensation death benefits. The Board concluded that Musa’s suicide was precipitated by an underlying depressive condition unrelated to any stress experienced by decedent at work.

Mrs. Musa appealed, arguing that the Board’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence because it was based, in part, on a report by a medical expert who failed to appear at the hearing. While the Appellate Division agreed with Mrs. Musa that the Board incorrectly relied upon this expert’s medical report in making its determination, it nevertheless affirmed the Board’s decision to reject her claim for benefits.

The reason for this, said the court, was that workers’ compensation death benefits may be awarded in cases of suicide only where the suicide results from insanity, brain derangement or a pattern of mental deterioration caused by a work-related injury. While Musa’s husband’s depressive condition might qualify as a brain derangement permitting an award of death benefits, Mrs. Musa failed to meet her burden of establishing by competent medical proof that a causal relationship existed between her husband’s employment and his depression and the suicide.

According to the decision, the only medical evidence offered by Mrs. Musa concerning causation was the testimony of her husband’s treating psychologist. While the psychologist testified that Musa’s suicide was causally related to employment stress, the Board rejected this opinion, finding that it was based upon information provided by Mrs. Musa and her attorney following the decedent’s suicide rather than the psychologist’s independent recollection of treating Musa’s husband five years earlier.

Affirming the Board’s decision, the Appellate Division commented that because the Board found that the psychologist’s opinion lacked evidentiary support in the record, the opinion had no probative value on the issue of causal relationship and the Board correctly declined to consider it.