Guidelines considered by the Commissioner of Education when adjudicating an application seeking the removal of a member of a board of education or a school officer

Guidelines considered by the Commissioner of Education when adjudicating an application seeking the removal of a member of a board of education or a school officer

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision 16,593

In considering this application seeking the removal of certain members of the school district’s board of education, the Commissioner first recited the litigation and other procedures over a number of years in which the parties to this application were involved and noted that “the history of dissention and conflict” affecting the school district is well documented by the numerous legal actions in recent years involving the district.

In the words of the Commissioner: “The record before me illustrates all too well how conflict and an atmosphere of this nature can interfere with the board’s ability to govern the affairs of the district and can undermine the public’s confidence in its elected school board. I strongly urge respondents and the board to engage in constructive discussions – not only as a board, but also with district staff and the community – aimed at eliminating conflict and achieving the best possible governance of the school district.”

After addressing a number of procedural matters, the Commission turned to the merits of the application in which it was alleged that conflicts of interest involving certain members of the school board had surfaced in the course of a board meeting and sought the removal of the board members.

In adjudicating an application seeking to remove a member of a board of education or a school officer the Commissioner noted the following criteria:

1. A member of a board of education or a school officer may be removed from office pursuant to Education Law §306 when it is proven to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the board member or school officer has engaged in a willful violation or neglect of duty under the Education Law or has willfully disobeyed a decision, order, rule or regulation of the Board of Regents or Commissioner of Education.

2. In an application for removal of a member of a board of education or a school officer brought pursuant to Education Law §306, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of establishing the facts upon which the petitioner seeks relief. *

3. Pursuant to §277.1(a) of the Commissioner’s regulations, the application “must distinctly state the willful violation of law, neglect of duty, or willful disobedience

of a decision, order or regulation of the commissioner charged against the officer....”

The petition submitted to the Commissioner seeking the removal of the board members alleged only that the named individuals violated board bylaws and policies, including §6110,**with respect to their conduct at a particular board meeting when they debated and voted upon various resolutions without publicly disclosing their alleged interests in such resolutions.

However, said the Commissioner, “it is well settled that, even if proven, violation of a board’s bylaws or policies, by itself, does not constitute sufficient grounds for removal of a member of a board of education in a proceeding pursuant to Education Law §306.”

Here it was alleged that the conflict of interest provisions of Article 18 of the General Municipal Law were violated because the board members had friendships or personal relationships with the subjects of the resolutions voted on at the board meeting. However the Commissioner held that the petitioner failed to establish facts sufficient to warrant the removal of the board member pursuant to Education Law §306 on this basis.

The Commissioner explained that the conflict of interest provisions of the General Municipal Law***define an interest as "a direct or indirect pecuniary or material benefit accruing to a municipal officer or employee as the result of a contract with the municipality which such officer or employee serves." Further, said the Commissioner, there is no provision in the General Municipal Law that deems a board member to have an automatic interest in a contract between a friend and the district in which the board member serves. Citing Opinion of the State Comptroller No. 83-40, the Commissioner pointed out that such an interest would arise only if a board member was to derive a direct or indirect pecuniary or material benefit from the resolution.

In contrast to alleging or establishing that any board member received a pecuniary or material benefit from their actions, the petitioner “merely alleges that they had undisclosed personal relationships relating to their votes.”

Noting that the petitioner cited no authority for the proposition that a friendship or social relationship, by itself, creates a conflict of interest, the Commissioner ruled that the petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and denied his application to remove the board members.

* See 8 NY CRR §275.10.

** §6110(3)(e) of the district’s ethics policy, which states that a member of the board shall “publicly disclose on the official record the nature and extent of any direct or indirect financial or other interest he/she has” in a resolution before the board.

*** See General Municipal Law §800[3].

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume53/documents/d16593.pdf
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The failure to serve a necessary party requires the dismissal of the proceeding

The failure to serve a necessary party requires the dismissal of the proceeding

2014 NY Slip Op 01696, Appellate Division, First Department

The Article 78 action involved an individual [Petitioner] seeking a court order annulling a decision of the New York City Civil Service Commission [CSC].

Petitioner was terminated from his employment by the New York City Department of Sanitation. CSC affirmed the Department’s decision and Petitioner appealed CSC’s ruling.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court granting CSC’s motion to dismissed Petitioner’s action, pointing out that Petitioner “concededly” failed to timely serve CSC, which was a necessary party* because CSC was the agency that made the decision challenged by Petition. The court explained that “[t]his failure to serve a necessary party required the dismissal of the proceeding,” citing Solid Waste Services, Inc. v City of New York, 29 AD3d 318 [leave to appeal denied, 7 NY3d 710].

The Appellate Division also sustained the Supreme Court declining to grant Petitioner an extension of time to perfect his appeal “notwithstanding the apparent absence of prejudice,” because of the Article 78 petition's “lack of merit.” Further, said the court, “Were we to reach the merits, under the extremely narrow scope of review applicable as [Petitioner] administratively appealed to CSC, we would find that [Petitioner} fails to demonstrate that CSC acted illegally, unconstitutionally, or in excess of its jurisdiction.”

* A party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_01696.htm
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Suspension without pay pending employer’s disciplinary determination

Suspension without pay pending employer’s disciplinary determination

CSEA, Cortland Local v Cortland Hous. Auth., 2014 NY Slip Op 01652, Appellate Division, Third Department

In August the Cortland Housing Authority served disciplinary charges pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 against a member of the Civil Service Employees Association’s Local Housing Association Unit and suspended her without pay. As the disciplinary hearing had not been conducted within 30 days, the member was restored to the Authority’s payroll while she remained suspended from work.*

In mid-December the Local filed a demand to arbitrate the disciplinary matter involving the member. Upon receipt of the demand for arbitration the Authority removed the member from the payroll and initiated a proceeding to permanently stay arbitration.

Supreme Court granted the stay the following February but a disciplinary hearing in accordance with Civil Service Law §75 was not scheduled. In April the Local commenced this proceeding on behalf of its member seeking to restore her to the Authority’s payroll retroactive to December as no disciplinary hearing had yet been scheduled.

Supreme Court determined that the delay caused by the Local’s demand for arbitration, together with 30 days as a reasonable time thereafter within which to hold a hearing, should be charged to the member. Accordingly, the court directed that the member be restored to pay status retroactive to the following March 29^th with back salary less any unemployment benefits that she may have received since that date and thereafter continuing on the payroll until the disciplinary matter is resolved.

The Authority appealed, contending that the proceeding seeking reinstatement to the payroll was premature and should not be considered ripe for review until after the Civil Service Law §75 hearing is concluded. The Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed the lower court’s determination.

The court explained that where unreasonable delay occurs in holding a disciplinary hearing and that delay is attributable in part to the public employer, an employee whose suspension without pay has exceeded 30 days may seek reinstatement to the payroll pending a final disciplinary determination by the appointing authority.

The Appellate Division also noted that “a reduction from back pay of the amount of unemployment insurance benefits received during such time is statutorily authorized” and that Supreme Court properly reduced the award by that amount, “but there was no need to further reduce the award under the circumstances.”**

The court explained that an employer's best protection against a back pay award accruing is to hold the hearing within 30 days or, if beyond 30 days, create a clear record reflecting that it is not responsible for the delay.

However, it should be noted that courts have approved the placement of an individual on leaves without pay for periods equal in length to any adjournment in the §75 hearing process requested by the employee. [See, for example, DeMarco v City of Albany, 75 AD2d 674, Amkraut v Hults, 21 AD2d 260].

* See Civil Service Law §75 [3].

** N.B. Prior to its amendment in 1984, §75.3 provided that an employee acquitted of disciplinary charges be “restored to his position with full pay less the amount of compensation which he may have earned in any other employment and any unemployment insurance benefits." In §75.3 was amended by Chapter 710 of the Laws of 1984 and no longer authorized an adjustment reflecting compensation received because of “other employment”. [See, also, §76 and §77 of the Civil Service Law.]

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_01652.htm


 

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Failing to take lawful action against an individual in exchange for a benefit

Failing to take lawful action against an individual in exchange for a benefit

2014 NY Slip Op 01663, Appellate Division, First Department

A New York City police officer [Officer] was terminated from his position after being found guilty of failing to take lawful police action against an individual who was driving without a license in exchange for that individual agreeing to provide a benefit to Officer, -- “installing sheetrock at [Officer’s] home.”

The Appellate Division sustained the Commissioner’s termination of Officer, noting that substantial evidence supported the determination. Further, said the court, “The penalty of termination does not shock our sense of fairness,” citing Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32.

The Appellate Division also considered the fact that “one of the two main witnesses relied upon by the hearing officer in reaching his conclusion had recanted his testimony” some two years later.

The Commissioner, however, had denied Officer’s request for a new hearing based on “this new evidence.” The court said that the recantation raised issues that were addressed by the Commissioner, who considered the submissions by Officer and reviewed of all the evidence.*

The Appellate Division decided that “Under the circumstances, including the sufficiency of the other evidence, the witness's recantation did not warrant a further hearing.”

* The Appellate Division, citing Douglaston Civic Assn. v Galvin, 36 NY2d 1, noted that the Commissioner’s 2013 decision denying Officer's request for a new hearing based on such “new evidence” could not reviewed in the instant proceeding as a separately brought petition was required.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_01663.htm

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Sleeping on the job

Sleeping on the job

OATH Index No. 2196/13  

The New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) charged a hospital police officer with sleeping or assuming a sleeping position while on an eight-hour tour that began at midnight.

HHC relied on video evidence that showed police officer’s head bobbing up and down and sideways after she was assigned to the front desk. Further, the officer admitted that her head was down and she was fighting to not fall asleep.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Faye Lewis found that HHC proved the charge and recommended seven days’ suspension as the officer had no prior disciplinary record.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/11_Cases/13-2196.pdf

Refusing to accept work assignments constitutes insubordination and dereliction of duty

Refusing to accept work assignments constitutes insubordination and dereliction of duty

2014 NY Slip Op 01505, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court denied an Article 75 petition filed by a New York City tenured teacher [Teacher] challenging a disciplinary arbitrator’s decision to terminate Teacher and dismissed the proceeding.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that the record indicated that Teacher “without reasonable or legitimate justification, continually refused teaching assignments” during the school year.

Such conduct, said the court, constitutes "insubordination and the dereliction of duties." As the arbitrator’s finding was “supported by adequate evidence in the record,” the Appellate Division said there was no basis upon which to disturb the credibility determinations of the Hearing Officer.

As to the penalty imposed by the arbitrator, termination, the court said that it did not shock its sense of fairness in light of the extensive nature of Teacher's insubordinate conduct throughout the school year. Such insubordination, said the court required the school to hire a substitute teacher to cover Teacher’s class. Further, noted the Appellate Division, Teacher’s refusal to admit to any wrongdoing indicated a likelihood of a recurrence of such insubordinate conduct.

The Appellate Division also noted that although the arbitration award was not issued in a timely manner, Teacher was not prejudiced by the delay.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_01505.htm