Arbitrator cannot add “implied contract terms” based on a past practice but, in contrast, may consider a past practice interpreting specific CBA terms

Arbitrator cannot add “implied contract terms” based on a past practice but, in contrast, may consider a past practice interpreting specific CBA terms
Matter of Monroe County Sheriff's Off. v Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn., Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 09797, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

In a CPLR Article 75 proceeding seeking to vacate an arbitration award Supreme Court held that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by adding an implied contract term to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) based on the Sheriff Department’s past practice.

The Appellate Division agreed, explaining that while "[p]ast practices may be considered by an arbitrator . . . when interpreting a specific contractual provision . . .[, a]n arbitrator may not rewrite a contract by adding a new clause based upon past practices," citing Hunsinger v Minns, 197 AD2d 871.

On the other hand, said the court, it agreed with the Deputy Sheriff’s Association that Supreme Court was incorrect in concluding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by determining that Sheriff’s Office’s denial of paid release time requests submitted by members of Association t to prepare for upcoming contract negotiations with the Office was unreasonable.

The court noted that the CBA provided that requests for "[r]elease time for union business shall not be unreasonably denied" by the Sheriff’s Office.

Accordingly, it ruled that the arbitrator determination that that the denial of the Association’s requests “to keep overtime costs down” was unreasonable absent evidence of some "financial exigency."

In addition, the Appellate Division said that it deemed that the arbitrator's reasonableness determination was not irrational inasmuch as "[a]n arbitration award must be upheld when the arbitrator offer[s] even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09797.htm

Freezing the payment of salary increments does not freeze the crediting of service for the purpose of determining an employee's increment step

Freezing the payment of salary increments does not freeze the crediting of service for the purpose of determining an employee's increment step
Matter of Meegan v Brown, 63 AD3d 1673

In response to a State Comptroller's report concerning a fiscal crisis in the City of Buffalo, the State Legislature passed the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority Act on July 3, 2003. The Act, Public Authorities Law §3850 et seq, created the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority (BFSA), a public benefit corporation, to assist in achieving fiscal stability in the City by the 2006-2007 fiscal year.

On April 21, 2004, the BFSA imposed a wage freeze on all employees of the City. The BFSA subsequently lifted the wage freeze effective July 1, 2007.

One of the issues considered in this case was the impact of the wage freeze on the eligibility of employees to “earn increments” under their respective “salary plan” as set out in various collective bargaining agreements. These agreements between the City and the unions representing various negotiating units contain salary plans or schedules for career advancement or promotion. Essentially the plans provided that as an employee acquires service credit or years of employment, he or she is to receive additional salary within his or her salary grade – i.e., a salary increment -- as a result of their being placed in a higher step in the salary grade.

Upon the lifting of the wage freeze, the employees were told would be entitled only to a one "step" increase in salary, in effect providing a “one-step” advancement in their salary grade from the step that they were at when the salary freeze was imposed in 2004.

In contrast, the unions contended that, although the employees could not be paid salary grade increases to which they otherwise would have been entitled during the wage freeze period, they nevertheless were entitled upon the lifting of the wage freeze to be moved ahead four salary "steps" in their salary grade rather then provided with a "one-step" increase. In other words, the employees should be “credited” for their service notwithstanding the fact that they had not actually received salary increments during the period when the salary plan had been frozen by the BFSA.

In the litigation that followed, Supreme Court concluded that the employees were entitled to their previously negotiated “wage increase benefits” – i.e., the negotiated step advancements -- immediately, thereby allowing them to be placed at the step that they would have otherwise enjoyed but for the “wage freeze imposed” by the BFSA.

The Appellate Division agreed, holding that under the plain meaning of the relevant provisions of Public Authorities Law §3858, the negotiated provision providing for the employees' ongoing advancement on the salary schedules as a result of continued accrual of service credit was not cancelled, annulled or eliminated.

Rather, said the court, “the City's obligation to make payment of the type of wage increases in question was suspended until the wage freeze was terminated” [emphasis supplied by the court].
The Appellate Division explained that although employee wage increases were frozen during the period of fiscal crisis, “The City cannot ignore the fact that the employees have continued to accrue service credit and have climbed the ladder of salary and career increments set forth in the collective bargaining agreements.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_04805.htm

Free speech does not protect employee making a racist statement

Free speech does not protect employee making a racist statementPereira v Commissioner of Social Services (SJC-08218), the Supreme Judicial Court, Mass., 432 Mass. 251

The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech did not shield a twelve-year public employee from dismissal for telling a racist joke at a political gathering.

Linda M. Pereira, a social worker, was terminated after making remarks that she, herself, described as a stupid, racist, and unthinking joke.

While citing a line of cases that included Pickering v Board of Education, 31 U.S. 563, and Connick v Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 1983, the Massachusetts high court said that although a public employee’s speech may be entitled to constitutional protection if the employee speaks out on a matter of public concern, and his or her interests as a citizen are not outweighed by the state’s interest in performing a public service, Pereira’s speech was not so protected.

Why not? Because, the court explained, while Pereira spoke at a political event, she conceded that her off-the-cuff ‘joke’ was not intended to convey any message and therefore did not address any matter of public concern. Further, the court noted that although the political affair was not a public gathering, Pereira’s remark was widely reported in the press.

Executive Order #3 requires certain State government executives to participate in "ethics training" conducted by the Commission on Public Integrity

Executive Order 8-3 requires certain State government executives to participate in "ethics training" conducted by the Commission on Public Integrity

Among his first acts as Governor, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo signed an Executive Order, Executive Order 8-3, requiring all Executive Chamber staff and other top state officials to participate in ethics training offered by the Commission on Public Integrity. Individuals covered by EO 8-3 includes agency commissioners and their respective counsels and ethics officers.

The training, which will focus on the rules about serving in government. will be available beginning no later than January 31st and must be completed within sixty days.

"Honor and integrity will be a hallmark of this administration, and I am confident that we have assembled a team that reflects that commitment," Governor Cuomo said. "Nonetheless, it is imperative that Chamber staff and other high ranking government officials be versed in the ethics rules and regulations that apply to them. Top government employees should have no questions, no gray areas, and no possibility of confusion regarding what is proper and what is not."

The Executive Order also requires officials to participate in this ethics training every two years.

The text of the Executive Order follows:


EXECUTIVE ORDER -- No. 3 ETHICS TRAINING

WHEREAS, all New York State taxpayers and residents and all those who depend on New York State government services have the right to expect that government programs will be administered and managed with the highest degree of professionalism;

WHEREAS, it is the obligation of every New York State officer and employee to pursue a course of conduct that will not engender public concern as to whether the individual is engaged in acts that may violate his or her public trust;

WHEREAS, officers and employees of the Executive Chamber, commissioners of New York State agencies, counsel to New York State agencies and ethics officers of New York State agencies are subject to certain ethical statutes and rules, including but not limited to the New York State Code of Ethics, statutory restrictions on business and professional activities and opinions issued by the New York State Commission on Public Integrity;

WHEREAS, officers and employees of the Executive Chamber, commissioners of New York State agencies, counsel to New York State agencies and ethics officers of New York State agencies play an important role in ensuring ethics compliance by all State officers and employees;

WHEREAS, New York State has a responsibility to ensure that its officers and employees are versed in the ethical statutes and rules that apply to them; and

WHEREAS, it is appropriate to take steps to ensure that employees and officers maintain the highest ethical and professional standards;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the State of New York, do hereby order as follows:

A. Definitions

1. “Agency” shall mean any state agency, department, office, board, bureau, division, committee, council or office.

2. “Covered Employees” shall mean all officers and employees working in the Executive Chamber in the office of the Governor, commissioners of New York State agencies, counsel to New York State agencies and ethics officers of New York State agencies.

3. “Officers and employees” shall have the meaning given to “state officer or employee” in Section 73 of the Public Officers Law.

B. Ethics Training

1. Every Covered Employee shall participate in an ethics training within sixty days of when such training is prepared and available. The ethics training program will be prepared and available no later than January 31, 2011.

2. New Covered Employees shall participate in such ethics training within sixty days of the later of commencing their employment or when such training is prepared and available.

3. Such training shall include a discussion of the provisions of Sections 73, 73-A, 74 and 78 of the Public Officers Law and Sections 75-b and 107 of the Civil Service Law.

4. Every Covered Employee shall participate in an ethics training every two years following his or her initial training session pursuant to this order.

5. Covered Employees shall submit a signed statement certifying their participation in each training session pursuant to this order, which statements shall be placed in their personnel files.

6. The Executive Chamber shall coordinate with the ethics officers of state agencies, and with the Commission on Public Integrity, to establish regular training sessions sufficient to allow affected individuals to comply with this order.

C. Penalties

Any violation of this order may result in dismissal or other appropriate sanction as determined by the appointing officer of the individual committing such violation.

Reinstatement to his or her former position and salary grade after a disciplinary demotion constitutes all the relief to which an employee is entitled

Reinstatement to his or her former position and salary grade after a disciplinary demotion constitutes all the relief to which an employee is entitled
Matter of Neeley v Town of Colonie, 2010 NY Slip Op 09606, Appellate Division, Third Department

William Neeley was appointed to the position of Public Works Operation Supervisor in 1998, while Thomas Romano was appointed to the position of Highway Maintenance Supervisor in 2005.

Both Neeley and Romano worked for the Town of Colonie Department of Public Works and both were suspended from their respective positions in July 2008 pending the resolution of certain disciplinary charges that had been filed against them.

Found guilty of misconduct, the penalty imposed on both Neeley and Romano was demotion in title and grade.

Neeley and Romano appealed to the Town's personnel officer and ultimately their respective demotions were rescinded and a new penalty - suspension without pay for 30 days - was imposed on each.

Although Neeley and Romano were reinstated to their titles, grades and salaries, they appealed contending that certain of their former duties had been curtailed and, therefore, they had been subject to a de facto demotion.

Supreme Court dismissed their Article 78 petition as moot and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s action.

The Appellate Division said that as it was “undisputed” that both Neeley and Romano had been restored to their original titles, grades and salaries in compliance with the decision issued by the Town's personnel officer, they had received “all the relief to which they were entitled.”

Accordingly, said the court, Supreme Court’s dismissal of their petition as moot was correct.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09606.htm

A school employee giving reasonable assurance of continued employment is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits between school years

A school employee giving reasonable assurance of continued employment is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits between school years
Matter of Sultana v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2010 NY Slip Op 09598, Appellate Division, Third Department

It is “black letter law” that "A professional employee of an educational institution is precluded from receiving unemployment insurance benefits during the time between two successive academic years where the claimant has received a reasonable assurance of continued employment"

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed May 4, 2009, which ruled that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she had a reasonable assurance of continued employment.

Chand Sultana, a per diem substitute teacher employed by the New York City Department of Education, worked a total of 138 days during the school year. At the end of the school year Sultana received a letter from the Department “assuring her of continued employment” during the upcoming school year. The letter indicated the amount of work available and that the economic terms and conditions of employment were to be substantially the same as in the school year then ending.

Sultana applied for unemployment insurance benefits for the intervening summer but Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that she was ineligible to receive them because she had received a reasonable assurance of continued employment pursuant to Labor Law §590(10).

The Appellate Division rejected Sultana’s appeal challenging the Board’s determination.
The court explained that the record indicated that a Department of Education representative testified that Sultana would have as many opportunities to work during the succeeding school year as she had the prior year inasmuch as more schools were to be opened, resulting in greater demand for substitute teachers and there had been no reduction in the budget. Such testimony, together with the letter sent to Sultana by the Department, constituted substantial evidence supporting the Unemployment Insurance Board's determination.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09598.htm

Health insurance for retirees

Health insurance for retirees
Erie County Retirees Assn. v County of Erie [PA], 220 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2000), Certiorari denied, 121 S.Ct. 1247

Many public employers provide health insurance to retired public employees. Some employers may have elected to provide a different type or level of health insurance coverage to retirees eligible for Medicare than it provides to retirees not eligible for Medicare. This, as the Erie County case demonstrates, could prove dangerous.

According to the ruling in Erie County Retirees, a public employer may be sued for alleged age discrimination within the meaning of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act if it modifies its health insurance plan to provide retirees who are 65 or older (and therefore eligible for Medicare) with less generous benefits than its retirees under age 65.*

The decision indicates that initially Erie classified employees and retirees into three main health insurance coverage groups:

1. Current employees;

2. Medicare-eligible retirees; and

3. Retirees not eligible for Medicare. Each group had separate but similar traditional indemnity health insurance coverage.

When the county subsequently initiated changes in carriers in response to increases in health insurance costs, the retirees age 65 or older were enrolled in a health insurance plan called the SecurityBlue Plan.

Claiming that SecurityBlue provided inferior coverage compared to other plans and to the traditional indemnity coverage previously available to age 65+ retirees, the Association sued. Its basic argument: the county’s action violated the ADEA by placing retired employee into SecurityBlue on the basis of their having attained age 65.

The County, on the other hand, argued that it based its decision to place Medicare-eligible retirees in SecurityBlue not because of their age but for three age-neutral factors: (1) active versus inactive employment status, (2) cost, and (3) availability of plans. Its theory: ADEA allows an employer to take any action otherwise prohibited ... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.

The relevant provisions of the ADEA make it unlawful for an employer to:


1. Fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age; [or]

2. Limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way, which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his or her status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.

The district court dismissed the Association’s petition, holding that while eligibility for Medicare is an age-based factor ... the ADEA clearly was not intended to apply to retirees....

The Circuit Court, however, disagreed and said the issue should go to trial to determine if the County violated the ADEA by treating age 65+ retirees less favorably than retirees under age 65 with respect to health insurance.

As to the applicability of ADEA to retirees, the Circuit Court observed that the ordinary meaning of the term employee benefit should be understood to encompass health coverage and other benefits, which a retired person receives from his or her former employer.

The court said that:

It is clear that the ADEA covers discrimination in a post-employment benefit where the facially discriminatory policy is instituted while an individual is still an active employee, even if the event occurred one day prior to his or her retirement. Thus, it was inconceivable to the Third Circuit that Congress intended to allow an individual to challenge the employer’s action that occurred while still an employee but bar such action if the policy were adopted two days later, one day after the date of retirement....

The court decided that Congress did not intended to expressly prohibit discrimination in employee benefits for active workers, yet allow employers to discriminatorily deny or limit post-employment benefits to former employees at or after their retirement, although they had earned those employee benefits through years of service with the employer.

Agreeing with the position taken by EEOC, the Third Circuit ruled that the ADEA applies even if the retirees’ benefits are structured discriminatorily after retirement. The court said that the age 65+ retirees are individuals who have been treated differently by their employer with respect to [their] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

The court said that the fact that the county’s action was the result neither of some malevolent motive nor due to some hostile age-based stereotypes was irrelevant.

Also of some significance is the Court’s rejection of the County’s argument that “... the underwriting criteria adopted by another of its carriers, Highmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield, disqualified Medicare-eligible retirees from enrollment ....” Why? Because, said the court, the Supreme Court has indicated that an employer cannot avoid responsibility for a facially discriminatory benefit plan simply because the discrimination arises from the criteria imposed by outside entities with whom the employer has contracted to participate in providing the benefit.

The court’s conclusion: the County has treated age 65+ retirees differently than other retirees with respect to their compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... age. Accordingly, such retirees were found to have established a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, 29 USC 623(a)(1).

Presumably, the Association will prevail unless the county can prove that one of the ADEA’s safe harbors is found applicable -- i.e., there were some qualified, non-discriminatory reasons for its action.

What would satisfy this standard? The Circuit Court said that that the safe harbor provided [by the ADEA] is applicable if the County can meet the equal benefit or equal cost standard.


* The Association withdrew its claim alleging differences in benefits for retirees and active County employees violated the ADEA and proceeded only on its ADEA claim that the differences in benefits between the age 65 and older retirees and retirees under age 65 violate the ADEA.