Public employer may be liable for damages suffered as a result of negligent supervision and negligent retention of its employees

Public employer may be liable for damages suffered as a result of negligent supervision and negligent retention of its employees

Gray v Schenectady City School Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 05925, Appellate Division, Third Department

One of the defendant in this action, Steven Raucci, was employed by the Schenectady City School District) as its director of facilities. Raucci, however, did not appeared in this action as “In April 2010, he was convicted of 18 felony counts, including several for conduct against plaintiffs and their property during the time when he was employed by [Schenectady City School District].”

The Grays’ complaint alleged Raucci and the school district inflicted intentional emotional distress. In addition, their compliant charged the school district with “negligent 

In this appeal the school district argued that Supreme Court should have dismissed the complaint with respect to it.

The Appellate Division agreed in part, noting that “a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress” requires the plaintiff to allege more than conduct that causes inconvenience or embarrassment, even if such conduct continues for a protracted period of time. The complaint, said the court, must also allege that the defendant's conduct was "'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . and [was] utterly intolerable in a civilized community."

Although the court found that “Liberally construed,” the Grays’ allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Raucci, the Appellate Division held that the school district’s “mere inaction after receiving complaints about Raucci's behavior” cannot be considered the type of extreme and outrageous conduct that is "utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Further, said the court, Schenectady could be held vicariously liable for Raucci’s tortious actions only if he committed them in furtherance of school district’s business and within the scope of his employment.

Thus, concluded the Appellate Division, Supreme Court should have granted the part of defendant's motion seeking dismissal of the first cause of action against it. 

Supreme Court, however, properly denied the part of the school district’s motion seeking to dismiss the causes of action alleging negligent supervision and negligent retention of Raucci. 

The Appellate Division explained that such claims require allegations that the school district knew or should have known of “its employee's propensity to engage in the conduct that caused the [Grays’] injuries, and that the alleged negligent supervision or retention [of Raucci] was a proximate cause of those injuries.” 

In this instance the Grays alleged that Raucci vandalized their property and threatened their personal safety. Such alleged conduct, said the court, certainly appears to fall outside the scope of his employment. Further, the Grays alleged that Raucci used the school district’s computers, material and personnel to harass and intimidate them and that, even after Schenectady was informed of Raucci's conduct targeting them, it failed to investigate or discipline him. 

The Appellate Division concluded that the complaint filed by the Grays “sufficiently alleged that [Schenectady’s] negligent supervision or retention of Raucci permitted him continued access to the means to carry out his actions, which caused [the Grays] injuries.” Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court “correctly refused to dismiss the second and third causes of action.” 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_05925.htm

Only a governmental not-for-profit corporation’s records is subject to FOIL

Only a governmental not-for-profit corporation’s records is subject to FOIL

Matter of Rumore v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of Buffalo, . 35 A.D.3d 1178

Philip Rumore, president of the Buffalo Teachers Federation, sought a court order directing the Board of Education of the City School District of Buffalo (Board) and the Education Innovation Consortium [EIC] to provide him with certain records and information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] (Public Officers Law Article 6). The records sought included EIC’s salary and budgetary records.

Supreme Court granted Rumore’s petition in part by directing the Board to obtain those records from EIC and then to make them available to Rumore for copying. The Appellate Division disagreed and ruled that the lower court should have dismissed Rumore’s petition in its entirety.

The ruling points out that FOIL requires the disclosure of the records of an “agency”. The term “agency” is defined as "any state or municipal department, board, bureau, division, commission, committee, public authority, public corporation, council, office or other governmental entity performing a governmental or proprietary function for the state or any one or more municipalities thereof, except the judiciary or the state legislature" (Public Officers Law §86 ).

Although a not-for-profit corporation may fall within the definition of an agency subject to FOIL if its purpose is governmental and it has the attributes of a public entity, here, said the court, the record demonstrated that EIC does not have those attributes.

Among the elements the court found persuasive in finding that EIC was not a governmental body were the following:

EIC's budget is not approved by any governmental agency;

EIC has a self-elected Board of Directors;

The School District has no authority to hire or discharge any employee of EIC;

EIC did not have offices in any District-owned building;

EIC provides services to the District on a fee-for-services basis; and

EIC provides services to other clients as well as the District

Thus, said the court, Supreme Court “erred in concluding that EIC is an agency subject to the mandates of FOIL.”

In addition, the Appellate Division said that it agreed with the arguments advanced by the Board and EIC that because the records sought by Rumore are not "kept, held, filed, produced or reproduced by, with or for" the District by EIC, they do not fall within the ambit of FOIL.

Presumption of work-connected heart attack for the purposes of Retirement and Social Security Law Section 363-a(1)

Presumption of work-connected heart attack for the purposes of Retirement and Social Security Law Section 363-a(1)

Tortorello v McCall, App. Div., 286 AD2d 841, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 97 NY2d 607

Roni Tortorello's husband, who was employed as a lieutenant in the Rockland County Sheriff's Department, collapsed at home after jogging earlier in the day and was pronounced dead at a hospital emergency room. The cause of death was listed as coronary occlusion due to coronary arteriosclerosis and thrombosis, with a prior myocardial infarction listed as a contributing condition.

The New York State Employees' Retirement System [ERS], concluding that Lt. Tortorello had not sustained an accident in service on the date of his death, rejected his widow's application for an accidental death benefit. ERS determined that Lt. Tortorello's death occurred at home on his day-off after jogging and thus was not the result of an accident sustained while in service.

Tortorello's widow sued, claiming that she was entitled to accidental death benefits because Section 557 of the Retirement and Social Security Law provides that “any condition of impairment of health caused by diseases of the heart, resulting in disability or death to a member shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty and the natural and proximate result of an accident, unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence”.

The Appellate Division disagreed with this theory, noting that the relevant statutory “heart presumption” clause provides that “any condition of impairment of health caused by diseases of the heart, resulting in disability or death to a member shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty and the natural and proximate result of an accident, unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence.” Accordingly, the “heart presumption” is a rebuttable presumption.

Here there was no medical evidence identifying any particular work-related incident as a possible cause of Lt. Tortorello coronary occlusion. Under these circumstances, and because it is not necessary that all possible accidental causes be disproved in order to rebut the statutory presumption, ERS could rationally focus on the day of Lt. Tortorello fatal cardiac event as the date of the presumptive accident. In effect, the court concluded that under the facts in this case, ERS had “rebutted the presumption.”

The court ruled that since the day on which he suffered the heart attack was a scheduled day off for Lt. Tortorello and as there was no evidence that he actually performed any of his police duties that day, ERS could rationally conclude that decedent did not sustain an accident in service on that day.

The Appellate Division commented that ERS has interpreted the “in service” requirement for an accidental death benefit as the equivalent of the “in service” requirement for accidental disability benefits ... and that it saw no basis to disturb that interpretation.

The court's conclusion: Tortorello's claim that the stress of late husband's duties caused or contributed to his disease of the heart and resulting coronary occlusion is unsupported by any medical evidence in the record. Further, risks inherent in her late husband's routine police duties are not accidental in nature.

In identical language, Retirement and Social Security Law Section 363-a(1) provides a “heart presumption” for firefighters. Presumably the court's rationale in deciding the Tortorello case would be applied in a similar situation involving a firefighter.

Evidence of pretext bars summary judgment of a Title VII complaint alleging unlawful discrimination because of race

Evidence of pretext bars summary judgment of a Title VII complaint alleging unlawful discrimination because of race

Curry v Menard, Inc., CA7, 00-4219, 270 F.3d. 473

Demonstrating that other employees of a different race were not subjected to the same disciplinary action for the same offense is sufficient to establish “pretext” for the purposes of Title VII.

Sylvia Curry, a black woman employed as a cashier at Menard's Sokie, Illinois store, complained that Menard Inc. had discharged her from her position because of her race.

Menard, on the other hand, said that Curry had been discharged in accordance with its “progressive discipline” policy after it found shortages in her cash receipts on three different occasions. The district court granted Menard's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's ruling, noting that From January 1, 1997, to December 31, 1998, Curry was the only cashier to be suspended or terminated for violating the store's progressive discipline policy although the record shows that had the policy been strictly enforced sixteen other cashiers should have been suspended or terminated in that same time period.

The Circuit Court said that summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Under such circumstances the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As Curry did not provide any direct evidence of discrimination because of her race, she had to prove a prima facie case of discrimination under the burden-shifting method. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Curry was required to show that:

1. She belongs to a protected class;

2. She performed her job according to Menard's legitimate expectations;

3. She suffered an adverse employment action; and

4. Similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

A prima facie case creates a presumption of discrimination and shifts the burden to the employer to produce evidence of a legitimate, race-neutral reason for the adverse action taken against the employee. If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff then has the burden of showing that the employer's stated “nondiscriminatory reason” is merely a pretext for discrimination.

Finding that Curry proved a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, the court said that Menard contended that Curry was not meeting its legitimate performance expectations because she had accumulated three “cash drawer” violations. Arguing that it had dismissed Curry in accordance with its progressive discipline policy, Menard claimed it had shown that it had terminated Curry for nondiscriminatory reasons.

Curry, then, was required to show that Menard's explanation of its action was pretext for unlawful discrimination.

The Circuit Court decided that Curry had met this burden by establishing that two employees, Margaret Venetico and Anne Merurio, both non-black cashiers, had two or more cash discrepancies but were neither suspended nor terminated. The court decided that this was sufficient evidence of alleged pretext to survive Menard's motion for summary judgment.

The key element here was Curry's evidence that prior to, and after, the tenure of Michael Stanley as the manager of the store none of the cashiers who had discrepancies, including Curry, was disciplined under the company's “progressive discipline” policy. In contrast, while Stanley was the manager there were three employees who had cash shortages but only Curry was fired.

This, said the court, leaves a material question of fact of whether terminating Curry for breaching the policy was a pretext.

Accumulating tenure eligibility credit while serving as an “intern teacher” not authorized

Accumulating tenure eligibility credit while serving as an “intern teacher” not authorized

Matter of Berrios v Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 05804, Appellate Division, Second Department

The genesis of this case was the termination of Jesus Berrios by the Board of Education of the Yonkers City School District without a hearing. Berrios, contending that he had attained tenure in his position with the District by estoppel or acquiescence,*complained that the Board’s action violated his rights to due process as set out in Education Law §3020-a.

The thrust of Berrios’ argument was that he had “accumulate tenure credit” while teaching under “an intern teaching acquiesce certificate.” The Appellate Division rejected his theory, holding that in the absence of holding a valid teaching certificate, in contrast to being employed pursuant to an “intern certificate,” a teacher’s service could not be credited toward completion of a required probationary period.

The Appellate Division ruled that Berrios was terminated while serving as a probationary employee and such personnel may be terminated at any time during the probationary period without being given a reason and without a hearing.**

Another element in this case concerned so-called “Jarema Credit.”*** Noting that “[s]ervice as a substitute teacher does not constitute probationary service for purposes of obtaining tenure as a regular teacher,” the Appellate Division observed that the Court of Appeals had held that a substitute teacher's three-year probationary period can be reduced to one year if the individual is eligible for "Jarema" credit.

Where, however, a teacher has not served as a regular substitute in the year immediately preceding a probationary appointment, such service will not count towards Jarema credit. In addition, said the court, case law supported its conclusion that Jarema credit cannot be awarded to a regular substitute teacher who does not possess a valid New York State teacher's certificate.

The court explained that “[a]llowing a substitute teacher to accumulate tenure credit for time spent teaching pursuant to an intern certificate would mandate that a school board grant or deny tenure to that teacher before he or she obtained a valid teacher's certificate.”

Rejecting Berrios’ contention that he acquired tenure by estoppel, the Appellate Division noted that a contrary determination would discourage school districts from employing students authorized to teach pursuant to intern certificates, thereby depriving both the school districts and the teachers of that valuable experience.

In light of the foregoing, the Appellate Division decided that Supreme Court correctly determined that Berrios did not earn tenure by estoppel because his first year of teaching as a substitute pursuant to an intern certificate was not creditable toward tenure. Thus, the Supreme Court was correct in denying his the petition, and properly dismissed the proceeding.

* Tenure by estoppel or acquiesce results "when a school board accepts the continued services of a teacher or administrator, but fails to take the action required by law to either grant or deny tenure prior to the expiration of the teacher's probationary term" [McManus v Bd. of Educ. of Hempstead UFSD, 87 NY2d 183].

** See Education Law §2509[1][a]; §3014[1] N.B. The summary termination of a probationer, however, will not be permitted if it is determined to have been for an unconstitutional or unlawful purpose or reason.

*** Typically referred to by the name of the bill's sponsor, then Assemblyman Stephen J. Jarema, Education Law §2573[1][a], in pertinent part, provides that “Teachers and all other members of the teaching staff, authorized by section twenty-five hundred fifty-four of this article, shall be appointed by the board of education, upon the recommendation of the superintendent of schools, for a probationary period of three years, except that in the case of a teacher who has rendered satisfactory service as a regular substitute for a period of two years … the probationary period shall be limited to one year….”

:

**** Prior to February 2, 2004, the entry-level certificate for classroom teachers were denominated "provisional" and are now denominated "initial."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_05804.htm

Arbitrating a grievance after the Taylor Law contract expires

Arbitrating a grievance after the Taylor Law contract expires

Uniformed Fire Fighters Assoc. Inc. v City of Mount Vernon, NYS Supreme Court, Justice Lefkowitz, Not selected for publication in the Official Reports

The 1996-2000 collective bargaining agreement between the Firefighters Union and the City of Mount Vernon provided that an issue involving random drug testing should be resolved by December 1, 1997 or it would be submitted to arbitration. The issue, however, was neither resolved nor submitted to arbitration.

The collective bargaining agreement expired on December 31, 2000. As no successor agreement had been negotiated, the provisions of Section 209-a(1) -- the so-called Triborough Amendment -- were triggered.*

On July 30, 2001 the city demanded that the drug testing issue be submitted to arbitration. The Union objected and asked State Supreme Court Justice Lefkowitz to stay the arbitration. Justice Lefkowitz granted the Union's motion, ruling that the City's demand to submit the matter to arbitration was untimely since the collective bargaining agreement had expired prior to its making the demand.

According to Justice Lefkowitz:

Absent conduct of the parties evincing survival of the arbitration clause notwithstanding expiration of the contract or an intent of survival contained within the parameters of the contract, an otherwise arbitrable dispute is not subject to arbitration upon expiration of the agreement “except as to rights and wrongs, which had already come into existence.

 

Justice Lefkowitz said that Section 209-a(1), making it an improper labor practice for a public employer to refuse to continue all the terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated, applies only “insofar as the rights of the union are concerned.”

Justice Lefkowitz commented that “statutorily only the public employer is obligated to arbitrate with respect to the terms of the expired contract until a new agreement is effective."

Implicit in Justice Lefkowitz's interpretation: Section 209-a(1) provides that only the union may demand arbitration under the expired agreement's contract grievance procedure concerning an alleged violation of a term or condition contained the expired Taylor Law agreement.

However, in Schenectady v Lainhartsi, 177 AD2d 826, the Appellate Division, Third Department said that the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement did not result in the agreement's arbitration clause being unenforceable as Section 209-a(1) [see Footnote below] mandates the continuation of all of the terms of the expired agreement, including the arbitration provision. Presumably this means that the mandates set out in Section 209-a(1) apply equally to both the employer and the union.

In contrast, if a provision set out in an expired Taylor Law agreement itself contained a “sunset” provision, presumably that specific limitation would be observed and excluded from the mandates implicit in Section 209-a(1).

* Section 209-a(1) of the Civil Service Law, makes it an improper practice for a public employer “to refuse to continue all the terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated.”

Surrender of prior contract benefit for a different benefit does not bar renegotiation of the new benefit in the future

Surrender of prior contract benefit for a different benefit does not bar renegotiation of the new benefit in the future

Mtr. of the Scotia-Glenville Central School District, Impasse procedure, PERB Case M200-080

A union agrees give up one employee benefit or accepts a lesser employee benefit in order to obtain, maintain or improve a different employee benefit. Is such a decision “permanent” insofar as subsequent demands to modify the benefit “bought” when the union agreed to the negotiated compromise? This was a consideration in the Scotia-Glenville case.

The Scotia-Glenville School Employees Local 766 and the Scotia-Glenville Central School District declared an impasse in collective bargaining.

In the impasse resolution procedure that followed, one of the issues before PERB Fact Finder Ben Falcigno was the District's demand that employee contributions for health insurance be increased.

Local 766 objected, contending that its prior decisions to take less pay in favor of continuing the higher level of employer health insurance contributions on behalf of unit members, had, in essence, frozen the employees' contributions for health insurance at levels previously agreed upon.

Falcigno rejected the Local's argument. He said that the Local's claim that what was done at one point in time is dispositive of all future considerations concerning the subject in dispute is inappropriate unless the actual agreement clearly says that such is to be the case. Without such a clear and specific contract provision, the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement sets the stage “for a whole new consideration of what is appropriate for these parties for the period of the newly negotiated agreement” by the fact finder.