Petitioning for a separate negotiating unit

Petitioning for a separate negotiating unit
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, and Baldwin Union Free School District, PERB Decision C-5690

CSEA filed a petition seeking to represent Security Aides in a separate unit. The District opposed the petition.

PERB’s Administrative Law Judge found that the Security Aides were most appropriately added to the existing School Monitors and Health Aides unit represented by CSEA. A community of interest was found to exist based upon a similarity in mission, skill level and working conditions. The ALJ rejected CSEA's argument that a conflict of interest was created by CSEA's initiation of litigation that challenged the District's assignment of certain duties to Security Aides instead of School Monitors.

Also rejected was CSEA's argument that a conflict existed because the Security Aides perform a security function. The ALJ noted that the Security Aides are not charged with the primary duty of investigating or reporting the job related misconduct of District employees, but to protect students and District employees from outside intruders. The ALJ placed the position in the existing unit pursuant to New York Convention Center Operating Corp, 27 PERB 3034 (1994), since there was no contractual bar to the placement and adding the position effectuated a de minimus change to the unit.

Appeal dismissed after employee fails to prove efforts to exhaust her administrative remedy would have been an exercise in futility

Appeal dismissed after employee fails to prove efforts to exhaust her administrative remedy would have been an exercise in futility
Amorosano-LePore v Grant, 56 AD3d 663

This decision by the Appellate Division illustrates the importance of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.

Gina Amorosano-LePore filed a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking a review of the City of New Rochelle’s decision to terminate her after she was found guilty of the disciplinary filed against her.

Instead of filling its answer to Amorosano-LePore’s petition, the City asked Supreme Court to dismiss the petition because Amorosano-LePore had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Civil Service Employee's Association.

Supreme Court granted the City’s motion and Amorosano-LePore appealed.

The Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Amorosano-LePore failed to avail herself of the available administrative remedies provided in the CBA.

While there are some exceptions to the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies, such as demonstrating that efforts to avail oneself of the available administrative procedures such as those that are set out in a statute or a collective bargaining agreement would be futile and thus excuse such failure to exhaust those remedies, the court said that in Amorosano-LePore's case she failed to prove that her pursuing her administrative remedies provided by the controlling collective bargaining agreement would have been an exercise in futility.

The court also rejected Amorosano-LePore argument that the City’s officials acted beyond the scope of their authority, noting that this directly related to questions of interpretation, application, and enforcement provisions of the CBA and thus was reviewable under the CBA. Similarly, Amorosano-LePore claim that she was deprived of due process the hearing officer’s conduct also could have been addressed through administrative review as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09073.htm

Employees and retirees covered by a health insurance plan must be advised of changes

Employees and retirees covered by a health insurance plan must be advised of changes

Orth v Wisconsin State Employees Union Council 24 et al, USCA 7^th Circuit, Docket # 07-2778.

A collective bargaining agreement between the employer (Council 24 of the Wisconsin State Employees Union) and the union that represented Mr. Orth prior to his retirement provided for certain changes to the health insurance plan available to employees and retirees. Although the case involved alleged violations of the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA, it may be instructive to those entities and individuals not subject to these federal acts.

According to the decision, there was a “secret side deal between the union and the employer in this case” regarding certain changes in the health insurance plan. This, said the court, constituted a breach of the plan managers’ fiduciary duty to the plan participants and beneficiaries.

Further, said the Circuit Court, "The plan fiduciaries are to the plan participants and beneficiaries as the union is to the workers it represents;" the union too is a fiduciary, and its duty of fair representation is simply another name for “fiduciary duty” and “just as in the collective bargaining setting, it is a breach of fiduciary duty to change the plan without notice to those affected by the change.”

Without knowledge of their rights under the plan, participants cannot make intelligent decisions with regard to the purchase of private health insurance to replace or supplement their plan benefits. The secret side deal between the union and the employer in this case, said the court, was a breach of the plan managers’ fiduciary duty to the plan participants and beneficiaries.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/HW1FFQKO.pdf

Residence requirements for public officers

Residence requirements for public officers
Informal Opinions of the Attorney General 2008-10

Public Officers Law §3 generally requires that a public officer reside in the political subdivision or municipality in which he or she holds such public office, i.e., the incumbent of a local office “must be a resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state for which he shall be chosen, or within which the electors electing him [or her] reside, or within which his [or her] official functions are required to be exercised ….”

One of the exceptions to this general rule permits police officers to reside in a county in New York State that is contiguous to the county in which the political subdivision or municipality is located. Police officers are public officers for the purposes of Public Officers Law Section 3. Although not all public employees are public officers, all public officers are public employees.

With respect to police officers, other than police officers employed by the City of New York, POL Section 3.2 provides as follows:

2. Neither the provisions of this section or of any general, special or local law, charter, code, ordinance, resolution, rule or regulation, requiring a person to be a resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state for which he shall be chosen or within which his official functions are required to be exercised, shall apply to the appointment of a person as a member of the police force of any political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state if such person resides (a) in the county in which such political subdivision or municipal corporation is located; or (b) in a county within the state contiguous to the county in which such political subdivision or municipal corporation is located; or (c) in a county within the state contiguous to such political subdivision or municipal corporation; or (d) in a county within the state contiguous to a county described in item (c) hereof where the former is less than fifteen miles from such political subdivision or municipal corporation, measured from their respective nearest boundary lines; or (e) in a county within the state contiguous to a county described in item (d) hereof where the former is less than thirty miles from such political subdivision or municipal corporation, measured from their respective nearest boundary lines. [N.B. Subdivision 19 of Section 3 sets out provisions applicable to police officers of the City of New York, i.e., a city of over one million population.]

Is it lawful for a municipality to permit a police officer to reside in a county that is not contiguous with the county in which the municipality is located? No, advised the Attorney General.

According to the Informal Opinion, “Contiguous” as used in Public Officers Law §3.2 means “sharing a border” or “touching.” In this instance the Attorney General said that police officers employed by the City of Syracuse may not live in Oneida County because that Oneida County is not contiguous to Onondaga County.

Failing to observe the mandates of Public Officers Law Section 3.2 could have other adverse consequences. For example, Kevin O'Connor, a Town of Clarkstown police officer, was terminated from his position by the Police Commission pursuant to Section 30.1.(d) of the Public Officers Law because O'Connor "ceased to be an inhabitant within the geographical restrictions" set by law. Public Officers Law Section 30.1(d) provides that the public office "shall be vacant" if the officer does not live in the appropriate geographical area.

Although Section 3.2 of the Public Officers Law permits a police officer to reside in the same or a contiguous county in which the political subdivision employing the officer is located, O'Connor had moved to Warren County. Clarkstown is in Rockland County. Warren and Rockland Counties are not contiguous.

In O’Connor v Police Commission of the Town of Clarkstown, [221 A.D.2d 444], the Appellate Division said that there was ample evidence to support the Commission's determination that O'Connor had ceased to be an inhabitant of the geographical area required for members of the Clarkstown Police Department. Accordingly, the Commission's decision terminating O'Connor from his position was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Another issue involved O'Connor's receiving disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law following a work-related injury at the time he moved to Warren County. Significantly, the Appellate Division ruled that "the fact that O'Connor was disabled and entitled to the benefits of General Municipal Law Section 207-c(1) does not render Public Officers Law Section 30 inapplicable."

In a case involving disability benefits under General Municipal Law Section 207-a, which provides firefighters injured on the job with benefits similar to those available to police officers pursuant to Section 207-c, the court decided that Section 207-a benefits were only available to firefighters while they remain members of the fire department. Payments are not made if a disabled firefighter ceases to be an employee of the fire department [Robinson v Cole, 193 Misc.717].

The Appellate Division also rejected O'Connor's claim that he satisfied Section 3.2's residence requirement because he "occasionally stayed" at an in-laws apartment that was within the geographical area."

The Informal Opinion is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/appeals_opinions/opinions/2008/Informal/I%202008-10%20pw.pdf

Procedural matters to satisfy when filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education

Procedural matters to satisfy when filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education
Appeal of Carl Stieffenhofer from actions of Donna Pieszala, President of the Board of Education of the Newfane Central School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education No. 15,846

Although the Commissioner dismissed Stieffenhofer’s appeal as untimely, he addressed a number of relevant procedural matters that are instructive. The Commissioner pointed out that:

1. A petition must contain “a clear and concise statement of the petitioner’s claim showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, and shall further contain a demand for the relief to which the petitioner deems himself entitled … which statement must be sufficiently clear to advise a respondent of the nature of petitioner’s claim and of the specific act or acts complained of.”

2. Where the complaint relates to allegedly "illegal" actions taken while the Board was in “executive session,” such matters fall “squarely within the ambit of the Open Meetings Law [and] Public Officers Law §107 vests exclusive jurisdiction over complaints alleging violations of the Open Meetings Law in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and alleged violations thereof may not be adjudicated in an appeal to the Commissioner.”

3. The failure to join as a necessary party is fatal to the petition as a party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such, named as a respondent in the caption and served with a copy of the notice of petition and petition to inform the individual that he or she should respond to the petition and enter a defense.

Although the Commissioner dismissed the appeal, he did address a motion by Pieszala that he issue her a certificate of good faith pursuant to Education Law §3811(1) thereby authorizing the board to indemnify her for legal fees and expenses incurred in defending this proceeding which arose out of the exercise of her powers or performance of duties as a board member.

The Commissioner ruled that it was appropriate to issue such certification as there was nothing in the record to indicate that Piezala acted in bad faith.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume48/d15846.htm

Statutory presumption that an individual suffered a disease of the heart as a result of the performance of duty rebutted by medical evidence to the contrary

Statutory presumption that an individual suffered a disease of the heart as a result of the performance of duty rebutted by medical evidence to the contrary
Lawless v DiNapoli, 56 AD3d 1114

A member of the New York State Employees’ Retirement System [NYSERS] applied for performance of duty disability retirement benefits alleging that he was permanently incapacitated as the result of a heart attack he suffered approximately six months earlier. The member filed his application relying upon the statutory presumption contained in Retirement and Social Security Law §507-b(c).

§507-b(c) provides that “…any condition of impairment of health caused by diseases of the heart, resulting in disability or death to a member covered by this section, presently employed and who shall have sustained such disability while so employed, who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into service as a correction officer or security hospital treatment assistant, which examination failed to disclose evidence of any disease or other impairment of the heart, shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty, unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence.”

NYSERS conceded that the individual was permanently incapacitated from the performance of his duties, but decided that his disability was not sustained as a result of the discharge of his duties as a correction officer and rejected his application for line-of-duty disability benefits. The Hearing Officer upheld the denial, concluding that the proof submitted by the Retirement System was sufficient to rebut the statutory "incurred in the line of duty presumption" set out in Retirement and Social Security Law §507-b(c).

The Appellate Division, noting that the Retirement System did not dispute that the member had successfully passed his pre-employment physical or that he is now permanently disabled from performing his duties as a correction officer due to his heart attack and underlying coronary artery disease, said that because the applicant elected to rely upon the statutory presumption contained in §507-b(c), the issue to resolve was whether the Retirement System had rebutted this presumption with competent medical evidence.

The court said that its conclusion, after its review of the record as a whole, was that the Retirement System successfully rebutted the statutory presumption and thus properly rejected the member’s application for benefits.

The full text of the decisions is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09335.htm

The duties and responsibilities of the position control with respect its classification and allocation to a salary grade

The duties and responsibilities of the position control with respect its classification and allocation to a salary grade
Matter of Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v State of New York Unified Court System, 55 AD3d 1070

Following the reallocation of positions previously titled "Hearing Examiner" to “Support Magistrates, JG-31” and the adoption of a new title standard, individual Support Magistrates and the labor union representing them [petitioners], commenced a proceeding seeking to rescind the allocation of the title to JG-31, and place the Support Magistrate title in a higher salary grade -- JG-33. The title change and level of compensation had been determined by the Chief Administrative Judge.

Supreme Court concluded that the classification of the position and its allocation to JG-31 had a rational basis, was not arbitrary and capricious and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s determination.

In the course of the proceeding the Administrative Director of the Unified Court System submitted an affidavit in support of the classification of the position and the allocation of the title Support Magistrates to JG-31 in which he stated that the allocation of the Support Magistrate title to salary grade JG-31 was based upon the Chief Administrative Judge's finding that duties, responsibilities and functions of Support Magistrates are comparable to those of Court Attorney-Referees. Court Attorney-Referees act as special referees in a number of courts, including Family Court, and are also allocated to grade JG-31.

In addition, the Administrative Director said that “Court Attorney-Referees, when authorized by a Family Court judge and upon consent of the parties, perform the same quasi-judicial functions that Support Magistrates do and in the same court both conduct trials, take evidence and issue orders, including orders of protection.”

Conceding that the reasons underlying the determination, are "facially legal," the petitioners argued that the two titles are not comparable because a Support Magistrate is directly empowered by statute to decide certain issues while a Court Attorney-Referee has no original jurisdiction conferred by statute and the Court Attorney-Referee must be appointed by a court to hear and report or, with the consent of the parties, hear and determine, the issues.

The Appellate Division was not persuaded by the petitioners’ argument, ruling that “the difference in the origin of authority to entertain issues does not contradict [the Chief Administrative Judge’s] conclusion that the duties, responsibilities and functions of the two titles are similar.” In other words, it is the duties and responsibilities of the position that are controlling in classifying the position and allocating it to a salary grade, not the source of the authority that the incumbent of the title exercises.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08043.htm

 

Reports from the Office of the State Comptroller

Reports from the Office of the State Comptroller

For the week of June 11 - 17, 2012

Forensic Audit Reveals Metro–North Employees Were No Shows

Metro–North Railroad employees that were supposed to monitor train conditions and crew performance were not on the job when they were scheduled to work and performed poorly when they were, according to an audit released Friday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. Auditors and investigators also found that a relative of a manager was hired at an inflated salary over other more qualified employees, a possible violation of the New York State Public Officers Law.

DiNapoli: State Agencies’ Late Approvals of Contracts with Not–For–Profits Rose to 80 Percent Last Year

State agencies were late more than 80 percent of the time in approving contracts subject to the Prompt Contracting Law with not–for–profit providers last year, according to a report released Thursday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. This prompted interest payments that cost taxpayers nearly $200,000, the report found.

DiNapoli: Auditors Blocked $61.5 Million in Erroneous Workers’ Compensation Payment Requests

Auditors uncovered $61.5 million in erroneous workers’ compensation payment requests, according to a report released Thursday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. The 2011 year–end report details errors caused by improper data entry or computation, among other reasons. After discussions with the Comptroller’s Office, the Workers’ Compensation Board made improvements which reduced the improper payment rate by 17 percent in November and December of 2011.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases School Audit

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced his office completed an audit of the Hoosick Falls Central School District.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audit

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced his office completed an audit of the City of Syracuse.

An employer may find that firefighter’s disability was not the result of a work-related injury or disease not withstanding the Retirement System’s decision to the contrary

An employer may find that firefighter’s disability was not the result of a work-related injury or disease not withstanding the Retirement System’s decision to the contrary

Davenport v City of Mount Vernon, 2012 NY Slip Op 04744, Appellate Division, Second Department

The City of Mount Vernon Fire Commissioner adopted the recommendation of a hearing officer denying a firefighter’s application for supplemental benefits otherwise available pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a(2).* The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s decision, commenting that it was supported by substantial evidence.

The court said that the record contains evidence consisting of the reports of three orthopedic surgeons, each of whom concluded that the firefighter's condition was not caused by an accident, explaining that the Commissioner had the authority to evaluate conflicting medical evidence, and was free to credit evidence based on reports of one set of physicians over that of another set of physicians.

In Cook v City Of Utica, 88 NY 2d 833, the court ruled that while a disabled firefighter's Section 207-a benefits may depend in part on benefits paid pursuant to RSSL Section 363-c, there is no specific statutory language or anything in the legislative history concerning these measures suggesting that the Comptroller's eligibility determination with respect to RSSL benefits precluded the municipal employer from making a separate, and, as here, contrary determination with respect an individual's eligibility for GML Section 207-a benefits. Accordingly, the employer could deny granting the firefighter supplemental benefits to his or her disability retirement allowance upon a finding that the disability was not the result of a work-related injury or disease that was supported by substantial evidence.

Similarly, in Balcerak v Nassau County, 94 NY2d 25, the Court of Appeals said that "[a] determination by the Workers' Compensation Board that an injury is work-related does not by operation of collateral estoppel, automatically entitle an injured [police] officer to General Municipal Law Section 207-c benefits."

Accordingly, an employer was not precluded from determining that an individual was not entitled to Section 207-c benefits despite a prior Workers' Compensation determination in an employee had suffered an "on-the-job" injury.

* The amount of the supplement that would be paid the disabled firefighter pursuant to §207-a(2) would the difference between his or her retirement allowance and the compensation he or she would have received in active service, payable until the firefighter's mandatory age of retirement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04744.htm

Removal of an officer of a political subdivision of the State for misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office

Removal of an officer of a political subdivision of the State for misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office
Matter of Hedman v Town Bd. of Town of Howard, 56 AD3d 1287

§36 of the Public Officers Law provides for the removal of an officer of a town, a village, an improvement district or a fire district, [other than a justice of the peace], found guilty of misconduct, maladministration [performing official duties corruptly or inefficiently], malfeasance [performing official duties inadequately or poorly], or malversation [misuse of public or other funds] while holding public office.

In this action it was alleged that a member of the Town Board attempted to conceal his relationship with an alternate energy company, and ignored an alleged conflict of interest that arose when he voted to approve a wind energy facility proposed by company that included installing a wind turbine on the Board member’s property.

The Appellate Division, citing Jones v Filkins, 238 AD2d 954, said that the removal of an official from office pursuant to Public Officers Law §36 "generally will not be granted absent allegations of self-dealing, corrupt activities, conflict of interest, moral turpitude, intentional wrongdoing or violation of a public trust[,]” while allegations of  “minor neglect of duties, administrative oversights, or violations of law do not, in general, warrant removal."

The court decided no an actual conflict of interest that would warrant the removal of the Board member had been shown, explaining that the submitted evidence in support of the alleged conflict of interest that consisted solely of company's proposal for a wind energy facility in which Board member was identified as a proposed participating landowner on whose property a wind turbine would be located.

In contrast, the Appellate Division said that the Board member had established that he had not entered into any agreement with company with respect to a wind turbine at the time he voted on the proposal in favor of the company's plan for a wind energy facility. Further, the court said that the allegation that Board member had intentionally concealed his relationship with company “was based on pure speculation and thus was not entitled to any evidentiary weight.”

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:

 http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09229.htm

Consideration of ex parte information in a disciplinary action constitutes a denial of due process

Consideration of ex parte information  in a disciplinary action constitutes a denial of due process

Faga v Board of Educ. of Harrison Cent. School Dist., 2008 NY Slip Op 09078, Decided on November 18, 2008, Appellate Division, Second Department

An employee, terminated from his position with the Harrison Central School District, challenged the District’s action, contending that his due process rights were violated the Board of Education had “received ex parte information about the charges from the District's attorneys and the Superintendent of Schools.”

The individual also alleged that his right to due process was violated because the Superintendent submitted a statement to members of the Board before the charges were brought that he believed that charges could be sustained.

The Appellate Division found that the District established that the Board did not prejudge the matter nor did it rely on any improperly-obtained information in making its determination to dismiss the employee from his position.

In contrast, where the court finds that the rights of the accused were prejudiced because of some activity of the appointing authority, it will typically vacate the determination.

For example, in Ernst v Saratoga County, 234 AD2d 764, the Appellate Division annulled the dismissal of an individual found guilty of disciplinary charges because the chairman of the county Board of Supervisors - 
(a) met with the county’s attorneys “to discuss the pending investigation;” (b) met with the employees involved to, as the chairman phrased it, “relieve their fears;” (c) signed the notice of the charges against the individual, (d) voted to bring charges against the employee; (e) served as a witness at the disciplinary hearing; and (f) voted to accept a hearing officer’s findings of guilt and impose the recommended penalty. 


These actions, said the court, denied the employee a fair and impartial tribunal.

The Faga decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09078.htm

Placement of a candidates name on an eligible list does not give the individual a right to an appointment

Placement of a candidates name on an eligible list does not give the individual a right to an appointment
Tardif v Town of Southold, 56 AD3d 755

John J. Tardif filed a notice of claim alleging that the Town of Southold, and the Town's police department, did not appoint him as a police officer even though he had "the best qualifications" and "the number one test score" on the examination to become a police officer because of his age.*

The Town moved for summary judgment, contending it did not discriminate against Tardif because of his age but elected not to appoint him “because he submitted deceptive responses in his application to become a police officer.”

In opposing the Town’s motion, Tardif did not make any argument in support of his age discrimination claim. He, instead, contended that the Town “had violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection in other ways.” The Appellate Division, however, ruled that Tardif failed to raise any triable issue of fact with regard to any of his constitutional claim.

The court pointed out that Tardif does not have a protectable property interest in a position with the Town's police department that would entitle him to maintain a due process claim. In this regard, said the court, “An individual does not have a "legally protectable interest" in an appointment to the position of police officer merely because he or she achieved a sufficient score on the examination to be placed on an eligibility list,” citing Andriola v Ortiz, 82 NY2d 320 and Cassidy v Municipal Civil Service Commission of City of New Rochelle, 37 NY2d 526.

Specifically, the Appellate Division commented that "'An appointing authority has wide discretion in determining the fitness of candidates . . . This discretion is particularly broad in the hiring of law enforcement officers, to whom high standards may be applied . . . As long as the administrative determination is not irrational or arbitrary, this Court will not interfere with it."

As Tardif did not have a property interest in an appointment as a police officer and failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the deprivation of a protected liberty interest, the Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court had properly determined that he had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process.

Finally, said the court, Tardif did not establish any right to a “name-clearing hearing” with respect to his rejection for appointment as a police officer by the Town.

*Section 54 of the Civil Service Law sets out standards for establishing age requirement for appointment to positions in the public service in general while Section 58.1(a) sets out age requirements for police officers in particular.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09381.htm

A provision in a town code that is intended to supercede a statutory provision must comply with the statutory method set by law to accomplish that end

A provision in a town code that is intended to supercede a statutory provision must comply with the statutory method set by law to accomplish that end
Matter of Guzdek v Mohan, 56 AD3d 1206

The Amherst Town Board adopted a resolution providing for the appointment of three officers to fill vacancies in the Town’s Police Department.

When Satish Mohan, the Town Supervisor, declined to comply with the Board’s action, Edward W. Guzdek, Jr., the President of the Amherst Police Club, sued in an effort to obtain a court order directing Mohan to fill the vacancies.

Mohan argued that, pursuant to Section 4-10 of the Town of Amherst’s Code, he had the authority to appoint officers to the Town Police Department.

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Code was inconsistent with Town Law §150. The court said that Town Law §150 provides that the appointment of police officers "is a legislative function within the exclusive jurisdiction of the town board," citing a 1980 opinion of the Attorney General [1980 Informal Opinion 249].

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling, holding that although the Amherst Town Board may delegate its authority to appoint police officers to the Town Supervisor by designating the Supervisor to serve as police commissioner as authorized by Town Law §150.2, it had not done so. Nor, said the court, does Section 4-10 of the Code effectively supersede the provisions of Town Law §150 with respect to the Town Board's authority to make appointments to the Town Police Department.

Section 150.1 of the Town Law provides, in pertinent part that “The town board of any town may establish a police department and appoint a chief of police and such officers and patrolmen as may be needed and fix their compensation.”

The Appellate Division concluded that Section 4-10 did not "substantial[ly] adhere to the statutory methods to evidence a legislative intent to … supersede those provisions of [Town Law §150] sought to be … superseded” and dismissed Mohan’s appeal.

On this point, Section 150.2, in pertinent part, provides that “The town board may also by resolution designate the supervisor to serve as police commissioner, and when so designated, such supervisor shall have all the powers of and perform the duties of such board of police commissioners.” In this instance the court, in effect, ruled that that no such resolution had been adopted and that Section 4-10 of the Town Code was not sufficient to demonstrate such a legislative intent.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08875.htm

A public school district is not an "education corporation or association" within the meaning of the State’s Human Rights Law §296(4)

A public school district is not an “education corporation or association” within the meaning of the State’s Human Rights Law §296(4)

North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2012 NY Slip Op 04668, Court of Appeals

Is a public school district an "education corporation or association" within the meaning of  Executive Law §296(4)? If it is an “education corporation or association,” then the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) has jurisdiction to investigate complaints filed against public school districts under that provision. Otherwise it does not. The Court of Appeals decided “not.”

The case arose when a number of public school students filed complaints with the SDHR claiming that their respective school districts engaged in an "unlawful discriminatory practice" barred by §296(4) of the Executive Law, the "Human Rights Law," by permitting their harassment on the basis of race and/or disability.

The school districts involved filed Article 78 petitions seeking a writ of prohibition* barring the SDHR from investigating the complaints on the ground that a public school district is not an "education corporation or association" as contemplated by Executive Law §296(4).**

The Appellate Division concluded that as a school district is a "municipal corporation" and therefore a "public corporation" under the General Construction Law, it could not be an "education corporation" within the meaning of Executive Law §296(4)]. However, the Court of Appeals, noting that this “approach is a legitimate one,” decided that there was some problem in SDHR's relying on the General Construction Law because the provision at issue in the Executive Law was enacted 15 years prior to General Construction Law §§65 and 66.

The Court, however, said that it did not need to address whether the General Construction Law is applicable here as there was an independent basis, supported by legislative history of Tax Law §4(6), for its conclusion that a public school district is not an "education corporation or association."

The Court of Appeals said that the legislative history surrounding the enactment of Tax Law §4(6), in concert with the circumstances under which the Legislature transferred the term "education corporation or association" from Tax Law §4(6) to Executive Law §296(4), “bespeaks the Legislature's intention that the term was to have the same meaning in the Executive Law as it did in former Tax Law §4(6).” Moreover, said the court, the use of the phrase "non-sectarian" was plainly included in Executive Law  296(4) to carve out an exception for parochial schools, while reserving for the SDHR the jurisdiction to investigate §296(4) complaints against private, non-sectarian education corporations or associations.

The Court then noted that “Public school districts are different from private, non-sectarian institutions and fall outside the purview of the SDHR's jurisdiction relative to §296(4) claims … [as] a public school district receives tax-exempt status by virtue of the fact that it is public, so there would never be any need for it to 'hold itself out to the public to be non-sectarian' as, say, a private school."

The fact that the SDHR did not have jurisdiction to consider the students’ complaints did not mean that they did not have a forum in which to seek relief. The Court said that “In addition to potential remedies under federal law, public school students may file a complaint with the Commissioner of Education (see Education Law §310).”

Further, said the court, in 2010, the Legislature enacted the "Dignity for All Students Act," establishing article 2 of the Education Law, designed "to afford all [public school] students an environment free of any harassment that substantially interferes with their education, regardless of the basis of the harassment, and free of discrimination based on actual or perceived race, color, weight, national origin, ethnic group, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender, or sex," commenting that while SDHR lauded this legislation by noting that it "addresses a myriad of harassment and discrimination issues that arise within a school context and its goals comport with the goals of the [Human Rights Law]," noticeably absent from SDHR’s correspondence was any indication that the Division had previously handled similar claims of that nature arising in public schools.***

The Court’s conclusion: Because a public school district is not an "education corporation or association" under Executive Law §296(4), the SDHR lacked jurisdiction to investigate the complaints filed by the students in these appeals.

* A writ of prohibition, one of the ancient writs under English Common Law, is an order issued by a higher tribunal barring a lower tribunal prohibiting the litigation from going forward because the lower tribunal lacks jurisdiction to consider the matter before it.

**Executive Law § 296 (4) provides, in relevant part, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an education corporation or association which holds itself out to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from taxation pursuant to … [RPTL Article 4] … to permit the harassment of any student or applicant, by reason of his race … [or] disability …."

***The Court of Appeals referred to a letter from New York State Div. of Human Rights, dated July 22, 2010, and included in the Bill Jacket for Chapter 482 of the Laws of 2010, in support of this statement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04668.htm

A public officer must show that alleged false statements concerning him or her were made with actual malice to recover damages for defamation

A public officer must show that alleged false statements concerning him or her were made with actual malice to recover damages for defamation
Watson v Jamestown, 56 AD3d 1289

Michael J. Watson, a police officer, sued a number of police department officials, alleging, among other alleged wrongdoing, defamation.

Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing Watson’s complaints. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s action.

Addressing Watson’s claim of defamation, the Appellate Division noted that "A public official [as a police officer, Watson was a public officer] may not recover damages for defamation unless the official proves that the offending false statement was made with actual malice -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," citing Freeman v Johnston, 84 NY2d 52.

In this instance, said the court, the officials being sued established “their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to that cause of action by demonstrating that the remarks that allegedly defamed [Watson] were true with the exception of one remark that was a misstatement but was not made with malice.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09231.htm