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February 02, 2016

Can Government Hiring Get Out of the Stone Age?


Can Government Hiring Get Out of the Stone Age?
Source: GOVERNING the States and Localities, February 2016

In the February 2016 issue of GOVERNING the States and Localities Katherine Barrett and Richard Green ask “Can Government Hiring Get Out of the Stone Age?”

Noting that “Urgency or not, many governments are locked in antiquated systems and outdated processes that stand in the way of bringing in the best and brightest. At a time when state budgets are loosening their strings and dormant programs are being refreshed, human resources departments are faced with the need to focus on improving their capacity to hire and to retain employees. Many governments are finding that if they want to hire the next generation of public employees, they’ll need to shift from the old ways of doing business.”

So what are states and localities to do? ask the authors. They then proposed and explain suggested changes in the following 10 key areas:

Enhancing benefits;
Loosening civil service requirements;
Reexamining minimum qualifications;
Changing your own expectations;
Recruiting online (and not just on your website);
Beefing up your technology;
Getting serious about interns;
Focusing on military vets; and
Changing the conversation.

The article is posted on the Internet at:

February 01, 2016

Distinguishing between employees and independent contractors


Distinguishing between employees and independent contractors
Matter of Strauss (Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 00561, Appellate Division, Third Department

RMC Research Corporation, an educational research firm, had a contract with the New York City Department of Education to provide teaching consultants, known as "peer observers," for the purpose of evaluating teachers who had received unsatisfactory ratings from school administrators. RMC had retained former teachers, including Michael D. Strauss, to act as peer observers at various schools within the Department's jurisdiction. The evaluations of the peer observers were used to assist school administrators in determining whether a disciplinary proceeding should be brought to remove the teacher under review from his or her position.

The issue in this action was an Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board’s decision that Strauss and other similarly situated peer observers, were employees of RMC for the purposes of its liability for unemployment insurance contributions based on remuneration RMC paid to Strauss and others engaged as peer observers.

Strauss had entered into a "consultant agreement" with RMC that required him to make 10 site visits to the school where the  teacher rated "unsatisfactory" was assigned, six for observation, three for consultation and one for final assessment. In addition, he was required to prepare specific documents including observation reports, an individualized professional development plan and a final assessment letter in connection with his assignment, and to complete his assignment within 10 weeks.

Noting that the existence of an employment relationship is a factual issue for the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to resolve, and its determination in this regard is beyond judicial review if it is supported by substantial evidence,  the court explained that although no single factor is determinative, “where, as here, the services of teaching professionals are involved, ‘the pertinent inquiry’ is whether the purported employer retains control of important aspects of the services performed."

Here, said the court, RMC's hiring process required Strauss to submit an application, undergo an interview and provide references. He subsequently signed a “consultant agreement” and received six hours of training provided by RMC.

Further, Strauss was paid an hourly rate set by RMC, was expected to work three to four hours per week for a total of 36 weeks during the 10-week assignment and submitted a voucher provided by RMC on the 15th of each month to receive payment for hours worked. Significantly, the Appellate Division noted that Strauss was paid for services rendered regardless of whether RMC received payment from the Education Department.

Other items of significance, said the court, included RMC's name appearing at the top of the documents that peer observers were required to prepare; RMC determined the format of such documents; during the course of his or her assignment peer observers interacted with RMC's project director who reviewed their observation reports for comprehensiveness, clarity, spelling and grammar; any complaints about a peer observer’s performance were directed to RMC; and RMC arranged for a replacement if an assignment could not be completed.

In the words of the Appellate Division, “The foregoing illustrates that there is substantial evidence that RMC retained overall control over important aspects of [Strauss’] work to establish the existence of an employment relationship,” and found no reason to disturb the Board’s decision.

As to distinguishing between an employee and an independent contractor, 20 factors being used by the IRS for this purpose. They are:

1. Instructions. An employee must comply with instructions about when, where, and how to work. Even if no instructions are given, the control factor is present if the employer has the right to control how the work results are achieved.

2. Training. An employee may be trained to perform services in a particular manner. Independent contractors ordinarily use their own methods and receive no training from the purchasers of their services.

3. Integration. An employee's services are usually integrated into the business operations because the services are important to the success or continuation of the business. This shows that the employee is subject to direction and control.

4. Services rendered personally. An employee renders services personally. This shows that the employer is interested in the methods as well as the results.

5. Hiring assistants. An employee works for an employer who hires, supervises, and pays workers. An independent contractor can hire, supervise, and pay assistants under a contract that requires him or her to provide materials and labor and to be responsible only for the result.

6. Continuing relationship. An employee generally has a continuing relationship with an employer. A continuing relationship may exist even if work is performed at recurring although irregular intervals.

7. Set hours of work. An employee usually has set hours of work established by an employer. An independent contractor generally can set his or her own work hours.

8. Full-time required. An employee may be required to work or be available full-time. This indicates control by the employer. An independent contractor can work when and for whom he or she chooses.

9. Work done on premises. An employee usually works on the premises of an employer, or works on a route or at a location designated by an employer.

10. Order or sequence set. An employee may be required to perform services in the order or sequence set by an employer. This shows that the employee is subject to direction and control.

11. Reports. An employee may be required to submit reports to an employer. This shows that the employer maintains a degree of control.

12. Payments. An employee is generally paid by the hour, week, or month. An independent contractor is usually paid by the job or on straight commission.

13. Expenses. An employee's business and travel expenses are generally paid by an employer. This shows that the employee is subject to regulation and control.

14. Tools and materials. An employee is normally furnished significant tools, materials, and other equipment by an employer.

15. Investment. An independent contractor has a significant investment in the facilities he or she uses in performing services for someone else.

16. Profit or loss. An independent contractor can make a profit or suffer a loss.

17. Works for more than one person or firm. An independent contractor is generally free to provide his or her services to two or more unrelated persons or firms at the same time.

18. Offers services to general public. An independent contractor makes his or her services available to the general public.

19. Right to fire. An employee can be fired by an employer. An independent contractor cannot be fire so long as he or she produces a result that meets the specifications of the contract.

20. Right to quit. An employee can quit his or her job at any time without incurring liability. An independent contractor usually agrees to complete a specific job and is responsible for its satisfactory completion, or is legally obligated to make good for failure to complete it.

Additional information concerning the status of an individual as an employee or as an independent contractor is posted on the Internet at: 

The Strauss decision is posted on the Internet at:

January 30, 2016

Selected Reports issued by the Office of the State Comptroller during the week ending January 30, 2016


Selected Reports issued by the Office of the State Comptroller during the week ending January 30, 2016
Click on text highlighted in color to access the full report

Former Security Director of the Monroe County Water Authority Pleads Guilty to Felony Charge in Elaborate Bid-Rigging Case
Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman announced the guilty plea of Robert Wiesner, the former Security Director for the Monroe County Water Authority, for working with others to rig the bidding process for a multi-million dollar public works contract in Monroe County. Wiesner entered a guilty plea before The Honorable Dennis M. Kehoe in Monroe County Court to the class “E” felony charge of Combination in Restraint of Trade and Competition in violation of General Business Law §§ 340 and 341, also known as a violation of New York State’s Donnelly Act.


82
School Districts in Fiscal Stress
Eighty-two school districts have been designated as fiscally stressed under New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli’s Fiscal Stress Monitoring System. The scoresare based on the evaluation of 672 school districts with fiscal years ending on June 30, 2015.


Municipal audits released

Clifton Park Water Authority – Water charges

Cortland County Industrial Development Agency – Project management

Middle Country Public Library – Treasurer

Otsego CountyCost of temporary housing


School Audits
 
Chazy Union Free School District – Payroll

Dobbs Ferry Union Free School District – Reserve funds

Haldane Central School District – Budget transfers and information technology

Randolph Academy Union Free School District – Financial management

Saranac Central School District – Payroll

South Seneca Central School District– Financial management

Governor Cuomo announced three appointments to the New York State Department of Financial Services


Governor Cuomo announced three appointments to the New York State Department of Financial Services
Source: Office of the Governor

On January 29, 2016 Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced three appointments to the New York State Department of Financial Services [DFS]. Earlier Governor Cuomo nominated Maria Vullo, Esq. to serve as the Superintendent of DFS.

DFS is charged with protecting consumers and markets in
New York State from fraud and financial crises, as well as reforming the regulation of financial services to keep pace with dynamic changes within the industry. It was created in 2011 by the merger of the State’s Banking and Insurance Departments.

Matthew L. Levine, Esq. has been appointed Executive Deputy Superintendent for Enforcement. In this role he will guide the Department's enforcement actions to ensure that regulated parties are held accountable for unlawful business practices, coordinating with other senior staff and law enforcement agencies under the direction of the Superintendent.

Mr. Levine is a former federal prosecutor and trial lawyer with significant experience in matters involving the financial markets and health care fraud. He has also represented clients in private practice, most recently as the founding principal of his own law firm in
New York City. For nearly a decade, he served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, first in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and later in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York. There, he served as Acting Chief of the Business & Securities Fraud Section and supervised a group of federal prosecutors conducting major securities fraud and other white-collar prosecutions. Before becoming a federal prosecutor, he worked in private practice as a Litigation Associate at the New York City office of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, where he represented corporate and individual clients in civil and criminal matters.

Mr. Levine clerked for the United States District Judge Barefoot Sanders in
Dallas, Texas. He earned his J.D. at Columbia School of Law and a B.A. in Government at Lehigh University.

Richard A. Loconte, Esq. has been appointed Executive Deputy Superintendent for Communications and Strategy at DFS.
Mr. Loconte brings with him more than 20 years of experience in communications and public policy. Since 2008, he was the Deputy Head of Government Affairs & Associate General Counsel at AIG, Inc. There, he represented AIG before regulatory agencies and other government bodies on legislative and regulatory issues related to the insurance industry and the broader financial services sector, and was instrumental in reestablishing the company's federal government affairs office in Washington, DC.

From 2005 - 2008, he was the Deputy Executive Director for the Association for a Better New York (ABNY), where he oversaw the organization’s communications, administrative functions, and legal matters. Prior to his time at ABNY, he was the Director of Public Affairs at the Grand Central Partnership. Mr. Loconte has also held roles at the New York City Department of Finance and the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs. He earned his J.D. from
Brooklyn Law School and a B.A. in Political Science from Fordham University.

Jennifer L. Smith, Esq. has been appointed Special Assistant to the Superintendent at DFS. Most recently, Ms. Smith was an attorney at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, where she worked with former Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye on various commercial and appellate matters. While at Skadden, she also served as Assistant Counsel to the Commission on Judicial Nomination and has handled multiple pro bono matters, including representation of domestic violence victims and representation of a client seeking executive clemency through the Department of Justice’s 2014 Clemency Project.

Prior to her time at Skadden, she was a Trial Attorney for Bolan Jahnsen Dacey, and Greenberg Traurig, where she litigated civil matters. She also developed a program with Sanctuary for Families to provide legal services to homeless and battered women and their children at the New York City Department of Homeless Services Prevention Assistance & Temporary Housing (PATH).

Ms. Smith earned her J.D. at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, an M.A. in Organization and Leadership from
Columbia University, Teachers College, and a B.A. in English and Anthropology & Sociology from Lafayette College. She received the Empire State Counsel Award from the New York State Bar Association in 2013 and 2014.

January 29, 2016

Additional member service credit in a public retirement system is not available to a retired public employee upon reemployment unless he or she discontinues receiving his or her retirement allowance


Additional member service credit in a public retirement system is not available to a retired public employee upon reemployment unless he or she discontinues receiving his or her retirement allowance
Regan v DiNapoli, 2016 NY Slip Op 00415, Appellate Division, Third Department

C. Murray Regan served as a teacher and, in that capacity, he was a member of the New York State Teachers' Retirement System [TRS] for over 30 years when, in January 1998, he simultaneously began to serve as an elected town supervisor. In this latter capacity, he was also a member of the New York Stateand Local Retirement System [ERS].

Regan was subsequently advised by a representative of ERS that he could retire from teaching and continue to accrue service credit in the ERS "[a]s long as [he] continue[d] as an elected official." Regan then retired from teaching in July 1998 and began collecting his retirement allowance from the TRS while continuing to receive his salary as a town supervisor.*

Regan was unsuccessful in his bid for reelection as town supervisor in 2001 and applied for ERS retirement benefits. ERS, however, denied his application, finding that he had not yet accrued the required minimum amount of service credit. In 2004, Regan regained elective office, this time as a village justice and served in that position for eight years during which period he received both his TRS retirement allowance and a village justice's salary. During this time period the ERS sent him annual updates indicating, among other things, that he was also accruing service credit.

Regan decided not to seek reelection to his position as a village justice for the term starting in 2012 and again applied to ERS for retirement benefits. Again, ERS rejected his application, this time explaining that he was ineligible for retirement benefits and its prior advice and updates had been erroneous because, upon acceptance of his position as an elected village justice in 2004, he had not suspended receipt of his TRS pension benefits. Accordingly, said ERS, he did not resume accruing service credit in ERS.**

After exhausting his administrative remedies in an unsuccessful attempt to overturn the denial of his application for additional ERS service credit, Regan nitiated and Article 78 proceeding only to have Supreme Court deny his request for additional service credit and dismiss his petition. Regan appealed the Supreme Court’s ruling to the Appellate Division.

Regan contended that Civil Service Law §150 permits him to receive both his TRS retirement allowance and his salary as an elected official while simultaneously accruing service credit toward an ERS retirement allowance. However, the Appellate Division said it could not agree based upon its review of the language of the statute and the legislative intent behind it.

The court explained that “As relevant here, Civil Service Law §150 generally prohibits receipt of both a public pension and a salary as a public official or employee, but also provides an exception for public pensioners who become elected officials — such as [Regan].”

Although the Appellate Division said that it agreed that this exception allowed Regan to receive a salary as an elected official without suspending his TRS retirement allowance, it noted that Civil Service Law §150 “makes no express mention of service credit” and, instead, refers only to pension benefits that have already been "awarded or allotted." 

Further, noted the court, the legislative history of the measure indicates that the original purpose behind the exception for public pensioners who subsequently become elected officials was to encourage continued civic engagement by "allow[ing] a retired public employee to seek elected public office and continue to receive his/her public pension benefits." Thus, said the court, in its view, “the statute allows public pensioners to continue receiving the benefits they have already earned while also serving in paid elective office, but it does not provide for the accrual of additional credit for new or greater pension benefits.”

Regan also advanced the argument that ERS should be “equitably estopped from denying him additional service credit because his career decisions were based, in part, upon incomplete advice and erroneous information provided by ERS employees regarding his ability to earn such credit.”

The Appellate Division rejected Regan theory of equitable estoppel, explaining that the doctrine of equitable estoppel generally cannot be invoked against a state agency unless “there has been a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or similar affirmative misconduct, along with reliance thereon.”

Noting that ERS “readily conceded that mistakes were made regarding the information provided to [Regan],” the court said it found no evidence in the record that any of those mistakes rise above the level of "erroneous advice [given] by a government employee[, which] does not constitute the type of unusual circumstance contemplated by the exception" to the doctrine.

* §150 of the Civil Service Law mandates the suspension of the “pension and annuity”  being paid to a retiree less than 70 years of age by a public retirement of this State except as otherwise permitted by §§101, 211, and 212 of the Retirement and Social Security Law, and by §503 of the Education Law, upon the employment of the retiree in “any office, position or employment in the civil service of the state or of any municipal corporation or political subdivision of the state to which any salary or emolument is attached, except jury duty or the office of inspector of election, poll clerk or ballot clerk under the election law, or the office of notary public or commissioner of deeds, or an elective public office.”

** The court noted that Retirement and Social Security Law §40(c)(9), provides that a retired public employee entitled to public pension benefits who subsequently accepts a new public service position is considered to be an active member of the retirement system only if the pension benefits to which he or she is entitled are suspended during his or her active membership.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

January 28, 2016

Police confrontations with mentally impaired citizens and inmates


Police confrontations with mentally impaired citizens and inmates
An AELE publication [© 2016 by Ashley Torres and AELE; 60 pages]

Americans for Effective Law Enforcement [AELE] has published a study addressing confrontations with mentally impaired citizens and inmates entitled “Accommodating the Violent: Analyzing Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Relevant to Arrests of the Armed, Violent, and Mentally Ill” by Ashley Torres.

Ms. Torres, a Whittier Law Schoolcandidate for the Juris Doctor degree and the Staff Editor of the Whittier Law Review, notes that “Although a law enforcement officer’s job is maintaining public safety and restoring order, society now demands that officers’ double as mental health proxies, counselors, and hospital transportation for persons with a mental Illness.” Ms. Torres observes that “In order to solve the public policy issue at hand, we must look to outside sources, other than the police themselves, to solve the problem and meet middle ground to keep both our officers and the mentally ill safe.”

The article is posted on the Internet at: http://www.aele.org/sheehan-torres.pdf

January 27, 2016

Unlawful discrimination on the basis of gender identity


Unlawful discrimination on the basis of gender identity
9 New York Code of Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) §466.13

The New York State Division of Human Rights adopted regulations, 9 NYCRR 466.13, prohibiting discrimination and harassment against transgender people and makes clear that transgender individuals are protected under New York State’s Human Rights Law. The new regulations expand the definition of “sex” under New York state law to include gender identity and transgender status.

The Division filed the Rule on January 5, 2016, and it took effect on January 20, 2016. The new rule clarifies how gender identity discrimination may constitute either sex or disability discrimination under the Human Rights Law.

§466.13 reads as follows:

466.13 Discrimination on the basis of gender identity.

(a) Statutory Authority.

Pursuant to N.Y. Executive Law §295.5, it is a power and a duty of the Division to adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the N.Y. Executive Law, Article 15 (Human Rights Law).

(b) Definitions.

(1) Gender identity means having or being perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or expression whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.

(2) A transgender person is an individual who has a gender identity different from the sex assigned to that individual at birth.

(3) Gender dysphoria* is a recognized medical condition related to an individual having a gender identity different from the sex assigned at birth.

(c) Discrimination on the basis of gender identity is sex discrimination.

(1) The term “sex” when used in the Human Rights Law includes gender identity and the status of being transgender.

(2) The prohibitions contained in the Human Rights Law against discrimination on the basis of sex, in all areas of jurisdiction where sex is a protected category, also prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity or the status of being transgender.

(3) Harassment on the basis of a person’s gender identity or the status of being transgender is sexual harassment.

(d) Discrimination on the basis of gender dysphoria or other condition meeting the definition of disability in the Human Rights Law set out below is disability discrimination.

(1) The term “disability” as defined in Human Rights Law §292.21, means

(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques or

(b) a record of such an impairment or

(c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment, provided, however, that in all provisions of this article dealing with employment, the term shall be limited to disabilities which, upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held.

(2) The term “disability” when used in the Human Rights Law includes gender dysphoria or other condition meeting the definition of disability in the Human Rights Law set out above.

(3) The prohibitions contained in the Human Rights Law against discrimination on the basis of disability, in all areas of jurisdiction where disability is a protected category, also prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender dysphoria or other condition meeting the definition of disability in the Human Rights Law set out above.

(4) Refusal to provide reasonable accommodation for persons with gender dysphoria or other condition meeting the definition of disability in the Human Rights Law set out above, where requested and necessary, and in accordance with the Divisions regulations on reasonable accommodation found at 9 NYCRR § 466.11 , is disability discrimination.

(5) Harassment on the basis of a person’s gender dysphoria or other condition meeting the definition of disability in the Human Rights Law set out above is harassment on the basis of disability.

* Dysphoria: a state of feeling unwell or unhappy.

Termination of employee found guilty violating patient escort procedures, being late for work, falsifying timesheets, and failing to arrive on time for assignments


Termination of employee found guilty violating patient escort procedures, being late for work, falsifying timesheets, and failing to arrive on time for assignments
OATH Index No. 2088/15

A community liaison worker at Bellevue Hospital was charged with violating patient escort procedures, being late for work, falsifying timesheets, and failing to arrive on time for assignments.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kara J. Miller sustained the charges. Evidence showed that the employee had violated patient escort procedures on three occasions by leaving patients unescorted at locations outside the facility; violated the hospital's lateness policy and in one instance, falsified her time sheet to indicate she had arrived to work on time.

ALJ Miller recommended termination of employment.   

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
__________________

A Reasonable Penalty Under The Circumstances - a 618-page volume focusing on New York State court and administrative decisions addressing an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/7401.html

__________________


 

The Comptroller has exclusive authority to determine the validity of a beneficiary designation on an application for death benefits, which determination must be supported by substantial evidence


The Comptroller has exclusive authority to determine the validity of a beneficiary designation on an application for death benefits, which determination must be supported by substantial evidence
Close v Nitido, 2016 NY Slip Op 00407, Appellate Division, Third Department

Eric M. Close’s father, William Close [Decedent], died in January 2012. Decedent's mother, Peggy Eythe, was listed as his primary beneficiary on the last designation of beneficiary form filed with the New York State Employees' Retirement System, [ERS] dated November 17, 2011. On a previous designation of beneficiary form, dated July 26, 2010, Close was listed as Decedent's primary beneficiary. After Decedent's death and upon being informed that he was no longer a primary beneficiary of Decedent's death benefits, Close filed an application for Decedent’s death benefits with ERS and requested an investigation and a hearing into whether Eythe submitted a fraudulent designation of beneficiary form.

ERS informed Close that its records indicated that Decedent had submitted a notarized change of beneficiary form and that payment would be made in accordance with the last valid designation.

At the administrative hearing Close indicated that “despite his knowledge that Decedent had been diagnosed with stage four cancer, [he] had not visited Decedent — who lived in the same state and sometimes the same city — for approximately five months leading up to Decedent's death. Among the reasons given by Close “for his lack of consistent contact with Decedent prior to Decedent's death” was that he was busy "trying to inherit [an] apartment" from his recently deceased grandmother.

In contrast, as the Appellate Division’s decision notes, Eythe, the primary beneficiary of the 2011 designation of beneficiary form filed with ERS, had moved in with Decedent to help care for him. Further, although Close’s handwriting expert opined that the signature on the 2011 designation of beneficiary form was forged, Decedent’s attorney testified to the contrary, stating that he had witnessed Decedent sign the 2011 change of beneficiary form and that he then notarized that form for the Decedent.

The Hearing Officer found that Close's testimony and the testimony of his witnesses were less credible than the witnesses called by ERS and determined that Close had failed to meet his burden of establishing that the 2011 designation was invalid. The Comptroller accepted in its entirety the Hearing Officer's determination and, as a result, denied Close's application for designation as the beneficiary of Decedent’s death benefits.

Close initiated Article 78 proceeding challenging Comptroller's determination and Supreme Court, finding there was an issue of substantial evidence present, transferred the action to the Appellate Division.

Initially Appellate Division explained that [1] the Comptroller has exclusive authority to determine the validity of beneficiary designations on applications for death benefits, and each such  determination must be supported by substantial evidence and [2] an individual challenging the Comptroller's determination had the burden of proving that the beneficiary designation accepted by the Comptroller was invalid.

Given the eyewitness testimony regarding validity of Decedent's signature on the 2011 designation form, the Appellate Division said that there was “compelling evidence” explaining Decedent's motivation for changing his beneficiary from Close to Eythe and, giving due deference to the Comptroller’s credibility determinations, found that substantial evidence supported the Comptroller decision.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

January 26, 2016

OATH Administrative Law Judge recommended dismissal of disciplinary charges after finding supervisors’ testimony was unsupported by reliable documentary evidence


OATH Administrative Law Judge recommended dismissal of disciplinary charges after finding supervisors’ testimony unsupported by reliable documentary evidence
OATH Index No. 195/16

The Department of Environmental Protection charged the employee, a city research scientist, with failing to perform the duties of his job satisfactorily. The Department presented the testimony of employee's supervisors, as well as employee's work performance evaluations.

The employee testified that after filing an Equal Employment and Opportunity complaint against one of his supervisors, he had been treated unfairly and his supervisors rated his work performance as unsatisfactory.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Alessandra F. Zorgniotti found that the testimony of the supervisors was unsupported by reliable documentary evidence and thus was not objective proof that employee was unable to meet the minimally acceptable threshold requirements with respect to performing the duties of his position satisfactorily.

Judge Zorgniotti recommended that the charges be dismissed.   

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

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