Public officer automatically terminated from his or her position upon conviction of a crime or a violation of his or her oath of office

Public officer automatically terminated from his or her position upon conviction of a crime or a violation of his or her oath of office

Hodgson v McGuire, 75 A.D.2d 763

Public Officers Law §30 provides for an automatic forfeiture of office upon a public officer’s conviction of a felony or a crime involving a violation of his oath of office.

A police officer was dismissed following his entering a plea of guilty to a crime (official misconduct) that was a class A misdemeanor under the Penal Law.

The police officer admitted acceptance of $350 from an undercover police officer and was dismissed without a hearing.

The Appellate Division held that police officers are public officers and that the underlying crime, although not a felony, involved a violation of his oath of office. The court indicated that there is a strong public policy in favor of vacating the office of a public officer convicted of a violation of his oath of office.

As the office was automatically vacated by operation of law, no pre-termination hearing was required.

Suspensions without pay deemed appropriate penalties under the circumstances

Suspensions without pay deemed appropriate penalties under the circumstances

105 AD3d 613

The New York City Department of Correction suspended one correction officer, “M” for sixty days without pay and a second correction officer, “S” for thirty days without pay. M was found guilty using excessive force against an inmate and making false and misleading statements; S was found guilty of misconduct in preparing an official report and making false and misleading statements.

Finding that the Department’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence, the Appellate Division sustained the Department’s decision. As to the penalty imposed, citing the “Pell” standard, the court said that the “The penalty imposed does not shock one's sense of fairness” (Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_02698.htm

Determining mandatory subjects of Taylor Law negotiations

Determining mandatory subjects of Taylor Law negotiations

Town of Haverstraw v Newman, 75 A.D.2d 874

The Appellate Division sustained PERB’S determination that “legal insurance”, family sick leave, uniform cleaning allowances and a safety clause in connection with Taylor Law negotiations between the Town and its police officer’s union were mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.

That determination, said the court, was a permissible interpretation of §201.4 of the Civil Service Law and it saw no reason to distinguish legal insurance from health insurance or group life insurance.

 The Appellate Division also commented that PERB was the expert here and that it would not substitute its judgment for that of PERB in this area.

Vacating an arbitration award

Vacating an arbitration award

2013 NY Slip Op 50666(U), Supreme Court, Part-orange County, Judge Catherine M. Bartlett [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

It is “black letter law” that an arbitration award will not be vacated "unless it is violative of a strong public policy, is totally irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power and every reasonable intendment is indulged in favor of an award." Further, the burden of proving that an arbitrator's ruling "constituted misconduct rests with [the] respondent and must be met by clear and convincing proof."

In this case the employer commenced a special proceeding in an effort to vacate an arbitration award that provided for the temporary suspension of an employee without pay for “the balance of the school year” and required the employee to attend an anger management class.

The employer appealed in an effort annul the penalty imposed by the arbitrator, contending that under the circumstances this "punishment did not fit the crime" that the arbitrator's decision was irrational given the sworn testimony of various witnesses concerning the employee’s [mis]behavior, and argued that the "shockingly lenient penalty" was enough to shock the court's conscience and violated public policy. In lieu of the penalty imposed by the arbitrator, the employer sought the termination of the employee.

In rebuttal, the employee argued that the arbitrator’s decision to suspend him without pay and require his participation in anger management training was well within the bounds of the arbitrator’s decision making authority and should not to be upset by the court.

Judge Bartlett observed that “Under CPLR §7511, the court may scrutinize an arbitration award only on the narrow grounds specified in subdivision (b) and only upon the application of a party.” As to the employer’s public policy argument, the court pointed out that in Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Town of Callicoon Unit, 70 NY2d 907, the Court of Appeals held that an arbitration award will not be vacated "unless it is violative of a strong public policy, is totally irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power."

In addition, Judge Bartlett commented that “every reasonable intendment is indulged in favor of an award” and that in this instance the burden of proving that an arbitrator's ruling "constituted misconduct rests with [the employer] and must be met by clear and convincing proof,” citing Matter of Mencher, 276 App.Div. 556, 96 N.Y.S.2d 13.

As to the employer’s claim that the arbitrator’s award was violative of public policy, Judge Bartlett observed that an arbitration award will be vacated on public policy grounds only where such policy "prohibit[s], in an absolute sense, particular matters being decided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator."

As to the arbitration award at issue, Judge Bartlett held that “upon review of the arbitration decision on its face, it cannot be said as a matter of law that public policy precludes its enforcement,” explaining that in this instance the hearing officer determined that an effective suspension for almost four months without pay plus remedial action in the form of required anger management training was the appropriate penalty.

Noting that there was no evidence that the employee previously or subsequently engaged in similar conduct, and that the employee had expressed his remorse and complied with the penalties imposed by the arbitrator, the court said that the fact that the employer disagreed with the arbitrator’s determination “does not empower this Court to dismantle the process.”

Accordingly, Judge Bartlett denied the employer’s application in its entirety.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_50666.htm

An uncertified union or unrecognized employee organization has a limited access to use a school mailboxes to contact employees

An uncertified union or unrecognized employee organization has a limited access to use a school mailboxes to contact employees

PERB decision U-3885

PERB has held that the Taylor Law does not require a public employer to give an unrecognized or an uncertified union competing with the recognized or certified employee organization equal access to teachers or mailboxes for the purpose of soliciting members except when such contact is timely in connection with a relevant challenge period. 

A peer-review panel member’s evaluation of an individual may be withheld from disclosure pursuant to a FOIL request

A peer-review panel member’s evaluation of an individual may be withheld from disclosure pursuant to a FOIL request

Shaw v. Lerer, 112 Misc2d 260

Typically a request to obtain a public record[s] pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law is required only in the event the custodian of the public record[s] sought declined to “voluntarily” provide the information or record requested. In such cases the individual or organization is required to file a FOIL request to obtain the information.

It should also be noted that there is no bar to providing information pursuant to a FOIL request, or otherwise, that falls within one or more of the exceptions that the custodian could rely upon in denying a FOIL request, in whole or in part, for the information or records demanded.

However, the release of some public records is limited by statute [see, for example, Education Law, §1127 - Confidentiality of records; §33.13, Mental Hygiene Law - Clinical records; confidentiality]. Otherwise, an individual is not required to submit a FOIL request as a condition precedent to obtaining public records where access is not barred by statute.

After officiating at interscholastic senior varsity hockey games for two years, Shaw was assigned only junior varsity events.

Rating summary sheets prepared by fellow officials evaluating Shaw were provided to him. Shaw, however, then demanded copies of the individual evaluations prepared by high school coaches pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (§87, Public Officers Law). The request was denied and the Shaw filed a petition in Supreme Court challenging the custodian of the records decision not to provide the ratings to him.

Supreme Court dismissed Shaw’s petition, holding that the individual ratings of Shaw by the panel members fell within an exception to disclosure under the law as they were “interagency documents” (See POL 87.2g). The court stated that “If the disclosure is more harmful to the public than nondisclosure, the scales of justice must tip towards nondisclosure.”

In a similar case, a teacher was denied information concerning the votes of two other faculty members considering his application for tenure sued in federal court. The court held that there was no showing that the denial of tenure was for constitutionally impermissible reasons (Gray v. Board of Higher Education, City of New York, 92 FRD 82). Here, said the court, “the benefit likely to be gained by disclosure...for which privilege was claimed, was outweighed by the potential effect of ordering disclosure of confidential votes made under a peer review system”, a point noted by the court in Shaw as well.

Hearing officer’s discontinuing the hearing prior to completion because of individual’s unruly conduct creates a problem

Hearing officer’s discontinuing the hearing prior to completion because of individual’s unruly conduct creates a problem

88 A.D.2d 907

A person serving as a hearing officer may be tempted to terminate or “shorten” a hearing because one or more of the participants becomes unruly or abusive. In such situations the “rules of procedure” should be carefully considered.

The Chairperson at the administrative hearing stopped the hearing before the employee had an opportunity to make a “statement” specifically permitted by the controlling rules of procedure because of the individual’s “personal vituperation and ... abrasive behavior, despite repeated warnings” concerning such behavior by the hearing officer.

The Chairperson then sustained the employee’s unsatisfactory service rating, which determination was later affirmed by the Chancellor of the New York City Board of Education. The employee then sued, arguing that the Board had failed to follow its own procedures.

The Appellate Division, reversing a lower court ruling to the contrary, held that the failure to provide the employee with the “Review Format” was an abuse of the Chairperson’s discretionary powers to make necessary “adjustments” in the format and insure an “expeditious and non-repetitious presentation [and] denied (the employee) a substantial right”.

The matter was then sent back to the school district with instructions that employee “be given the opportunity to exercise his right to make a presentation and statement on his own behalf as provided in the Review Format”. 

Seminar for school districts focusing on the Affordable Care Act scheduled for July 17, 2013

Seminar for school districts focusing on the Affordable Care Act scheduled for July 17, 2013

Harris Beach, a law firm, has announced that it is offering a complimentary seminar titled “De-Mystifying the Affordable Care Act [ACA]: Practical Steps You Should be Taking Now” on Wednesday, July 17th from 1:00 to 3:00 p.m. at The West Room, Reid Castle at Manhattanville College, 2900 Purchase Street, Purchase, NY 10577.

Harris Beach said that the program is “specifically designed to help clear up confusion among superintendents, business officials, HR personnel and board members over ACA employer mandates.”

 Full program details are available by clicking on the following link, “De-Mystifying the Affordable Care Act.”

To register, e-mail Jennifer Jones at jjones@harrisbeach.com or call Ms. Jones at 800-685-1429 ext. 1114.

Intentional discrimination by an employer to avoid or remedy unintentional disparate impact in employment must be based on strong evidence to believe disparate-impact liability will result if it fails to do so

Intentional discrimination by an employer to avoid or remedy unintentional disparate impact in employment must be based on strong evidence to believe disparate-impact liability will result if it fails to do so

Margerum v City of Buffalo, 2013 NY Slip Op 05104, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Firefighters employed by City of Buffalo Department of Fire sued the City contending that it had discriminated against them  (Fire Department), commenced this action alleging that defendants discriminated against by allowing promotional eligibility lists created pursuant to the Civil Service Law to expire solely on the ground that these firefighters [plaintiffs] who were next in line for promotion, were Caucasian.

Previously, the Appellate Division had held that [1] the action taken by the City was subject to strict scrutiny and [2] the plaintiffs had failed to establish "the absence of a compelling interest," particularly because " a sufficiently serious claim of discrimination' may constitute a compelling interest to engage in race-conscious remedial action."

A short time later the United States Supreme Court decided Ricci v DeStefano (557 US 557), holding that, "before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious discriminatory action."

Following Ricci, the Appellate Division affirmed an order that granted those parts of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability with respect to the Fire Department and the City, determining that defendants "did not have a strong basis in evidence to believe that they would be subject to disparate-impact liability if they failed to take the race-conscious action, i.e., allowing the eligibility lists to expire."

Supreme Court then conducted a nonjury trial on the issue of damages, and the City appeal from an order that awarded a total amount of $2,510,170 in economic damages and a total amount of $255,000 in emotional distress damages to the remaining plaintiffs.

The City appealed and the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court's awards for emotional distress were proper, but that the court erred with respect to its awards for economic damages.

The Appellate Division explained that that plaintiffs the established that their damages were proximately caused by the City's failure to promote them from the 2002 eligibility list. Thus, it its view, the plaintiffs met their burden of establishing that they would have been promoted but for the City's action in allowing the promotion eligibility lists to expire and suffered economic damages because they were not promoted.

As to the amounts of damages, the Appellate Division concluded that each amount of damages awarded for emotional distress is reasonable. However, it found that as to the awards for economic damages, Supreme Court “applied the wrong burden of proof and erred in relying on assumptions not supported by the record.”

Supreme Court had placed the burden of proof on the City to establish plaintiffs' economic damages. This was error as a plaintiff seeking, e.g., damages for loss of future earnings must "provide evidence demonstrating the difference between what he [or she] is now able to earn and what he [or she] could have earned" in the absence of discrimination.

Noting that recovery for lost earning capacity may be based on future probabilities and is not limited to actual past earnings and that a plaintiff is not required to establish loss of earnings with absolute certainty, the Appellate Division said that it is a "fundamental premise that loss of earnings or earning capacity must be established with reasonable certainty . . . and will be reduced if based upon mere speculation."

The Appellate Division then considered the evidence and expert testimony offered on the issue of economic damages and modified the Supreme Court’s determinations in whole or in part.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05104.htm

Discontinuing the performance of a governmental operation

Discontinuing the performance of a governmental operation

Civil Serv. Employees Assn., Inc. Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v County of Onondaga, State Supreme Court Judge Donald A. Greenwood [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) brought an Article 78 petition seeking a determination that Onondaga County acted in violation of law and in an arbitrary and capricious manner by authorizing the sale of the County owned Van Duyn Home and Hospital Facility. CSEA also alleged that the County “acted in bad faith by adopting a budget that zero-funded positions at Van Duyn.”

After considering a number of procedural issued, Judge Donald A. Greenwood addressed the merits of CSEA’s petition.

CSEA’s first claim in its petition alleged that the Department of Long Term Care Services was created by the County Charter and that the elimination of that department, along with the positions employed within it, without passing an amendment to the Charter, was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, violative of law and in excess of the County’s jurisdiction in that the County Legislature lacked the authority to adopt a budget striking salary appropriations, thereby eliminating the operations of the department without affecting an amendment to the Charter.

In effect, CSEA contended that the action offended the doctrine of legislative equivalency, also known as the legislative equal dignity rule.* (1995). The Court of Appeals has summarized the principle by stating "to repeal or modify a statute requires a legislative act of equal dignity and import."

Judge Greenwood decided that CSEA’s argument was “both factually and legally flawed.” explaining that the County demonstrated that through the annual budget process established within the County Charter and Administrative Code, the Legislature declared its intent” to be out of the nursing home business, and abolished a number of positions related to provisions of such services at Van Duyn, and determined that the facility should be sold.” This legislative act, said the court, carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, including a rebuttable presumption of the existence of necessary factual support for its provisions.

In addition, Judge Greenwood said that the County demonstrated that the facts here justified the legislative decision to sell the facility while retaining operating rights, to enact a local law amending the Administrative Code to reorganize the Long Term Care Services Department and eliminate job titles effective November 30, 2013.

The court also noted that “the County is authorized to enact legislation establishing its form of government … and generally regulating its affairs, provided that such legislation is consistent with state law and [it] is empowered to establish and abolish positions of employment by resolution as part of the budget process.”**

As to CSEA’s contention that the “elimination of union jobs here constitutes a bad faith abolition of the positions,” the court said that “municipal officials are vested with authority to create and abolish positions and to adopt a budget; they also have the power and the prerogative to determine that civil service positions may be abolished in good faith for reasons of efficiency and economy in the absence of fraud, corruption or bad faith.”

As to CSEA’s claim of bad faith on the part of the County, CSEA was required to show that the positions in question were not eliminated for bona fide reasons, that savings were not accomplished or that replacement employees were hired. Judge Greenwood found that CSEA had not met this burden and dismissed its petition seeking a court order invalidating the sale of the facility and nullifying the budgetary elimination of the positions by the County Legislature..

* In Torre v County of Nassau, 86 NY2d 421, the Court of Appeals noted that the Doctrine of Legislative Equivalency requires that a position created by a legislative act can only be abolished by a correlative legislative act.

** The decision notes that the budget resolution, Resolution #160-2012, established the budget for 2013 and declared the County's policy with respect to discontinuing future provision of nursing home services and further provided for the abolition of roster positions, except for two positions established by the County Charter and Administrative Code.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_50813.htm