Providing legal representation to public officers and employees being sued

Providing legal representation to public officers and employees being sued
Vitucci v City of New York, 272 AD2d 620

A New York City employee, Jacqueline Vitucci, was named as a defendant in a federal lawsuit. He asked Corporation Counsel to defend him in accordance with Section 50-k of the General Municipal Law.

Like similar representation provisions, Section 50-k(2) requires the Corporation Counsel to defend municipal employees in civil actions which the corporation counsel finds occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his [or her] public employment and in the discharge of his duties and was not in violation of any rule or regulation of his [or her] agency at the time the alleged act or omission occurred.

When Vitucci’s request was denied, he filed a petition seeking a court order requiring the Corporation Counsel to defend him. The Appellate Division sustained a lower court ruling dismissing his petition.

The court’s rationale: Whether an employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment and is entitled to legal representation must be determined in the first instance by the Corporation Counsel, whose determination may be set aside only if it lacks a factual basis, and in that sense, is arbitrary and capricious.

The court said that the report prepared by the Special Commissioner for Investigation for the New York City School District provided the Corporation Counsel with a sufficient factual basis to determine that the acts allegedly committed by Vitucci were not within the scope of his employment.

Retirees claim they were mislead by union concerning accepting a retirement incentive

Retirees claim they were mislead by union concerning accepting a retirement incentive
Dolce v Bayport-Blue Point UFSD, 286 AD2d 316

A number of school districts have negotiated retirement incentive provisions in the course of collective bargaining. Sometimes hindsight causes an individual to regret his or her decision to accept or reject the opportunity. The Dolce case concerns a number of teachers who had accepted a retirement incentive only to later regret their decision.

Essentially the retired teachers complained they were misled by their union when they decided to accept the incentive and retire.

According to the decision, Bayport-Blue Point Union Free School District and the teachers’ union negotiated a retirement incentive providing for a one-time payment of $34,000 to eligible teachers who retired by a specified date. Teachers electing the incentive were required to submit irrevocable resignations on or before April 28, 1997.

Dolce alleged that a number of teachers decided to take advantage of the incentive and retire because the Union’s chief negotiator advised them that this was the best offer they would get and that it would never be offered again.

As things turned out, the chief negotiator may have been somewhat pessimistic. In December 1998, the district and the union negotiated a second retirement incentive that provided for the same one-time payment to teachers who elected to retire by June 30, 1999. The second agreement specifically provided that it would not apply to teachers who had previously submitted their resignations.

Dolce and the other teachers sued, complaining that they lost substantial salary and pension benefits in reliance upon the Union’s representation that the 1997 one-time retirement incentive would not be offered again. They also objected to the district’s refusal to allow them to rescind or recant their resignations in order to take advantage of the second retirement incentive. Justice Emerson dismissed the petition, holding that it was untimely.

State Supreme Court Justice Emerson said that while Dolce’s petition concerning the union is based on allegations of breach of contract and fraud, Dolce’s remedy against the Union is an action for breach of the duty of fair representation.

The Appellate Division agreed, holding that:

Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiffs' claims against the Teachers' Association were time-barred, citing Bitterman v Herricks Teachers' Association, 220 AD2d 473. Further, as the claims against the superintendent of schools and other school officials, such claims are “inextricably intertwined with the claims against the Teachers' Association for breach of duty of fair representation.” Accordingly, said the court, they are governed by the four-month Statute of Limitations in CPLR 217 (2) (b), and thus, they are also time-barred [with respect to suing the district officials].

Another critical element in pursuing this lawsuit: Dolce had neglected to file a timely notice of claim as mandated by Section 3813(l) of the Education Law, a condition precedent to suing a school district concerning a “personal matter.”

Designation of a representative in writing found critical to making a lawful determination

Designation of a representative in writing found critical to making a lawful determination
Matter of Richards v City of Binghamton, 2011 NY Slip Op 00306, Appellate Division, Third Department

James Richards, a City of Binghamton firefighter, was receiving benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a as a result of his suffering a job-related disability.

Binghamton’s independent medical examiner subsequently determined that Richards was capable of returning to modified duty with specific restrictions and Fire Chief Daniel Thomas sent Richards a letter directing him to complete certain medical procedures and tests “within 30 days and report to work for light duty on a date six days from the date of the letter.” Richards was also advised that he had 10 days to appeal the determination by submitting a written request for appeal, accompanied by medical documentation that he was unable to perform light duty tasks.

Richards “was away on vacation” when Chief Thomas sent him the letter. The letter, however, was not received until after the deadlines for Richards to report to work or appeal had passed. Ultimately the city terminated Richards’ §207-a benefits following a number of communications and Richards sued, complaining that Binghamton failed to “comply with proper procedures.” Supreme Court agreed and directed the city to “continue paying benefits,” ruling that Richards was entitled to a hearing.

The Appellate Division agreed, holding that “Because [Binghamton] did not comply with its own procedures prior to terminating [Richards’] benefits, Supreme Court properly annulled the determination.”

The court noted that “A municipality is entitled to order medical examinations of a firefighter who is receiving benefits and direct the employee to return to light duty work if medically able (see General Municipal Law § 207-a [1], [3]).” Further, said the court, a municipality may terminate benefits if a firefighter refuses to report for such work, citing General Municipal Law §207-a[3].

Although §207-a does set out a procedural framework that must be followed for such determinations, it does permit "each municipality to formulate its own procedure consistent with the demands of due process” and such procedures may be established through collective bargaining.

In this instance, said the Appellate Division, the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] between Richards’ union and Binghamton provides that disagreements concerning determinations, other than initial determinations, — including whether a firefighter is able to perform light duty work — "will be resolved in accordance with the current City procedure using an impartial hearing officer."

The CBA, however, did not define what constituted the "current City procedure" and the parties did not agree on the meaning of that term. This did not create any insurmountable obstacle for the court, however, as the Appellate Division held that “Even if we accept [the city’s] contention that the CBA incorporates an undated document entitled Firefighter's and Police Officer's Disability Procedure (FPODP) as the current procedure, [the city] cannot prevail because it failed to comply with the FPODP.

The FPODP provided, in pertinent part, that "the Commissioner shall order the individual to report for such available modified duty.” Further, the parties agreed that Binghamton’s mayor is the "Commissioner," although that term is defined to also include "an agent appointed by" the Commissioner and so designated in writing by the Mayor.*

The Appellate Division found that because the record did not contain any written designation by the mayor granting “an agent” authority to perform the functions of the Commissioner, Chief Thomas did not qualify as the Commissioner's agent.

Accordingly, said the court, Thomas's letter does not constitute an order by the Commissioner, so Richards’ “noncompliance with that letter” cannot serve as a proper basis for discontinuing benefits.

Further, assuming that Chief Thomas’ letter was proper, the FPODP merely requires an individual who disagrees with the Commissioner's determination regarding a modified duty assignment to serve the Commissioner with "a demand for a hearing," It does not mention any supporting medical documentation is required to perfect such a demand.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division rejected the city’s argument that “pursuant to case law, [Richards] was not entitled to a hearing because he did not provide medical proof that he is unable to perform modified duties.

The court ruled that the case law cited by Binghamton, which included Matter of Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686, was inapplicable as the city had chosen “a procedural framework that does not require that medical proof be submitted along with the hearing request.”

* The designation of an “agent” in writing may critical in other situations as well. For example, Section 75.2 of the Civil Service Law permits an appointing authority to designate “a deputy or other person ... in writing” to conduct a disciplinary hearing for the purpose of making findings of fact and recommendations concerning the disposition of the charges filed against the employee and the penalty, if any, to be imposed. The importance of naming a hearing officer in writing is demonstrated by Perez v NYS Dept. of Labor, 665 NYS2d 714. Citing the Court of Appeals ruling in Wiggins v Board of Education, 60 NY2d 385, the Appellate Division said that because there was no written designation appointing the hearing officer, the appointing authority “lacked jurisdiction” to maintain the initial disciplinary proceeding” against Perez.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_00306.htm

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For additional information about concerning administering General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and providing benefits thereunder go to: http://booklocker.com/books/3916.html

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