Failing to seek a court order staying an arbitration precludes the objecting party from subsequently contending that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate

Failing to seek a court order staying an arbitration precludes the objecting party from subsequently contending that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate

Ruiz v County of Rockland, 2016 NY Slip Op 02999, Appellate Division, Second Department

Carlos Ruiz was terminated from his position with the County of Rockland. Ruiz, through his employee organization, demanded that the matter of his termination be submitted to arbitration under color of terms set out in collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the County and United Federation of Police Officers, Inc., Local 613, [Union], of which Ruiz was a member. 

Rockland did not apply for a court order staying the arbitration although it sent letters to Ruiz, the Union and the assigned arbitrator indicating that “it refused to participate in an arbitration proceeding.”  Following the County's refusal, Ruiz and the Union [Petitioners] commenced an Article 75 proceeding to compel the County to arbitrate Ruiz's termination grievance in accordance with the terms of the CBA. The Supreme Court granted the petition and the County appealed the court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court’s decision explaining that the County's “failure to apply to stay arbitration precludes it from now contending that the CBA does not constitute a valid agreement to arbitrate” the issue, rejecting the County’s argument that the disciplinary procedure outlined in the CBA does not entitle Ruiz to grieve his termination through arbitration. The issue of whether Ruiz's termination was a type of disciplinary action subject to arbitration under the CBA “is a matter of contract interpretation and application to be resolved by the arbitrator.”

Why it is necessary for a party to go to court to seek a stay of arbitration? If the partly refuses to participate in the arbitration and does not have the authority of the court in the form of a “stay of arbitration,” temporary or otherwise, the arbitration can proceed “in absentia” of the objecting party.

For example, in Hall v Environmental Conservation, 235 AD2d 757, the Appellate Division ruled that an arbitrator [1] may proceed with a disciplinary arbitration notwithstanding the fact that the appointing authority refused to participate in the proceeding and [2] thereafter make a final, binding determination.  

The employer had boycotted the arbitration because, it contended, Hall was not entitled submit the matter to arbitration. The court upheld the arbitrator’s award in favor of the employee.

The same result obtains when a party refuses or fails to participate in an administrative proceedings. The decision of the Appellate Division, Third Department in Aures v Buffalo Board of Education, 272 A.D.2d 664, demonstrates this.

In Aures, the employer, the Buffalo City School District, failed to appear at an unem­ployment insurance hearing as scheduled. The hearing officer proceeded to hold the hearing "in absentia" and awarded unemployment insurance benefits to Aures. Rejecting Buffalo's appeal challenging the award of benefits, the Appellate Division ruled that the administrative determination was binding on the parties.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_02999.htm

Reports recently issued by the Office of the State Comptroller

Reports recently issued by the Office of the State Comptroller

Click on text highlighted in color to access the entire report

Recent reports issued by the Office of the State Comptroller

Click on text highlighted in color to access the entire report

Special Education
The Unadilla Valley Central School District saved more than $300,000 in special education costs over a two-year period, according to an auditissued by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/apr16/041916.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=school+audit&utm_content=20160424&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight

School Audits issued

Campbell-Savona Central School District - Liquidating the accumulated deficit in the District’s general fund

Gilboa-Conesville Central School District – Internal controls to safeguard portable devices such as laptop computers, tablets and cameras

Hicksville Union Free School District – Purchasing

Highland Falls-Fort Montgomery Central School District - Financial Condition

Madrid-Waddington Central School District - Financial Condition

Yorkshire-Pioneer Central School District - Financial Management

A probationary employee employee may not be terminated in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible or an illegal purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law

A probationary employee employee may not be terminated in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible or an illegal purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law

Johnson v County of Orange, 2016 NY Slip Op 02821, Appellate Division, Second Department

Supreme Court granted the Orange County Sheriff’s motion to dismiss Janine Johnson's Article 78 petition challenging her termination from her position while she was still serving her probationary period “for failure to state a cause of action.” Johnson had filed a “notice of appeal” that the Appellate Division deemed to be an application for leave to appeal, granted the “application” and then affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling with costs.

The Appellate Division explained that a probationary employee “may be terminated without a hearing and without a statement of reasons in the absence of a demonstration that the termination was in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible or an illegal purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law." 

In addition, it should be noted that Rules promulgated by a civil service commission may set out administrative procedures and standards that control the termination of a probationary employee.* For example, in Scherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes BOCES, 77 NY2d 753, the Court of Appeals held that where the rules of a civil service commission specifically set out the reasons for which a probationary employee may be dismissed, the appointing authority's broad discretion with respect to terminating the services of probationers is subject to the limitations imposed by those standards. 

Further, as the court held in Yan Ping Xu v New York City Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 121 AD3d 559,  a  department policy does not trump the probationary period established by law or by a rule or regulations having the force and effect of law. 

Another element to consider in the context of terminating a probationary employee is the "probationary status" of the individual. Case law indicates that a probationary employee may be terminated at any time after the completing his or her minimum period of probation prior to completing his or her maximum period of probation [see Gray v Bronx Developmental Center, 65 NY2d 904] unless otherwise provided by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law [Civil Service Law Article 14]. 

In contrast, if the probationer has not yet completed his or her minimum period probation, he or she is entitled to “notice and hearing” as a condition precedent to termination on the theory that the individual is entitled to a minimum period of service to demonstrate his or her ability to satisfactorily perform the duties of the position [see McKee v. Jackson, 152 AD2d 54]. 

In Johnson's case the Appellate Division found that the allegations in her petition were insufficient to state a cause of action that her employment was terminated “in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible or an illegal purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law.”

The Appellate Division also held that:

1. Johnson’s claims that the Orange County Sheriff's Office tolerated other relationships such as the one in which she was involved and did not have a formal anti-fraternization policy were inadequate to state a cause of action alleging that she was terminated in bad faith; and

2. Johnson was not entitled to a statement of the reason for the termination of her probationary employment, citing York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760.

Accordingly, said the court, Supreme Court properly granted the appointing authority’s motion to dismiss Johnson’s petition.

* See, for example, 4 NYCRR 4.5(b) of the Rules of the State Civil Service Commission. Many local civil service commissions have adopted similar rules. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_02821.htm

Lack of prior misconduct not sufficient to mitigate imposing the penalty of dismissal given the fraudulent nature of the individual’s misconduct

Lack of prior misconduct not sufficient to mitigate imposing the penalty of dismissal given the fraudulent nature of the individual’s misconduct

Ronga v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2016 NY Slip Op 02921, Appellate Division, First Department

In an earlier decision, Ronga v New York City Department of Education, 114 AD3d 527, the Appellate Division sustained the findings of the Disciplinary Hearing Officer that Ronga, a probationary principal at a New York City public school, [1] improperly directed subordinates to create fabricated teacher observation reports and professional development plans for which he himself was personally responsible, and [2] submitted those reports and plans to the superintendent.  

That court, however, had dismissed certain other charges and specifications filed against Ronga on due process grounds, vacated the penalty of termination imposed by the Hearing Officer, and then remanded the matter to the Hearing Officer for consideration of the appropriate penalty to be imposed based on the surviving charges and specifications.

The Hearing Officer, in accordance with the Appellate Division’s directive, reconsidered the penalty to be imposed and reimposed the penalty of termination. Again Ronga appealed but this time the Appellate Division affirmed the penalty the Hearing Officer had determined – dismissal from the position.

The Appellate Division explained that “[d]espite [Ronga’s] long-standing work history and lack of prior misconduct, given the fraudulent nature of his misconduct, the fact that he coerced subordinates into being complicit in his malfeasance, and the fact that his misconduct deprived teachers of important observations and evaluations, the penalty of termination does not shock [its] sense of fairness.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_02921.htm

__________________________ 

Challenging Adverse Personnel Decisions - A 752-page volume focusing on New York State court and administrative decisions addressing an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information click on http://nypplarchives.blogspot.com/

__________________________

Reassigning individuals to perform duties alleged to be those of a position classified and allocated to a lower title and grade

Reassigning individuals to perform duties alleged to be those of a position classified and allocated to a lower title and grade

Alston v Bertoni, 2016 NY Slip Op 02897, Appellate Division, Third Department

As the result of a perceived increase in criminal activity, Village of Endicott Mayor John Bertoni, directed Endicott Police Chief Michael Cox to assign detectives to police patrol duties.

Chief Cox designated Detectives Scott Alston, Michael McEwan and James Surdoval to perform such police patrol duties.* As a result, these detectives "work[ed] part of [their] normal work week, during [their] normal work hours, in uniform on patrol." The detectives and their union, Endicott Police Benevolent Association, Inc., filed a petition pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR challenging their patrol duty assignments. Supreme Court found that the assignments were permissible and dismissed their petition.

The detectives had contended that assigning detectives to patrol duty on a limited basis violated Civil Service Law §§58 and 75 by forcing them to perform work "beneath their rank and title" without a hearing,” appealed the Supreme Court's decision. The Appellate Division disagreed with the arguments advanced by the dectectives and sustained the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Initially the Appellate Division noted that the detectives had [1] been permanently appointed to their positions, and there is no dispute that they are entitled to "the higher salaried, preferred status of detective" and [2] they had held their positions as detectives for more than three years and thus they may "not be removed or otherwise subjected to any disciplinary penalty provided in [Civil Service Law §75**] except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing upon stated charges."

With respect to any alleged violation of CSL §58, the court determined that the detectives had not been deprived of their detective positions as a result of their assignment to patrol duties nor was their pay or benefits as detectives adversely affected in any way by such an assignment. The court explained that “§58 only guarantees that the detectives will ‘be permanently designated as . . . detective[s] . . . and receive the compensation ordinarily paid to persons in such designation,’ its provisions are not implicated by the assignment here” challenged."

Significantly, the Appellate Division observed that it is well settled that [1] an employee's displeasure with a work assignment, absent an adverse impact on his or her civil service grade or title, salary or benefits, does not implicate Civil Service Law §75, citing Galatti v County of Dutchess, 64 NY2d 1163, and [2] the assignments of the detectives were within the sole discretion of "the appointing officer.”***

Finally, said the court, assigning the detectives to patrol duty on a limited basis was rational in light of the proof that residents of the Village were demanding a greater police presence to combat a perceived rise in lawlessness, demands that could not be met by hiring more patrol officers because of budgetary problems.

* A footnote in the Appellate Division’s decision refers to the job description for Detective, which included the provision that detectives are required to "[a]ssist Patrol Division concerning criminal cases," and that both detectives and juvenile division detectives must perform any "duties imposed upon them by … [s]pecial [o]rders and lawful orders of their [s]uperior [o]fficers."

** One of the penalties authorized by §75 is “demotion in grade and title.”

*** See Detective Endowment Assn., Police Dept., City of N.Y. v Leary, 36 AD2d 289, affirmed 30 NY2d 577

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_02897.htm

Accruing vacation and sick leave credits during leave for ordered military leave

Accruing vacation and sick leave credits during leave for ordered military leave

Andrews v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 02895, Appellate Division, Third Department

An employee of the State as the employer absent from his or her position while on “ordered military duty,” is placed on military leave* from his or her position in accordance with provisions in the State Military Law and the Rules of the State Civil Service Commission. While on such military leave Rules of the State Civil Service Commission provided that the employee does not accrue vacation or sick leave credits unless he or she is "in full pay status for at least seven workdays during [the] biweekly pay period" during such absences for ordered military duty.**

A number of current and former employees [Claimants] of the State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision [Department], absent during various periods of ordered military duty, demanded that the Department credit them with the vacation and sick leave credits that they would have otherwise accrued had they not been absent on such ordered military duty. 

The Department ultimately denied there request and Claimants sued the Department seeking, among other things, a declaration that the denial of vacation and sick leave accruals during their respective periods of military leave violated both the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 USC §4301 et sec, [USERRA]), and §242 of the State’s Military Law and sought a court order directing the Department to calculate and credit the amount of vacation and sick leave accruals that they would have otherwise earned but for their absences for ordered military service.

Supreme Court, concluding that [1] the State of New York did not waive its sovereign immunity with respect suit founded on alleged violations of USERRA; [2] that only those claims arising within the four-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR Article 78 proceedings were timely; and, in any event, [3] the Claimants failed to state a cause of action.  In response to Claimant's appeal of Supreme Court's dismissal of  their petition, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Reviewing of the applicable state and federal statutory and regulatory provisions, the court noted that, with respect to the relevant State law, rules and regulations:

1. An employee in state service "shall not earn" either annual or sick leave credits "for any biweekly pay period unless he [or she] is in full pay status for at least seven workdays during such biweekly pay period" (4 NYCRR 21.2 [b] [1]; 21.3 [b]).***

2. A state employee who is ordered to military duty is entitled to take a leave of absence for such purpose and, consistent with the provisions of Military Law §242 (5), is entitled to be paid his or her salary and other compensation for a specified number of days.

3. Upon the exhaustion of the military leave with pay authorized by Military Law §242(5), certain eligible state employees "shall be granted supplemental military leave with pay for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 30 calendar days or 22 working days, whichever is greater" (see 4 NYCRR 21.15 [a]; 4 NYCRR 21.16). Once that employee has exhausted those available options and, thus is no longer is on full pay status, he or she — consistent with the requirements imposed by 4 NYCRR 21.2 (b) (1) and 21.3 (b) — no longer accrues such credits.

With respect to federal law, the Appellate Division noted that:

1. USERRA prohibits an employer from denying a member of the uniformed services "initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment" based upon, among other things, such member's performance of military service (38 USC §4311 [a]).

2. USERRA further provides that "a person who is absent from a position of employment by reason of service in the uniformed services shall be . . . deemed to be on furlough or leave of absence while performing such service . . . and . . . entitled to such other rights and benefits not determined by seniority as are generally provided by the employer . . . to employees having similar seniority, status, and pay who are on furlough or leave of absence under a contract, agreement, policy, practice, or plan in effect at the commencement of such service or established while such person performs such service" (see 38 USC §4316 [b] [1]; 20 CFR 1002.150 [a]).

3. Generally speaking, "accrual of vacation leave is considered to be a non-seniority benefit that must be provided by an employer to an employee on military leave of absence only if the employer provides that benefit to similarly situated employees on comparable leaves of absence" [emphasis supplied by the Appellate Division].

4. In the event "the non-seniority benefits to which employees on furlough or leave of absence are entitled vary according to the type of leave, the employee must be given the most favorable treatment accorded to any comparable form of leave when he or she performs service in the uniformed services" [emphasis supplied by the Appellate Division].

For purposes of determining whether two forms of leave are comparable, the Appellate Division said “consideration should be given to the purpose of the leave and the employee's ability to choose when to take the leave, with the duration of the leave being the most significant factor.”

Addressing Claimants’ allegations that the Department violated 38 USC §§4311(a) and 4316(b) when it denied them vacation and sick leave accrual credits during their respective periods of military duty benefits, the court said that Claimants contended were denied benefits provided to state employees on allegedly comparable leaves of absence. However, said the court, Complainants “did nothing more than assert in a conclusory fashion — and without reference to the allegedly applicable statutory or regulatory provisions — that such accruals and credits were ‘generally provided by the [s]tate . . . to such employees on [w]orkers' [c]ompensation [l]eave, jury duty, bereavement, and extended sick leave/[Family Medical Leave Act].’”

Further, the court noted that:

1. “[A]bsent from the petition was any evidence … that state employees who were absent from work due to one of the cited forms of leave did in fact accrue vacation and/or sick leave credits even if they were not ‘in full pay status for at least seven workdays during [the relevant] biweekly pay period;’” and

2. The Claimants’ petition did not set forth any factual assertions demonstrating that the leaves of absence they claimed were “comparable leaves of absences” -- workers' compensation, jury duty, bereavement and extended sick leave - are, in fact, comparable in terms of purpose and duration to the military/supplemental military leaves available to Claimants.

Absent such factual allegations, the Appellate Division ruled that Claimants' allegations of violations of USERRA cannot stand.

The court said it reached a similar conclusion with regard to Claimants’ allegations of violation of Military Law §242(4). 

Although §242(4) prohibits an employer from subjecting an employee on a leave of absence due to ordered military duty "to any loss or diminution of time service, increment, vacation or holiday privileges, or any other right or privilege, by reason of such absence," the Appellate Division pointed out that “state employees on military leave/supplemental military leave (such as [Claimants]) are entitled to be paid for certain specified periods of time, and the parties do not dispute that such employees also may utilize certain accrued leave credits to extend their full pay status.”

While on full pay status, explained the court, "employees on leave for military service — like any other full pay status state employee — continue to accrue vacation and sick leave credits". However, "once employees on leave for military service exhaust their options to remain in full pay status, they — like all other state employees on unpaid leave — no longer accrue vacation and sick leave credits."

Finding that Claimants failed to demonstrate that they were treated differently than any other state employee on an unpaid leave of absence, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court correctly concluded that Claimants failed to state a cause of action and properly granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the Article 78 petition in its entirety.

* Military Leave is leave without pay except as otherwise provided by State law, rule or regulation.

** See 4 NYCRR 21.2[b][1]; 21.3[b]

*** Employees absent on leave for ordered military leave may elect, but may not be required, to use vacation, overtime and similar leave credits to remain on the payroll until such leave credits are exhausted.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_02895.htm