Police officer terminated after being found guilty of possessing and ingesting cocaine

Police officer terminated after being found guilty of possessing and ingesting cocaine
2013 NY Slip Op 07262, Appellate Division, First Department

The Appellate Division confirmed the disciplinary penalty imposed on a New York City Detective – termination from the force - found guilty of possessing and ingesting cocaine.

The court said that there was substantial evidence supporting finding the detective guilty of the charges, including a positive random drug test results, and there was no basis for  “disturbing the Hearing Officer's credibility determinations.”

Citing Trotta v Ward, 77 NY2d 827, the Appellate Division said that the penalty imposed did not shock its sense of fairness as the detective "is accountable to the public for the integrity of the Department."

The Appellate Division also noted that it had considered the individual’s concerns about the impact his disciplinary termination has on his retirement benefits and found them “unavailing.” Section 13-173.1 of New York City’s Administrative Code requires an employee to "be in service" on the effective date of his or her retirement or vesting of retirement benefits. If the employee is not "in service" on that date, he or she forfeits his or her retirement benefits.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07262.htm

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A municipality may rescind its decision to defend and indemnify an employee being sued for acts or omission that occurred performing official duties if the individual fails to cooperate

A municipality may rescind its decision to defend and indemnify an employee being sued for acts or omission that occurred performing official duties if the individual fails to cooperate
Lancaster v Incorporated Village of Freeport, 2013 NY Slip Op 07652, Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that a municipality, here the Village of Freeport, may withdraw from its defense and indemnification obligations otherwise required under provisions of the Freeport Village Code §130-6 adopted pursuant to Public Officers Law §18* in the event current and former municipal officials and officers being sued in a civil action decline to accept a reasonable settlement offer. Further the court said that “First Amendment concerns with respect to the settlement's nondisclosure clause do not warrant a different conclusion.”

However, §130-6 of the Code provided that the Village's duty to defend and indemnify "shall be conditioned upon: . . . the full cooperation of the employee in the defense of such action or proceeding against the Village based upon the same act or omission"

According to the decision, the Freeport Board of Trustees authorized the Village to defend and indemnify the employees named in the civil action and retained separate counsel to represent the Village and employees in the litigation.

Subsequently the Village's counsel began settlement negotiations with the plaintiffs and an agreement whereby the plaintiffs would dismiss the actions against the Village in return for $3,500,000 paid over six years. In addition, the settlement agreement included a “nondisparagement clause” and required the employees to "agree not to ever interfere, nor challenge or criticize the terms of either Stipulation [of Settlement] in any manner."

The employees’ counsel indicated that, in his opinion, “the nondisparagement clause constituted a "concerted effort by the Village and the plaintiffs to silence any comment by [the employees] in this matter of public concern, particularly as to those who hold public office, is misguided at best and could be construed as a threat to [the employees’] First Amendment rights.” The employees’ suggest revisions “to avoid even the impression of an effort to impinge on anyone's right to express themselves or to coerce any public official from fulfilling his/her responsibilities.”

The Village's counsel replied indicating that: the proposed settlement did not violate employees' free speech rights; the settlement was advantageous for employees §18; and refusal would be patently unreasonable and a breach of their duty to cooperate under the Public Officers Law** and Village Code.

The employees refused to settle. The Board subsequently met in executive session and resolved to withdraw providing for the employees’ defense and indemnification. However, the employees continued to litigate the actions at their own expense and subsequently initiated a “hybrid Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking a judgment (1) vacating the withdrawal; (2) directing [the Village] to provide a defense; and (3) declaring invalid the Village's disclaimer of any further obligation to defend [the employees].”

Supreme Court denied the petitions and dismissed the proceedings, rejecting the employees’ arguments that “the Village had infringed their First Amendment rights, improperly withdrawn the defense and indemnification for lack of cooperation, or violated the Open Meetings Law.” The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court ruling and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of Appeals rejected the employees’ argument that (1) the Village violated their free speech rights by withdrawing the defense and indemnification; (2) their refusal to settle did not constitute a failure to cooperate justifying revocation of the defense and indemnification under Public Officers Law §18; and (3) the Board violated the Open Meetings Law by withdrawing the defense and indemnification in executive session.

The Court of Appeals said that the employees had advance two argument: [1] the requirement of a nondisparagement clause was an impermissible prior restraint on free speech, and [2] penalizing the employees for refusing to refrain from criticizing the settlement was unconstitutional retaliation. The court found neither argument persuasive.

The court noted that the evidence does not show the Village to have actively sought to restrict the employees’' speech. If, on the other hand, were there. for example, that as part of the settlement, the Village induced the plaintiffs to include the nondisparagement clause in the settlement with employees, said the court, this might be a different case.

The Court of Appeals explained that the plaintiff’s inclusion of the nondisparagement clause in the settlement offer was not a prior restraint on speech as plaintiff was a private party and entitled to offer settlement on whatever terms it saw fit. Had employees accepted the settlement and breached its terms, only the plaintiff, not the Village, could have sued to enforce it.

As the employees’ claim that the Village's "threat" to withdraw the defense and indemnification a prior restraint on speech, the Court of Appeals noted that "[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from encouraging the suppression of speech in a manner which can reasonably be interpreted as intimating that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action will follow the failure to accede to the official's request." Here, however, the reason the Village threatened to withdraw funding was to end the litigation and save public funds, rather than to suppress speech.

The court also observed that the withdrawal of it obligation to provide for the employees’ defense and indemnification was not a prior restraint on speech but rather a response to employees' failure to cooperate. It was not a restraint on what petitioners could say in the future as the employees were free to continue litigating and criticize the settlement as they pleased.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, Judge Pigott dissenting.

* Presumably the same ruling would control with respect to officers and employees of the State as the employer seeking “defense and indemnification” pursuant to §17 of the Public Officers Law in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or is alleged in the complaint to have occurred while the officer or the employee was acting within the scope of his or her public employment or duties

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** §17.5 of the Public Officers Law provides, in pertinent part, “The duty to defend or indemnify and save harmless prescribed by this section shall be conditioned upon: … (ii) the full cooperation of the employee in the defense of such action or proceeding and in defense of any action or proceeding against the public entity based upon the same act or omission, and in the prosecution of any appeal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07652.htm
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Police Department's policy of requiring a police officer who discharges a firearm causing death or personal injury to submit to a Breathalyzer test sustained

Police Department's policy of requiring a police officer who discharges a firearm causing death or personal injury to submit to a Breathalyzer test sustained

Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., v New York City Police Department, Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner, US Circuit Court of Appeals, 2^nd Circuit, Docket No. 12-3089

The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., appealed the District Court’s granting summary judgment dismissing its petition challenging the New York City Police Department’s [NYPD] administration of a Breathalyzer test to any officer whose discharge of his firearm within New York City results in death or injury to any person.

The Circuit Court of Appeals denied the PBA’s appeal, holding that such testing “is reasonable under the special needs doctrine" and that [the PBA’s] Fourth Amendment challenge "fails as a matter of law.”

The “Special Needs” Doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Typically when law enforcement seek to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, “reasonableness” generally requires the officer first obtaining of a judicial warrant supported by probable cause.

The court said that “neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance” and “[w]arrantless, even suspicionless, searches can be constitutionally reasonable where 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement' are present." However, warrantless, suspicionless searches is “closely guarded” and a court must conduct a “close review of the scheme at issue” in light of “all the available evidence” to determine its “primary purpose.”

The tests applied by the Circuit Court in holding that the “Special Needs Doctrine” applied in this instance were:

1. Sobriety is a fitness-for-duty condition of employment with the NYPD and a sobriety determination serves special needs distinct from criminal law enforcement, specifically, personnel management of, and maintaining public confidence in, the NYPD;

2. NYPD's interest in these special needs is not compatible with the warrant requirement applicable to criminal investigations; and

3. NYPD's interest in these special needs sufficiently outweighs the privacy interests of tested police officers as to render warrantless, suspicionless testing constitutionally reasonable.

The court’s conclusion: these special needs “greatly outweigh officers' reduced expectation of privacy with respect to alcohol testing at the time of any firearms discharge causing death or personal injury,” thereby rendering warrantless, suspicionless testing constitutionally reasonable as a matter of law.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/8f207a1c-113c-4011-b240-6e49dc649f4e/2/doc/12-3089_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/8f207a1c-113c-4011-b240-6e49dc649f4e/2/hilite/

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Employee demoted after being found guilty of misconduct

Employee demoted after being found guilty of misconduct

2013 NY Slip Op 07363, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

In this action an employee asked the Appellate Division to annul a determination by the appointing authority finding the employee guilty of specified acts of misconduct and demoting the employee to a lower grade position.

The court rejected the employee's claim that the appointing authority’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence, explaining that substantial evidence is "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact," citing 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176.

Further, said the Appellate Division, the penalty imposed by the appointing authority, demotion, “is not so disproportionate to the offense[s] as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, and thus does not constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07363.htm
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Applying the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Applying the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Marsico v Armstrong, 2013 NY Slip Op 07487, Appellate Division, Second Department

Education Law §2510(2) provides that “Whenever a board of education abolishes a position under this chapter, the services of the teacher having the least seniority in the system within the tenure of the position abolished shall be discontinued [emphasis supplied].*

The Board of Education abolished Business Education teacher positions in accordance with Education Law §2510(2) and then established a preferred eligible list pursuant to Education Law §2510(3) for use in the event a vacancy became available and the Board elected to fill the position.

Donna Marsico was granted tenure as a Business Education teacher by the Board effective September 1, 1994. Upon the abolishment of her positions, the Board placed Marsico’s name on the appropriate preferred list as “the most senior teacher for rehiring purposes.” The Board, however, later concluded that Marsico’s service with the school district as an Adult Education teacher from 1993 to 2007 should not have been considered in determining her seniority for placement on the preferred list.

The Board then adopted a resolution establishing a new preferred eligible list listing the names of two other teachers as having greater seniority in the tenure area than Marsico. One of those teachers was later appointed from the preferred list.

Marsico filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 [1] seeking a review of the resolution establishing the new preferred eligible list, [2] seeking an order to compel the Board to restore “her reinstatement rights pursuant to the initial preferred eligible list” and [3] directing the Board to appoint her to the position to which the other teacher had been appointed.

The Board moved to dismiss Marsico’s petition based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.** Supreme Court granted the Board’s motion to the extent that it  “stayed the proceeding and referred the matter to the Commissioner of Education”

The Commissioner subsequently decided Marisco’s administrative appeal challenging the Board's several determinations and agreed with the Board, dismissing her administrative appeal on the merits. [Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision 16,158].***

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The Supreme Court then denied Marisco’s petition and dismissed the proceeding.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s ruling explaining that “Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court either should have dismissed the petition upon the [Board’s] motion, pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or, upon the Commissioner's determination of the administrative appeal, should have permitted Marsico to amend her petition so as to seek review of the Commissioner's determination and to join the Commissioner as a party.”

As Supreme Court elected to await the Commissioner's determination rather than dismiss the petition, the Appellate Division remitted the matter Supreme Court “to permit Marsico to amend her petition and join the Commissioner as a party and, thereafter, for a determination of the amended petition.”

* In contrast, in the event positions in the competitive class in the classified service are abolished [educators are in the unclassified service], §80.1 of the Civil Service Law provides that the incumbents of such positions shall be laid off “in the inverse order of original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service in the service of the governmental jurisdiction in which such abolition positions occurs [emphasis supplied]. §80-a(1) of the Civil Service Law so provides for employees in the noncompetitive class employed by the State as the employer[emphasis supplied].

** The doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied by a court in order to permit an administrative agency an initial opportunity to decide an issue in a case in which the court and the agency have concurrent jurisdiction.

*** The Commissioner's decision is posed on the Internet at: http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume50/d16158.htm

The Appellate Division's decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07487.htm

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Employee has a duty of loyalty to the appointing authority

Employee has a duty of loyalty to the appointing authority

56 N.Y.2d 656

An employer is sometimes confronted with a situation in which an employee’s duty of loyalty to the employer is called into question or there appears to be a conflict of interest with respect to the employee’s performance.

In this action, the employee sued the agency after it had discharged him for “disloyalty and conflict of interest.”

At the time of his dismissal, the employee served as an associate counsel to the agency. The agency alleged that while its employee, the individual was also actively assisting one of the organizations that the agency was established to regulate.

In the words of the Court of Appeals, “Given the nature of the attorney-client relationship and petitioner's position as associate counsel to [agency] ... it cannot be said that reports of [the employee's] active assistance to two public interest lobbying groups regulated by the [agency] were an improper basis for the [agency's] decision to terminate petitioner's employment (cf. Arnett v Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134; Cooper v Johnson, 590 F.2d 559). Nor was petitioner entitled to a due process hearing* inasmuch as he never alleged that there was public dissemination of the reasons for his dismissal. Finally, petitioner, a nontenured employee, has demonstrated no procedural violation in the manner in which his employment was terminated.”

* Presumably the court was referring to a "name clearing hearing."
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Retirement System not required to explain the tax implications of its response to an employee’s question

Retirement System not required to explain the tax implications of its response to an employee’s question

Hauser v. Comptroller, 83 A.D.2d 649

From time to time Personnel Officers receive questions from employees that may require extensive analysis or speculation because of the fact that there may be different results depending on the course of action followed by the employee. It seems that as long as the answer is correct, the Court will not impose an unreasonable burden on the administrator to explain the implications of the answer.

The case arose when a retiree sought to change the basis for his retirement from “service retirement” to “ordinary disability” retirement.

Max Hauser contended that the Employees’ Retirement System should have advised him of the possible federal tax benefits were he to elect “ordinary disability” retirement rather than the service retirement option.

In rejecting the argument, the Court indicated that the information given Hauser regarding the amount of benefits was correct and “to require the Retirement System to advise every applicant of the tax implications of their retirement would impose an unreasonable burden on the system”.
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Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending November 16, 2013

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending November 16, 2013

Click on text highlighted in color  to access the full report

DiNapoli Announces New In–State Private Equity Investment Through Softbank Capital

On Friday, November 15, 2013 State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Friday announced the New York State Common Retirement Fund’s In–State Private Equity Program investment in The Dodo Inc., a start–up website focusing on animal issues, through investment manager SoftBank Capital.

DiNapoli: Former Fire District Treasurer Accused of Stealing More Than $50,000

The former Crystal Beach Fire District treasurer was arrested Thursday, November 14, 2013 for allegedly stealing and spending more than $50,000 of public funds on tanning, TV and shopping sprees, according to State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Wednesday announced his office completed audits of the

Northern Onondaga Public Library District and the

Town of Sidney.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases State Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced Wednesday, November 13, 2013 the following audits have been issued:

Plaza College;

Dowling College;

Mercy College;

Department of Health;

New York State Energy Research and Development Authority;

State University of New York Farmingdale State College; and the

State Education Department.
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Employee terminated after being found guilty of “excessive absence”

Employee terminated after being found guilty of “excessive absence”
2013 NY Slip Op 07430, Appellate Division, First Department

The Appellate Division sustained the termination of a Senior Court Officer [Appellant] employed by the Unified Court System following a disciplinary hearing. The hearing office determined that that Appellanthad engaged in misconduct by missing 197 days of scheduled work assignments in the course of a 14-month period and recommended that he be dismissed from his position.

The appointing authority adopted the findings and recommendation of the hearing officer and terminated Appellant. .

The Appellate Division sustained the appointing authority’s decision, noting that substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s determination.

Noting that Appellant’s absences “were not caused by his psychological disorders,” court said that the penalty imposed by the appointing authority, termination, did not shock its sense of fairness, citing Dickinson v NYS Unified Court System, 99 AD3d 569.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07430.htm
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Replacement of a 55-year-old Webmaster by a younger “web guru” in course of a business reorganization did not constitute a violation of the ADEA

Replacement of a 55-year-old Webmaster by a younger “web guru” in course of a business reorganization did not constitute a violation of the ADEA

Source: Employment Law Daily - a Wolters Kluwer publication

Decision summarized by Majorie Johnson, J.D.

A 55-year-old website coordinator who was laid off during a restructuring in which his employer adopted a web-based multimedia marketing model, and hired a younger “web guru” to rebuild the website with the latest technology, could not advance his ADEA and state law claims of age bias, a federal district court in New York ruled. Dismissing the employee’s pro se claims on summary judgment, the court held that the disparity in age between him and his “replacement,” standing alone, was insufficient to prove age discrimination.

The full text of Ms. Johnson’s article is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/no-age-bias-when-55-year-old-webmaster-replaced-by-younger-web-guru-in-restructuring-failed-to-advance-age-bias-claims/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CCH-Workday+%28WKL%26B+WorkDay%29
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