“New New York Education Reform Commission” established by Governor Cuomo

“New New York Education Reform Commission” established by Governor Cuomo

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo has established the New New York Education Reform Commission, bringing together nationally recognized education, community, and business leaders to recommend reforms to the state's education system in order to improve performance in the classroom so that all of New York's students are fully prepared for their futures. Richard (Dick) Parsons, Retired Chairman, Citigroup will serve as the Chair of the New NY Education Reform Commission

The Executive Order creating the Commission includes the following tasks:

1. Find ways to improve teacher recruitment and performance, including the teacher evaluation system;

2. Examine factors contributing to teacher recruitment and performance including: incentives to hire and retain high-quality teachers; improvements in the teacher evaluation system to ensure New York is implementing one of the strongest evaluation systems in the country;

3. Use teacher evaluations for decisions regarding promotion, hiring and termination as required in the teacher evaluation law; and teacher preparation, certification and education programs to ensure that teachers are properly trained to best educate our Students;

4. Improve student achievement;

5. Examine education funding, distribution and costs;

6. Increase parent and family engagement in education;

7. Examine state and local policies to increase parent and family engagement;

8. Examine the problem of high-need and low-wealth school communities;

9. Find the best use of technology in the classroom;

10. Identify the strategies for making the best use of technology in the classroom;

11. Examine New York's education system to ensure it meets the needs of students while respecting the taxpayer;

12. Examine potential strategies to reorganize the state's education system including district

consolidation and/or shared services; and comparing models from other states to achieve efficiencies and improved education outcomes.

Membership of the Commission includes:

Richard (Dick) Parsons, Retired Chairman, Citigroup, Chair of the New NY Education Reform Commission

Randi Weingarten, President, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO

Geoffrey Canada, Founder & CEO, Harlem Children's Zone

Irma Zardoya, President & CEO, NYC Leadership Academy

Elizabeth Dickey, President, Bank Street College of Education

Mary Anne Schmitt-Carey, President, Say Yes to Education

Lisa Belzberg, Founder & Chair Emeritus, PENCIL

Michael Rebell, Co-Founder & Executive Director, Campaign for Educational Equity

Karen Hawley Miles, President & Executive Director, Education Resource Strategies

José Luis Rodríguez, Founder & CEO, Hispanic Information and Telecommunications Network, Inc.

Sara Mead, Associate Partner, Bellwether Education Partners

Eduardo Martí, Vice Chancellor of Community Colleges, CUNY

Thomas Kane, Professor of Education & Economics, Harvard Graduate School of Education

Jean Desravines,CEO, New Leaders

Michael Horn, Executive Director & Co-Founder, InnoSight Institute

Chancellor Nancy Zimpher, Chancellor, SUNY

Chancellor Matthew Goldstein, Chancellor, CUNY

John B. King, Jr., Commissioner, New York State Education Department

Senator John Flanagan, Chair, Senate Education Committee

Assembly Member Cathy Nolan, Chair, Assembly Education Committee

The Commission expected to submit preliminary recommendations to the Governor by December 1, 2012.

The Deputy Secretary for Education, the Assistant Deputy Secretary for Education, and the Assistant Deputy Secretary for Higher Education to the Governor.will serve as staff to the Commission.

The text of the Governor’s announcement is posted on the Internet at:

http://d2srrmjar534jf.cloudfront.net/6/c0/9/3828/press_rls.pdf

Filing an administrative appeal does not extend or toll the statute of limitations for filing a timely Article 78 petition

Filing an administrative appeal does not extend or toll the statute of limitations for filing a timely Article 78 petition

A former teacher asked Supreme Court to annul the determination of the New York City Department of Education (DOE) that terminated her employment.

The teacher had earlier allowed her teaching license to lapse and she was removed from payroll. She was subsequently advised to “secure another teaching position” and was to serve as a probationary employee.

Appointed as a probationary employee, she was found guilty of misconduct by the Special Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School District and notified that her services as a probationary employee would be terminated and placed on the “Ineligible/lnquiry list due to inappropriate conduct.”

In response to her administrative appeal the teacher was ultimately advised of the decision to reaffirm the underlying decision to terminate her employment and the termination of her DOE license.

Supreme Court dismissed the teacher’s petition because she failed to file a timely notice of claim in accordance with Education Law §3813(1).

Although the teacher conceded that she had not filed the Notice of Claim within three

months of the termination of her probationary employment, she contented that it was unnecessary for her to do so. Justice Mills disagreed, holding that she was required to file the notice of claim within three months of her termination.

Turning to another procedural matter, Supreme Court held that the teacher’s Article 78 challenge to the termination of her probationary employment is also time-barred, having been filed some 18 months after she was terminated from her probationary appointment.

Pointing out that an Article 78 proceeding must be commenced “within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding on the petitioner,” the court said that “An agency determination becomes final and binding when the aggrieved party received actual notice of  the determination” and is neither extended nor tolled by the individual’s seeking administrative relief.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2012/2012_31102.pdf

Individuals employed by a private entity under contract to operate a charter school are “public employees” for the purposes of the Taylor Law

Individuals employed by a private entity under contract to operate a charter school are “public employees” for the purposes of the Taylor Law

Buffalo United Charter School ("BUCS") and Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School ("BECS") were formed under Education Law Article 56, (the "Charter Schools Act", together with National Heritage Academies, Inc. (NHA) challenged PERB’s rulings regarding its jurisdiction over the employees providing services to these charter schools.

The Council of School of Supervisors and Administrators, Local 1, AFSA ("CSA") had petitioned PERB for certification as the collective bargaining representative for a unit of unrepresented assistant principals at BECS, while NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO (NYSUT) had petitioned PERB for certification as the collective bargaining representative of a unit of unrepresented instruction employees at BUCS.

In response to CSA’s a petition seeking to be certified as the collective bargaining representative of all assistant principals working for BECS, BECS and NHA filed an application with PERB seeking to have the assistant principals designated as "managerial" or "confidential" employees as those terms are defined in Civil Service Law §201(7)(a).

BUCS and BECS then advanced the theory that that PERB was prevented by its own joint public-private employment doctrine* from asserting jurisdiction over the cases and the employees at issue in view of the fact that both entities had contracts with NHA, a private, for-profit corporation, to operate the schools formed by BUCS and BECS.

These agreements, they claimed, provided that NHA was responsible for employing the staffs at BUCS and BECS. In addition, both also claim that PERB lacks jurisdiction because with respect to the employees of NHA the NLRA preempted the Taylor Law.**

PERB, on the other hand, argued that it had properly concluded that the Charter Schools Act "explicitly and implicitly makes (the Taylor Law) applicable to every New York charter school" and that PERB's "joint public-private employer relationship [doctrine] … has been superceded" by the Charter Schools Act.

According to PERB, its joint public-private employment doctrine was inconsistent with the Charter Schools Act and therefore explicitly superceded by §2854(1)(a) of the Education Law. Further, PERB contended that Education Law §2854(3)(a) provides that charter schools are public schools for purposes of the Act and that because the Legislature made no provision for an exception to this mandate, there is no authority permitting application of the joint public-private employment doctrine in this instance.

PERB also asserted that its conclusion that the Charter Schools Act does not authorize the designation of "managerial" and "confidential" employees is a proper legal conclusion and urged the Court to apply a deferential standard of review to PERB's conclusion in this regard.***

Finally, PERB argued that there is no unconstitutional impairment of the Management Agreements between NHA and its charter schools because even with PERB exercising jurisdiction over the charter school employees, NHA's role under the agreements was not materially diminished or impaired.

Justice Curran said that “The critical issue in this proceeding is whether the Charter Schools Act precludes PERB from following its own jurisprudence in applying the joint public-private employment doctrine.”

Concluding that “it is impossible to construe the joint public-private employment doctrine together with application of the Taylor Law via the provisions of the Charter Schools Act,” Justice Curran ruled that “the joint public-private employment doctrine is inconsistent with and contrary to the Charter Schools Act and therefore inapplicable to the petitioners in this action.

As to the question of “preemption” by NLRB, the court ruled that “given the unsettled federal law on this issue and the well researched analysis by PERB” it could not conclude as a matter of law that PERB's decision was arbitrary or clearly contrary to the law. Accordingly, Justice Curran determined that PERB's decision on the NLRB jurisdictional issue should not be annulled.

Turning to PERB’s decision that the specific provision of the Taylor Law authorizing a public employer to designate "managerial" or "confidential" employees the court concluded that “In applying the Taylor Law to charter schools, the Legislature did not employ any language precluding the designation of ‘managerial’ or ‘confidential’ employees.”

Accordingly, Justice Curran ruled that PERB's interpretation of Education Law §2854(3)(a) to mean that all charter schools' employees are public employees and therefore not "managerial" or "confidential," except for its chief executive officer, was overbroad and not supported by the language and structure of the Charter Schools Act.

The court then dismissed the petition filed by BECS. BECS and NHA except that with respect to PERB's ruling holding that assistant principals at BECS are neither "managerial" nor "confidential" employees. As to this determination by PERB the court annulled PERB’s decision and reinstated PERB’s Administrative Law Judge’s ruling on this point.

* PERB's joint public-private employment doctrine derives from New York Public Library v PERB (37 NY2d 752 [1975] where the Court of Appeals held: "[t]he Taylor Law applies only to employment which is unequivocally or substantially public.” In situations where the employment relationship involves joint public and private employers, PERB has declined jurisdiction on the premise that it has no jurisdiction unless each of the joint employers is itself a public employer.

** BUCS and BECS also argued that PERB erroneously found that the Charter Schools Act prevents the designation of the assistant principals at issue as "managerial" or "confidential." The assistant principals, according to petitioners, are members of the executive team at these charter schools and therefore PERB wrongly denied their "managerial" or "confidential" status.

*** PERB had earlier reversed its ALJ’s designating such individuals “managerial” or “confidential.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_22113.htm

Disciplinary action for off-duty misconduct vacated as unrelated to the employee’s ability to satisfactorily perform the duties of the position

Disciplinary action for off-duty misconduct vacated as unrelated to the employee’s ability to satisfactorily perform the duties of the position

A town building inspector cited a building owned by a Town of Huntington employee for “numerous violations” of the Town of Huntington’s Town Code. As a result the employee was served with a notice of discipline and later "suspended from his position."

The employee's union filed a grievance protesting the suspension on the employee’s behalf and ultimately the matter was submitted to arbitration. 

The arbitrator made an award finding that the Town had just cause for suspending the employee. Supreme Court, however, vacated the award after holding that it was irrational and, therefore, the arbitrator exceeded her authority.

The town appealed but the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Noting that a court may vacate an arbitrator's award only on the grounds stated in CPLR §7511(b), the Appellate Division said that the only ground asserted by the union was that the arbitrator "exceeded [her] power."

Such an excess of power occurs only where the arbitrator's award (1) violates a strong public policy, (2) is irrational, or (3) clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power. In this instance the union argued that the award was irrational because the individual’s employment by the Town was “completely unrelated to the off-duty misconduct of which he [was] accused.”

Observing that if an arbitrator's award is completely irrational, "it may be said that [s]he exceeded [her] power," this basis for the objection requires a showing that there was "no proof whatever to justify the award."

The Appellate Division held that although the charges against the employee flowing from his ownership of a building situated in the town, if proven, “are substantial and directly affect the safety of the public,” they did not relate to his character, neglect of duty, or fitness to properly discharge the duties of his position. As there was no proof in the record to justify the town suspending the employee, it ruled that Supreme Court had properly vacated the arbitration award.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_05702.htm

Lack of veracity warrants employee’s termination

Lack of veracity warrants employee’s termination

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s denial of a petition seeking to vacate a post-hearing arbitration award.

The disciplinary hearing officer found that the employee was guilty of all of the specified charges and that the employer “had just cause for terminating her from her position as a parole officer.”

The Appellate Division, noting that the former employee had failed to establish that the arbitration award violated public policy, was irrational, or was in violation of any of the grounds enumerated in CPLR 7511(b)(1), said that the hearing record “amply supports the arbitrator's finding that [the individual] had violated the DOP's Code of Conduct by making false accusations of stalking, which resulted in her arrest.”

Finding that there was no basis for disturbing the arbitrator's rejection of former employee’s account of events in view of the testimony of an investigating detective that at the time of the alleged incident, the purported stalker was not even in the former employee’s vicinity, the Appellate Division concluded that “in light of petitioner's responsibilities as a parole officer, which depend in large part upon her veracity, her misconduct warranted the penalty of termination.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_03281.htm

Legislation proposed to provide for a new procedure for determining suspensions and demotions of members of certain police agencies upon abolition or reduction of positions

Legislation proposed to provide for a new procedure for determining suspensions and demotions of members of certain police agencies upon abolition or reduction of positions


In the Assembly April 20, 2012 [A9887-2011]; In the Senate April 27, 2012  S7075-2011

This bill seeks to amend §80 of the New York State Civil Service Law as it applies to members of any police agency in the State other than those police agencies already subject to the provisions of subdivisions 1-a through 1-d of §80.

The proposed amendment, if signed into law would use seniority for the purposed of demotions and,or,  reductions in force on the basis of time in grade or title in contrast seniority based on service in the classified service.

The bills sponsor state that “This amendment would address a longstanding problem in the police community, as witnessed by the fact that 4 police agencies (the City of Buffalo Police and Fire Departments, employees of secure detention facilities in the State of New York, sworn employees of the Monroe County Sheriff's Department, and the Nassau County Police Department) have already obtained passage of existing subdivisions 1-a through 1-d changing the measure [seniority for the purposes of layoff] from time in the classified service to time in grade or title.”

The sponsors offer the following justification for this amendment to the Civil Service Law:

“Under the current law, suspensions or demotions in the Civil Service upon the abolition or reduction of positions must be made based upon seniority, with demotions or reductions in force to be made in "inverse order of original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service" (CSL, §80.1). The spirit of the law is to safeguard the employment of those employees with the most time in the system, with the general principle being "last in - first out". In the uniformed services, this law can have a reverse effect essentially retaining employees with shorter tenures in the civil service rank while demoting those with longer tenures in rank. For example, a police officer with ten years in rank as a Sergeant would have to be demoted before a police officer with 1 year in rank as a Sergeant if the latter had more time in the classified service.* As mentioned above, several uniformed services operations have recognized this inequity and obtained individual legislative amendments to §80 of the New York Civil Service Law requiring said demotions and reductions to be made by "inverse order of original appointment on a permanent basis in the grade or title". We believe that this is the preferred and equitable method to handle these issues within the context of the police community and that it should be adopted state-wide, which this bill would do.”**

The text of Assembly 9887, Senate 7075 is set out below:

AN ACT to amend the civil service law, in relation to the calculation of seniority for purposes of layoffs or demotions

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

[Matter in ITALICS underscored is new; matter in brackets [ ] is old law to be omitted].

Section  1. Section 80 of the civil service law is amended by adding a new subdivision 1-e to read as follows:

 1-e. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one of this section, the sworn members of any police agency as defined in section eight hundred thirty-five of the executive law, other than police agencies referred to in subdivisions one-a through one-d of this section shall be subject to the following procedure. Where, because of economy, consolidation or abolition of functions, curtailment of activities or otherwise, positions in the competitive class are abolished or reduced in rank or salary grade, suspension or demotion, as the case may be, among incumbents holding the same or similar positions shall be made in the inverse order of original appointment on a permanent basis in the grade or title in the service of the governmental jurisdiction in which such abolition or reduction of positions occurs, subject to the provisions of subdivision seven of section eighty-five of this chapter; provided, however, that the date of original appointment of any such incumbent who was transferred to such governmental jurisdiction from another governmental jurisdiction upon the transfer of functions shall be the date of original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service in the service of the governmental jurisdiction from which such transfer was made. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision, however, upon the abolition or reduction of positions in the competitive class, incumbents holding the same or similar positions who have not completed their probationary services shall be suspended or demoted, as the case may be, before any permanent incumbents, and among such probationary employees the order of suspension or demotion shall be determined as if such employees were permanent incumbents.

S 2. This act shall take effect immediately.

*This rationale could be applied to all positions in the classified service.

** Presumably the seniority provisions of Section 80.2 defining "continuous service" applies with respect to such an individual's rights with respect to "bumping," "displacement" and placement on a Section 81 preferred list for reinstatement.

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The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645-page e-book reviewing the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click On http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/ for additional information about this electronic reference manual.

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From the Office of New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli -Selected audits and reports issued during the period April 23-29, 2012

From the Office of New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli -Selected audits and reports issued during the period April 23-29, 2012

Please click on the caption to access report posted on the Internet.

DiNapoli Announces Audits of Troubled Central New York Developmental Disabilities Services Office

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced Thursday that his office will examine whether the Office of People With Developmental Disabilities’ (OPWDD) Central New York Developmental Disabilities Services Office has taken action to end the numerous criminal and ethical violations exposed in previous Comptroller’s audits. Auditors will undertake three audits to determine if OPWDD has acted on the recommendations of prior reports.


DiNapoli: School District Tax Levy Growth Averages 3 Percent Statewide Under New Limits

School district tax levies in the 2012-13 school year are limited to average increases of 3 percent under a new property tax cap law, in addition to any further increases approved by voter overrides of the cap, according to a preliminary analysisof data released Monday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli’s office.


Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli this week announced his office completed the following audits:
the Town of Duanesburg;

the Village of Endicott;

the Village of Herkimer;

the Village of North Collins;

the Village of South Blooming Grove; and

the Spencerport Fire District.


Comptroller DiNapoli Releases School Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli this week announced his office completed the following audits:

the BOCES’ Non–Instructional Services; and

the Monroe–Woodbury Central School District.

Court’s review of an administrative disciplinary action is limited to determining if the decision is supported by substantial evidence

Court’s review of an administrative disciplinary action is limited to determining if the decision is supported by substantial evidence
 

The Commissioner of the Dutchess County Department of Social Services adopted the finding and recommendation of a hearing officer as to the employee’s being guilty of a certain charge of misconduct after a §75 disciplinary hearing and terminated the individual's employment.

The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination, denying the former employee’s petition “on the merits, with costs.”

The court explained that a court's review of administrative determinations in employee disciplinary cases made after a hearing under Civil Service Law §75 is limited to a consideration of whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence in the record of the hearing. In this instance, said the court, there was substantial evidence in the record to support the determination that the employee was guilty of misconduct

Further, the court found that the penalty of termination “was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_02882.htm

A reviewing body may not ignore evidence in the record in making its determination

A reviewing body may not ignore evidence in the record in making its determination

The Appellate Division granted the disability retirement applicant’s petition to annul the decision denying his request to amend his application for accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits and remanded the matter with the direction that individual be permitted to amend his application to include a heart-related disability.

The court said the Retirement Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion as at the time it denied application for ADR benefits based on an orthopedic condition, a member of the Board was aware that the applicant had suffered a heart attack, was incapacitated, and might wish to amend his application to include a claim under the Heart Bill [see Retirement and Social Security Law §363-a.].

The Appellate Division also noted that the record showed that the applicant’s heart condition predated his retirement, but was not diagnosed until after he retired.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_02945.htm

A party’s failure to have an arbitration award confirmed is not a ground for vacating the award

A party’s failure to have an arbitration award confirmed is not a ground for vacating the award 

The Appellate Division succinctly ruled that the application to vacate the arbitration award filed pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules was made more than 90 days after the award was delivered to the individual and is therefore untimely.

The court also noted that although CPLR Article 75 provides a mechanism by which a party may obtain judicial confirmation of an arbitration award, the failure to have an award confirmed is not a ground for vacating the award, citing CPLR §§7510 and 7511[b][1].

Addressing another claim by the individual – that the arbitration award should be vacated under CPLR §751l(b)(1)(iv), “failure to follow the procedure,” the Appellate Division explained that subdivision (iv) address vacating the award because of a "failure to follow the procedure” set out in Article 75. 

However, said the court, if a party applying to vacate the award pursuant to subdivision (iv) continued with the arbitration with notice of the defect and without objection, the award may not be vacated for that reason.

In this instance, said the court, the party seeking to vacate the award under color of §751l(b)(1)(iv) participated in the arbitration without objection as to the procedure employed and thus the award could not be vacated as otherwise permitted by subdivision (iv).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_02949.htm

State of Maryland bill prohibiting employers from requiring job applicants to reveal Internet passwords pending approval by the Governor

State of Maryland bill prohibiting employers from requiring job applicants to reveal Internet passwords pending approval by the Governor

The Maryland legislature's has passed a bill [Senate 433; House 964] prohibiting, among other things, employers from 1) requesting or requiring a job applicant to disclose user names or passwords for a personal electronic service; 2) refusing to hire an applicant for not providing access to such information; and 3) terminating or disciplining an employee for refusing to provide this information.

The provision is pending action by the Governor and if signed into law would take effect October 1, 2012.

The text of the bill is posted on the Internet at:

http://mlis.state.md.us/2012rs/bills/sb/sb0433t.pdf

The employee’s refusal to participate in a disciplinary hearing does not mean that the employee was denied administrative due process

The employee’s refusal to participate in a disciplinary hearing does not mean that the employee was denied administrative due process  

The Appellate Division rejected the employee's arguments seeking to vacate or modify a disciplinary action determination on grounds that included allegations that the hearing officer was biased and exceeded her authority in reaching a determination without affording the employee administrative due process.

The court said that the employee’s allegations were refuted by the record holding that the individual “was afforded every opportunity to present a defense and she acknowledges intentionally attempting to stonewall the proceedings by not appearing for and/or not participating on many of the hearing dates.”

Holding that the award was made in accord with due process, was supported by adequate evidence, and was rational and was not arbitrary and capricious, the Appellate Division noted that the employee failed to meet her burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the hearing officer was partial in her consideration of the evidence and ultimate determination.

Concluding that the penalty imposed, six months suspension without pay, was neither shocking to the court’s sense of fairness nor disproportionate to the multiple offenses for which she was found guilty, the court dismissed the employee’s petition.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_02948.htm

 

Employee’s loss of employment as a result of his or her “off-duty” misconduct disqualifies the individual for unemployment insurance benefits

Employee’s loss of employment as a result of his or her “off-duty” misconduct disqualifies the individual for unemployment insurance benefits

The Appellate Division affirmed the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s decision that disqualified an applicant for unemployment insurance benefits based on its finding that, among other things, the applicant for such benefits had left his employment following misconduct unrelated to his work.

The applicant had resigned form his position "in lieu of termination" following his arrest on multiple counts of aggravated harassment* in connection with his allegedly having made harassing phone calls to various women in the course of activities “unrelated to his employment."

The Appeal Board had rejected the applicant’s claim that he was entitled to benefits because his termination “stemmed from activity unrelated to his employment.”

The Appellate Division ruled that "[m]isconduct committed during nonworking hours, which raises serious questions as to a worker['s] integrity, bears a relationship to his [or her] work within the meaning of . . . the Labor Law."

* The applicant ultimately entered a plead guilty to two of the charges filed against him, which were later reduced to harassment in the second degree.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_02934.htm

OSHA releases information addressing “Employer Safety Incentive and Disincentive Policies and Practices”

OSHA releases information addressing “Employer Safety Incentive and Disincentive Policies and Practices”

OSHA has posted a new enforcement memo online focusing on "Employer Safety Incentive and Disincentive Policies and Practices".

According to the HRTraniningCenter.com, OSHA views as suspect any incentive or disciplinary programs linked to worker accidents resulting in injury or illness. In addition, OSHA may prosecute employers whose programs violate worker whistleblower rights under Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970.

A 90-minute training session via on the new rules via Audio Conferencing is being offered by HRTrainingCenter.com on April 24, 2012 from 1:00 to 2:30 p.m., Eastern Standard Time.

Additional information concerning this training session is available on the Internet at: http://hrtrainingcenter.com/showWCDetails.asp?TCID=1010681&RID=1010687

Disclosure of public information or records to one is disclosure to all

Disclosure of public information or records to one is disclosure to all

The basic rule when considering a Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] request is that the theory underlying FOIL is that all public documents are subject to disclosure.

The release of some public records, however, may be limited by statute [see, for example, Education Law, §1127 - Confidentiality of records; §33.13, Mental Hygiene Law - Clinical records; confidentiality]. Otherwise, an individual is not required to submit a FOIL request as a condition precedent to obtaining public records where access is not barred by statute.

However, the custodian of the records may elect to deny access to documents otherwise subject FOIL absent a FOIL request or if it decides that the document requested may be withheld because it meets one or more of the exceptions set out in the law.

Significantly, there is no bar to providing information pursuant to a FOIL request, or otherwise, even if it falls within one or more of the exceptions that the custodian could rely upon in denying a FOIL request, in whole or in part, for the information or records demanded.

Indeed, a FOIL request is required only in the event the custodian of the public record[s] sought declines to “voluntarily” provide the information or record requested. In such cases the individual or organization world be required to file a FOIL request to obtain the information or record.

Further, it appears that once the information or record sought is provided to one party, it may not be denied to another party.

On this point the State’s Committee On Open Government advised a Town’s attorney that there was no legal basis to withhold the information requested pursuant to a newspaper’s FOIL request after it was disclosed to another newspaper.

In this instance Robert Freeman, the Committee’s Executive Director, stated that, in his view, “If a record is disclosed to one news media organization [by the custodian of the record]…it should be disclosed to any news media or for that matter any person requesting it.” Notwithstanding this advisory opinion, the Town’s attorney refused to supply the document demanded in the FOIL request submitted to the Town’s clerk.

Once possible exception: if the document demanded was provided pursuant to a court order or a subpoena, this may not constitute “disclosure” within Mr. Freeman’s meaning.