Less than 30-days notice of termination of a probationary educator does not always result in the payment back salary

Less than 30-days notice of termination of a probationary educator does not always result in the payment back salary
Vetter v Board of Educ., Ravena- Coeymans-Selkirk Cent. School Dist., 53 AD3d 847

A probationary teacher of physical education and health education employed by Ravena-Coeymans-Selkirk Central School District. During the school year, several students made written complaints that the teacher had walked through the middle school girls' locker room while females were changing their clothes. Placed on administrative leave while an investigation was conducted, the teacher was told by the Superintendent that she planned to recommend his termination at the June 19, 2006 Board meeting .The decision notes that although the Board terminated the teacher’s employment on June 21, 2006 effective July 21, 2006, it did not notify him of that fact in writing until a letter dated July 19, 2006 was sent to him.

The teacher sued, seeking a name-clearing hearing pursuant to US Constitution 14th Amendment and 42 USC §1983, payment of 30 days salary in accordance with Education Law §3019-a and an award of counsel fees pursuant to 42 USC §1988. Without conceding that the probationer was entitled to a name-clearing hearing, the district agreed to provide him with one. Supreme Court awarded the teacher counsel fees related to his attempt to secure the name-clearing hearing, but denied his request for 30 days salary. Both parties appealed those portions of the Supreme Court’s ruling respectively viewed as adverse to them.

Regarding the teacher’s demand for salary payment, the Appellate Division said that a school district terminating a probationary teacher that fails to provide the 30-days notice required by Education Law §3019-a, must provide "one day's pay for each day the notice was late." Although it is uncontroverted that the teacher was only given two days notice of his termination - 28 days less than the required 30 days notice – the court agreed with the district that because “the time during which salary would be paid on account of the late notice fell during the summer vacation a time” when the teacher did not work and, therefore, would not otherwise have been paid, he was not entitled to receive any pay based upon the district's failure to provide the requisite notice.

The court noted that there is no evidence that the probationary teacher would have been entitled to any pay during the period in question if he had not been terminated. Thus, under these circumstances, the payment of salary to him would, in effect, provide a windfall to him and would not serve the purposes for which such payment was intended.

As to Supreme Court’s awarding the teacher attorney fees, the Appellate Division said such fees were erroneously awarded to him. The United States Supreme Court has clearly held that a voluntary resolution of a matter "lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur" to warrant "an award of attorney's fees." In this instance the district decided to give the probationer the “name-clearing hearing” he demanded. As the hearing was the result of the voluntary actions of school district, which was not enforced by a consent decree or judgment of Supreme Court, the Appellate Division ruled that the award of counsel fees was improper.

NYPPL Comments: A name clearing hearing, however, serves only one purpose - to clear the accused individual's good name and reputation. It does not result in the individual obtaining any right to reemployment. This means that having been provided with a hearing and having cleared his name is, at best, all the relief an individual can expect. Prevailing at a name-clearing hearing does not require the individual to be reemployed by his or her former employer.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/less-than-30-days-notice-of-termination.html

Failure to produce a valid license required to perform the duties of the position bars individual’s employment

Failure to produce a valid license required to perform the duties of the position bars individual’s employment

NYC Department of Sanitation v Wright, OATH Index #1601/12

OATH Administrative Law Judge John B. Spooner found that the worker’s failure to possess a valid driver’s license barred him from continued employment as a sanitation worker. The Appointing Authority adopted Judge Spooner recommendation that the individual be terminated from his position.

The decision indicates that the worker “violated department rules by failing to have a valid driver’s license and not having the license reinstated after being notified of the need to do so.”

Where a valid license, permit or certification is required to lawfully perform the duties of the position, courts have ruled that an individual may be suspended without pay if he or she becomes unable to lawfully perform the duties of the position because of a lack of, or the loss of, the required license, certification or similar permit. “Summarily” in this context means without preferring disciplinary charges and providing a due process hearing once the individual has been given a reasonable opportunity to produce the required credential and has failed to do so.

Common examples of situations leading to a valid summary dismissal include the revocation of a truck driver’s permit to operate a motor vehicle on public roads, the loss of an attorney’s license to practice law and the expiration of a temporary permit to teach. All that appears to be necessary in such cases is for the appointing authority to make some reasonable inquiry to determine if the employee may lawfully perform the duties of the position.

Essentially courts have viewed employees who lack such a required credential as being “unqualified,” in contrast to being “incompetent,” to perform the duties of the position. As the Court of Appeals indicated in New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs. v Lanterman, 14 NY3d 275, termination from the position because the individual does not possess a valid required license or certification is not a disciplinary termination.

Other examples include Meliti v Nyquist, 53 AD2d 951, affirmed 41 NY2d 183 (immediate suspension of teachers was lawful because their teaching licenses had expired) and O’Keefe v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp, 714 FSupp 622, (traveling company demonstrator was not discriminated against when a private sector employer terminated the individual after his driver’s license was suspended).

In contrast, in Martin ex rel Lekkas, 86 AD2d 712, the issue focused on the employer's requiring Lekkas, an Assistant Clinical Physician, to have a valid license to practice medicine while serving as an administrator, a position that did not involve Lekkas’ practicing medicine. The appointing authority had terminated Lekkas from his position because he did not hold a valid New York State license to practice medicine. The Appellate Division ruled that only in the event the duties of the position require the incumbent to be licensed may the lack of such a license serve as grounds for termination.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/12_Cases/12-1601.pdf

Employer’s duty to provide a safe place to work does not extend to hazards inherent in the duties of the position

Employer’s duty to provide a safe place to work does not extend to hazards inherent in the duties of the position

Consalvo v City of New York, 53 AD3d 521

A New York City Sanitation Department employee was instructed to remove a dead cat from a public roadway. While removing the animal for the roadway the employee was struck by a hit-and-run driver, and thereafter died. Diane Consalvo sued the City, alleging wrongful death claming the City was negligent. The Supreme Court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the action. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division said that “The duty of an employer to provide its employees with a safe place to work does not extend to hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work which the [employee] is to perform [nor] to secure the safety of [an employee] against a condition, or even defects, risks or dangers that may be readily observed by the reasonable use of the senses, having in view the age, intelligence and experience of the [employee]”

In this instance, said the court, the City demonstrated it was entitled to judgment as a law by showing that the employee was an experienced sanitation worker, that it was part of his work to pick up dead animals from the roadway, and that the risks inherent therein, including the risk of being struck by a car, were readily observable.

Consalvo relied upon union rules, which the court said “were promulgated not as a safety measure, but to promote efficiency,” and upon the alleged "custom" of the Sanitation Department to dispatch two workers to collect garbage. However, said the Appellate Division, such evidence did not raise a “triable issue of fact” sufficient to defeat the City's entitlement to judgment as a law.

In another “safe workplace” case, Scharff v Sachem Cent. School Dist. at Holbrook, 53 AD3d 538, the court said that although Labor Law §240(1) affords special protection to workers who sustain personal injuries as a result of elevation-related risks such as falling from a height or being struck by a falling object that was improperly hoisted, the provision does not "encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity."

The injured worker testified that he slipped and fell onto the surface of a roof of a school while working. The school district, said the Appellate Division, met its burden of establishing its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a law by showing that the employee’s injury was not incurred as a result of an elevation-related risk. The Appellate Division also commented that “Supreme Court properly found that the [worker’s] affidavit, in which he alleged that he also slid down the roof, contradicted prior deposition testimony and was an attempt to create a feigned issue of fact.

The Consalvo decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/employers-duty-to-provide-safe-place-to.html

The Scharff decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/worker-injured-while-working-above.html

 

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel held to bar applicant’s claim for unemployment insurance benefits

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel held to bar applicant’s claim for unemployment insurance benefits

Matter of Redd (Commissioner of Labor), 2012 NY Slip Op 05886, Appellate Division, Third Department

Initially suspended without pay from her employment for alleged misconduct, an arbitrator ultimately found the employee guilty of misconduct and terminated from her position.

The individual then filed for unemployment insurance benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board denied her claim for unemployment insurance benefits on the basis that she lost her employment through misconduct.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that as “there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding, collateral estoppel* effect must be given to the arbitrator's factual findings regarding claimant's misconduct.”

Further, said the court, upon review it concluded that "the Board properly took into account the arbitrator's factual findings regarding the events which led to claimant's dismissal and then went on to reach its own conclusion as to whether claimant's behavior constituted [disqualifying] misconduct under the Labor Law."

As the record before court provided substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that claimant engaged in disqualifying misconduct, the Appellate Division said that it found no basis to reverse the Board’s ruling.

* The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel holds that the determination of the facts litigated between the parties to an earlier proceeding are binding and conclusive on those parties in any subsequent litigation involving the same issue[s] and parties.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05886.htm

Mode of payroll payment should not affect the employer’s being reimbursed for the salary paid an educator while he or she was receiving workers’ compensation benefits

Mode of payroll payment should not affect the employer’s being reimbursed for the salary paid an educator while he or she was receiving workers’ compensation benefits
Pawlewski v Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 53 AD3d 834

A teacher employed by the Buffalo Board of Education, was injured when she fell at work. She was still out of work at the time of the relevant workers' compensation hearings. The controlling provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and the educator’s union provide that the teacher was continue to receive her regular wages and benefits for up to two years and "the salary allowance paid [to her] under worker[s'] compensation [would] be assigned to the [employer]."

Buffalo paid the teacher her full salary during this period but when it sought reimbursement, the Workers' Compensation Board modified its hearing officer’s determination, finding that Buffalo was not entitled to reimbursement for payments it made to the teacher for the “summer recess” period during which she was “on disability leave.”

Buffalo and its workers' compensation carrier appealed.

The Appellate Division noted that Workers' Compensation Law §25 (4) (a) “provides, in pertinent part, that if an employer ‘has made payments to an employee in like manner as wages during any period of disability, [the employer] shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of an unpaid installment or installments of compensation due.’”

In this instance the teacher had received her full annual wages, which had been paid in the same manner as she had received them before her injury in accordance with the contractual terms providing that a teacher's total annual salary is paid over a period of 10 months. Under the circumstances, said the court, the Board erred in reversing that part of the ALJ’s determination that would have reimbursed Buffalo for the summer recess period.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/mode-of-payroll-payment-should-not.html

Waiving further administrative or judicial consideration of the resulting decision as a conditions of electing a particular administrative review procedure binding

Waiving further administrative or judicial consideration of the resulting decision as a conditions of electing a particular administrative review procedure binding

Colon v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 2012 NY Slip Op 05819, Appellate Division, Second Department

When the application for a performance-of-duty retirement disability pension was denied by the Board of Trustees of the New York City Employees' Retirement System, the applicant was advised that there were three different options to seek review of the determination available: (1) to commence a CPLR article 78 proceeding within four months of receipt of the denial letter; (2) to request review of her case by a Special Medical Committee consisting of three independent physicians; or (3) to refile for a disability pension.

The applicant elected to have her case reviewed by the Special Medical Committee and, as a condition of obtaining such a review, waived any right to further administrative or judicial review of the Board of Trustees' determination.

The Special Medical Review Committee concluded that while the applicant was, indeed, disabled, the disability was not the result of a job-related accident.

Board of Trustees adopted the Special Medical Review Committee's recommendation, again denying the application, and the applicant filed an Article 78 petition seeking to overturn the Board’s determination.

Denying the appeal, the Appellate Division said that by “electing to have her case reviewed by the Special Medical Review Committee and executing a waiver of her right to further administrative or judicial review, [the applicant] agreed to accept the Special Medical Review Committee's determination as binding and conclusive.”

Noting that the applicant did not allege that the waiver was the result of coercion or duress and its terms were “clear and unambiguous,” the court explained that "[W]hen a waiver is freely and knowingly made and not the product of coercion or duress, a party can waive his rights to seek review of an administrative proceeding and such determination is binding."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05819.htm

Limitations on the use of sick leave by police officers

Limitations on the use of sick leave by police officers
Economico v. Village of Pelham, 50 NY2d 120

Is it lawful to terminate a police officer on sick leave at full pay if he or she is unable to perform the duties of the position due to a non-work related injury or disease?

In contrast to the discontinuation of a police officer from the payroll while he or she is eligible for benefits pursuant to §207-c of the General Municipal Law,* a police officer placed on a leave of absence pursuant to §72 of the Civil Service Law because of an injury or disease that is not work-related may be terminated from his or her position pursuant to §73 of the Civil Service Law at the discretion of the appointing authority.

Notwithstanding a Taylor Law contract provision providing for “unlimited sick leave with pay” for police officers unable to work due to non-service related disabilities, the New York State Court of Appeals has held that a police officer so disabled could be terminated pursuant to §73 of the Civil Service Law. The Court distinguished Economico from the Yonkers teacher case (Board of Educ. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 40 NY2d 268) where the Court held there was no prohibition against the establishment of a limited job security clause in a collective bargaining agreement.

The State’s interest in maintaining the efficiency and continuity of its civil service was held to be a substantial one and §73 truncates the employee’s right to be continued in his or her position without limitation, even in the face of a contract provision to the contrary, at the discretion by the appointing authority. It should be noted, however, that a police officer eligible for General Municipal Law §207-c benefits would be subject to the provisions of §71 of the Civil Service Law while a police officer absent due to an injury or disease that was not job-related is typically granted leave, with or without pay, pursuant to §72 of the Civil Service Law.

In Dolan v Whalen, 49 NY2d 991, the Court of Appeals held that a hearing in connection with termination pursuant to §73 is required if there is “some factual dispute impacting upon the employer’s right to discharge” the employee.**

Although §73 speaks of “termination,” such a termination is not a “dismissal” in a pejorative sense as the individual has certain rights to reinstatement to his or her former position, or a similar position, upon his or her recovery from the underlying disability or, if there is no suitable vacancy available at that time, the placement of his or her name on a preferred list. The same it true with respect to an individual who is terminated from his or her position while on leave pursuant to §71 of the Civil Service Law.

The police officer injured in the line of duty is entitled to unlimited leave with pay and other benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law, Sections 207-c(1), which leave is at full salary until the disability ceases or the individual retires or is retired, as provided by law. 

Further, the police officer cannot be required to use any leave credits available to him (Op. St. Comp. 79-356). The Comptroller’s Opinion noted that “a municipality and its policemen may not agree through collective bargaining that a policeman injured in the performance of his duties apply accumulated sick leave or vacation credits to receive the full amount of his salary during the period of his [or her] disability.”

* An appointing authority may not summarily terminate an individual’s §207-c disability benefits [Kempkes v Downey, 53 AD3d 547].

** See Sheeran v New York State Dept. of Transp., 18 NY3d 61, a case addressing the rights of an individual who has voluntarily absented him or herself from work due to a non-work related injury of disease and seeks to return to his or her position.

=======================

General Municipal Law§§ 207-a and 207-c - a 1098 page e-book focusing on administering General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and providing benefits thereunder and other disability retirement issues is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://section207.blogspot.com/for additional information about this electronic reference manual.

========================