Intentional discrimination by an employer to avoid or remedy unintentional disparate impact in employment must be based on strong evidence to believe disparate-impact liability will result if it fails to do so

Intentional discrimination by an employer to avoid or remedy unintentional disparate impact in employment must be based on strong evidence to believe disparate-impact liability will result if it fails to do so

Margerum v City of Buffalo, 2013 NY Slip Op 05104, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Firefighters employed by City of Buffalo Department of Fire sued the City contending that it had discriminated against them  (Fire Department), commenced this action alleging that defendants discriminated against by allowing promotional eligibility lists created pursuant to the Civil Service Law to expire solely on the ground that these firefighters [plaintiffs] who were next in line for promotion, were Caucasian.

Previously, the Appellate Division had held that [1] the action taken by the City was subject to strict scrutiny and [2] the plaintiffs had failed to establish "the absence of a compelling interest," particularly because " a sufficiently serious claim of discrimination' may constitute a compelling interest to engage in race-conscious remedial action."

A short time later the United States Supreme Court decided Ricci v DeStefano (557 US 557), holding that, "before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious discriminatory action."

Following Ricci, the Appellate Division affirmed an order that granted those parts of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability with respect to the Fire Department and the City, determining that defendants "did not have a strong basis in evidence to believe that they would be subject to disparate-impact liability if they failed to take the race-conscious action, i.e., allowing the eligibility lists to expire."

Supreme Court then conducted a nonjury trial on the issue of damages, and the City appeal from an order that awarded a total amount of $2,510,170 in economic damages and a total amount of $255,000 in emotional distress damages to the remaining plaintiffs.

The City appealed and the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court's awards for emotional distress were proper, but that the court erred with respect to its awards for economic damages.

The Appellate Division explained that that plaintiffs the established that their damages were proximately caused by the City's failure to promote them from the 2002 eligibility list. Thus, it its view, the plaintiffs met their burden of establishing that they would have been promoted but for the City's action in allowing the promotion eligibility lists to expire and suffered economic damages because they were not promoted.

As to the amounts of damages, the Appellate Division concluded that each amount of damages awarded for emotional distress is reasonable. However, it found that as to the awards for economic damages, Supreme Court “applied the wrong burden of proof and erred in relying on assumptions not supported by the record.”

Supreme Court had placed the burden of proof on the City to establish plaintiffs' economic damages. This was error as a plaintiff seeking, e.g., damages for loss of future earnings must "provide evidence demonstrating the difference between what he [or she] is now able to earn and what he [or she] could have earned" in the absence of discrimination.

Noting that recovery for lost earning capacity may be based on future probabilities and is not limited to actual past earnings and that a plaintiff is not required to establish loss of earnings with absolute certainty, the Appellate Division said that it is a "fundamental premise that loss of earnings or earning capacity must be established with reasonable certainty . . . and will be reduced if based upon mere speculation."

The Appellate Division then considered the evidence and expert testimony offered on the issue of economic damages and modified the Supreme Court’s determinations in whole or in part.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05104.htm

Discontinuing the performance of a governmental operation

Discontinuing the performance of a governmental operation

Civil Serv. Employees Assn., Inc. Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v County of Onondaga, State Supreme Court Judge Donald A. Greenwood [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) brought an Article 78 petition seeking a determination that Onondaga County acted in violation of law and in an arbitrary and capricious manner by authorizing the sale of the County owned Van Duyn Home and Hospital Facility. CSEA also alleged that the County “acted in bad faith by adopting a budget that zero-funded positions at Van Duyn.”

After considering a number of procedural issued, Judge Donald A. Greenwood addressed the merits of CSEA’s petition.

CSEA’s first claim in its petition alleged that the Department of Long Term Care Services was created by the County Charter and that the elimination of that department, along with the positions employed within it, without passing an amendment to the Charter, was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, violative of law and in excess of the County’s jurisdiction in that the County Legislature lacked the authority to adopt a budget striking salary appropriations, thereby eliminating the operations of the department without affecting an amendment to the Charter.

In effect, CSEA contended that the action offended the doctrine of legislative equivalency, also known as the legislative equal dignity rule.* (1995). The Court of Appeals has summarized the principle by stating "to repeal or modify a statute requires a legislative act of equal dignity and import."

Judge Greenwood decided that CSEA’s argument was “both factually and legally flawed.” explaining that the County demonstrated that through the annual budget process established within the County Charter and Administrative Code, the Legislature declared its intent” to be out of the nursing home business, and abolished a number of positions related to provisions of such services at Van Duyn, and determined that the facility should be sold.” This legislative act, said the court, carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, including a rebuttable presumption of the existence of necessary factual support for its provisions.

In addition, Judge Greenwood said that the County demonstrated that the facts here justified the legislative decision to sell the facility while retaining operating rights, to enact a local law amending the Administrative Code to reorganize the Long Term Care Services Department and eliminate job titles effective November 30, 2013.

The court also noted that “the County is authorized to enact legislation establishing its form of government … and generally regulating its affairs, provided that such legislation is consistent with state law and [it] is empowered to establish and abolish positions of employment by resolution as part of the budget process.”**

As to CSEA’s contention that the “elimination of union jobs here constitutes a bad faith abolition of the positions,” the court said that “municipal officials are vested with authority to create and abolish positions and to adopt a budget; they also have the power and the prerogative to determine that civil service positions may be abolished in good faith for reasons of efficiency and economy in the absence of fraud, corruption or bad faith.”

As to CSEA’s claim of bad faith on the part of the County, CSEA was required to show that the positions in question were not eliminated for bona fide reasons, that savings were not accomplished or that replacement employees were hired. Judge Greenwood found that CSEA had not met this burden and dismissed its petition seeking a court order invalidating the sale of the facility and nullifying the budgetary elimination of the positions by the County Legislature..

* In Torre v County of Nassau, 86 NY2d 421, the Court of Appeals noted that the Doctrine of Legislative Equivalency requires that a position created by a legislative act can only be abolished by a correlative legislative act.

** The decision notes that the budget resolution, Resolution #160-2012, established the budget for 2013 and declared the County's policy with respect to discontinuing future provision of nursing home services and further provided for the abolition of roster positions, except for two positions established by the County Charter and Administrative Code.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_50813.htm

Employee terminated for failure to comply with the employer’s “residence” requirement

Employee terminated for failure to comply with the employer’s “residence” requirement

2013 NY Slip Op 04148, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The City of Niagara Falls requires its employees “to reside in the City.” When the City terminated the employment of one of its employees based on her failure to comply with the City’s residence requirement, the individual filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 challenging the City’s action.

Supreme Court granted the individual’s petition; the Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling on the law.

Addressing the merits of the City’s determination, the Appellate Division said that “"the proper standard for judicial review in these cases is whether the . . . determination was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.” Here, said the court, it conclude that City’s determination that individual violated the City's residency requirement was neither arbitrary nor capricious nor an abuse of discretion.

The Local Law relied upon by the City, Local Law No. 7, as amended, defines "residency" as "the actual principal place of residence of an individual, where he or she normally sleeps; normally maintains personal and household effects; the place listed as an address on voter registration; and the place listed as his or her address for driver's license and motor vehicle registration, if any."

The Appellate Division said that it agreed with the City that the phrase "actual principal place of residence is akin to, if not synonymous with, the legal concept of domicile,' i.e., living in [a] locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home."**

In this regard the court found that the City had sufficiently established that individual’s "actual principal place of residence" was in the Town of Niagara rather than the City of Niagara by utillizing the services of a surveillance company.

Under these circumstances, the Appellate Division concluded that the City’s determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious because there is substantial evidence, based on the surveillance of the individual demonstrating that she "normally [slept]" at the Town of Niagara address. While the individual did produce documents listing a City residence as her address, the court decided "that evidence was not so overwhelming as to support the [Supreme] court's determination granting the petition."

Relying on the "extremely deferential" standard applied in reviewing administrative determinations, the Appellate Division decided that the City's determination that individual's actual principal place of residence was outside the City is not "without foundation in fact" and the City "rationally concluded that [individual] did not comply with the residency policy."

** See also Alexis v City of Niagara Fallsposted on the Internet at:  http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2013/05/an-employees-satisfying-employers.html

The decision in this action is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_04148.htm

In the event it is determined that the arbitrator has exceed his or her powers, the arbitration award must be vacated

In the event it is determined that the arbitrator has exceed his or her powers, the arbitration award must be vacated
Adirondack Beverages Corp. (Bakery, Laundry, Beverage Drivers & Vending Mach. Servicemen & Allied Workers, Local Union No. 669 of Albany, N.Y and Vic.), 2013 NY Slip Op 05031, Appellate Division, Third Department

The genesis of this appeal was the arbitrator’s rejection of Adirondack Beverages’ contention that the grievances at issue were not timely filed under the collective bargaining agreement [CBA].

Ultimately the arbitrator determined that certain of Adirondack Beverages’ employees were entitled to back wages, negotiations with respect to higher wages and a preference with respect to filling certain positions.

Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator exceeded his powers, granted Adirondack Beverages’ petition to vacate the arbitration award and remitted the matter to a different arbitrator for a rehearing to decide the timeliness of the grievances.* Local Union No. 669 appealed the Supreme Court’s remanding the matter to a new arbitrator.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling explaining that “[I]t is well established that an arbitrator's award is largely unreviewable but such an award may be vacated upon a showing that it ‘'violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power.'"

In this instance, said the court, Supreme Court properly concluded that the arbitrator exceeded a specifically enumerated limitation on his power by failing to recognize the grievance and arbitration procedures as outlined in the CBA and, more particularly, the time limitation for filing grievances that is contained therein. The Appellate Division cited Article VII, §4 of the CBA which stated that "[t]he [a]rbitrator shall in no way have the right to modify, add to[,] subtract from or [otherwise] alter the provision[s] of [the CBA]."

In his award, said the court, the arbitrator acknowledged the CBA's limitation of his authority, as well as the controlling provisions with respect to filing a timely grievance, but “[n]onetheless, the arbitrator decided that he would ‘not mechanically apply the contractual limitations period in the instant case as to do so would discourage good faith negotiations in the future.’"

Concluding that in refusing to address the issue of the timeliness advanced by Adirondack Beverages that could otherwise preclude the grievances from being arbitrated, the arbitrator ignored a specifically enumerated limitation on his powers and effectively modified, added to or subtracted from the terms of the CBA.

Accordingly the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court properly vacated the arbitrator's award remitted the matter to a different arbitrator for a rehearing to determine whether the grievances were timely submitted under the CBA.

* Supreme Court reserved judgment on Local Union No. 669’s petition to confirm the award pending the arbitrator's decision on the timeliness issue.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:  

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05031.htm

An employee of a BOCES is a State employee for the purposes Public Officers Law §17 when performing his or her duties under the supervision of the State Education Department

An employee of a BOCES is a State employee for the purposes Public Officers Law §17 when performing his or her duties under the supervision of the State Education Department

Formal Opinions of the Attorney General, 2013-F1

The Attorney General advised Richard J. Trautwein, Esq., State Education Department Counsel & Deputy Commissioner for Legal Affairs, that a member of the staff of a BOCES district superintendent who is serving as an integrity officer under the supervision of State Education Department is eligible for state-provided defense and indemnification in accordance with the provisions of Public Officers Law §17 in the event he or she is sued as the result of an act or an omission flowing from the performance of his or her official duties under such supervision. 

In the opinion of the Attorney General, “… an integrity officer who is a member of the district superintendent's staff also is in the service of the State when performing these duties.” Accordingly, the Attorney General explained, such personnel are eligible for defense and indemnification pursuant to Public Officers Law §17 in the event the individual is sued as the result of his or her investigating test security breaches on behalf of the State.

Subdivision 3 of §17, in pertinent part, provides that: “The state shall indemnify and save harmless its employees in the amount of any judgment obtained against such employees in any state or federal court, or in the amount of any settlement of a claim, or shall pay such judgment or settlement; provided, that the act or omission from which such judgment or settlement arose occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment or duties; the duty to indemnify and save harmless or pay prescribed by this subdivision shall not arise where the injury or damage resulted from intentional wrongdoing on the part of the employee."

The text of the opinion is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinion/2013-f1_pw.pdf

Tenure by estoppel, tenure by acquisition, tenure by default

Tenure by estoppel, tenure by acquisition, tenure by default, tenure by inaction

Brown v Board of Educ. of the Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 2013 NY Slip Op 51026(U), Supreme Court, Putnam County [Not selected for publications in the Official Reports]

Tenure by estoppel, tenure by acquisition, tenure by default, tenure by inaction. All four terms describe the result of the failure of an appointing authority to act that results in a probationary employee obtaining tenure by operation of law because he or she was not lawfully terminated on or before the last day of his or her original, or extended, probationary period.*

As the Court of Appeals held in McManus v Hempstead Union Free School District, 87 NY2d 183, a  probationary administrator or teacher employed by a school district or a BOCES may attain tenure by estoppel when the appointing authority continues the teacher or administrator in service after failing to take the administrative action required by law to either grant or deny the individual tenure prior to the expiration of the administrator’s or teacher’s probationary term.

In this CPLR Article 78 proceeding Maura Ann Brown sought, among other things, reinstatement to her teaching position with the Mahopac Central School District based her contention she had attained tenure by estoppel and thus could not be summarily terminated from her postion.

The issue before State Supreme Court Judge Lewis Jay Lubell in this third appearance before the court:  the propriety of the school district’s recalculation of Brown’s Education Law §3012(3) probationary period end date “as directed and guided by the Court in its Decisions and Orders of March 19, 2012, and October 25, 2012”** which, in the words of the court, were “thoroughly set forth in this Court's prior two Decisions and Orders.”

The court’s conclusion: "… the Administrative Recalculation of [Brown’s] Education Law §3012(3) probationary period end date was undertaken in a manner and reaches a result that is legally insupportable and is contrary to the legal conclusions reached and directives clearly enunciated by this Court in its March and October 2012 Decisions and Orders directing remand for purposes of recalculation." Judge Lubell pointed out that the Administrative Recalculation results in a probation end date that coincided with Brown’s termination date, January 21, 2011. Brown needed just one additional date of service time to prevail on her tenure by estoppel argument, which, said the court, “she has easily established.”

Judge Lubell said the Administrative Recalculation did not properly account for his “unequivocal determination that ‘[the school district is] bound by the originally established and thereafter repeatedly reasserted June 30, 2010 probationary period end-date . . . . from [which] . . . any properly attributed extension of the probationary period must be calculated.’"

The court ruled that “it is June 30, 2010 from which to calculate [Brown’s] probationary end date….” The school district apparently “ignore the June 30th date in favor of September 2, 2010.” Accordingly, said Judge Lubell, “Upon properly accounting for the sixty-four day period from June 30th to September 2, 2010, [Brown’s] recalculated probationary end-date falls well before her termination date, i.e., the date needed by [Brown] to prevail on her tenure by estoppel argument.”

The Administrative Recalculation, said the court, “employs a ‘workday-for-workday’ methodology which is in contravention of this Court's interpretation of the methodology used in Maras v Schenectady CSD, 275 AD2d 551, wherein the Appellate Division ruled as follows:

Clearly, it was error for [the Schenectady City School District] to extend petitioner's probationary period beyond September 12, 1998 - "the period of time petitioner was absent from school in excess of her contractually allotted sick days. While respondents possess the authority to exclude from the computation of petitioner's three-year probationary period any noncontractual absences [citations omitted], they have no authority to exclude those absences provided for by contract, i.e., petitioner's 20 days of sick leave, five days of personal time and five days of medical leave that fell on school-wide vacation days. Indeed, Education Law §2509(7) expressly prohibits extension of an employee's probationary period by adding thereto contractually bargained for sick or personal leave days or school-wide vacation days.

In sum, said Judge Lubell, the court in Maras permitted an extension of Maras’ probationary period by the actual number of workdays her medical leave exceeded her paid contractual leave time, excluding any medical leave which otherwise fell on school-wide breaks or vacation days (for a total of eleven days) and which, in any event, extended petitioner's probationary period by a corresponding number of consecutive calendar days, not "workdays" as respondents would have it; thus arriving at a new probation period end date of September 12, 1998.

The bottom line: Judge Lubell held the Brown completed her three year period of Education Law §3012(3) probation well before her January 21, 2011, termination date and granted her motion to strike and dismiss the school district's Administrative Recalculation.

The court then granted summary judgment in her favor on her claim of tenure by estoppel, which tenure by estoppel matured “prior to the school district’s termination of her employment on January 21, 2011,”

Accordingly, the court directed Brown’s reinstatement to her former position as a tenured teacher effective January 21, 2011, “together with an award of back-pay, reimbursement of all employment benefits, including but not limited to medical, retirement and pension contributions, and other compensatory damages to which she may be entitled and in an amount to be determined at a damages hearing” before Judge Lubell to be held at a later date.

One exception to the general rule applied for the purpose of determining if an individual has attained tenure by estoppel is set out in Mendez v Valenti, 101 AD2d 612. In Mendez the Appellate Division ruled that as long as the termination of a probationer [in the classified service] is effected within a reasonable time after the end of his or her maximum period of probation, such as set to coincide with the end of the next payroll period, the courts will not deem the individual to have obtained tenure by estoppel because of his or her continuation on the payroll following the last day of his or her probationary period.

Stated another way, the appointing authority has until the last day of the individual's probationary period to decide whether to retain the employee, extend the employee's probationary period, or to terminate the employee from his or her position. Although the effective date of the employee's removal from the payroll may occur after this date, the required notice of the termination must be delivered to the employee before close of business on the last day of his or her probationary period.

* Military Law §243.9 [with respect to public employees other than teachers] and Military Law §243.9-a, [with respect to teachers] provide certain rights to such an employee entering military service before the end of his or her probationary period upon his or her return to his or her former position.

** See, also, Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of the Mahopac Cent. School Dist., 32 Misc 3d 370, at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_21182.htm

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_51026.htm

A retiree is not affected by post-retirement collective bargaining negotiations concerning health insurance contributions absent specific contract language to that effect in place at the time of his or her retirement

A retiree is not affected by post-retirement collective bargaining negotiations concerning  health insurance contributions absent specific contract language to that effect in place at the time of his or her retirement

Warner v Board of Educ., Cobleskill- Richmondville Cent. Sch. Dist., Warner v Board of Educ., Cobleskill- Richmondville Cent. Sch. Dist., Appellate Division, Third Department

Samuel T. Warner, on behalf of himself and other former school administrators who retired from the Cobleskill-Richmondville Central School District [Warner] sued the District in this combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment contending that the District had breached its contractual obligations as a result of its reducing the District's share of the cost of the premium it paid towards Warner’s health insurance coverage.

The relevant provision in the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) in effect from July 1993 to June 2003 provided:

"Individuals who retire during the term of the contract shall be covered at the rate of 100 percent of the charge for individual coverage and 75 percent of the charge for dependent coverage, as applicable. Employees hired after July 1, 1976 shall be required to satisfy ten (10) years of service in order to be eligible to continue the health insurance program in retirement as offered by the District."

According to the Appellate Division’s decision, successive CBAs in effect from July 2003 to June 2009 contained nearly identical language regarding the rate and eligibility for retiree health insurance coverage.

In June 2009, the Association and the District agreed to a CBA for the July 2009 through June 2012 CBA that provided that employees who retire during the 2010-2011 or 2011-2012 school year would receive health insurance coverage at the rate of 84% of the charge for individual or dependent coverage as the “District’s contribution,” while those who retire during the 2009-2010 school year would continue to receive the rates of 100% for individual coverage and 75% for dependent coverage as the “District’s contribution.”

In March 2010, Warner received a letter from the District stating that, "[a]s of July 1, 2010, the rate of contribution for both eligible active and eligible retired [Association] employees shall be 16% of the charge for individual and dependent coverage." He filed a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 and action for declaratory judgment alleging seeking, among other things, a declaration that District is obligated to contribute to the cost of his health insurance throughout his retirement.

Supreme Court granted Warner’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the plain language of the CBAs unambiguously obligated the District to provide lifetime health insurance coverage for those bargaining unit members who retired prior to the 2010-2011 school year at a rate of 100% for individuals and 75% for dependents. The District appealed.

The Appellate Division commenced its review by noting that “A written agreement that is clear and complete on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” and that “Extrinsic evidence may be considered to discern the parties' intent only if the contract is ambiguous, which is a question of law for the court to resolve.”

In determining whether an ambiguity exists, said the court, the entire contract must be examined and consider the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which it was executed. “Particular words should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby."

The Appellate Division said that considering the CBAs as a whole and in accordance with these principles, it found no ambiguity, pointing out that pursuant to the CBAs in effect at the time Warner and his co-plaintiffs retired, an employee who had completed 10 years of service was entitled to health insurance coverage "in retirement." In order to receive that coverage at a rate of 100% per individual and 75% per dependent, the only requirement was that the individual "retire during the term of the contract."

Despite the District’s argument to the contrary, the court said that “nothing in the provisions at issue suggests that the coverage was limited to the time period of the CBA in effect at the time of an individual's retirement.”

Significantly, the Appellate Division pointed out that Warner and his co-plaintiffs, as retirees are not involved in subsequent collective bargaining negotiations and that "it is logical to assume [from the absence of any such durational language] that the bargaining unit intended to insulate retirees from losing important insurance rights during subsequent negotiations by using language in each and every contract which fixed their rights to coverage as of the time they retired."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that the CBAs at issue “unambiguously provide lifetime health insurance coverage to [Warner and his co-plaintiffs] pursuant to the terms of the CBA in effect at the time of their retirement, and therefore consideration of the extrinsic evidence submitted is unnecessary. Further, notes the opinion, were the court to have found that there was an ambiguity, the extrinsic evidence introduced to aid in the construction of the CBAs fully supports the interpretation proffered by Warner and his co-plaintiffs.

The court then ruled that Supreme Court had properly award summary judgment to Warner.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05032.htm

Board member’s defeat in an election to the board renders appeal seeking his or her removal from the board moot

Board member’s defeat in an election to the board renders appeal seeking his or her removal from the board moot

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education # 16,468

The Board of Education asked the Commissioner of Education to remove one of its members from the board, alleging the board member had breach of fiduciary duties and violations of district policies.

The board member denied the allegations. The Commissioner, however, dismissed the Board complaint without addressing its merits.

Subsequent to its filing its complaint, the board submitted an affidavit from its superintendent stating that board member “was defeated in [the] school board election and is no longer a member of the board."

Accordingly, the Commissioner ruled that the Board’s application to remove the member was moot and dismissed it, explaining that "the Commissioner will only decide matters in actual controversy and will not render a decision on a state of facts which no longer exist or which subsequent events have laid to rest.”

The Commissioner’s decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume52/documents/d16468.pdf

The State’s State Fire Prevention and Building Code Council to meet on July 16th 2013

The State’s State Fire Prevention and Building Code Council to meet on July 16^th 2013

Source: New York State Department of State

The New York Department of State’s State Fire Prevention and Building Code Council will hold a public meeting of the Council on Tuesday, July 16^th, 2013 at 10:00 a.m.at the Department of State, 99 Washington Avenue in Albany, 123 William Street in NYC, and 65 Court Street in Buffalo. 

The meeting will be held via videoconferencing to discuss a number of topics, including more restrictive local standards and the next Uniform Code and Energy Code Adoption update.

The public is welcome to attend the meeting at any of the locations listed below:

Albany:

Department of State

99 Washington Avenue (Commerce Plaza)

5^th Floor, Room 505

Albany, NY

New York City

123 William Street

20^th Floor, Executive Conference Room

New York, NY

Buffalo, New York:

65 Court Street

Room 208

Buffalo, NY

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Issued during the week ending July 6, 2013 [Click on text highlighted in bold to access the full report] 


DiNapoli: ESDC Needs to Better Monitor Foreign Offices

The Empire State Development Corp. needs to set clear performance standards to determine if its remaining four foreign offices are fulfilling their missions and bolstering New York’s economy through overseas business and investment, according to an audit released July 1, 2013 by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

DiNapoli: Westchester Special Education Provider Overcharged Taxpayers $800,000

The Westchester School for Special Children overcharged taxpayers by more than $800,000 over a four–year period, and engaged in questionable business transactions with companies connected to board members and executives, according to an audit released Wednesday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. The findings of the audit are under review by the Office of the Attorney General. Legislation that would improve oversight of preschool special education by mandating audits of every provider was recently passed by the legislature.

DiNapoli Returns Record $347 Million in Unclaimed Funds to Rightful Owners

A record amount of unclaimed funds, totaling $347 million, were paid out to individuals and organizations in the state’s last fiscal year, according to State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. This new record surpasses the previous year by $33 million. Currently, there is $12.5 billion in lost or forgotten money that is still waiting to be claimed.

DiNapoli Releases Bond Calendar for Third Quarter

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli on July 2, 2013 announced a tentative schedule for the planned public sale of obligations for the state, New York City, and their major public authorities during the third quarter of 2013.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced Tuesday, July 2, 2013, that his office completed audits of:

the Village of Albion;

the Bloomingburg Fire Company #1;

Cattaraugus County;

the Town of Dunkirk;

the Town of Hamden;

the City of Hudson;

the Killawog Fire District;

the City of Rochester;

the Town of Seneca Falls; and,

the Town of Wappinger.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced Monday, July 1, 2013, the following audits have been issued:

the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision;

the Department of Environmental Conservation;

the New York State Health Insurance Program; and,

Statewide Travel Audits of the Department of Labor;

the Office of Mental Health; and,

the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases School Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Tuesday announced that his office completed audits of:

the South Country Central School District; and,

the Watervliet City School District.