Application of the federal Hatch Act barring partisan political activities by certain State and municipal employees

Application of the federal Hatch Act barring partisan political activities by certain State and municipal employees
Juan Molina-Crespo v United States Merit Systems Protection Board, 547 F.3d 651

Juan Molina-Crespo served as the Executive Director of the Lorain County Children and Families First Council (“LCCFFC”), an Ohio government agency that is financed in part by the federal government. The federal government provides funds to Ohio agencies, which are then passed through to the LCCFFC. The United States Merit Systems Protection Board [Board] determined that Molina-Crespo violated the federal Hatch Act [5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3)], which regulates the political activity of certain state employees who administer federal funds. The Board ruled that Molina-Crespo’s actions in violation of the Hatch Act warranted his removal.

The Circuit Court of Appeals said: “It is undisputed that, as Director, Molina-Crespo was subject to the Hatch Act because he was “an individual employed by a State . . . agency whose principal employment is in connection with an activity which is financed in whole or in part” by the federal government.”

Molina-Crespo’s difficulties arose when he declared his candidacy in a primary election for the office of Lorain County Commissioner. The United States Office for Special Counsel (“OSC”), the federal agency charged with administering the Hatch Act, advised him that his candidacy violated § 1502(a)(3) of the Act and that he would either have to resign his position at the LCCFFC or withdraw his candidacy in order to comply with the Act’s requirements.

Molina-Crespo, however, told the OSC that he did not consider himself a “covered employee” subject to the Act because the federal funding the LCCFFC received first passed through various state agencies.

Although Molina-Crespo’s candidacy for Lorain County Commissioner ended when he failed to win the Primary, the OSC filed a formal complaint with the MSPB alleging that Molina-Crespo violated the Act by being a candidate for elective office.

Ultimately the Board ordered the LCCFFC to remove Molina-Crespo from his position as Director within thirty days and warned that, if the LCCFFC failed to dismiss Molina, it would lose federal funds equal to two years of Molina-Crespo’s pay. Molina-Crespo then resigned from his position and sued, challenging the constitutionality of the Hatch Act together with allegations that the Act violated his First Amendment rights and constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.

The court noted the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of the Hatch Act’s restrictions on federal employees’ political activities, and has concluded that the Act’s prohibitions are constitutional, citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 and in Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, and that the Sixth Circuit had earlier concluded that there is no fundamental right to be a candidate for political office. Rejecting Molina-Crespo’s efforts to distinguish between federal and state employees with respect to the application the Hatch Act, the Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a state employee’s participation in political activities violated the Hatch Act and warranted his or her removal from his or her state position.

Similarly, the Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Molina-Crespo contention that the Hatch Act violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Finally, the court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Molina-Crespo’s violation of the Hatch Act justified his removal.

A relevant decision, Matter of Blackburne, 211 AD2d 13, [motion to appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 705], holds that an individual otherwise subject to a “due process disciplinary hearing” such as that provided by a Taylor Law agreement or by State Law, may be summarily removed from his or her position on the authority of a Board determination. The Blackburne decision, which addressed the right of an individual to file a Taylor Law contract disciplinary grievance after the Board directed his removal from his position for violating the Hatch Act, held that arbitration would offend public policy as it "would significantly lessen the efficacy of the Hatch Act and frustrate its purpose and scope."

The full text of the Molina decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/08a0419p-06.pdf

N.B. As earlier noted, officers and employees in the executive branch of state and local government whose principal employment involves an activity financed in whole or in part by federal loans or grants are subject to the Hatch Act. However, certain public officers such as the governor, the mayor of a city, and the elected head of an executive department not in the classified service are exempted, as are individuals employed by educational or research institutions which are supported in whole or in part by the State or a political subdivision of the State.

Another key element of the Hatch Act provides that while public officers and employees may be members of a political party and even serve as officers in that party, they cannot use their official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the results of such elections or the nominations of candidates for those elective offices. Also direct or indirect coercion of public workers to make a loan or to contribute anything of value to an individual or a party or other organization for political purposes is prohibited.

Union presence during an interrogation of a unit member by the appointing authority

Union presence during an interrogation of a unit member by the appointing authority

Seabrook v City of New York, 57 AD3d 232

Norman Seabrook, individually and as President of the Correction Officers' Benevolent Association, challenged the policy of not allowing an employee to consult with a union representative after a question is posed and before an answer must be given, at an interrogation conducted pursuant to [New York City] Mayoral Executive Order No. 16.

Mayoral Executive Order 16 requires city employees to report allegations of corruption to City's Department of Investigation.

The exclusion of union representatives, said the court, "ensures that the charges will be probed confidentially and professionally by investigators independent of the employee's own agency and superiors."

Holding that this policy “was reasonably designed to promote truthful responses by discouraging coaching,” the Appellate Division concluded that such action did not deprive the employee of his right to union representation under Civil Service Law §75(2) or National Labor Relations Bd. v J. Weingarten, Inc. (420 US 251 [1975]).

A similar issue was addressed by the Appellate division in City of Rochester v Public Employment Relations Board, 15 AD3d 922, Leave to appeal denied, 4 N.Y.3d 710. In Rochester the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that PERB abused its discretion when it decided that the City of Rochester committed an improper employer practice in violation of Civil Service Law §209-a(1)(a) (The Taylor Law) by denying city police officers, who were union members, access to union representation during a criminal investigation interview.

The Fourth Department said that "PERB abused its discretion in expanding a public employee's rights to include the right to have a union representative present during a criminal investigation" as New York State "has a strong public policy that prohibits union interference with criminal investigations."

The full text of the Seabrook decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09471.htm

The text of Executive Order 16 is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nyc.gov/html/doi/html/whistblr-eo16.html

 

A court order must be “clear and unequivocal” in order to hold a party in contempt for its alleged “failing to comply”

A court order must be “clear and unequivocal” in order to hold a party in contempt for its alleged “failing to comply”

Storman v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2012 NY Slip Op 04217, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court granted, among other things, a motion to hold the New York City Department of Education (DOE) in contempt for its alleged failure to comply with a judgment.

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court’s action, commenting that it was acting “In the interest of justice, we nostra sponte* [in granting] DOE leave to appeal from the contempt order … which was "made in a proceeding against a body or officer pursuant to article 78" and therefore was not appealable as of right” (see CPLR 5701[b][1]).

The court explained that Supreme Court's “judgment to remand for ‘further proceedings’ was not a ‘clear and unequivocal’ mandate, and thus DOE should not have been held in contempt for allegedly disobeying it.” The remedy, if any, said the Appellate Division “lies in seeking to clarify the … order, which will allow the court to issue a clear and unequivocal mandate.”

Considering a related aspect of the appeal, the Appellate Division noted that the administrative hearing conducted by the Chancellor's Committee "was not determinative but merely advisory" to the Chancellor and thus the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review applies, not the "substantial evidence" standard.

Accordingly, said the court, “Applying the proper standard, DOE's determination was not arbitrary and capricious, but was rationally based in the record, which included the investigator's report and the testimony of the investigator and principal at the administrative hearing,” citing Murane v Department of Education, 82 AD3d 576.

* Nostra Sponte - an action by a court undertaken on its own inherent authority.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04217.htm

Employee terminated after being found guilty of deliberately striking his superior with a duffel bag

Employee terminated after being found guilty of deliberately striking his superior with a duffel bag

Human Resources Administration v. Power, OATH Index No. 879/12

OATH Administrative Law Judge Ingrid M. Addison sustained charges Civil Service Law §75 charges alleging that an agency employee deliberately struck his supervisor with his heavy duffel bag and continued walking without stopping even though the supervisor was pinned to the wall.

Judge Addison recommended dismissal of two charges [1] that the individual intimidated a co-worker by staring through her office window and [2] that he failed to evacuate the building as directed by building security, finding the proof insufficient to establish guilt of the misconduct alleged.

The ALJ recommended that the employee be terminated based on the charges found to have been proven in the course of the disciplinary hearing. 

The Commissioner adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s findings and recommendation, dismissing the employee from his position with the agency.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/12_Cases/12-0879.pdf

Selected Rulings posted by PERB

Selected Rulings posted by PERB 

Matter of Chemung County Sheriff’s Association, Inc., Decision 44 PERB 3026, U-29007

The Board reversed a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that had found that the Chemung County Sheriff’s Association, Inc. (Association) violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it sought interest arbitration of a nonarbitrable proposal under §209.4(g) of the Act.

The Board held that the joint employer’s second amended charge, which alleged for the first time that the Association’s General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c hearing proposal was nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act, was untimely because it did not relate back to the joint employer’s original claim challenging the mandatory nature of the proposal under the Act.

Finally, the Board held that the Association’s GML §207-c hearing proposal to permit a hearing officer to issue a binding decision, subject to review by the courts under CPLR Article 78, was mandatory under City of Watertown v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 97 NY2d 73, [33 PERB 7007].

Recipient of workers' compensation benefits may not sue his or her employer “in its landlord role”

Recipient of workers' compensation benefits may not sue his or her employer “in its landlord role”

Weiner v City of New York, 2012 NY Slip Op 04207, Court of Appeals

Mark Weiner was employed by the New York City Fire Department as an Emergency Medical Technician. Injured in the course of his performing his duties, he applied for, and received, workers' compensation benefits from his employer - the City of New York.

Weiner subsequently sued the City and the New York City Parks and Recreation Department alleging both “common law negligence and a cause of action under General Municipal Law §205-a.” According to Weiner, the City-maintained boardwalk was poorly illuminated, resulting in his being injured.

The Appellate Division, reversing a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary, held that Weiner's action was barred by his receipt of workers' compensation benefits and that he could not sue the City “in its landlord role.”

The Court of Appeals, citing Gonzales v Armac Indus., 81 NY2d 1, sustained the Appellate Division’s decision, commenting that worker’s compensation benefits are "[t]he sole and exclusive remedy of an employee against his employer for injuries in the course of employment."

The Court explained that "In exchange for the security of knowing that fixed benefits will be paid without the need to resort to expensive and sometimes risky litigation, … the employee has been asked to pay a price in the form of the loss of his [or her] common-law right to sue his [or her] employer in tort and perhaps to enjoy a more substantial recovery through a jury award."


In the words of the court: “Weiner's principal argument relies on a difference in wording between General Municipal Law § 205-a (pertaining to firefighters) and General Municipal Law §205-e (pertaining to police officers). Section 205-e contains the same statement found in §205-a that the cause of action created by the statute exists "[i]n addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law" (General Municipal Law §205-e [1]).


However, said the Court, in addition §205-e explicitly provides that "nothing in this section shall be deemed to expand or restrict any right afforded to or limitation imposed upon an employer, an employee or his or her representative by virtue of any provisions of the workers' compensation law."

Although Weiner argued that the omission of this §205-e language concerning workers' compensation law in §205-a was deliberate, the Court said that it disagreed, holding that “Had the Legislature intended to give firefighters, but not police officers, the right to sue as well as receive workers' compensation benefits, this distinction, we are certain, would have been evident in the legislative history.” Rather, concluded the court, “it was not the intent of the Legislature to allow recipients of workers' compensation benefits to sue their employers in tort under §205-a.”*

Noting that it was not addressing the question of whether emergency medical technicians who are employed by fire departments and are not recipients of workers' compensation benefits are entitled to the right of action provided by §205-a, or whether the right of action is limited to firefighters, the Court noted that it has “long refused to condone the circumvention of the Workers' Compensation scheme by means of a theory that would allow an employer to be sued in its capacity as property owner.”

Here, said the court, “[a]n employer remains an employer in [its] relations with [its] employees as to all matters arising from and connected with their employment" and Weiner's injuries arose from and were connected with his employment as an emergency medical technician.


* See the Governor's "Approval Memorandum" in the "bill jacket" of Chapter 703 of the Laws of 1996.


The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04207.htm

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