Unilateral modification of a past practice

Unilateral modification of a past practice

Selected Rulings posted by PERB - Matter of the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York, Decision U-28706

PERB affirmed a decision of an ALJ finding that the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally modified a past practice by reducing the number of annual parking permits issued to Local 891-represented unit members, and by changing the method of distribution of the permits.

PERB held that free parking is a mandatory subject of negotiations because it is an economic benefit to the employees and that the distribution of parking permits is also mandatorily negotiable. It also affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the District unilaterally reduced the number of parking permits issued to Local 891-represented unit members and changed the existing practice of distributing parking permits upon request to unit members.

Termination without notice or hearing by operation of law

Termination without notice or hearing by operation of law

Supreme Court, New York County, dismissed an Article 78 petition seeking to annul the termination of New York City Department of Corrections correction officer without notice or hearing or, in the alternative, an order compelling the Corrections Department to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

According to the decision, the correction officer had pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania to stalking, a first degree misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law. The Department of Corrections had terminated him pursuant to Public Officers Law §30(1)(e), deeming that the correction officer had been terminated “by operation of law” by reason of his conviction of the misdemeanor in Pennsylvania.

Public Officers Law §30(1)(e) provides that a public office automatically becomes vacant upon the officeholder's conviction of a felony, or a crime involving a violation of his or her oath of office.

The Appellate Division held that the correction officer’s Pennsylvania conviction involved a violation of his oath of office and thus his office automatically became vacant by operation of law pursuant to §30(1)(e), resulting in his lawful termination from his postion without notice and hearing.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_03871.htm

Employer has the burden of proof that a disability prevents the employee from reasonably performing the functions and duties of the position

Employer has the burden of proof that a disability prevents the employee from reasonably performing the functions and duties of the position
Matter of New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 57 AD3d 1057

New York State Correction Officer Edward J. Rice suffered a heart attack that resulted in the implantation of stents and a defibrillator in his chest. Although Rice was cleared for duty without restriction by his cardiologist, Corrections placed him on involuntary leave until November 2005, at which time it terminated Rice's employment on the basis that he "ha[d] been continuously absent" and "unable to perform the duties of his position for more than one year" as a result of a disability pursuant to Civil Service Law §73.

Rice filed a complaint with the State’s Division of Human Rights (SDHR), alleging that Corrections had engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice by terminating his employment due to a disability.

Although a SDHR Administrative Law Judge determined that Rice had failed to establish that he was fit to perform the essential duties of a correction officer and, thus, Corrections had not improperly terminated his employment, the Commissioner of Human Rights concluded that Corrections had, in fact, engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice by terminating Rice's employment.

The Commissioner awarded Rice back pay, as well as damages for emotional pain and suffering.

Corrections appealed, but the Appellate Division said that Corrections could not terminate Rice’s employment on the basis of his disability unless it proved that the disability prevented him from reasonably performing the functions and duties of a correction officer.

In support of the determination that Corrections had engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice by terminating Rice's employment on the basis of his disability, SDHR relied upon, among other things, the reports of Rice's treating cardiologists, as well as the original report of the physician who performed an independent medical examination for petitioner, that Rice was capable of returning to work without any restriction.

In contrast, SDHR found that the reports of Correction's medical examiner that Rice was unable to function as a correction officer due to the possibility of a physical confrontation with an inmate damaging his defibrillator were insufficient to support the termination of his employment inasmuch as “the identified risk was speculative and hypothetical in nature.”

Finally, said the court, the fact that Rice's application for, and receipt of, Social Security disability insurance benefits subsequent to the termination of his employment does not, as a matter of law, preclude a finding that Corrections had unlawfully discriminated against Rice.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09517.htm

Characterizing a complaint as a violation of civil service rules does not avoid having to seek relief pursuant to the contract grievance procedure

Characterizing a complaint as a violation of civil service rules does not avoid having to seek relief pursuant to the contract grievance procedure
Montgomery County Deputy Sheriff's Assn., Inc. v County of Montgomery, 57 AD3d 1061

Cathy Anderson and Grace De Waal Malefyt each worked for a period of time in the title of "part-time" correction officer in Montgomery County. During their respective periods of employment in the title of part-time correction officer, both voluntarily and regularly “worked in excess of 20 hours per week and, in fact, in excess of 40 hours per week” without complaint nor did the Association ever file complaints on their behalf or sought to obtain additional compensation or benefits for them during this period.

Anderson and Waal Malefyt were appointed "full time" correction officers in 2000 and 2003 respectively.

In March 2004, the Association sued, seeking monetary relief in the form of retroactive benefits under the collective bargaining agreement. Supreme Court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.

In addressing the Association’s appeal from the dismissal of its petition by Supreme Court, the Appellate Division ruled that “Having failed to avail themselves of the grievance procedures outlined under the very collective bargaining agreement on which they now rely for monetary relief, [Anderson and Waal Malefyt] and the Association failed to exhaust administrative remedies and are precluded from pursuing this action.”

The Appellate Division noted that in an effort to avoid the rejection of its appeal because of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Anderson and Waal Malefyt and the Association try to disavow their reliance on the collective bargaining agreement by claiming that “they are not seeking to enforce the collective bargaining agreement but, rather, are alleging a violation of the County Civil Service Rules and Regulations.”

The court said that the petition filed in Supreme Court “belies this notion” as it clearly alleged that County defendants “have breached the terms of the collective bargaining agreement . . . in that they, as [j]oint [e]mployers, denied [p]laintiffs . . . benefits afforded by the collective bargaining agreement to full-time employees while holding the title of ‘[p]art-time [c]orrection [o]fficer’” and “denied the benefits contained in the collective bargaining agreement, including, but not limited to longevity, health insurance, vacation leave, holiday pay, sick leave, personal time, and increased wages.”

Thus, said the Appellate Division, it is clear that the true nature of this action is for breach of contract. Further, said the court, “even if we were to view the complaint as simply alleging a violation of the County Civil Service Rules and Regulations,” the result would be the same “as the monetary remedy for this perceived violation is still being sought under the auspices of the collective bargaining agreement, thus leading to the same result; namely, that [Anderson and Waal Malefyt] and the Association were still required to avail themselves of the grievance and arbitration procedures outlined under the agreement with the failure to do so being fatal to the requested relief.”

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09519.htm