Certification of the payroll critical to lawfully paying an individual in the classified service

Certification of the payroll critical to lawfully paying an individual in the classified service

Eldridge v Carmel Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2011 NY Slip Op 02620, Appellate Division, Second Department

The Personnel Officer of Putnam County, who also serves as the Personnel Director for the Putnam County Personnel Department, Paul Eldridge, sued the Carmel Central School District’s Board of Education and a number of employees of the District pursuant to Civil Service Law §102(2) to recover certain sums that were allegedly illegally paid by the School District to an individual in the classified service that had been employed by the District without the certification required by the Civil Service Law §100.*

Eldridge contended that the School District “illegally paid or authorized payment of salary or compensation to nonparty Joseph Gramando, totaling approximately $233,245” during the period February 10, 2006 through October 15, 2008, which payments Eldridge alleged were not properly certified as required by Civil Service Law §100(1)(a).

In response to a number of technical objections to the parties named as defendants in Eldridge’s petition, the Appellate Division, noting that the Board of Education was not an officer within the meaning of CSL §100(1)(a), said that Supreme Court should have dismissed Eldridge’s complaint with respect to the Board as an entity being named a defendant but that the complaint sufficiently alleged that School Board members “Kreps, Riley, Dougherty, MacDonald, Nesheiwat, Port, and Shilling,” as individual members of the Board of Education, were "officers by whom [nonparty Joseph Gramando] w[as] appointed in violation of the provisions of law and of the rules made in pursuance of law."

Further, said the court, Eldridge’s complaint sufficiently alleged that the officers of the District that he named in his petition, Terranova, Wilson, Stark, and Haywood, were "officer[s] signing or countersigning or authorizing the signing or countersigning of any warrant for the payment of" salary or compensation distributed to nonparty Joseph Gramando contrary to the provisions of Civil Service Law §100.

Among the defenses raised by the board members and district officers were the following:

1.      Eldridge failed to notify "the appropriate disbursing and auditing officers" that Gramando was being employed in violation of the law. 

 
The Appellate Division rejected the argument, holding that such notice that a person has been "promoted, transferred, assigned, reinstated or otherwise employed" in violation of the law is not a condition precedent to an action to recover sums illegally paid under Civil Service Law §102(2). Further, said the court, the “defendants failed to submit documentary evidence conclusively establishing that the salary and compensation allegedly paid to Gramando in violation of the law was properly certified by the civil service department or municipal commission having jurisdiction, as required by Civil Service Law § 100(1)(a).”

2.      Eldridge failed to serve a timely serve a notice of claim as required by Education Law § 3813(1). 

  
Citing Union Free School Dist. No. 6 of Towns of Islip & Smithtown v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 NY2d 371, the Appellate Division rejected this defense as well, commenting that “Contrary to the defendants' contention, an action commenced pursuant to Civil Service Law §102(2) is an action ‘to vindicate a public interest’ to which the notice of claim requirement in Education Law §3813(1) does not apply.”

 

3.      The action brought was untimely as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Education Law §3813(2-b). 

  
The court said that "All of the public policy considerations for finding that Education Law §3813's notice of claim requirement is inapplicable to [this action] are equally valid with respect to the Statute of Limitations set forth in [Section 3813(2-b)]" and since the action is to recover upon “a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute" a three-year statute of limitations is applicable. Accordingly, Eldridge’ action to recover sums allegedly illegally paid said the Appellate Division, ‘should be limited to the money paid to Gramando on or after June 2, 2006, citing General Construction Law §20.

In response to another argument advanced by the defendants, the court commented that Eldridge was not required, nor does he have the authority, to extend or terminate provisional appointments. It is the obligation of the appointing authority to terminate all provisional appointments "within two months following the establishment of an appropriate eligible list for filling vacancies" (Civil Service Law §65[3]).

The court explained that power of the civil service department and municipal commission lies in their ability to withhold certification "from an entire payroll or from any item or items therein." (Civil Service Law § 100[1][a]).

The Appellate Division said that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to establish that the individual defendants “continued to pay and approve salary and compensation to Gramando after the expiration of his provisional appointment and without proper certification of the payroll

* Subdivision 1(a) of Civil Service Law §100, Certification of payrolls, in pertinent part, provides that certification of the payroll is required and that “no disbursing or auditing officer of the state or of any civil division thereof shall approve or pay or take any part in approving or paying any salary or compensation for personal service to any person holding an office or position in the classified service unless the voucher or payroll therefor bears the certificate of the civil service department or  municipal commission having jurisdiction that the persons named therein  are employed in their respective positions in accordance with law and  rules made pursuant to law. The certificate of municipal commissions shall also include a statement of membership in an appropriate retirement system where such membership is mandatory.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_02620.htm
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Inability to obtain a timely waiver to reemploy a person receiving a retirement allowance from a public retirement system of this State does not result in a breach of contract

Inability to obtain a timely waiver to reemploy a person receiving a retirement allowance from a public retirement system of this State does not result in a breach of contract
LaSalle v Board of Educ. of Bridgehampton Union Free School Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 02632, Appellate Division, Second Department

Edward J. LaSalle, a retired schoolteacher, applied for a teaching position with the Bridgehampton Union Free School District. In order for LaSalle to be so reemployed without having his retirement allowance adjusted, the district applied for a “§211 waiver” pursuant to §211.2(a) of the Retirement and Social Security Law.*

In essence, if the school district’s application for a §211 waiver for LaSalle was not approved, LaSalle’s earnings could not exceed the statutory annual earnings limitation of $27,500, which was the sum then applicable to him.** [The maximum currently permitted without loss of retirement benefits set out in RSSL §212 absent a waiver is $30,000. However, there is no earning limitations in or after the calendar year in which the retired individual attains age 65.]

LaSalle signed a salary notification for the school year containing a notation that the salary was "pending NYS waiver for Retiree." In addition, a resolution of the board of education appointing LaSalle as a teacher recited that the hiring was "effective" September 5, 2006. The resolution did not contain termination date for the period of employment but it did state that confirmation of his appointment was "pending NYS Education Department waiver for employment of retiree." The school superintendent also wrote to LaSalle to the same effect.

The school district’s waiver application, which it had submitted in June 2006, was denied.

The district then resubmitted a second waiver application and LaSalle commenced teaching on September 5, 2006.

However, by November 2006 LaSalle was close to the maximum compensation he could earn without have his retirement allowance adjusted and the State Department of Education had not acted on its resubmitted waiver application.

In view of the situation, the district offered LaSalle a number of options, including “placement of his retirement benefits on hold, resignation prior to the date when his salary would reach the statutory earnings limitation, or termination of employment.”

LaSalle elected to resign, which resignation took effect prior to the district’s receiving the Education Department’s approval of the §211 application it had filed on behalf of LaSalle.

LaSalle then sued the district “to recover damages for breach of contract and wrongful termination of employment.”

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s determination that the district had established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law when it dismissed LaSalle’ petition.

Failure to obtain the required waiver in a timely fashion may result in a financial liability to the retiree.

For example, in Freda v Board of Educ. of City of New York, 224 A.D.2d 360, the court ruled that the NYC Police Retirement System could “recoup” over $100,000 of the retirement allowance that had been paid to Freda because the required §211 approval had not been obtained prior to his being reemployed by the New York City Board of Education following his retirement from the New York City Police Department.

N.B. RSSL §217.1 requires "school salary transparency and disclosure" and mandates that school districts and all BOCES to report " all monies earned by a retired person in their employ that is in excess of the limitations set out in §212 to the appropriate retirement system and to the appropriate political subdivision. RSSL §217.2 requires the school district or the BOCES employing a retired person "who is eligible to collect or is already collecting a retirement allowance" to report, among other things, all earnings of such an individual to the appropirate retirement system and to the State Comptroller.


*The Optional Retirement Plans, available to certain employees of SUNY, CUNY, the statutory colleges at Cornell and Alfred Universities, the community colleges and the New York State Department of Education, are not public retirement systems of this State within the meaning of Article V, §7 of the State Constitution.

** RSSL §211.2(a), in pertinent part, provides that ”No retired person may be employed in a position in public service pursuant to subdivision one hereof except upon approval of  …  (2) the commissioner of education if such person is to be employed in the unclassified service of a school district other than the city of New York, a board of cooperative educational services or a county vocational education and extension board.... The

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_02632.htm

Considering “mitigating factors” in setting a disciplinary penalty

Considering “mitigating factors” in setting a disciplinary penalty
Matter of Senior v Board of Education of Byram Hills Cent. School Dist., 37 AD3d 610,

The Board of Education of the Byram Hills Central School District adopted the findings of a disciplinary hearing officer that concluded that Fenton Senior was guilty of the charges of misconduct filed against him. The charge alleged that Senior was involved in an altercation with a co-worker. The penalty imposed by the Board: termination of Senior’s employment with the School District.

The Appellate Division, after affirming the finding that Senior was guilty of the charges filed against him, annulled the penalty imposed: termination. The court said that “the penalty of termination imposed was so disproportionate to the petitioner's conduct as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness,” citing Matter of Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222.

The court then remanded the case to the School Board “for the imposition of an appropriate penalty less severe than the termination of [Senior’s] employment.”

The reason given by the Appellate Division for remanding the case for the purpose of imposing a lesser penalty: The Board “failed to give adequate consideration to certain mitigating factors.”

The “mitigating factors” listed by the court: Strong’s four-year employment record was unblemished, and he performed good deeds in the community.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2007/02/physical-altercation-with-coworker.html
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Fitness for promotion

Fitness for promotion
Alston v City of New York, 270 AD2d 3

Sometimes an employee sues the appointing authority in an effort to secure a promotion. Alston, a New York City caseworker, complaining that he had been denied a promotion because of his earlier conviction for Federal mail fraud. Alston asked a Supreme Court justice to direct his agency, New York City’s Administration for Children’s Services, to promote him to a supervisory position. Alston’s theory: Children’s Services’ failure to promote him constituted a violation of Section 296.15 of the Executive Law (New York’s Civil Rights Law).*
 
The Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s dismissal of Alston’s petition on the grounds that the caseworker’s allegations concerning the reasons why he was denied the promotion -- conviction of a crime -- were speculative.

In contrast, the court noted that record “set out evidence of [Alston’s] mediocre performance as a caseworker and of [Alston’s] prior attempt to deceive ACS by seeking a medical leave when he had actually taken a job with another City agency.”

Further, the court said that it concluded that Alston’s mail fraud conviction, which involved his submission of false car service vouchers in connection with his employment as a caseworker, raises legitimate issues about his fitness for the supervisory position.

* Another element relevant to this case: Section 752 of New York’s Correction Law. Section 752, in general, prohibits an employer from considering an applicants’ conviction of a crime in making its employment decision.