Work related investigations

Work related investigations

Cerrone v Cahill, USDC, NDNY, 84 F. Supp. 2d 330

An investigation is being conducted by the appointing authority concerning alleged misconduct by an employee.

1. Do the same rules that apply when the appointing authority conducts an investigation involving alleged work-related misconduct control when the appointing authority is investigating alleged off-duty misconduct?

2. Is there any difference between an investigation by an appointing authority for the purpose of filing administrative disciplinary charges against an employee and its investigation directed towards bringing criminal charges against the individual?

As the Cerrone case demonstrates, if the focus of the investigation is criminal rather than administrative, different rules and safeguards control.

State Police Sergeant Thomas Cerrone filed a law suit in federal district court contending that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated in the course of his being investigated concerning “some sort of cover-up” related to his role in an investigation of a hit and run accident that occurred on April 3, 1993.

According to the decision, Cerrone reviewed and signed an accident report prepared by Trooper Robert Gregory that was alleged to be facially insufficient and contained false information. Sometime later, a letter signed by Ed Scott stating that Rory Knapp, the brother of State Trooper Timothy Knapp, left the scene of an accident on April 3, 1993 was received by the Division of State Police. Ed Scott denied writing the letter and the letter writer was never positively identified.

On January 19, 1995, Cerrone was stopped by investigators, placed in an unmarked police car and taken to a hotel for questioning about the hit and run incident.

Cerrone was given a Miranda warning and advised that he was the target of a criminal investigation. The investigators did not have a warrant for their action. After being questioned for six hours, Cerrone was permitted to leave when he agreed to take a polygraph test.

One of the recognized exceptions to the prohibition against warrant less searches and seizures is work-related investigations. Cerrone argued that in this case, the investigation was criminal rather than work related and thus he was entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Noting that the procedures governing administrative investigations set out in the applicable Taylor Law agreement were not implemented in the course of Cerrone’s interrogation, Judge Thomas J. McAvoy agreed that the basic purpose of the investigation was criminal rather than administrative in nature.

The court said that the distinction between searches and seizures for the purpose of criminal prosecution and those undertaken for work related or administrative purposes is critical and many courts upholding a standard lower than probable cause [in work related investigations] have recognized that the lower standard is not appropriate in the criminal arena.

Thus, observed Judge McAvoy, if Cerrone was seized or arrested without probable cause, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The court also noted that the available evidence prior to Cerrone’s being questioned revealed little linking him, as opposed to other officers, to the alleged cover-up.

The decision sets out the following basic principles to be followed in investigation of employee misconduct:

1. Where a search or seizure is conducted by a government employer to further a criminal investigation, the traditional requirement of probable cause is necessary and the individual is protected by the Fourth Amendment.

2. Government employers cannot avoid the traditional Fourth Amendment safeguards applicable in the context of criminal investigations simply by labeling a criminal search work-related.

Law enforcement agencies may have greater difficulty here than other government employers. Typically, a non-law enforcement agency’s investigation of alleged misconduct looks towards filing administrative disciplinary charges against an individual. As the court ruled in Biehunik v Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, Fourth Amendment rights do not apply in investigations of work-related misconduct.

In contrast, the very nature of investigations by law enforcement agencies of its personnel often tends to blur the line between administrative investigation for the purpose of initiating administrative disciplinary action and an investigation of the same or a related incident for the purpose of bring criminal charges against the individual. Accordingly, the distinctions identified by Judge McAvoy in the Cerrone case should be kept in mind when investigations into alleged employee misconduct are initiated by a law enforcement agency.

However, in Dombrowski v Safir, decided by the Appellate Division, First Department, 269 AD2d 161, the court upheld the termination of New York City police officer Kenneth J. Dombrowski as a result of his refusal to answer questions directly and narrowly relating to his official duties.

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New York State's Banking and Insurance Departments to be consolidated into a new Department of Financial Services effective October 3, 2011

New York State's Banking and Insurance Departments to be consolidated into a new Department of Financial Services effective October 3, 2011

Source: Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLPC

As part of the approval of the budget bill on March 31, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo signed into law Chapter 62 of the Laws of 2011 which consolidates the Banking Department and the Insurance Department into a new Department of Financial Services*.

BSK reports that:

“The new law consolidates the Banking and Insurance Departments to establish the Department of Financial Services, which will have a Banking Division and an Insurance Division.

"There will be a Superintendent of Financial Services appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of the Senate, and who shall hold office at the pleasure of the Governor. The Superintendent of Financial Services is granted enforcement and regulatory authority over financial products and services. The Superintendent of Financial Services shall appoint a Deputy Superintendent who shall be the head of the Banking Division and a Deputy Superintendent who shall be the head of the Insurance Division.

"The Superintendent of Financial Services may remove at will any Deputy Superintendent, except as may be otherwise provided by the New York Civil Service Law.”

* Article V,  §2 of the State's Constitution provides that "There shall be not more than twenty civil departments in the state government, including those referred to in this constitution. The legislature may by law change the names of the departments referred to in this constitution." §3 of Article V of the Constitution provides that." Subject to the limitations contained in this constitution, the legislature may from time to time assign by law new powers and functions to departments, officers, boards, commissions or executive offices of the governor, and increase, modify or diminish their powers and functions. Nothing contained in this article shall prevent the legislature from creating temporary commissions for special purposes or executive offices of the governor and from reducing the number of departments as provided for in this article, by consolidation or otherwise."

Bond, Schoeneck & King’s report concerning this change is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.bsk.com/archives/detail.cfm?archive=publication&ID=1286
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Eligibility for General Municipal Law §207-a benefits and for Workers’ Compensation Benefits are not linked and are to be determined on their own merits

Eligibility for General Municipal Law §207-a benefits and for Workers’ Compensation Benefits are not linked and are to be determined on their own merits
Matter of Davidson v LaGrange Fire District, 2011 NY Slip Op 02666, Appellate Division, Second Department

Deborah A. Davidson filed and Article 78 action “in the nature of mandamus,” seeking an order to compel the LaGrange Fire District to make a final determination regarding her application for medical benefits under General Municipal Law §207-a.

Davidson has sustained an injury on a fire call and the Fire District awarded her salary benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a. However, Davidson had also asked for certain medical benefits related to her work-connected injury that had been denied by the New York State Insurance Fund, the Fire Districts workers' compensation insurance carrier.

An administrative law judge for the Workers’ Compensation Board had ruled that the State Insurance Fund was liable for the full cost of the Davidson’s surgery but the Fund had filed an application seeking a review by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.

Before a decision was issued by the Board, Davidson filed her CPLR Article 78 petition. The petition, among other things, sought an order in the nature of mandamus, in effect, to compel the respondents to issue a final determination as to the her request for medical benefits under General Municipal Law §207-a.

Supreme Court denied Davidson’s petition ruling that it was premature as she had not exhausted her administrative remedies before the New York State Workers' Compensation Board concerning her claims. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division explained that in the event an officer or agency fails or refuses to conduct a hearing or decide a particular matter where there was a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to do so, mandamus is appropriate to compel performance of the required duty.

Davidson argued that although the Fire District had made a determination that she is entitled to receive benefits under General Municipal Law §207-a, had not made a determination regarding coverage under General Municipal Law §207-a for her medical expenses.

As a determination by the WCB regarding workers' compensation benefits, and a determination by a municipal employer regarding statutory benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a, are separate and distinct matters, which the Court of Appeals had made clear in Matter of Balcerak v County of Nassau (94 NY2d 253), “[a] municipality's obligation to pay wages and medical costs under General Municipal Law §207-a or § 207-c is in no way dependent upon any determination made by the WCB.”

In the words of the Appellate Division, quoting Balcerak, "the eligibility determinations for these distinct types of statutory benefits" must "stand and be resolved essentially on their own merits."*

Here, any workers' compensation remedies that may have been available to Davidson were separate from and independent of her request that Fire District provide coverage for the full cost of medial expenses pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a. Accordingly, said the court, she was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies in the workers' compensation proceeding before pursuing this CPLR Article 78 proceeding against the Fire District.

The matter was remanded to Supreme Court for further proceedings on Davidson’s petition, “and a new determination thereafter.”

* In Balcerak the Court of Appeals held that a determination by the WCB that an injury is work-related does not, by operation of collateral estoppel, automatically entitle an injured employee to benefits under General Municipal Law §207-c [which applies to law enforcement personnel], which ruling presumably would be controlling in a GML §207-a case [which applies to firefighting personnel].

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_02666.htm
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Where a collective bargaining agreement sets out a “board agreement to arbitrate,” the arbitrator, rather than the court, is to determine if the grievance is subject to arbitration

Where a collective bargaining agreement sets out a “board agreement to arbitrate,” the arbitrator, rather than the court, is to determine if the grievance is subject to arbitration

Matter of City of Binghamton v Binghamton Police Benevolent Assn., Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 02109, Appellate Division, Third Department

When the Binghamton chief of police instituted new rules concerning the use of sick leave and subsequently counseled a police officer about an alleged pattern of suspected sick leave abuse and the need to provide a physician’s notes for all future sick leave absences, the Police Benevolent Association filed a grievance alleging a violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the Association and the City. In addition, the Association contended that the new policy constituted “departure from past practices.”

The grievance was denied by both the police chief and a representative of the mayor. The City, in response to the Association demand to submit the grievance to arbitration, filed a petition pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR seeking a stay of arbitration. Supreme Court denied the petition and the City appealed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s determination, noting that the sole issue to be resolved was whether the parties to the CBA agreed to refer disputes in this specific area to arbitration.

In such situation, said the Appellate Division, courts "should merely determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA."

As the parties' broad agreement to arbitrate provided that "[a]ny grievance or dispute which may arise between the parties involving the application, meaning, or interpretation of this [a]greement," the Appellate Division ruled that the subject matter of the dispute bears a reasonable relationship to the articulated contract provisions and, therefore, it is for an arbitrator to decide in the first instance whether the precise scope of those provisions covers the issues presented in the Association’s grievance.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_02109.htm

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Ordering a correction officer to submit to a drug test, without more, does not violate the officer’s rights under the Constitution or §75 of the Civil Service Law

Ordering a correction officer to submit to a drug test, without more, does not violate the officer’s rights under the Constitution or §75 of the Civil Service Law

Department of Corrections v Johnson, OATH Index #1303/11

A New York City correction officer who tested positive for illegal drugs argued that the results were obtained in violation of her union and privacy rights. In essence, the officer challenged the legality of a second drug test administered to her after she tested positive in an earlier test on the grounds that the test violated the office’s right to union representation under §75 of the Civil Service Law and her right to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.

OATH Administrative Law Judge John Spooner rejected the correction officer’s theory and found that the tests had been properly conducted.

Significantly, Judge Spooner found that the procedure did not involve questioning of the officer by a supervisor or anyone else. Rather Johnson was ordered by a captain to report to the toxicology unit and there was directed to provide a hair sample by a civilian staff member. Because the test did not involve questioning, no written notice of a right to union representation was required under Civil Service Law §75(2).

The ALJ recommended that Johnson’s employment be terminated.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/11_Cases/11-1303.pdf

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Disqualification of candidates for employment as police officers

Disqualification of candidates for employment as police officers

Needleman v Rockland County, 270 A.D.2d 423

The Rockland County Commissioner of Personnel disqualified Seth Needleman, David Oliver and Donna Russo for appointment as patrol officers in the Rockland County Sheriff’s Department. The three applicants sued in an effort to overturn the commissioner’s determination.*

Russo complained that the personnel commissioner had improperly disqualified her from appointment as a patrol officer.

The Appellate Division disagreed, commenting that the commissioner did not act irrationally or arbitrarily in relying upon “the evaluations of two independent psychologists, who used objective tests, to determine that [Russo] was not qualified for the position of patrol officer.”

The standards applied by the court in resolving Russo’s appeal:

1. An appointing authority has wide discretion in determining the fitness of candidates.

2. Such discretion is particularly broad in the hiring of persons for positions in law enforcement, to whom high standards may be applied.

3. The courts will not interfere with the discretion of the appointing authority to determine the qualifications of candidates unless the determination warrants judicial intervention because it is irrational and arbitrary.

Finding that Russo’s disqualification was not an abuse of discretion, the Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court’s dismissal of her petition.

Section 50.4 of the Civil Service Law provides for the disqualification of applicants or appointees by the state civil service department or the municipal commission having jurisdiction. Among the reasons set out in Section 50.4 for disqualifying an applicant: the applicant lacks any of the established requirements for admission to the examination or for appointment to the position.**

However, in such cases the applicant must be provided with a pre-disqualification opportunity to object to his or proposed disqualification. In the words of Section 50.4:

No person shall be disqualified pursuant to this subdivision unless he [or she] has been given a written statement of the reasons therefore and afforded an opportunity to make an explanation and to submit facts in opposition to such disqualification.

Although a full and formal pre-disqualification hearing is not required, the individual must be advised of his or her right to file a written objection to the disqualification and given a reasonable opportunity to submit the objection to the municipal commission or the state department.

Further, as a general rule, only the responsible municipal civil service commission, or in the case of employment by the State, the State Department of Civil Service may disqualify an applicant for employment in the public service.

Typically, the appointing authority does not have any independent authority to disqualify an individual in contrast to declining to appoint an individual certified for permanent appointment to a position in the competitive class consistent with the so-called Rule of Three [Section 61.1, Civil Service Law.***
 

However, the appointing authority may request a municipal commission or the State Department of Civil Service to initiate action that could lead to the disqualification of the applicant by the commission or by the State Department of Civil Service.

* The court dismissed both Needleman’s and Oliver’s appeals as abandoned and only considered Russo’s challenge her disqualification.

** Section 50.4 permits the disqualification of an applicant or an appointee (a) who is found to lack any of the established requirements for admission to the examination or for appointment to the position for which he applies; or (b) who is found to have a disability which renders him or her unfit to perform in a reasonable manner the duties of the position in which he or she seeks employment, or which may reasonably be expected to render him or her unfit to continue to perform in a reasonable manner the duties of such position; or (d) who has been guilty of a crime; or (e) who has been dismissed from a permanent position in the public service upon stated written charges of incompetency or misconduct, after an opportunity to answer such charges in writing, or who has resigned from, or whose service has otherwise been terminated in, a permanent or temporary position in the public service, where it is found after appropriate investigation or inquiry that such resignation or termination resulted from his incompetency or misconduct, provided, that in cases of dismissal, resignation or termination after written charges of incompetency, the examination or certification in question be for a position that requires the performance of a duty or duties which are the same as or similar to the duty or duties of the position from which the applicant has been dismissed, resigned or terminated on account of incompetency; or (f) who has intentionally made a false statement of any material fact in his application; or (g) who has practiced, or attempted to practice, any deception or fraud in his application, in his examination, or in securing his eligibility or appointment; or (h) who has been dismissed from private employments because of habitually poor performance.

*** Section 61.1, in pertinent part, provides: Appointment and promotion. 1. Appointment or promotion from eligible lists. Appointment or promotion from an eligible list to a position in the competitive class shall be made by the selection of one of the three persons certified by the appropriate civil service commission as standing highest on such eligible list who are willing to accept such appointment or promotion.
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The party objecting to an arbitration award has a heavy burden to meet to prevail

The party objecting to an arbitration award has a heavy burden to meet to prevail
Matter of Cherry v New York State Ins. Fund, 2011 NY Slip Op 02797, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court denied Stephanie Cherry’s Article 75 petition seeking to vacate the arbitration award upholding State Insurance Fund’s determination to terminate her employment based on violations of its zero-tolerance workplace violence policy.

Cherry appealed but the Appellate Division ruled that Cherry failed to meet her heavy burden of establishing that the arbitration award was irrational, or in violation of any of the grounds enumerated in CPLR 7511(b).*

Further, said the court, “There exists no basis to disturb an arbitrator's finding because ‘unless there is no proof whatever to justify the award so as to render it entirely irrational . . .the arbitrator's finding is not subject to judicial oversight.’”

Addressing another argument raised by Cherry, -- the award should be vacated due to [the State Insurance Fund’s] non-compliance with the procedures of CPLR Article 75 – the Appellate Division said that she had waived such a basis for challenging the award because she had continued participating in the arbitration proceeding “without objection."

* In addition to the grounds for vacating an arbitration award set out in CPLR Article 75, awards have been vacated by the courts based on a finding that the award violated a strong public policy.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_02797.htm
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Parties directed to proceed to arbitration based on the court finding that its decision could not be made “without extensive fact-finding or legal analysis”

Parties directed to proceed to arbitration based on the court finding that its decision could not be made “without extensive fact-finding or legal analysis”
Matter of Newburgh v McGrane, 2011 NY Slip Op 02665, Appellate Division, Second Department

The City Council of the City of Newburgh passed a resolution reappointing Jean-Ann McGrane to the position of City Manager for the City of Newburgh for a three year period ending May 31, 2009. Subsequently the City and McGrane entered into an employment agreement consistent with that resolution passed by the City Council which provided that McGrane was entitled to severance pay and other benefits if the City terminated her employment.


In addition, the agreement set out a broad arbitration provision applicable to "[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this Agreement arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof."
When the City Council passed a resolution dated January 12, 2009 terminating McGrane's employment as City Manager "effective immediately," McGrane filed a demand for arbitration seeking an award of her salary and all benefits pursuant to the employment agreement.

The City filed a petition seeking to vacate the demand for arbitration and permanently stay arbitration on the ground that the employment agreement was void as against public policy. The City contended that the agreement violated the “term limits rule” by binding the successor members of the City Council to a contract relating to the area of governance entered into by members of the predecessor City Council.

The Supreme Court denied the City’s petition, dismissed the proceeding, and directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s ruling, explaining tha:

Arbitration is favored in the State of New York as a means of resolving disputes, and courts interfere as little as possible with agreements to arbitrate.

1. "The courts may intervene in a dispute which the parties had agreed to arbitrate where the arbitrators could not grant any relief without violating public policy."

2. Where a court examines an arbitration agreement ". . . on its face and concludes that the granting of any relief would violate public policy without extensive fact-finding or legal analysis, [it] may then intervene and stay arbitration.";

3. Citing Matter of Karedes v Colella, 100 NY2d 45, the Appellate Division noted that "The term limits rule prohibits one municipal body from contractually binding its successors in areas relating to governance unless specifically authorized by statute or charter provisions to do so"; and

4. "An agreement that violates the term limits rule is against public policy (see Matter of City of Utica Urban Renewal Agency v Doyle, 66 AD3d 1495; Karedes v Village of Endicott, 297 AD2d 413, 415)."

In this instance the Appellate Division found that any determination as to whether an arbitrator could not grant any relief without violating public policy on the ground that the employment agreement violated the term limits rule could not be made at this stage in the proceeding without extensive fact-finding or legal analysis.

Accordingly, said the court, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, directing the parties to proceed to arbitration.

The Appellate Division noted that in the event that the arbitrator's award violates public policy, the Supreme Court retained the power to vacate the award."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_02665.htm
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Collateral Estoppel may bar a lawsuit involving essentially the same issues earlier adjudicated in a quasi-judicial administrative hearing

Collateral Estoppel may bar a lawsuit involving essentially the same issues earlier adjudicated in a quasi-judicial administrative hearing
Pisano v NYC Board of Education, 2002 WL 484305, [not selected for publication in the Official reports ], Affd. 303 A.D.2d 735

Sometimes an individual, unsuccessful in one lawsuit, will commence another legal action involving essentially the same issues and parties. However, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating an issue which has already been decided by the courts involving the same parties and issues. The Pisano case involves such multiple litigations and illustrates how the court will apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel in case the subsequent litigation involves a challenge to an administrative determination.

In Abiele Contracting, Inc. v New York City School Construction Authority, 91 NY2d 1, the court held that the doctrine may apply to bar relitigating issues decided by administrative agencies if those decisions are "quasi-judicial" in nature. According to the ruling, an administrative agency is quasi-judicial in nature if it is given express statutory authority to act adjudicatively.

In contrast, if an agency only invokes its executive powers under the governing statute in making its determination, it is not exercising "quasi-judicial powers." In Venes v Community School Board, 43 NY2d 520, the Court of Appeals indicated that challenging the administrative agency's decision in court in situations where the agency did not arrive at its decision as a result of its acting in an adjudicative or judicial capacity would not be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

In this case, a State Supreme Court judge decided the doctrine prevented Sheila Pisano from pursuing this lawsuit against the New York City Board of Education.

This action arose after a medical arbitrator sustained the New York City Board of Education Medical Board's ruling that Pisano's absence from work did not result from her job-related injury. According to the record, Pisano had fallen at work on October 18, 1996. As a result of injuries she alleged she suffered because of her fall, Pisano did not return to work.

After receiving the Medical Board's determination, Pisano asked for, and was granted, an independent evaluation by a medical arbitrator accordance with the provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the United Federation of Teachers and the Board. She also authorized the Board of Education Medical Board to release her entire medical file to the medical arbitrator.

Dr. David Kaufman, the medical arbitrator, sustained the Medical Board's decision based on his medical examination of Pisano as well as a review of her available medical records and his conversations with Pisano's personal physician. Dr. Kaufman noted in his report that he had not reviewed all of Pisano's medical records because Pisano "failed to provide the Medical Board with this essential material." His conclusion: the Medical Board therefore acted correctly in not accepting the accident as being the cause of [Pisano's] absence from October 18, 1996 until the present" on the basis of the record before it.

Pisano challenged the arbitrator's determination pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. Her argument: the arbitrator's determination "was the result of misconduct by the Board and that the arbitrator failed to examine all of [her] medical records and thus did not conduct a thorough and exhaustive record."

A State Supreme Court justice dismissed Pisano's petition, ruling that the arbitration award was proper notwithstanding her allegations, as the award was "rational and unambiguous."

When Pisano filed second lawsuit based on the Medical Board's determination, the City asked the court to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel and dismiss her petition. The court granted the City's motion, noting that the Medical Board is an agency within the meaning of 2 NYCRR 353, which provides for medical examinations, the creation of a medical board and the right to a hearing to challenge any adverse findings adopted by the Board.

The court said that "[t]hese procedures demonstrate that the determinations of these agencies are not merely the exercise of any rule-making or policy-making resolutions but are adjudications pursuant to their specific authority to actually decide cases. The court's conclusion: the Medical Board acted in a quasi-judicial capacity and its rulings bar any subsequent proceedings pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

In addition, the court rejected Pisano's argument that "the arbitration award should be vacated since [she] was denied her Due Process at the arbitration hearing," noting that a Justice of the Supreme Court already ruled on "the propriety and manner of the arbitration proceeding and found that it fully conformed with the law." Thus, said the court, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this action is appropriate.

The court also commented that "while the [Pisano] apparently did not appear with an attorney when she underwent her medical examinations, she was represented by the Union, which under a collective bargaining agreement with the Board, represents the interests of its members." In addition, said the court, "a party's election to appear without counsel will not invalidate the award of any part of the proceeding in which the right to counsel was not exercised."

New parking placard policies for the executive branch and Legislature

New parking placard policies for the executive branch and Legislature
Source: Office of the Governor

In response to State Inspector General Ellen Biben finding systemic problems with how parking placards were distributed and how they were used by some state employees, Governor Cuomo set new rigorous new policies for state issued parking placards.

Currently, the state distributes two types of parking placards. One says "police" in all capital letters, the other says "official business."

The new parking placard policies for the executive branch and Legislature provide that:

1. State officials are required to fill out a form before receiving the placard indicating why the placard is needed and what vehicle it will be used in.


2. State officials are required to sign a certification acknowledging the proper use of a placard.

3. The Executive Chamber is recalling all outstanding "Police" placards so they can be redistributed to police personnel only.

4. State officials without police powers will be issued "Official Business" placards.

5.The State Police will review and distribute all "Police" placards.

6. The Governor's Office of Public Safety will review and distribute all "Official Business" placards.

7. Agencies will review requests by employees to ensure that their duties and responsibilities would require the use of a placard.

8. Complaints of improper use of "Police" placards will be handled by State Police.

9. Complaints of improper use of "Official Business" placards will be handled by the Inspector General's office. 

10. An employee who misuses the placard could face disciplinary action.

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