The Marriage Equality Act and New York State Taxes
Source: New York State Department of Taxation and Finance
A document explaining the tax implications of New York's Marriage Equality Act has been posted on the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance's Web site at http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/memos/multitax/m11_8c_8i_7m_1mctmt_1r_12s.pdf
The document explains that all marriages, whether of same-sex couples or different-sex couples, will be treated equally under all laws of the state.
Accordingly, the Act applies to all taxes administered by the Tax Department as of the effective date of July 24, 2011.
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL
July 30, 2011
Layoff, reinstatement and tenure by estoppel considered
Layoff, reinstatement and tenure by estoppel considered
Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16256
1. Appeal of MARY DICKINSON from action of the Board of Education of the Deer Park Union Free School District and Lynn Hadity relating to preferred eligibility rights.
2. Appeal of MARY DICKINSON from action of the Board of Education of the Deer Park Union Free School District regarding teacher termination.
KING, JR., Acting Commissioner.--On or about March 31, 2009, petitioner commenced an appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 challenging the determination of the Board of Education of the Deer Park Union Free School District (“board” or “respondent board”) to appoint Lynn Hadity as a reading teacher (“Dickinson I”). In a separate appeal commenced on or about July 22, 2009, petitioner challenged the actions of the board terminating her employment (“Dickinson II”).
On June 30, 2010, a decision was rendered, consolidating the two appeals (Appeals of Dickinson, 49 Ed Dept Rep 463, Decision No. 16,082) and concluding in Dickinson I that the board violated petitioner’s rights when it failed to recall her to the vacant reading teacher position created in the 2008-2009 school year and ordering that she be reinstated to a reading teacher position with back pay, seniority and benefits as of September 1, 2008; and, concluding in Dickinson II, that when petitioner was recalled to a reading teacher position in June 2009, she was a probationary employee not entitled to the procedural protections of Education Law §§3013, 3020 and 3020-a and, therefore, was properly terminated on July 28, 2009.[1]
Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, respondent appealed the decision to Supreme Court, Albany County. In a decision dated February 22, 2011, the court ordered that the petition be granted solely to the extent of vacating the Commissioner’s determination in Dickinson II and remanded the matter to the Commissioner “for clarification on the effect of his determination in Dickinson I on petitioner’s tenure claims raised in Dickinson II and the basis upon which such determination is made.”[2] Accordingly, as remanded by the court, I have considered petitioner’s tenure claims in Dickinson II in light of Dickinson I.
Pursuant to §276.5 of the Commissioner’s regulations, respondent board submitted a memorandum of law addressing the effect of the decision in Dickinson I on petitioner’s tenure status.[3] The board alleges that the decision in Dickinson I properly did not interfere with its authority to grant or withhold tenure from petitioner. The board seeks a determination that its recall and termination of petitioner as a probationary teacher was proper, that petitioner did not obtain tenure by virtue of Dickinson I and that petitioner is entitled only to the salary, seniority and benefits of a probationary reading teacher as of September 1, 2008 until her termination on August 31, 2009, less any compensation she received in the interim.
On or about September 1, 2005, petitioner was appointed as a remedial reading teacher in the district, subject to a two-year probationary period. On April 24, 2007, the board granted petitioner tenure in reading, effective August 31, 2007. On June 30, 2007, petitioner’s position was abolished and her name was placed on the district’s preferred eligibility list for a reading position.
Dickinson I held, inter alia, that the board violated petitioner’s rights when it failed to notify and recall her to an elementary school reading teacher position created for the 2008-2009 school year and ordered that petitioner “be reinstated to a reading teacher position with back pay, seniority and benefits as of September 1, 2008, less any compensation she may have received in the interim.”
Petitioner’s reinstatement on September 1, 2008 by order pursuant to Dickinson I did not result in her acquiring tenure in the district. As previously noted in Dickinson II, in Remus v Bd. of Educ. for Tonawanda City School Dist. (96 NY2d 271, 278), the Court of Appeals held that a board of education resolution that grants tenure to a teacher effective on a specified future date “confers tenure upon the teacher only as of that specified future date.” (see Mahoney v Mills, 29 AD3d 1043, lv to app den 7 NY3d 708). There is no dispute that petitioner’s teaching position was properly abolished on June 30, 2007, prior to the August 31, 2007 effective date of the conditional tenure appointment on August 31, 2007. Therefore, petitioner’s tenure never took effect.
Consequently, when petitioner was “recalled and appointed” as of September 1, 2008, by virtue of the order in Dickinson I, it was to a probationary position in the reading tenure area. Although she was awarded back pay, petitioner never rendered any further actual service in that tenure area. Therefore, petitioner was a probationary employee when the board acted to recall her to a reading position on June 23, 2009 and simultaneously rescinded her conditional tenure appointment. Accordingly, petitioner was a probationary employee when she was terminated by respondent and was not entitled to the procedural protections of Education Law §§3013, 3020 and 3020-a.
Nor does the decision in Dickinson I result in petitioner acquiring “tenure by estoppel”.
“Tenure by estoppel ‘results when a school board fails to take the action required by law to grant or deny tenure and, with full knowledge and consent, permits a teacher to continue to teach beyond the expiration of the probationary term’” (Matter of Gould v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sewankhaka Cent. High School Dist. et al., 81 NY2d 446, citing Matter of Lindsey v Bd. of Educ., of Mount Morris Cent. School Dist., et al., 72 AD2d 185, 186) (emphasis added). This is not the situation before me. Here, the board did not knowingly permit petitioner to teach beyond the expiration of her probationary term but, instead, was ordered in Dickinson I to reinstate her retroactively to September 1, 2008. It is noteworthy that, when the board did act to recall petitioner on June 23, 2009 to a probationary position in the reading tenure area, it simultaneously rescinded its April 24, 2007 conditional appointment of petitioner in that tenure area. Indeed, petitioner never rendered any further service in the reading tenure area under the reasonable expectation that it would lead to tenure. As such, the board did not itself acquiesce or consent to the continuance of her employment in the district and, consequently, petitioner did not acquire tenure by estoppel (see LaBarr v Board of Ed. Of Union Free School Dist. No. 1, Town of Hempstead, 425 F Supp 219 [EDNY 1977]).
Based on the foregoing, I find that the relief provided in Dickinson I had no effect on petitioner’s tenure status and, therefore, the rationale for dismissing petitioner’s tenure claims as set forth in the decision in Dickinson II remains unaltered (Appeals of Dickinson, 49 Ed Dept Rep 463, Decision No. 16,082).
While petitioner disagrees with the board’s determination to terminate her from her position, petitioner has failed to present any evidence that the reason for the board’s denial of tenure was in violation of any statute or the constitution. Accordingly, having determined that the decision and order in Dickinson I had no effect on petitioner’s tenure claims raised in Dickinson II, I hereby affirm and adopt the findings and determination in Dickinson II in its entirety for the reasons set forth therein and in this decision.
THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
[1] The facts and procedural history are set forth in the original decision.
[2] As ordered by Supreme Court, the sole issue for consideration is the effect of the determination in Dickinson I on petitioner’s tenure claims raised in Dickinson II. To the extent the parties attempt to introduce arguments not directly relevant to the tenure issue, I have not considered them.
[3] By letter dated April 8, 2011, my Office of Counsel notified each party of the opportunity to submit additional affidavits and memoranda of law on the sole issue of the effect of Dickinson I on petitioner’s tenure status. Petitioner did not submit any further papers or memorandum.
Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16256
Full text of the decision
1. Appeal of MARY DICKINSON from action of the Board of Education of the Deer Park Union Free School District and Lynn Hadity relating to preferred eligibility rights.
2. Appeal of MARY DICKINSON from action of the Board of Education of the Deer Park Union Free School District regarding teacher termination.
KING, JR., Acting Commissioner.--On or about March 31, 2009, petitioner commenced an appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 challenging the determination of the Board of Education of the Deer Park Union Free School District (“board” or “respondent board”) to appoint Lynn Hadity as a reading teacher (“Dickinson I”). In a separate appeal commenced on or about July 22, 2009, petitioner challenged the actions of the board terminating her employment (“Dickinson II”).
On June 30, 2010, a decision was rendered, consolidating the two appeals (Appeals of Dickinson, 49 Ed Dept Rep 463, Decision No. 16,082) and concluding in Dickinson I that the board violated petitioner’s rights when it failed to recall her to the vacant reading teacher position created in the 2008-2009 school year and ordering that she be reinstated to a reading teacher position with back pay, seniority and benefits as of September 1, 2008; and, concluding in Dickinson II, that when petitioner was recalled to a reading teacher position in June 2009, she was a probationary employee not entitled to the procedural protections of Education Law §§3013, 3020 and 3020-a and, therefore, was properly terminated on July 28, 2009.[1]
Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, respondent appealed the decision to Supreme Court, Albany County. In a decision dated February 22, 2011, the court ordered that the petition be granted solely to the extent of vacating the Commissioner’s determination in Dickinson II and remanded the matter to the Commissioner “for clarification on the effect of his determination in Dickinson I on petitioner’s tenure claims raised in Dickinson II and the basis upon which such determination is made.”[2] Accordingly, as remanded by the court, I have considered petitioner’s tenure claims in Dickinson II in light of Dickinson I.
Pursuant to §276.5 of the Commissioner’s regulations, respondent board submitted a memorandum of law addressing the effect of the decision in Dickinson I on petitioner’s tenure status.[3] The board alleges that the decision in Dickinson I properly did not interfere with its authority to grant or withhold tenure from petitioner. The board seeks a determination that its recall and termination of petitioner as a probationary teacher was proper, that petitioner did not obtain tenure by virtue of Dickinson I and that petitioner is entitled only to the salary, seniority and benefits of a probationary reading teacher as of September 1, 2008 until her termination on August 31, 2009, less any compensation she received in the interim.
On or about September 1, 2005, petitioner was appointed as a remedial reading teacher in the district, subject to a two-year probationary period. On April 24, 2007, the board granted petitioner tenure in reading, effective August 31, 2007. On June 30, 2007, petitioner’s position was abolished and her name was placed on the district’s preferred eligibility list for a reading position.
Dickinson I held, inter alia, that the board violated petitioner’s rights when it failed to notify and recall her to an elementary school reading teacher position created for the 2008-2009 school year and ordered that petitioner “be reinstated to a reading teacher position with back pay, seniority and benefits as of September 1, 2008, less any compensation she may have received in the interim.”
Petitioner’s reinstatement on September 1, 2008 by order pursuant to Dickinson I did not result in her acquiring tenure in the district. As previously noted in Dickinson II, in Remus v Bd. of Educ. for Tonawanda City School Dist. (96 NY2d 271, 278), the Court of Appeals held that a board of education resolution that grants tenure to a teacher effective on a specified future date “confers tenure upon the teacher only as of that specified future date.” (see Mahoney v Mills, 29 AD3d 1043, lv to app den 7 NY3d 708). There is no dispute that petitioner’s teaching position was properly abolished on June 30, 2007, prior to the August 31, 2007 effective date of the conditional tenure appointment on August 31, 2007. Therefore, petitioner’s tenure never took effect.
Consequently, when petitioner was “recalled and appointed” as of September 1, 2008, by virtue of the order in Dickinson I, it was to a probationary position in the reading tenure area. Although she was awarded back pay, petitioner never rendered any further actual service in that tenure area. Therefore, petitioner was a probationary employee when the board acted to recall her to a reading position on June 23, 2009 and simultaneously rescinded her conditional tenure appointment. Accordingly, petitioner was a probationary employee when she was terminated by respondent and was not entitled to the procedural protections of Education Law §§3013, 3020 and 3020-a.
Nor does the decision in Dickinson I result in petitioner acquiring “tenure by estoppel”.
“Tenure by estoppel ‘results when a school board fails to take the action required by law to grant or deny tenure and, with full knowledge and consent, permits a teacher to continue to teach beyond the expiration of the probationary term’” (Matter of Gould v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sewankhaka Cent. High School Dist. et al., 81 NY2d 446, citing Matter of Lindsey v Bd. of Educ., of Mount Morris Cent. School Dist., et al., 72 AD2d 185, 186) (emphasis added). This is not the situation before me. Here, the board did not knowingly permit petitioner to teach beyond the expiration of her probationary term but, instead, was ordered in Dickinson I to reinstate her retroactively to September 1, 2008. It is noteworthy that, when the board did act to recall petitioner on June 23, 2009 to a probationary position in the reading tenure area, it simultaneously rescinded its April 24, 2007 conditional appointment of petitioner in that tenure area. Indeed, petitioner never rendered any further service in the reading tenure area under the reasonable expectation that it would lead to tenure. As such, the board did not itself acquiesce or consent to the continuance of her employment in the district and, consequently, petitioner did not acquire tenure by estoppel (see LaBarr v Board of Ed. Of Union Free School Dist. No. 1, Town of Hempstead, 425 F Supp 219 [EDNY 1977]).
Based on the foregoing, I find that the relief provided in Dickinson I had no effect on petitioner’s tenure status and, therefore, the rationale for dismissing petitioner’s tenure claims as set forth in the decision in Dickinson II remains unaltered (Appeals of Dickinson, 49 Ed Dept Rep 463, Decision No. 16,082).
While petitioner disagrees with the board’s determination to terminate her from her position, petitioner has failed to present any evidence that the reason for the board’s denial of tenure was in violation of any statute or the constitution. Accordingly, having determined that the decision and order in Dickinson I had no effect on petitioner’s tenure claims raised in Dickinson II, I hereby affirm and adopt the findings and determination in Dickinson II in its entirety for the reasons set forth therein and in this decision.
THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
[1] The facts and procedural history are set forth in the original decision.
[2] As ordered by Supreme Court, the sole issue for consideration is the effect of the determination in Dickinson I on petitioner’s tenure claims raised in Dickinson II. To the extent the parties attempt to introduce arguments not directly relevant to the tenure issue, I have not considered them.
[3] By letter dated April 8, 2011, my Office of Counsel notified each party of the opportunity to submit additional affidavits and memoranda of law on the sole issue of the effect of Dickinson I on petitioner’s tenure status. Petitioner did not submit any further papers or memorandum.
July 29, 2011
The administrative tribunal, not the court, weighs the evidence and determines the credibility of witnesses in an administrative hearing
The administrative tribunal, not the court, weighs the evidence and determines the credibility of witnesses in an administrative hearing
Matter of Martin v Board of Trustees of the Vil. of Pelham Manor, 2011 NY Slip Op 06106, Appellate Division, Second Department
Matter of Martin v Board of Trustees of the Vil. of Pelham Manor, 2011 NY Slip Op 06106, Appellate Division, Second Department
The Village of Pelham Manor found Robert Manor, a Village police officer guilty of a number disciplinary charges filed against him including excessive use of paid sick leave and insubordination. The penalty imposed, termination.
Manor appealed, contending that the Village’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Appellate Division disagreed, sustaining the Village’s findings and the penalty it imposed.
The court explained that the standard of review in an administrative determination made after a hearing is limited to considering whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence. In contrast, the Appellate Division said that “it is the function of the administrative agency, not the reviewing court, to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and determine which evidence to accept or reject.”
Accordingly, where there is conflicting evidence and, or, testimony, it is the administrative tribunal, not the court, that weights the evidence and the determines credibility of the witnesses testifying at the hearing.
As to the penalty imposed, dismissal from his position, the Appellate Division, applying the so-called Pell test {[Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222], held that “the penalty of termination of employment was not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law,”
An appointing authority does not have the authority to take unilateral action to dismiss an individual because of alleged pre-employment misconduct
An appointing authority does not have the authority to take unilateral action to dismiss an individual because of alleged pre-employment misconduct
Umlauf v Safir, 286 AD2d 267
Clearly, an employee may be subjected to disciplinary action for his or her off-duty misconduct that adversely affects his or her employer. If the employee is found guilty, any one of a number of penalties, including termination, may be imposed. The Umlauf case raises a related issue: what action, if any, may the appointing officer take in consideration of an employee's “pre-employment” misconduct.
In this instance the employee sued the City of New York following the Police Commissioner's dismissing him from his position without a hearing. Although the employee's petition seeking to annul the Commissioner's action was dismissed by State Supreme Court Justice William Davis, the Appellate Division reversed Justice Davis' decision “on the law.”
The Appellate Division ordered Commissioner Safir to reinstate the individual to his former position. If the Commissioner wished have the employee terminated, said the court, Safir would have to submit a request for such action in accordance with the provisions of Civil Service Law Section 50.4.
Section 50.4 provides for the disqualification of applicants or eligibles by the state civil department or responsible municipal civil service commission for a variety of reasons. The court's decision indicates that the relevant provision in this case is Section 50.4(d). Paragraph (d) authorizes the disqualification of an individual who has been guilty of a crime.
Section 50.4 further provides that “[n]o person shall be disqualified pursuant to this subdivision unless he [or she] has been given a written statement of the reasons therefore and afforded an opportunity to make an explanation and to submit facts in opposition to such disqualification.”
The court found that Safir had terminated the employee because of the individual's pre-employment conduct. This, said the Appellate Division, was improper -- an appointing authority does not have the authority to take such unilateral action. The court pointed out that in this instance Section 50.4 of the Civil Service Law vests the authority to disqualify or remove the individual in the head of New York City's Department of Citywide Administrative Services, not the head of a City department or agency.
Further, the individual may neither be disqualified nor terminated, as the case may be, unless he or she is provided with a written explanation of the reasons for the proposed action and given an opportunity to submit an explanation and facts opposing such action prior to his or her disqualification for, or termination of, employment.
Where the appointing authority seeks to have an individual disqualified or employee terminated for one or more reasons set out in Section 50.4, it should so advise the State Department of Civil Service or the responsible municipal civil service commission, as the case may be, setting out its reasons for seeking the disqualification or termination of the individual.
Is the individual who is to be disqualified or terminated pursuant to Section 50.4 entitled to a hearing before the department or municipal commission? In Mingo v Pirnie, 55 NY2d 1019, the Court of Appeals ruled that no “Section 50.4 hearing” is required where the individual is advised of the reasons for the proposed action and given an opportunity to submit a written explanation and exhibits contesting his or her disqualification or termination.
Discontinuing General Municipal Law Section 207-c benefits
Discontinuing General Municipal Law Section 207-c benefits
Dacey v Dutchess County, 121 AD2d 536
An individual is receiving benefits pursuant to Section 207-a or Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law and is absent on disability leave. While on disability leave and while still receiving benefits, the individual served with disciplinary charges alleging off-duty misconduct that occurred while he or she was on such leave. This was the fact pattern underlying a question raised by a reader. The question: What happens to the Section 207-c benefits if the individual is found guilty following a disciplinary hearing and the penalty imposed is termination?
The Appellate Division's decision in the Dacey case indicates that Section 207-a and Section 207-c benefits cease upon the termination of the employee.
Dacey, a Dutchess County corrections officer, was injured in the line of duty and was granted disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-c. While on disability leave she was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to Section 75 of the Civil Service Law. Found guilty of the charges, she was terminated. The County discontinued her Section 207-c benefits when she was dismissed. Claiming that she could not be deprived of her disability benefits solely on the basis of her termination following disciplinary action, Dacey sued.
The Appellate Division said that Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law must be read together with Section 75 of the Civil Service Law. Its conclusion: Dacey was entitled to receive her Section 207-c benefits only until she was terminated following her being found guilty of misconduct in the disciplinary action.
May the employer discontinue the payment of Section 207-a or Section 207-c whenever the employee is lawfully removed from the payroll rather than solely upon his or her “termination of employment” such as the 30-day suspension without pay authorized by Civil Service Law Section 75 or pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement?
Noting that prior to a final determination in the disciplinary action, Section 207-c benefits could not be suspended without a prior evidentiary hearing, the Appellate Division advised that such benefits had to be continued until a “final determination ... which would justify her removal from the payroll” was made. However, this does not suggest that the employee subject to disciplinary action must be continued in Section 207-a or 207-c status pending a final determination in the administrative disciplinary procedure if there is some lawful basis to otherwise discontinue such payments.
It would seem that the courts would not hold the payment of Section 207-a and Section 207-c benefits absolute and agree that they may be discontinued for the duration of any Section 75 or contract disciplinary action involving a lawful “suspension without pay” such as the 30-day period of suspension pursuant to Section 75.3 pending a determination of disciplinary charges; when the individual would otherwise be removed from the payroll such as approval of the accused individual's request to adjourn a scheduled hearing date; or as a result of the imposition of a disciplinary penalty of a suspension without pay for a specified period.
Applying the statute of limitations
Applying the statute of limitations
Dolce v Bayport-Blue Point UFSD and others, 286 AD2d 316
Sometimes an individual will claim that his or her union had violated its duty of fair representation. The Dolce cases explores a number of issues, including a claim involving an alleged breach of the union's duty of fair representation that were intertwined with Statute of Limitation problems.
According to the Appellate Division, this lawsuit was brought by members Bayport-Blue Point Teachers Association against the Association and the School District. Dolce's compliant alleged a “breach of contract.” In reality, said the court, Dolce's complaint appeared to a violation of the union's “duty of fair representation” claim.
Sustaining State Supreme Court Justice Emerson dismissal of the complaint for a number of technical reasons, including being time-barred, the Appellate Division, said that while the plaintiffs describe their action as involving a breach of contract, “the gravamen [material part] of the complaint is that the defendant Bayport - Blue Point Teachers' Association, Inc., unfairly favored one group of teachers over the Dolce plaintiffs in negotiations with the [school district] over the terms of two successive retirement incentives, thereby causing the Dolce plaintiffs to lose salary and pension benefits.”
According to the Appellate Division, Dolce's claims against the Teachers' Association are, in essence, for breach of duty of fair representation. This means, said the court, the commencement of their action is governed by a four-month Statute of Limitations.
Its conclusion: the Supreme Court correctly determined that the Dolce's claims against the Teachers' Association were time-barred since their petition was filed after the four-month period had passed.
The court also said that “[a]s the claims against the [School District] are inextricably intertwined with the claims against the Teachers' Association for breach of its duty of fair representation, they are governed by the four-month Statute of Limitations ... and thus, are also time-barred.”
Another element in this case: the Dolce plaintiff’s failure to serve a timely notice of claim on the school district. Filing such a notice, said the court, was a condition precedent to the commencement of the action against the school district. Further, the Supreme Court did not have any authority to grant the Dolce plaintiffs permission to serve a late notice of claim.
Why didn't the court has such authority? Because, explained the Appellate Division, citing Sainato v Western Suffolk BOCES, 242 AD2d 301, Dolce ask the lower court for such permission after the Statute of Limitations for bring their law suit had already expired
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
CAUTION
Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the decisions summarized here. Accordingly, these summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard.
Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
Copyright 2009-2024 - Public Employment Law Press.
Email: nyppl@nycap.rr.com.