Educators are ineligible for unemployment insurance between academic terms only if given timely assurance of reemployment for the next academic term

Educators are ineligible for unemployment insurance between academic terms only if given timely assurance of reemployment for the next academic term

Upham (Dutchess Community Coll.--Commissioner of Labor), 2015 NY Slip Op 07898, Appellate Division, Third Department

Labor Law §590(10) prohibits a professional employed by an educational institution from receiving unemployment insurance benefits during the period between two successive academic terms if the educational institution has given the professional a reasonable assurance of continued employment.

In cases where educational institutions have failed to set forth the terms or conditions of continued employment or have made such employment contingent upon certain conditions, courts have found that a reasonable assurance of reemployment was lacking and thus the individual was eligible for unemployment insurance benefits.

Paul Upham served as an adjunct instructor at a community college and, during the fall 2013 semester, he taught three courses in history and government. Prior to the end of that semester, the chair of his department asked Upham if he wanted to teach potentially four courses during the spring 2014 semester and he expressed an interest in doing so.

After the semester ended, the college sent Upham a letter "anticipat[ing] that [he would] be invited to return to teach," during the spring 2014 semester "subject to enrollment and/or budget constraints."

Upham had applied for unemployment insurance benefits before receiving this letter.  Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Upham was, in fact, eligible to receive benefits because the college had not given him a reasonable assurance of continued employment within the meaning of Labor Law §590(10).

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board sustained the administrative law judge’s decision and the college appealed the Board’s determination.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s ruling, explaining that while Labor Law §590(10) makes a professional employed by an educational institution ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits during the period between two successive academic terms, such ineligibility is triggered by the claimant having been given a reasonable assurance of continued employment by the institution.

A "reasonable assurance," in turn, is a representation by the educational institution "that substantially the same economic terms and conditions will continue to apply to the extent that the claimant will receive at least 90% of the earnings received during the first academic period." Whether the claimant has been given a “reasonable assurance” is a factual question for the Board to resolve and its determination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.

While the department chair mentioned that Upham could teach potentially four courses during the spring 2014 semester, which exceeded the number that he taught during the fall 2013 semester, this was never confirmed during any subsequent conversations nor in the letter sent to Upham.

Significantly, the Appellate Division noted that the letter did not specify the details of the spring 2014 semester teaching assignment and conditioned Upham’s further employment upon "enrollment and/or budget constraints."

Accordingly, said the court substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that Upham was entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_07898.htm

A governmental entity’s liability for alleged negligence is limited

A governmental entity’s liability for alleged negligence is limited
Guerrieri v New York City Dept./Bd. of Educ., 2015 NY Slip Op 07816, Appellate Division, Second Department

As a general rule, a governmental entity’s liability for alleged negligence may arise where the entity has a special duty or a special relationship to the plaintiff. Such a special duty can arise in three situations: (1) the plaintiff belonged to a class for whose benefit a statute was enacted; (2) the government entity voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally; or (3) the municipality took positive control of a known and dangerous safety condition. Further, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the government defendant owed a special duty of care to the injured party because such a duty is an essential element of the negligence claim itself and in situations where the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, liability may not be imputed to the municipality that acted in a governmental capacity.

Thomas Guerrieri was employed as a school bus driver by an independent contractor that contracted with the New York City Department/Board of Education [BOE] to provide student transportation services.

Guerrieri was allegedly assaulted by one of the students he was transporting and sued BOE, among others, for damages for personal injury. Supreme Court granted BOE’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and Guerrieri appealed.

Citing Garrett v Holiday Inns, 58 NY2d 253, the Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling, explaining that "Liability for a claim that a municipality negligently exercised a governmental function turns upon the existence of a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public." In contrast to a school district having a special duty to its students to adequately supervise them to prevent foreseeable injuries to fellow students, the court said that such a duty does not extend to adults.

Holding that BOE “demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law” by establishing that it did not owe Guerrieri a special duty and Guerrieri’s failing to raise a triable issue of fact, the Appellate Division said that Supreme Court properly granted BOE’s motion for summary judgment “dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.”

Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d 872, provides another illustration of the proof of a “special duty” that a plaintiff is required to demonstrate.

Zelinda Dinardo, a special education teacher at a New York City public school, was injured when she tried to restrain one student from attacking another. The student had been orally and physically aggressive for several months and Dinardo had repeatedly expressed concerns to her supervisors about her safety in the classroom. The school's supervisor of special education and the principal had both told Dinardo that "things were being worked on, things were happening" and urged Dinardo to "hang in there because something was being done" to have the student removed.

Following her injury, Dinardo commenced an action alleging, among other things, that by the assurances given to her by her supervisor and her principal, the Board of Education of the City of New York had assumed an affirmative duty to take action with respect to the removal of the student and that she justifiably relied upon those assurances. When the student was not removed in a timely fashion, Dinardo alleged, the altercation which led to her injury resulted.

In the words of the Dinardo court, “Affording Dinardo every inference that may properly be drawn from the evidence presented and considering the evidence in a light most favorable to her (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]), we conclude that there is no rational process by which the jury could have reached a finding that [Dinardo] justifiably relied on assurances by the Board of Education. The vaguely worded statements by Dinardo's supervisor and principal that 'something' was being done to have the student removed, without any indication of when, or if, such relief would come, do not, as a matter of law, constitute an action that would lull a plaintiff into a false sense of security or otherwise generate justifiable reliance. Indeed, [Dinardo] was aware that the administrative process for determining whether a student should transfer to a different program or school could take up to 60 days and was still ongoing when the incident occurred. There was therefore no "special relationship" between the Board of Education and [Dinardo] (see Cuffy, 69 NY2d at 259), upon which a cause of action for negligence could be based, and the Board of Education is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_07816.htm

Selected Reports issued by the Office of the State Comptroller during the week ending October 31, 2015

Selected Reports issued by the Office of the State Comptroller during the week ending October 31, 2015

Click on text highlighted in color to access the full report

Former Town Clerk falsified her own tax payments

Former DePeyster Town Clerk Michelle Sheppard was sentenced to five years probation and paid a total of $4,303 in restitution for falsifying her own tax payments for at least three years until her crimes were exposed in an audit and investigation by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli’s office.

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/towns/2015/depeyster.htm?utm_source=weeklynews20151101&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=102615release

New York receives 91 cents for each dollar sent to Washington, D.C.

For every dollar New York sends to Washington D.C., it receives about 91 cents back in federal spending — compared to a national average of nearly $1.22, according to a report released by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

http://osc.state.ny.us/reports/budget/2015/fed_budget_fy2013.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20151101&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=102715release

Individuals, government agencies, businesses and charitable organizations urged to check for unclaimed money held by State Comptroller

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli encourages individuals and other entities to search for unclaimed funds, also known as lost and forgotten money, now being held by the State Comptroller in the State’s Abandoned Property Fund pursuant to the Abandoned Property Law.The Abandoned Property Fund now holds over 14 Billion Dollars.

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/ouf/

Audits of State Agencies released

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following audits have been issued: the

Department of Health (Improper Payments to a Dentist - Follow-up); Workers’ Compensation Board; Tuition Assistance Program; and the

Department of Health (Medicaid Program: Appropriateness of Medicaid Eligibility Determined by the New York State of Health System).

Court annuls employee's unsatisfactory performance rating after finding that the rating lacked a rational basis and was arbitrary and capricious

Court annuls employee's unsatisfactory performance rating after finding that the rating lacked a rational basis and was arbitrary and capricious

Mendez v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2015 NY Slip Op 07599, Appellate Division, First Department

A tenured common branches teacher [Teacher] employed by the New York City Department of Education [DOE] who had received satisfactory ratings since February 2010, forfeited her tenure as a common branches teacher in order to obtain a position as a special education teacher. Appointed as a probationary special education teacher at a high school subject to the satisfactory completion of a two-year probationary period ending in September 2012, Teacher was given a satisfactory rating on her Annual Professional Performance Review for the 2010-2011 school year.

During the summer of 2011, Teacher was an “unsatisfactory rating” [U-rating] and was suspended without pay for four days based on an incident where she was found to have engaged in a loud argument with another teacher in front of students. Teacher appealed and the Chancellor's Committee held a hearing. During the course of the hearing the Superintendent Representative conceded that the four-day suspension was "inappropriate" under the terms of the relevant collective bargaining agreement and it was reversed because of the error.

After receiving a second U-rating,* Teacher was terminated from the position.

A majority of the Appellate Division, Judge Sweeny dissented in part, addressing Teacher’s U-rating for the summer of 2011, held that the U-rating “lacked a rational basis and was arbitrary and capricious.” The court said that accepting the testimony that Teacher had engaged in a loud argument with another teacher about sharing a room, there is no rational basis to find Teacher's conduct was unprofessional, insubordinate or unbecoming.

The majority, noting that the subject of the argument concerned whether Teacher's students with disabilities should share space with students that composed the art cluster or obtain a larger classroom, said that there was no evidence presented that the content of conversation itself was unprofessional. In the words of the court, “The simple conduct of an argument without more elaboration on how the subject and language of the conversation was unprofessional is insufficient to provide a rational basis for professional misconduct.”

Further, said the court, Teacher’s failure to admit that the conversation rose to the level of an argument is not evidence of insubordination.”

Turning to DOE’s termination of Teacher’s employment, the Appellate Division, citing Brown v City of New York, 280 AD2d 368, observed that it is well established that a "probationary employee may be discharged for any or no reason at all in the absence of a showing that [the] dismissal was in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible purpose or in violation of law."

Here, however, the court determined that Teacher had established a deficiency in the review process that resulted in Teacher’s termination that was "not merely technical, but undermined the integrity and fairness of the process" considering the fact that the record demonstrated  that Teacher had received satisfactory ratings since February 2010, “which established her professional conduct but for the alleged incident of a loud argument.”

The Appellate Division annulled Teacher's termination and the summer 2011 U-rating and then remanded the  matter to DOE for completion of its final review of the second U-rating for the 2011-2012 school year.

* Teacher’s challenge to the second U-rating for the 2011-2012 school year was premature as she had not exhausted her administrative remedies and a determination of her appeal of that rating had not yet been made at the time the petition was brought.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_07599.htm

An educator's claim of tenure by estoppel may be defeated if the educator agrees to an extension of his or her probationary period

An educator's claim of tenure by estoppel may be defeated if the educator agrees to an extension of his or her probationary period

Slutsky-Nava v Yonkers City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2015 NY Slip Op 07670, Appellate Division, Second Department

A teacher may attain tenure by estoppel* when a school board accepts the continued services of a teacher but fails to take the action required by law to either grant or deny tenure prior to the expiration of the teacher's probationary term.

In this CPLR Article 78 action a teacher [Teacher] asked to court to review a determination of the Yonkers City School District Board of Education [Yonkers] terminating Teacher’s employment as an elementary school teacher. Supreme Court granted Yonkers’ motion to dismiss Teacher’s petition and Teacher appealed.

According to the decision, Teacher was appointed by Yonkers as an elementary school teacher subject to Teacher’s satisfactorily completing a three-year probationary period which was to run through September 2, 2011. Teacher, however, was laid off from her position, effective June 31, 2011. In August 2012, she was again offered a position as an elementary school teacher, starting September 1, 2012.**

Upon her reemployment Teacher was told that, as a result of having been laid off, her probationary period was being extended to November 4, 2012. She signed the offer of employment, which clearly stated that her "expected date of tenure [would] be on November 4, 2012." The petitioner's employment was terminated on October 17, 2012, after she received an unsatisfactory rating.

The Appellate Division said that Teacher’s “probationary period was properly extended to November 4, 2012 since she signed an offer of employment which specified that she would not become eligible for tenure until November 4, 2012.” As Yonkers terminated the Teacher’s employment prior to the expiration of her probationary period and she did not perform the duties of a teacher after November 4, 2012, Supreme Court properly determined that, even accepting the allegations in the Teacher’s petition as true, she could not have acquired tenure by estoppel.

The court also rejected Teacher’s claim that Education Law §2573(15),***which, among other things, describes certain factors to be considered in calculating service for the purposes of determining a teacher's probationary period, holding that §2573(15) did not apply to the facts of this case.

The Appellate Division then held that “[s]ince the allegations of the petition were insufficient to state a cause of action to review [Yonkers’] determination based on the theory of tenure by estoppel, the Supreme Court properly granted [its] motion to dismiss the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding.” 

* Also sometimes referred to as tenure by acquisition, tenure by default or tenure by inaction.

** Presumably [1] Yonkers abolished a position in the elementary tenure area, [2] Teacher was the least senior employee in that tenure area and her name was placed on a preferred list and [3] Teacher was subsequently appointed from the preferred list.

*** §2573(15), which applies to city school districts of cities with one hundred twenty-five thousand inhabitants or more, provides as follows: “15. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section [2573] no period in any school year for which there is no required service and/or for which no compensation is provided shall in any event constitute a break or suspension of probationary period or continuity of tenure rights of any of the persons hereinabove described.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_07670.htm

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Remanding a disciplinary penalty “to a new hearing officer” to determine a “lesser penalty”

Remanding a disciplinary penalty “to a new hearing officer” to determine a “lesser penalty”

Fox v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2015 NY Slip Op 07792, Appellate Division, First Department

The New York City Department of Education [DOE] appealed a decision by Supreme Court that [1] vacated the penalty of termination of a guidance counselor's employment imposed by DOE after a disciplinary hearing and [2] remanded the matter to DOE for a determination of a "lesser penalty” by a new hearing officer.  

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court’s ruling “on the law” and reinstated the penalty imposed on the educator by DOE, dismissal from the position.

The Appellate Division explained that the guidance counselor had engaged in a course of conduct over two years demonstrating "insubordination, professional unfitness, inability to handle a crisis situation, disclosure of confidential information, and inadequate record keeping."

Under the circumstances, said the court, "The termination of [the guidance counselor's] employment is not so disproportionate to this pattern of misconduct as to shock our sense of fairness," citing Lackow v Department of Education, 51 AD3d 563.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_07792.htm

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Grievances reasonably related to the general subject matter of the CBA typically involve matters of contract interpretation and application to be determined by an arbitrator

Grievances reasonably related to the general subject matter of a CBA typically involve matters of contract interpretation and application to be determined by an arbitrator

Village of Garden City v Local 1588, Professional Firefighters Assn., 2015 NY Slip Op 07672, Appellate Division, Second Department

Local 1588, Professional Firefighters Association [Association] filed a grievance after the Village of Garden City [Village] laid off of members of the bargaining unit members and assign bargaining unit work to nonbargaining unit volunteers.  In response to the Association’s demand to submit the grievance to arbitration, the Village sought a court order to permanently stay arbitration on the ground that it retained absolute management rights to lay off employees and assign work under the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA]. The Association cross-moved compel arbitration, arguing that the CBA permitted arbitration of this dispute.

The Supreme Court denied the Village’s motion, finding that the parties had agreed in the CBA to arbitrate these issues, and that it was not against public policy to do so and granted the Association’s motion to compel arbitration. The Village appealed.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court’s ruling, explaining that the determination of whether a dispute between a public sector employer and employee is arbitrable is subject to a “two-prong test."

First the court must determine whether there is any statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance. If there is no such prohibition, the court must then examine the CBA and determined if the parties did, in fact, agree to arbitrate the particular dispute.

Although the Village argued that the arbitration of layoffs of unit member firefighters is prohibited by public policy, the Appellate Division, citing NYC Transit Authority v Transportation Workers Union of America, 88 AD3d 887, said a dispute is not arbitrable if a court can conclude “without engaging in any extended factfinding or legal analysis” that a law "prohibit[s], in an absolute sense, [the] particular matters [to be] decided by arbitration.” Here, said the court, the Village failed to point to any law or public policy that would prohibit arbitration of the grievance.

As to the Association's claim that the Village had improperly assigned bargaining unit work to nonunion volunteers, the court observed that “the very issue as to arbitrability has already been decided” by it. The Appellate Division cited Professional Firefighters Association Local 1588 v Village of Garden City, 119 AD2d 803, explaining that by confirming an arbitration award which directed the Village “to cease and desist from assigning bargaining unit work to volunteers” it had implicitly acknowledged the arbitrability of that specific issue.

Finding that the grievances were reasonably related to the general subject matter of the CBA and, therefore, the Village’s management rights granted under Article XVII of the CBA and "the question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA [are] a matter of contract interpretation and application reserved for the arbitrator."

Accordingly, said the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition to permanently stay arbitration and granted the Association's motion to compel arbitration.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_07672.htm