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September 11, 2015

A supervisor’s personal daily log recording observations concerning a subordinate’s performance held not to be a record “used for personnel purposes”


A supervisor’s personal daily log recording observations concerning a subordinate’s performance held not to be a record “used for personnel purposes”
Steve Poole et al, v Orange County Fire Authority, Supreme Court of California, Ct. App., G047691, G047850

The California Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, §3250 et seq.) provides that a firefighter has the right to review and respond to any negative comment that is “entered in his or her personnel file, or any other file used for any personnel purposes by his or her employer.”

In the Poole case, the California Supreme Court considered whether §3255 gives a firefighter the right to review and respond to negative comments in a supervisor’s daily log, consisting of notes that memorialize the supervisor’s thoughts and observations concerning a firefighter which the supervisor uses as a memory aid in preparing performance plans and reviews.

The court held that in this instance because the log was not shared with or available to anyone other than the supervisor who wrote the log, it does not constitute a file “used for any personnel purposes by his or her employer” and thus §3255 did not apply.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://hr.cch.com/ELD/PooleOrangeCounty.pdf

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Employee's application for Workers’ Compensation Benefits based on "multiple chemical sensitivity" rejected


Employee's application for Workers’ Compensation Benefits based on "multiple chemical sensitivity" rejected
2015 NY Slip Op 06756, Appellate Division, Third Department

An employee [Claimant] sought workers' compensation benefits based upon an alleged disability resulting from her exposure to toxic mold at the workplace and her claim for hypersensitivity reaction to occupational presence of fungi was established.

Claimant was found to have a temporary total disability and an award of benefits was made. Subsequently the claim was amended to include "multiple chemical sensitivity" and awards for a marked disability were continued. In a decision filed March 31, 2010, a Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) classified Claimant with a permanent total disability as a result of the work-related injury.

The Workers' Compensation Board modified the March 31, 2010 decision by rescinding the finding of permanent total disability and referring the matter to an impartial specialist to examine Claimant and report to the Board with respect to Claimant's disability classification.

When the matter was restored to the calendar, Theodore Them, the impartial medical specialist who examined Claimant, testified that “multiple chemical sensitivity” was not a medically-recognized condition and, in any event, it was his opinion that Claimant was not suffering from any causally-related disability.

The Board credited the testimony of Them, found no further causally-related disability, thereby reversing the WCLJ's finding of total permanent disability. In this December 19, 2012 decision the Board "closed the case."

Following a number of procedural steps by Claimant, Claimant’s employer sought Board review of a second WCLJ's ruling,*which ruling included a direction to depose Claimant's doctor. The employer contended that the Board's had promulgated a decision on December 19, 2012 that resolved the issue of Claimant's degree of disability by finding that Claimant suffered no causally-related disability and properly closed the case. The Board agreed with the employer and Claimant appealed that determination.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision, observing that its review was limited to determining whether the Board abused its discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner in precluding further development of the record regarding the issue of Claimant's causally-related disability.

The court then ruled that the Board had “properly precluded further development of the record” since the issue of Claimant's causally-related disability was addressed and decided by the Board in its December 19, 2012 decision.

The Appellate Division then explained that “To the extent that Claimant now asserts, on the instant appeal, that the Board erred in crediting the opinion of the impartial specialist that Claimant had no causally-related disability, her remedy was to perfect her appeal from the Board's December 19, 2012 decision,” which had not been done.**

* In a ruling issued April 8, 2013 the WCLJ construed the Board's December 19, 2012 decision as rejecting his prior decision that Claimant suffered a causally-related total disability, but continued the case for further development of the record to determine Claimant's appropriate, lesser degree of disability.

** The Appellate Division noted that Claimant “filed a notice of appeal with this Court as to the December 19, 2012 Board decision, but failed to timely perfect that appeal.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_06756.htm
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September 10, 2015

Some guidelines for obtaining DNA samples from sworn officers “to protect the crime scene”


Some guidelines for obtaining DNA samples from sworn officers “to protect the crime scene”
Bill v Brewer, USCA, 9th Circuit, Docket #13-15844

In this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 by three Phoenix police officers, the United States Court of Appeals for the 9thCircuit affirmed a federal district court’s dismissal of their complaint. The three police officers had alleged that two other Phoenix police officers violated their rights under the Fourth* and Fourteenth** Amendments as the result of their obtaining DNA samples from the three officers for the purpose of excluding them as contributors of DNA at a crime scene.***

Noting that the samples had been obtained pursuant to an Arizona state court order, the Circuit Court ruled that a state court’s order authorizing the collection of DNA samples satisfied the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.

The Circuit Court also held that it was not unreasonable, under the circumstances, to ask sworn officers to provide saliva samples for the sole purpose of demonstrating that the DNA left at a crime scene was not the result of inadvertent contamination by on-duty public safety personnel.

The court explained that “The policeman’s employment relationship by its nature implies that in certain aspects of his [or her] affairs, he [or she] does not have the full privacy and liberty from police officials that he [or she] would otherwise enjoy.” It was hardly unreasonable here, said the court, to ask sworn officers to provide saliva samples for the sole purpose of demonstrating that DNA left at a crime scene was not the result of inadvertent contamination by on-duty public safety personnel.”

Although the Circuit Court said that it shared the police officers’ concerns “over potential misuse of DNA samples to reveal private information about contributors,” the court observed that “no such danger is realistically posed” in this situation as the memorandum concerning obtaining such DNA samples “expressly guarantees” that the DNA samples taken from the police officers would be used” for comparison to evidence in this report only” and would not be used for any research type testing, including race, ethnicity or health, provided to any outside organization for those purposes, entered into the employee database, or entered into CODIS, the Combined DNA Index System.**** 

The court noted that the police officers had not alleged “any plausible reason to believe that the Phoenix Police Department will not abide by these limitations,” and the federal district court did not err in declining to speculate about possible future abuse.

* The Fourth Amendment prohibits the unreasonable search of persons. The police officers alleged “obtaining, analyzing, and retaining” their DNA samples violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment.

** The Circuit Court did not specifically address the police officers’ Fourteenth Amendment arguments which presumably contended that the taking of the DNA samples violated their right to “due process.”

*** The samples had been obtained pursuant to an Arizona state court order.

**** CODIS is “a centrally-managed database linking DNA profiles culled from federal, state, and territorial DNA collection programs, as well as profiles drawn from crime-scene evidence, unidentified remains, and genetic samples voluntarily provided by relatives of missing persons.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

September 09, 2015

A showing of a direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting illness or injury entitles an eligible individual to General Municipal Law §207-c benefits


A showing of a direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting illness or injury entitles an eligible individual to General Municipal Law §207-c benefits
Lynn v Town of Clarkstown, 2015 NY Slip Op 06726, Appellate Division, Second Department
Lynn v Town of Clarkstown, 2015 NY Slip Op 06727, Appellate Division, Second Department

§207-c of the General Municipal Law provides for the payment of salary, medical and hospital expenses of police officers, deputy sheriffs, correction officers and others serving in titles listed in subdivision 1 of §207-c who suffer injuries or illness incurred in, or resulting from, the performance of their duties.

The Chief of Police of the Town of Clarkstown Police Department denied Clarkstown Police Officer Robert Lynn’s applications for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c [1] for injuries he reported he suffered when he fell while walking to his patrol vehicle while on duty and [2] for injuries he reported he suffered when he tripped and fell responding to an injured animal call while on patrol duty. The Chief of Police denied the applications on the ground that Lynn was not injured in the performance of his duties.

Lynninitiated two CPLR Article 78 proceedings to review the Chief’s determinations. The Supreme Court granted both petitions thereby annulling the Chief’s determinations and the Town appealed.

The Appellate Division said that a determination denying an application for General Municipal Law §207-c benefits may be annulled only if it was arbitrary and capricious, and "An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts," citing Peckham V Calogero, 12 NY3d 424.

The court explained that "a covered municipal employee need only prove a direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting illness or injury" in order to be entitled to §207-c benefits. Further, said the Appellate Division, the word "duties" in General Municipal Law § 207-c "encompasses the full range of a covered employee's job duties," citing Theroux v Reilly, 1 NY3d at 232.

The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court properly found that [Lynn] had been injured in the performance of his duties in both instances and that the denial of his applications for §207-c benefits was arbitrary and capricious.

The decisions are posted on the Internet at:

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September 08, 2015

Police officer suspended without pay pending a determination of criminal charges filed against him and any administrative disciplinary action taken against him


Police officer suspended without pay pending a determination of criminal charges filed against him and any administrative disciplinary action taken against him
2015 NY Slip Op 06729, Appellate Division, Second Department

In February 2013 a City of Mount Vernon police officer [Officer] was suspended without pay by the Commissioner of the City of Mount Vernon Police Department [Commissioner] pending a determination of the criminal charges and any administrative disciplinary action taken against him as the result of Officer’s arrest and being charged with falsifying business records in the first degree. It was alleged that Officer had submitted false overtime slips indicating that he had worked overtime during certain periods when he had not, in fact, worked overtime.

Before any administrative disciplinary charges were filed against Officer he commenced a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging that the Mount Vernon City Charter did not authorize the Commissioner to impose punishment on a police officer unless the police officer had been found guilty after a disciplinary hearing.Officer asked Supreme Court for an order reinstating to his position as a police officer with back pay. 

Supreme Court, concluding that the Commissioner exceeded his authority under the City Charter by suspending Officer indefinitely without pay, granted Officer’s petition to the extent of limiting the period of suspension without pay to 30 days, restoring Officer’s salary pending a final determination of any administrative disciplinary charges, and awarding Officer back pay from March 15, 2013.

Citing Coscette v Town of Wallkill, 281 AD2d 479, the Appellate Division revered the Supreme Court’s ruling. The court explained that the Mount Vernon City Charter was enacted prior to Civil Service Law §§75 and 76 and thus the provisions of the City Charter governing the discipline of police officers are controlling with respect to matters concerning police discipline.

The Mount Vernon City Charter §116, said the court, provides that the Commissioner "is authorized and empowered to make, adopt, promulgate and enforce reasonable rules, orders and regulations for the government, discipline, administration and disposition of the officers and members of the Police Department, and for the hearing, examination, investigation, trial and determination of charges made or prepared against any officer or member of said Department" for certain specific offenses"

Pursuant to the delegation of rule-making authority in City Charter §116, the Commissioner had, in fact, promulgated a disciplinary procedure, which includes a regulation providing that "[m]embers of the [Police] Department may be suspended from duty, whenever in the opinion of the Commissioner . . . such action is appropriate." The Commissioner relied on this regulation in suspending Officer without pay pending a determination of the criminal charges and any future disciplinary charges.

The Appellate Division held that given the broad delegation of authority in City Charter §116, the disciplinary procedure regulation allowing the Commissioner to suspend members of the Mount Vernon Police Department has a rational basis and was not unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to the statute under which it was promulgated.

Thus, said the court, the Commissioner did not exceed his authority under the City Charter in relying on this regulation to suspend Officer without pay pending a determination of the criminal charges and any future administrative disciplinary action and, accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court must be reversed.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

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New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
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