Right to counsel in an administrative disciplinary hearing

Right to counsel in an administrative disciplinary hearing
Matter of Elmore v Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District, Board of Education, 273 A.D.2d 307

The Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District terminated the employee following an administrative disciplinary hearing held pursuant to Education Law §3020-a.

The employee appealed the dismissal, contending that the Hearing Officer’s ruling unfairly denied him his right to counsel during the hearing when the Hearing Officer ruled that the employee could not discuss his “cross-examination testimony” with his attorney during any adjournments in the proceding.*

The Supreme Court agreed and granted the employee’s petition to vacate the School District’s decision to terminate his employment.

The Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling, noting that under Education Law §3020-a(3)(c)(i), a teacher facing disciplinary charges shall have the right to be represented by counsel at any hearing held on those charges.

The court explained that while it was mindful that teacher disciplinary proceedings are not criminal actions, it was equally mindful that a tenured teacher has a protected property interest in his position which raises due process considerations when a teacher is faced with termination of his employment.

Noting that New York courts have disapproved similar prohibitions forbidding a defendant from discussing his trial testimony with his attorney for all but brief periods of time, the Appellate Division ruled that “In view of the due process considerations involved when a tenured teacher is threatened with termination of his employment, this is a sound approach, particularly in the instant case, where the time period involved was 10 weeks.”

Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that the Supreme Court did not err in vacating the award and directing a new hearing.

* The cross-examination of the employee was conducted during five days which extended over a period of 10 weeks.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://weblinks.westlaw.com/result/default.aspx?cfid=1&cnt=DOC&db=NY-ORCS-WEB&eq=search&fmqv=c&fn=_top&method=TNC&n=11&origin=Search&query=%2205738%22&rlt=CLID_QRYRLT6702424942&rltdb=CLID_DB921112324942&rlti=1&rp=%2Fsearch%2Fdefault.wl&rs=NYOFF1.0&service=Search&sp=NYOFF-1000&srch=TRUE&ss=CNT&sskey=CLID_SSSA991112324942&tempinfo=word&vr=2.0

Substantial evidence test used to resolve challenges to an administrative decision

Substantial evidence test used to resolve challenges to an administrative decision
Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Lake Success v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 41 AD3d 599

The Appellate Division held that the determination of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board, confirming the determination of an administrative law judge, made after a hearing, granting the petition of the Civil Service Employees Association to place certain positions into an already existing negotiating unit was supported by substantial evidence. 

Such evidence, said the court, consisted of PERB’s finding that the incumbents of those positions and the CSEA unit employees share a community of interest, that there is no conflict of interest that would affect the conduct of meaningful and effective negotiations, and that the placement would not cause administrative inconvenience. 

Accordingly, PERB's determination had to be sustained.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2007/2007_05275.htm

Employee’s objection to the introduction of a “911 recording” in a disciplinary hearing rejected

Employee’s objection to the introduction of a “911 recording” in a disciplinary hearing rejected
Matter of Dockery v New York City Hous. Auth., 51 AD3d 575

The Appellate Division held that the Housing Authorit’s termination of its employee based on evidence contained on a “911 recordings.”

The court explained that “911 recordings were properly admitted into evidence at the [administrative] disciplinary hearing since they were not official records relating to [the employee’s] arrest or prosecution, and thus were not subject to the sealing statute (CPL 160.50; see Matter of Harper v Angiolillo, 89 NY2d 761, 767 [1997].”

Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division ruled that “The penalty of dismissal does not shock the conscience,” citing Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_04753.htm