Tests applied by the courts in determining if a demand to arbitrate a grievance pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement should be granted

Tests applied by the courts in determining if a demand to arbitrate a grievance pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement should be granted
Locust Valley Central School District v Benstock, 2016 NY Slip Op 07299, Appellate Division, Second Department [Matter #1]

Locust Valley Central School District v Locust Valley Teachers' Association 2016 NY Slip Op 07299, Appellate Division, Second Department [Matter #2]

The relevant collective bargaining agreement [CBA] between Locust Valley Teachers' Association [LVTA] and the Locust Valley Central School District [School District] provided that either party had the right to submit a grievance to arbitration in the event the grievance was not resolved by the School District. The CBA defined a "grievance" as "a claimed violation, misinterpretation or inequitable application [of a] provision of th[e] Agreement."

LVTA filed a grievance against the School District concerning the School Districts commencing a plenary action* against a teacher formerly employed by the School District. The former teacher was a member of the LVTA and presumably in the collective bargaining unit represented by LVTA.

In the plenary action, the School District sought, under a "faithless servant" theory,**the forfeiture of all compensation earned by the former teacher pursuant to the CBA during a period of time in which the teacher allegedly engaged in certain criminal conduct. That conduct ultimately resulted in the teacher's plea of guilty to several criminal charges.

In an action (Matter #1) and a related proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of a grievance (Matter #2), the School District in Matter #2 appealed from an order of the Supreme Court which denied its petition seeking a stay of arbitration and granted LVTA’s motion to compel arbitration of the grievance.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Matter #2.

The court explained that the determination of whether a dispute between a public sector employer and employee is arbitrable is subject to a two-prong test.

The court must first if there is any statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance. In the event it finds no such prohibition, the court must review the relevant collective bargaining agreement between the parties and determine if they, in fact, agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute.

Citing Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Waterman Edu. Assn.], 93 NY2d 132, the Appellate Division said that in examining the collective bargaining agreement, must "merely determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the [agreement]." If there is such a relationship, said the Appellate Division, "the court should rule the matter arbitrable, and the arbitrator will then make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the . . . provisions of the [collective bargaining agreement], and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them."

In determining whether a matter is arbitrable, however, the court may not "consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute."

Finding that the School District had not identified any statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. In the words of the Appellate Division, the fact that “the grievance concerns the right of the School District to bring a plenary action seeking the equitable forfeiture of compensation paid to the teacher under the CBA establishes “a reasonable relationship between the grievance and the CBA.”

* A lawsuit where the merits are fully investigated and discussed and the decision is not based on another lawsuit.

** The "faithless servant doctrine" states that an individual owing a duty of fidelity to a principal and who is faithless in the performance of his or her services generally cannot recover his or her compensation or other consideration that would be otherwise available to that individual [Murray v Beard, 102 NY 505]. See, also, http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/02/applying-faithless-servant-doctrine.html

The decisions in Matter #1 and Matter #2 are posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_07299.htm

Findings of fact in support of the appointing authority’s decision to terminate an employee required to survive the employee’s judicial challenge seeking reinstatement to his or her former position.

Holding that Schoharie County failed to make any findings of fact in support of its decision terminating a County employee, the Appellate Division said it could not conduct a meaningful review of the County’s determination in response to the employee’s Article 78 challenge to the County’s action. The court explained that “[A]dministrative findings of fact must be made in such a manner that the parties may be assured that the decision is based on the evidence in the record, uninfluenced by extralegal considerations, so as to permit intelligent challenge by an aggrieved party and adequate judicial review” and remitted the matter to the County Board of Supervisors “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.”

Ethington v County of Schoharie, 2016 NY Slip Op 07908, Appellate Division, Third Department

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Eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits based on work-related stress

Eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits based on work-related stress

Matter of State Insurance Fund and Workers’ Compensation Board, 2016 NY Slip Op 07734, Appellate Division, Third Department

A supervisor [Claimant] filed for workers’ compensation benefits contending that she that had felt threatened as the result of a work-related incident involving one of her subordinates and that the incident had resulted in stress, panic attacks and digestive problems.* 

After a series of hearings and the submission of Claimant's medical records and the reports and deposition testimony of her treating physician, as well as an independent medical exam by the workers' compensation carrier's consultant, a Workers' Compensation Law Judge [WCLJ] ultimately issued a decision disallowing the claim on the grounds, among others, that Claimant did not experience work-related stress greater than what is experienced in a normal work environment, and that "the exacerbation of her mental health symptoms did not arise out of and in the course of the incident or its aftermath."

The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the WCLJ’s findings and determination denying Claimant's allegations that she suffered a work-related injury or disease arising out of and in the course of her employment. Her claim denied  for workers' compensation benefits by the Board, Claimant then appealed the Board’s decision.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s ruling, citing Matter of Lozowski v Wiz, 134 AD3d 1177. In Lozowski the court held that it was "well established that ‘mental injuries caused by work-related stress are compensable if the claimant can establish that the stress that caused the injury was greater than that which other similarly situated workers experienced in the normal work environment.’"

However, said the court, in resolving that factual question, the Board's determination will not be disturbed provided that it is supported by substantial evidence.

In this instance, although the medical evidence concluded, based upon Claimant's self reporting, that the incident caused or exacerbated her mental health problems, substantial evidence supports the Board's factual determination that the incident was not compensable on the ground that the work-related stress suffered by Claimant that led to her anxiety, PTSD and depression was not "greater than that which other similarly situated workers experienced in the normal work environment."

In contrast to Claimant’s description of the events constituting the incident, including Claimant’s testimony that her subordinate “swore at her during the encounter,” the WCLJ credited the evidence given by a coworker who testified that she had overheard "a work interaction" in which Claimant and the subordinate "disagreed" and that she had informed Claimant, after the incident, that the subordinate used profanity after Claimant walked away from the disagreement.

In addition the WCLJ discreded Claimant's account of the incident and her claim that this brief episode left her terrified based upon her testimonial demeanor as well as her inconsistent accounts and actions after the incident, including Claimant's return to her subordinate's work area shortly after the incident to speak with a coworker and her testimony that “the day after the incident, she had a meeting with the [subordinate]" and later reported that the matter was "settled" and that they were "moving forward with a good working relationship."

The Appellate Division, deferring to the Board's credibility determinations, found that the record as a whole supported its conclusion that this was, at most, "an isolated incident of insubordination" to which the employer appropriately responded, which was not so improper or extraordinary as to give rise to a viable claim for a work-related injury.

Finding “… no basis to disturb the Board's determination that Claimant's work-related stress did not exceed that which could be expected by a supervisor in a normal work environment,” the Appellate Division denied Claimant’s appeal.

* The Appellate Division’s decision notes that “After the incident, Claimant, who had a history of treatment for non-work-related anxiety, depression and posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD], reportedly experienced increased symptoms of anxiety and depression, as well as panic attacks, insomnia and difficulty concentrating for which she sought treatment from her internal medicine physician.” 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_07734.htm