Retirement System member retroactively reinstated to Tier I membership not entitled to employee contributions he or she made to the Retirement System as a Tier III member

Retirement System member retroactively reinstated to Tier I membership not entitled to employee contributions he or she made to the Retirement System as a Tier III member

Price v New York State & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 2013 NY Slip Op 04405, Appellate Division, Third Department

An individual [Member] was employed in various positions by New York State public employers in 1968 until 1975 when he left public service. At no time during such period did Member join the New York State and Local Employees’ Retirement System [ERS] nor, according to the decision, was he advised that he was a “mandatory Tier 1 member” of ERS.

Member reentered New York State public employment in 1980 and joined ERS as a contributory Tier 3 member. In 1997, without notice to Member, ERS administratively granted him Tier 1 membership with service credit for the initial years he had worked (1968-1975). However, upon further review, ERS deemed that Member’s Tier 1 membership automatically terminated in 1975 for inactivity in accordance with the provisions of the Retirement and Social Security Law then in effect, thereby continuing him as a Tier III member of ERS.

Member subsequently applied for, and was approved for, reinstatement to Tier 1 pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law §645.* He then requested a refund of the contributions he had made since 1980 as a Tier 3 member.

ERS denied his request indicating that “[Member] did not qualify for a refund under the … statute pursuant to which he was reinstated,” (see Retirement and Social Security Law §645[2]). Member then commenced an Article 78 proceeding challenging the Retirement System’s determination denying his request for a refund of the contributions he had made as a Tier 3 member prior to his reinstatement to Tier 1, a noncontributory tier, pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law §645.

The Appellate Division sustained ERS’s determination, explaining that  “Under the unambiguous terms of [Retirement and Social Security Law §645(2)], ‘[a]ny contribution made to [ERS] pursuant to Article [14] or [15] of this Chapter by a member who rejoined his or her current system on or after [July 27, 1976] shall not be refunded.”" [Emphasis supplied by the Appellate Division.]

Where, as here, said the court, "the Comptroller's application and interpretation of the relevant statutes are not 'irrational, unreasonable or contrary to the statutory language,' the determination will be upheld.”

As to “procedural difficulties” experienced by Member, the court said that “erroneous advice by [Member’s] employer, misplacement [of him] by [ERS] in a contributory tier or [his] delayed reinstatement to a noncontributory tier ‘cannot estop the Comptroller from performing his duties and denying any reinstatement [or refund of contributions] that is contrary to the statutes.’"

The Appellate Division also addressed the various provisions set out in the Retirement and Social Security Law addressing “vesting” of a member's ERS benefits under certain conditions, none of which “conditions,” said the court, were applicable in Member’s situation.

* Retirement and Social Security Law §645, which was adopted in 1998, allows current members of ERS who had reentered public service to apply for reinstatement to their original Tier membership status under certain circumstances.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_04405.htm

Correction officers locked up for compulsory overtime

Correction officers locked up for compulsory overtime

Cacace v Seniuk, 104 Misc.2d 560

While a somewhat novel way to have overtime work performed, Supreme Court, Nassau County, held that correction officers compelled to work overtime were not denied their constitutional rights.

Although locked up in the jail, as they were during normal working hours, and denied the ability to leave without permission, Supreme Court ruled that such action was within the power of management.

The fact that the employees had received overtime pay or compensatory time off, together with a view that such a procedure was a reasonable and necessary limitation on the correction officers, was enough to support for the Court to hold that correction officers were not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief.

Indeed, said the court, “In the last analysis, it is doubtful whether it is within the competence of the judiciary to grant the injunctive relief requested in any event. The question of manpower and its deployment is essentially one of management prerogative solely within the discretion of the public employer.”

The Court also found that §161 of the Labor Law was not applicable to correction officers, explaining that a corrections officer is a “peace officer” and “clearly not an employee within the statutory definition, i.e., a “mechanic, workingman or laborer working for another for hire,” set out in §161.

A change in the professional obligation of employees in a collective bargaining unit negotiable

A change in the professional obligation of employees in a collective bargaining unit negotiable

PERB (Case U-4144)

The unilateral reduction of the school district’s administrators’ work year [professional obligation] from 11 to 10 months -- but requiring the performance of essentially the same service -- was held to be a violation of the school district’s duty to negotiate the change with the employee organization representing the administrators’ “negotiating unit”.

The school district was directed to reinstate the administrators’ 11-month professional obligation and pay any back salary due them.

In contrast, a PERB hearing officer held that the unilateral change in a district’s work day for teachers from 8 am to 3 pm to 8:30 am to 3:30 pm following good faith bargaining to impasse on the issue was not a violation of the Taylor Law even though the impasse had not been resolved at the time of the change by the district. (Case U-4294).

Jurisdiction of village school crossing guards

Jurisdiction of village school crossing guards

Informal Opinion of the Attorney General 2013-3

The Attorney General’s Assistant Solicitor General in Charge of Opinions, Kathryn Sheingold, advised the Village of Alden’s village attorney, Chris G. Trapp, Esq., that, consistent with General Municipal Law §208-a, a village school crossing guard may control traffic at an intersection within the village that does not abut school property if his or her exercise of such traffic control is to aid in protecting school children going to and from school.

The opinion is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinion/2013-3_pw.pdf