In an appeal to the Commissioner of Education the aggrieved party has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief he or she is seeking

In an appeal to the Commissioner of Education the aggrieved party has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief he or she is seeking

Nicholas Washburn v Ellenville Central School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16,368

Nicholas Washburn challenged the termination of his probationary appointment and his denial of tenure by the Ellenville Central School District Board of Education at the end of the third year of his probationary appointment as a physical education teacher.

In response to the superintendent writing to Washburn informing him that she would recommend termination of his services as a probationary teacher effective July 22, 201 at a board to be held on June 22, 2010, Washburn requested “a written statement of the reasons for the superintendent’s negative recommendation.”

The superintendent replied to Washburn indicating that her recommendation was based on his failure to follow certain directives and practices and set forth a number of examples of such omissions.

When the Board terminated Washburn’s probationary appointment effective July 22, 2010, he appealed the Board's decision to the Commissioner of Education.

In his appeal Washburn contended that the reasons for his termination and denial of tenure were “false and pretextual” and asked the Commissioner to annul the Board’s action and to grant him tenure retroactive to June 22, 2010.

The Board, in rebuttal, argued that [1] Washburn failed to state any procedural violation of Education Law §3031 with respect its terminating his probationary appointment and [2] that he did not established any basis for granting him tenure retroactively. The Board also claimed that Washburn had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the relevant collective bargaining agreement.

As to the Board’s “affirmative defense” that Washburn failed to exhaust his administrative remedy under the collective bargaining agreement, the Commissioner said that “other than this conclusory allegation,” the Board neither supplied any facts nor made any reference to any “applicable provisions of the agreement.”  Accordingly, the Commissioner ruled that the Board had not established this defense. 

Turning to the merits of Washburn’s appeal, the Commissioner observed that “generally, a board of education has the unfettered right to terminate a probationary teacher or administrator’s employment for any reason, unless the employee establishes that he or she was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible reason or in violation of a statutory proscription or decisional law.” Further, said the Commissioner, the aggrieved party “has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of establishing the facts upon which [he or she] seeks relief.”

Although Washburn alleged that the Board’s decision to terminate his probationary employment and deny him tenure violated his right to due process, the Commissioner said that he failed to allege any procedural violation of Education Law §3031 or any other applicable statute.  Further, said the Commissioner, the record indicated that the Board complied "in all respects with the statutory procedural requirements for terminating a probationary employee and denying a probationer tenure."  

Nor, said the Commissioner, did Washburn establish that he was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible reason or in violation of statute.

Having failed to articulate a clear legal right to the relief requested, the Commissioner ruled that Washburn failed to meet his burden and dismissed his appeal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume52/d16368.html

An employer may, but is not required to, create a new job or create a light-duty version of the disabled employee’s current job in order to provide a reasonable accommodation

An employer may, but is not required to, create a new job or create a light-duty version of the disabled employee’s current job in order to provide a reasonable accommodation
Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2012 NY Slip Op 05478, Appellate Division, First Department

William Jacobsen alleged that he was wrongfully terminated from his position because of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law §296[1][a]) and the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY §8-107[1][a]).

Diagnosed with pneumoconiosis, an occupational lung disease, Jacobsen requested, and was granted, a medical leave of absence. Subsequently Jacobsen’s physician cleared to return to work on January 3, 2006, but directed that he not be present at any construction site. HHC sent a letter to Jacobsen’s physician setting out his duties and explaining that he is required to spend approximately 75% of his time in the field monitoring construction sites. Jacobsen’s union representative then asked HHC to let him return to work with an accommodation of being assigned work "that he is capable of doing in the office." In addition, Jacobsen provided another letter from his physician stating that he was medically cleared to work in the field.

Ultimately HHC told Jacobsen that he would be placed on unpaid medical leave for six months and his job would be left open in the event that his condition improved, indicating that his union’s proposed accommodation, relocation to the central office, was not feasible because the duties of his position required that he visit facilities that have ongoing construction. Jacobsen’s physician then advised HHC that Jacobsen “could never be medically cleared to perform the essential functions of his current duties because he should not be further exposed to any type of environmental dust.”

HHC terminated Jacobsen at the end of his six-month leave of absence, whereupon he commenced an action for wrongful termination because of a disability.

To state a prima facie case of employment discrimination due to a disability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered from a disability and that the disability caused the behavior for which he or she was terminated (Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer, here HHC, to show that the disability prevented Jacobsen "from performing the duties of the job in a reasonable manner or that the employee's termination was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason".

The Appellate Division concluded that HHC met its burden by establishing that at the time of termination, Jacobsen was unable to perform the duties of his job because of his lung condition and that no reasonable accommodation was available.

Under the Executive Law §292 [21-e], a "reasonable accommodation" is defined as "actions taken by [an] employer which permit an employee . . . with a disability to perform in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held . . . provided, however, that such actions do not impose an undue hardship on the business." Similarly, the City's Human Rights Law provides that an employer "shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to satisfy the essential requisites of a job" (Administrative Code §8-107 [15][a]).

However, said the court, "an employer is not required to find another job for the employee, create a new job, or create a light-duty version of the current job."

Under both New York's Executive Law and the City's Administrative Code, an employer is required to perform an individual assessment of an employee prior to terminating him or her. In this instance it was only after Jacobsen's doctor and Jacobsen himself confirmed that he could no longer work at construction sites that HHC terminated him from his position.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s order granting HHC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05478.htm

Terminated employee’s actions that did not constitute misconduct but was an error of judgment does not disqualify the individual for unemployment insurance benefits

Terminated employee’s actions that did not constitute misconduct but was an error of judgment does not disqualify the individual for unemployment insurance benefits

Jackson (County of Nassau Civ. Serv. Commn.--Commissioner of Labor), 2012 NY Slip Op 05372, Appellate Division, Third Department

A correction officer at the Nassau County Correctional Facility began a “personal relationship with a man who was later incarcerated at that facility.” She continued to have a personal relationship with this individual following his incarceration and communicated with him on her cell phone in contravention of the facility’s policy prohibiting corrections personnel from fraternizing with inmates.

Ultimately the correction officer was terminated from her position and she was later disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits on the ground that her employment was terminated due to misconduct.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, however, reversed this decision and ruled that correction officer was entitled to receive benefits because her activities did not constitute misconduct, but rather an error of judgment.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board’s ruling.

Rejecting the facility’s appeal, the court explained that the question of whether an applicant for unemployment insurance benefits had engaged in disqualifying misconduct is a factual issue for the Board to resolve and “its determination will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.”

Notably, said the court, "not every mistake, exercise of poor judgment or discharge for cause will rise to the level of misconduct." Although the correction officer’s making the phone calls violated the employer's policy prohibiting corrections personnel from having personal conversations with inmates, she had testified that she was unaware of this policy.

The court, “based upon the limited record” before it, concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that correction officer's actions, “albeit inappropriate, did not rise to the level of misconduct disqualifying her from receiving unemployment insurance benefits.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/slipidx/aidxtable_3.shtml

New York City Civil Service Commission’s determination that an applicant is qualified for the position sought affirmed

New York City Civil Service Commission’s determination that an applicant is qualified for the position sought affirmed

In the Application of The City of New York and Martha K. Hirst, As Commissioner of the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services, 2008 NY Slip Op 32509(U), Supreme Court, New York County, Docket Number: 0400925/2008, Judge: Lewis Bart Stone [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

In this action, New York City’s Department of Citywide Administrative Services [Administrative Services] as the court to review the City Civil Service Commission’s [CSC] decision that an applicant for the position of Assistant Engineer was qualified for appointment to this title.

The applicant had been educated in Minsk, Belarus and had completed a combined undergraduate curriculum for the degree of Specialist in Civil Engineering with a specialization in Water Supply and Sewage Systems in 1974. Administrative Services had rejected her application on the grounds that she was not qualified for the position because she did not meet the qualifications set out in the Examination Announcement.

CSC held an “evidentiary hearing” an ultimately determined that the applicant was qualified for the position, ruling that the course work completed by the applicant is equivalent to the curriculum outlined for a baccalaureate degree in Environmental Engineering at the State University of New York at Buffalo and the curriculum outlined by Manhattan College for a Master’s Degree in Environmental Engineering.

Administrative Services appealed, contending that CSC had “acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its discretion” in qualifying the applicant for the position.

Justice Stone said that the hearing record shows that Administrative Services “relied on a consultant’s evaluation” of the applicant’s educational transcript to find a lack of equivalency, and that CSC made its own factual evaluation of equivalency based on the applicant’s transcript in light of curricula in New York colleges.

The problem of equivalency, CSC noted, is that engineering disciplines overlap. Accordingly, said the court, inquiry into the meaning of the applicant’s educational courses and relating their equivalency to modern environmental curricula is hardly arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion in this context.

Justice Stone dismissed Administrative Service’s appeal, ruling “Whether this Court would have made the same decision on the facts as [the Commission] did is not relevant. What is relevant is that [the Commission] made an inquiry and reviewed the material submitted to it and made its Decision on the facts of equivalency, a determination that is neither arbitrary, capricious or ai1 abuse of discretion.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2008/2008_32509.pdf

Conflicts of Interest

Conflicts of Interest

Opinion of the Office of the State Comptroller, #2008-1; #2008-2

In response to an inquiry concerning gifts to school district, the Office of the State Comptroller advised:

A school board member would not have a prohibited conflict of interest under article 18 of the General Municipal Law if he or she also served as a trustee on the board of trustees of a not-for-profit foundation that raises money and makes gifts to the school district. The school board member, however, should not participate in school board discussions or decisions relating to gifts from, or other matters involving, the not-for-profit foundation for which the board member serves as a trustee and, assuming disclosure is not otherwise required by General Municipal Law § 803, should disclose his or her relationship with the not-for-profit entity. [Opinions of the Office of the State Comptroller 2008-1]

The full text of the opinion 2008-1is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/legal/2008/op2008.1.htm

___________________

In response to an inquiry concerning contracts entered into prior to an individual’s commencing municipal service, the Office of the Comptroller advised:

A newly elected town board member has an interest in a contract between the town and the board member, as a sole proprietor, under which the board member picks up road salt and delivers the salt to a town storage facility.

If the contract was entered to before the board member was elected to office, the exception in General Municipal Law §802 (1) (h) applies and the interest is not prohibited. The board member would be required, however, to disclose the interest in accordance with General Municipal Law §803. In addition, the board member would have a prohibited interest in renewals of the existing contract, or in subsequent contracts between the town and himself or herself as sole proprietor unless another exception in General Municipal Law §802 were to apply. The town should consult its code of ethics to determine whether it contains any pertinent provisions. Even if not required by the town's code of ethics, the board member should not participate in town board discussions or decisions relating to the hauling contract, including but not limited to, discussions or decisions pertaining to auditing claims under the contract. [Opinions of the Office of the State Comptroller 2008-2]

The full text of the opinion 2008-2 is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/legal/2008/op2008.2.htm

N.B. These opinions represent the views of the Office of the State Comptroller at the time it was rendered. These opinions may no longer represent those views if, among other things, there have been subsequent court cases or statutory amendments that bear on the issues discussed in these opinions.

Seeking a court order to compel a public officer to perform his or her duty

Seeking a court order to compel a public officer to perform his or her duty

CSEA v Patchogue-Medford UFSD, 239 A.D.2d 415

CSEA v Patchogue-Medford UFSD, a case involving a demand to effect an appointment of an individual to a reclassified position, was characterized as an action “in the nature of mandamus.”

After reviewing the duties and responsibilities of the position of stenographer then held by Lorraine Fishman, the Suffolk County Civil Service Commission advised the Patchogue-Medford Union Free School District that it had reclassified the position to senior stenographer. The Commission then certified the promotion list for senior stenographer to the District. Fishman was first on the list.

The District returned the list to the Commission, indicating that "it would not be making an appointment to the position of senior stenographer at that time."* Fishman sued, seeking a court order compelling the District to appoint her to the reclassified position. Her petition, said the court, was an action "sounding in mandamus."

Supreme Court, Suffolk County, however, never reached the merits of Fishman's claim as it dismissed her petition on the grounds that it was untimely. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower Court's ruling.

What was the reason for the Courts to declare Fishman's suit untimely? The Appellate Division said that although Fishman knew in June that the District was not going to appoint her to the position of senior stenographer, "she made no formal demand upon the District” to appoint her to the senior stenographer position until she commenced the [Article 78] proceeding until the following March.

The Court pointed out that "before commencing a proceeding in the nature of mandamus, it is necessary to make a demand and await a refusal and the Statute of Limitation begins to run on the date of the refusal and expires four months later."

A party, however, cannot delay in making his or her demand, thereby extending indefinitely the period during which he or she is required to take action.

In this instance the Appellate Division decided that Fishman had not proceeded with sufficient promptness in making her demand and thus the doctrine of laches barred her from suing. Laches results from the failure of a party to do something to enforce a right at a proper time.

Although the courts never reached the merits of Fishman's petition, it should be noted that as a general proposition, an appointing authority cannot be required to fill a vacant position, even if there is an appropriate eligible list available to it.

For example, in Porto v Town of Harrison, 100 AD2d 870, the Appellate Division said that an individual on an eligible list does not have a "presumptive right" to appointment."

Similarly, in Bailey v Kern, 177 Misc 904, the Court said that it did not have the power to command an appointing authority to fill a vacancy because the discretion to make appointments is vested in the appointing authority.

Another case, Taylor v Hammondsport CSD, 267 A.D.2d 987, brought by a teacher following his being involuntarily reassigned to non-teaching duties, was also characterized by the court as being "an action in the nature of mandamus."

The Hammondsport Central School District had assigned the teacher to perform non-teaching duties after he was found guilty of certain disciplinary charges filed against him pursuant to [former] Section 3020-a of the Education Law.

The educator objected to his reassignment to non-teaching duties, contending that the assignment to such duties constitutes the imposition of an additional penalty or remedial action in violation of Education Law Section 3020-a. He challenged his reassignment, demanding that he be reinstated to his former teaching assignment and compensated "for emotional distress he has endured as the result of district's assigning him to non-teaching duties."

A State Supreme Court judge dismissed the teacher's petition on the ground that he did not have any "clear legal right to the relief sought against [district], and therefore mandamus" was not available to him as a remedy.

The Appellate Division agreed with the lower court, pointing out that [former] "Section 3020-a neither limits the authority of [the district] to assign [a teacher] to non-teaching duties nor requires [the district] to restore [a teacher] to his [or her] teaching duties following the completion of disciplinary procedures conducted pursuant to the statute.”

* Presumably Fishman was reassigned to another, vacant, Stenographer position or she was “laid off” and her name was placed on a preferred list.

Abolishment of positions by a BOCES

Abolishment of positions by a BOCES must be made in good faith

Appeal of Christopher Curtis and G. Michael Newell from action of the Otsego-Northern Catskill Board of Cooperative Educational Services, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 15,831

Christopher Curtis and G. Michael Newell appealed BOCES’ decision eliminate two positions of “English Teacher” in the Alternative Education Department effective September 1, 2004, because of a reduced request for services, contending that the stated reason for the abolition of their positions was unsupported by the facts.

With respect to Newell, BOCES argued that his appeal is moot because he retired from his position and that the Commissioner will only decide matters in actual controversy and will not render a decision on a state of facts which no longer exist or which subsequent events have laid to rest.”

The Commissioner agreed in part. He said “[r]etirement constitutes a formal and presumably permanent withdrawal from the teaching profession” and ruled that Newell’s petition is moot to the extent he seeks reinstatement to his former position. In contrast, the Commissioner said that Newell’s claim that seeks back salary and benefits “is not entirely moot because he alleges that BOCES abolished their positions improperly and unlawfully assigned others to teach English classes prior to the effective date of his retirement.”

As to the claim that BOCES abolished their positions in bad faith in violation of the Education Law, the Commissioner pointed out that Education Law Section 3013(1) provides that if a position is abolished and a similar position is created, the person who filled the abolished position must be appointed to the new position. However, neither Curtis nor Newell claimed that BOCES created similar positions and failed to appoint them to those positions. Rather they contend that BOCES “effectively created” two positions by redistributing their workload.

The Commissioner said that, in general, a board of education, acting in good faith, may abolish positions and consolidate the duties of the former positions among existing positions, citing Education Law §§1709[16] and [33]. Similarly, said the Commissioner, a board of cooperative educational services may abolish a position and consolidate it with another without creating a new position, pointing to Education Law §3013[3][a].

Noting that the record reflects that the elimination of two full-time English positions in BOCES’ Alternative Education Department was for economic and administrative reasons, the Commissioner concluded that Curtis and Newell failed to meet their burden of showing that BOCES acted in bad faith in abolishing their positions. Accordingly, the Commissioner ruled that neither is entitled to the requested reinstatement or back pay and dismissed their appeal.

The full text of the Commissioner’s decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume48/d15831.htm

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The New York State Division of Human Rights fines owners of businesses found guilty of sexual harassment at the workplace

The New York State Division of Human Rights fines owners of businesses found guilty of sexual harassment at the workplace

Source: NYS Division of Human Rights

The New York State Division of Human Rights recently determined that two female employees had been subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace. 

In commenting on the rulings, New York State Deputy Secretary for Civil Rights Alphonso David said “Every person is legally entitled to a work environment free of harassment and discrimination … Sexual harassment will not be tolerated in our State and the Administration will use its powers to prosecute those who violate the law.” 

In one case the Division found that the complainant had been subjected to a pattern of sexual harassment by the owner of the business. This included touching the complainant inappropriately, appearing at her home uninvited and offering to pay her rent in exchange for a sexual relationship.

The Division awarded the woman $50,000 in compensatory damages; $13,000 as back wages for the period in which she was paid less than other waitresses; $10,668.68 as back wages for the period in which she was unemployed, and $23,700.06 as back wages for the period she was employed but unable to find a job with a comparable salary. In addition the restaurant owner was ordered to pay $75,000 as a civil fine and penalty for violating New York State’s Human Rights Law.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.dhr.ny.gov/pdf/orders/2012/hernandez_v_team_taco_mexico.pdf 

In the second case the Division found a woman was subjected to inappropriate behavior by the owner of the business soon after being hired. Although the complainant resigned from her position, the owner continued the harassment by telephone. The complainant was awarded $75,000 in compensatory damages and $27,500 in back wages. The owner was also ordered to pay $25,000 in civil fines and penalties. 

Sexual harassment is prohibited as a form of sex discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law. The Division reports that it received 517 sexual harassment complaints in 2011. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.dhr.ny.gov/pdf/orders/2012/park-v-kk-management.pdf 

Other decisions by the Division are available on the Division’s website at  http://www.dhr.ny.gov/orders.html  

Failure to cooperate in an employer’s investigation held disqualifying misconduct for the purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits

Failure to cooperate in an employer’s investigation held disqualifying misconduct for the purposes of receiving unemployment insurance benefits

Matter of Ortiz (New York Eye & Ear Infirmary--Commissioner of Labor), 2012 NY Slip Op 05369, Appellate Division, Third Department

An administrative assistant was terminated from her position for insubordination after she refused to cooperate with her employer's investigation of an earlier incident involving an angry dispute between the administrative assistant and an employee of a tenant.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board denied the administrative assistant from unemployment insurance benefits after it determined that she had lost her job due to her misconduct.

The Appellate Division affirmed, explaining “An employee's failure to comply with an employer's reasonable request may constitute insubordination rising to the level of disqualifying misconduct."

The administrative assistant conceded that she had refused repeated requests by her employer’s director that she discuss the incident with him. Given the reasonableness of this request and the absence of a compelling reason for administrative assistant's refusal, the court said that it found no basis to vacate the Board's decision.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05369.htm

Investigating anonymous allegations of wrongdoing by a public official

Investigating anonymous allegations of wrongdoing by a public official
Application of Crystal Barton for the removal of Ralph R. Hernandez as a member of the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of Buffalo, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 15,832

Crystal Barton, a high school principal employed by the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of Buffalo (“board”), asked the Commissioner to remove Ralph R. Hernandez from office as a member of the board.

According to the Commissioner’s decision, Hernandez sent a letter "asking that [the Commissioner] initiate an investigation into certain allegations of employee misconduct and/or criminal activity by employees at McKinley High School, where Barton is employed as principal." Hernandez attached an anonymous letter he had received which made numerous allegation of wrongdoing on the part of Barton.

Barton claimed that the letters to the Commissioner amounted to commencement of a disciplinary proceeding against her, and that her rights were violated because the disciplinary proceeding did not comply with Education Law §3020-a.

She also alleged that Hernandez and the board exceeded their authority under Education Law §2554 by sending letters to the Commissioner and that Hernandez and other board members have made statements to the media which were critical of her. She asked the Commissioner to remove Hernandez from the board, and for a declaration that other board members have exceeded their authority under Education Law §2554.

The Commissioner dismissed Barton’s appeal for a number of technical reasons.

As to anonymous allegations, however, such allegations should not be ignored by an appointing authority. A judgment should be made as to the extent of any investigation required based on "reasonable suspicion." In the Shepard v Ward, 547 NYS2d 57, the Appellate said that suspicious behavior coupled with anonymous tips provided a basis for reasonable suspicion.

In Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York v. Mills, 250 A.D.2d 122, an anonymous letter was the genesis of disciplinary action taken against a physical education teacher. The letter alleged that the teacher was having an inappropriate relationship with a female student. An initial investigation revealed that educator had, in fact, formed a romantic relationship with the student.

During the course of the investigation the teacher refused to be interviewed by a confidential investigator. He was then subpoenaed to appear to give testimony during a prehearing inquiry concerning his relationship with the student.

The teacher appeared with his attorney and, prior to being questioned, was informed that he had an obligation to cooperate with the investigation, that he was being granted use immunity*and that if he failed to answer questions at this stage of the proceeding, his refusal would be construed as a failure to cooperate and would subject him to dismissal.

In spite of having been granted use immunity, the teacher answered only pedigree and background questions, refusing to answer any questions regarding his relationship with the student. The Commissioner upheld the Hearing Panel's determination regarding the teacher's inappropriate relationship with the student and imposed a three years' suspension without pay as the penalty.

* Use immunity   The question of compelling a public officer or employee to testify or risk termination was considered by the Court of Appeals Matt v LaRocca, 71 NY2d 154. In the Matt case the court of appeals held that when a public employee is threatened with termination if he or she refuses to testify under oath, the testimony given by the individual is "cloaked with use immunity."

The Commissioner’s decision in the Barton case is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume48/d15832.htm