Substantiated, nonpretextual complaints of petitioner's subordinates comprise a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonretaliatory reason for terminating supervisor

Substantiated, nonpretextual complaints of petitioner's subordinates comprise a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonretaliatory reason for terminating supervisor

The termination of petitioner's employment did not violate a constitutional or statutory provision or a policy established by decisional law where employer's investigation reveled that the petitioner “favored employees of his own national origin, including his brother-in-law, giving them more favorable schedules and faster promotions, and discriminated against women and persons not of his own national origin.”

Reported as 2016 NY Slip Op 08010, Appellate Division, First Department

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Evaluating claims seeking to recover damages for alleged defamation and maintaining a hostile work environment

Evaluating claims seeking to recover damages for alleged defamation and maintaining a hostile work environment

In this action to recover damages for defamation and a hostile work environment in violation of Executive Law §296, the plaintiff, Pall, appealed an order of the Supreme Court granting the Roosevelt Union Free School District’s motion to dismiss her complaint.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling, explaining:

1. "To state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant published a false statement, without privilege or authorization, to a third party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation per se."

2. "Since falsity is a necessary element of a defamation cause of action and only facts' are capable of being proven false, it follows that only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action.'" and

3. "The dispositive inquiry . . . is whether a reasonable [reader] could have concluded that [the statement was] conveying facts about the [Pall]."

The Appellate Division ruled that “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, affording [Pall] the benefit of every favorable inference, and considering the evidentiary material submitted by the parties,” Pall did not have a cause of action to recover damages for defamation as the context of the alleged statement was such that a reasonable reader would have concluded that he or she was reading an opinion, and not a fact, about Pall.

Addressing Pall’s claims of the existence of “a hostile work environment in violation of Executive Law §296,” the court held that her allegations “fell short of alleging that the workplace was " permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive working environment.'"

Pall v Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 07937, Appellate Division, Second Department

Rights of employees transferred to another jurisdiction pursuant to §70(2) of the Civil Service Law.

Rights of employees transferred to another jurisdiction pursuant to §70(2) of the Civil Service Law.

The Village of East Syracuse dissolved its police department and police officers who were formerly employed by the Village were transferred to the Town of DeWitt Police Department and placed at a salary step that was at a lower seniority level than warranted by those police officers length of service with the Village. Supreme Court concluded that the Town of DeWitthad acted arbitrarily and capriciously and directed it to award each former Village police officer seniority credit for each year of service as a Village police officer.

The Appellate Division agreed, explaining that Supreme Court had properly concluded that §70(2) of the Civil Service Law “requires [the Town] to award [the former Village police officers] full seniority credit for the time that they served as police officers in the Village.” In pertinent part, said the court, the statute mandates that "[o]fficers and employees transferred to another governmental jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision shall be entitled to full seniority credit for all purposes for service rendered prior to such transfer in the governmental jurisdiction from which transfer is made."

[See Civil Service Law §45 with respect to the status of employees upon acquisition of a private institution or enterprise by a New York governmental entity.] 

Barhite v Town of DeWitt, 2016 NY Slip Op 07782, Appellate Division, Fourth Department