Determining if a dispute between a public employer and an employee organization is arbitrable

Determining if a dispute between a public employer and an employee organization  is arbitrable
Matter of City of Long Beach v Long Beach Professional Fire Fighters Assn., Local 287, 2018 NY Slip Op 03356, Appellate Division, Second Department

The City of Long Beach [Long Beach] filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 75 seeking a permanent stay of a demand for arbitration submitted by the Long Beach Professional Fire Fighters Assn., Local 287 [Local 287].

Local 287 sought arbitration alleging that Long Beach had violated provisions set out in a collective bargaining agreement* negotiated by the parties addressing [1] the layoff of certain Long Beach firefighters and [2] the terms and conditions of employment with respect to certain paramedics when Long Beach "unilaterally set the terms of employment" for certain paramedics when they were hired.

Initially the Appellate Division observed that a public employer has wide latitude to negotiate the terms of the agreements, and can agree to submit disputes to arbitration in "the absence of plain and clear prohibitions in statute or controlling decisional law, or restrictive public policy" and, Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d 563 noted that although the Taylor Law reflects New York's " strong'" policy favoring arbitration, this principle is not without limits.

New York courts use a two-part test to determine if a dispute is arbitrable, first asking if "there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance." In the absence of any such prohibition, the court then inquires as to whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute by examining their collective bargaining agreement.

A court must stay arbitration where it can conclude, upon the examination of the parties' contract and any implicated statute on their face, "that the granting of any relief would violate public policy."

Turning to Local 287's claim that Long Beach's decision regarding layoffs of the firefighters was subject to arbitration the Appellate Division said that Civil Service Law §80(1), Suspension or demotion upon the abolition or reduction of positions, provides that a public employer has the nondelegable discretion to determine—for reasons of economy, among others — what its staffing and budgetary needs are in order to effectively deliver uninterrupted services to the public. Accordingly, and in the absence of bad faith, fraud, or collusion, that discretion "is an undisputed management prerogative" for the public's benefit, and cannot be altered or modified by agreement or otherwise.

Thus, said the Appellate Division, arbitration of the claim regarding the layoffs of the firefighters would violate public policy.

Turning to Local 287's claims relating to the terms and conditions of employment of the paramedics, the court opined that "no public policy precludes arbitration of those claims." Further, the court noted that the arbitration provision in the CBA "permits arbitration of such claims."

* Civil Service Law Article 14, typically referred to as the "Taylor Law."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_03356.htm

Unsatisfactory rating voided because employee's "performance review" failed to comply with the employer's own procedures and thus undermined the integrity of the process

Unsatisfactory rating voided because employee's "performance review" failed to comply with the employer's own procedures and thus undermined the integrity of the process

Joyce v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 03433, Appellate Division, First Department

The Appellate Division annulled the determination of respondent New York City Department of Education [DOE] sustaining the "unsatisfactory" rating for the 2010-2011 academic year give to John Joyce, a tenured teacher.

The court said that the record demonstrates "deficiencies in the performance review process" that resulted in Mr. Joyce being given an unsatisfactory rating for the 2010-2011 academic year.

Citing Matter of Gumbs v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 125 AD3d 484, and Matter of Richards v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 117 AD3d 605, the Appellate Division noted that these deficiencies "were not merely technical, but undermined the integrity and fairness of the process."

Mr. Joyce had received a satisfactory rating for the previous academic year and, in contravention of its own procedures, DOE failed to place him on notice that he was in danger of receiving an unsatisfactory rating for the 2010-2011 academic year until after April 28, 2011.

Although DOE's procedures required that tenured teachers in danger of receiving an unsatisfactory rating have "formal observations including a pre-observation and post-observation conference by the principal ... as part of a prescriptive plan to improve their teaching," Mr. Joyce received only one formal observation which took place one week before the end of the academic year and was not part of a prescriptive plan to improve his performance as a teacher.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_03433.htm

Report Reviews Impact of Taylor Law

Duly noted:

The Empire Center has issued a 50th anniversary update of its seminal 2007 report on New York’s landmark Taylor Law, which governs labor relations in state and local government, 50 Years Later, Report Reviews Impact of Taylor Law. 

The report is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/taylor-made/?utm_source=Empire+Center+emails&utm_campaign=5422cbfc52-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_05_29_07_25&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6cc7720848-5422cbfc52-290604285

Authority of the arbitrator

Authority of the arbitrator

City of New York v District Council 37, 2018 NY Slip Op 03220, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court granted the City of New York's petition to vacate an arbitration award, denied the grievance, and dismissed this proceeding the City brought pursuant to CPLR Article 75. The Appellate division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling.

The court explained that an arbitrator exceeds his or her powers when the "award violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power."

However, the fact that there is a provision in a contract that the arbitrator may not alter or modify does not limit the arbitrator's power to resolve the dispute by interpreting the contract based on his or her findings as to the intent of the parties.

In contrast, an arbitration award should be vacated where it is not derived from the contract but from the deliberate and intentional consideration of matters outside the contract.

Here, said the Appellate Division, the record shows that the arbitration award added to or modified the collective bargaining agreement as the arbitrator's decision rewrote the contract for the parties by expanding the number of workers entitled to the assignment differential, when the contract expressly limited the differential to workers at a specific facility.

This exceed the arbitrator's powers as such an action was expressly prohibited in the agreement

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_03220.htm

Concerning the fellow-servant rule, the doctrine of vicarious liability and the doctrine of respondeat superior in New York State

Concerning the fellow-servant rule, the doctrine of vicarious liability and the doctrine of respondeat superior in New York State

Buckley v City Of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 300

[Decided with Lawrence v City of New York]

These cases essentially involved the question of whether the fellow-servant rule continues to apply in New York. 

In each of these cases an employee of the City of New York, who was injured through the negligence of a coworker brought an action against the City. 

In Buckley v City of New York, a police officer was accidentally shot in the leg when a gun being loaded by a fellow officer discharged in the station house locker room. 

In Lawrence v City of New York, a fire fighter was seriously injured when a fellow fire fighter threw a smouldering couch from the second story window of a fire-damaged building and struck the plaintiff while he was standing in the yard.

In each case the plaintiff secured a jury verdict of liability against the city on a theory of vicarious liability and the city's motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the fellow-servant rule was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments in both instances and leave has been granted to appeal to this court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling.

The doctrine of  rule of respondeat superior holds that the employer will be liable to third parties for torts of an employee committed within the scope of his or her employment.

In contrast, the fellow-servant rule is triggered in the event an employee is injured by a fellow employee in the workplace. The injured worker will have no recourse against the employer in respondeat superiorand the rule provides that "where a servant is injured through the negligence or fault of a fellow servant, engaged in a common business and employment ... if the master is himself free from fault, the master is not responsible for the injury."

The Court of Appeals observed that "The over-all effect of the fellow-servant rule was drastically curtailed by the advent of workers' compensation legislation," concluding that "Today we are squarely presented with the question left open in Poniatowski — whether the fellow-servant rule is to survive in New York." Continuing, the court opined that "The rule had its birth in the 19th century, was severely crippled with the advent of workers' compensation, and was dealt an almost fatal blow in this State in Poniatowski v City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 76."

With these decisions the court said it rejected "this rule entirely [and] inter its remains," explaining "The fellow-servant rule serves no continuing valid purpose in New York, but instead merely works an unjustifiable hardship upon individuals injured in the workplace, and we must thus conclude that the fellow-servant rule is no longer to be followed in New York."

The Buckley decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/198235656ny2d3001326

Exploring some aspects of "civil service status" in the Classified Service of the Civil Service in New York State

Exploring some aspects of "civil service status" in the Classified Service of the Civil Service in New York State

Cannavo v Olatoye, 2018 NY Slip Op 03740, Appellate Division, First Department

The Cannavo decision by the Appellate Division is set out below, with comments concerning some of the more "troublesome" elements of the ruling set out in bold in blue.

Supreme Court denied Cannavo's application for reinstatement to his former position with the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR Article 78, which ruling was unanimously affirmed, by the Appellate Division without costs. The Appellate Division's ruling states:

"The article 78 court correctly determined, upon consideration of all the facts, that respondents' denial of petitioner's application for reinstatement to his former position with NYCHA was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Roberts v Gavin, 96 AD3d 669, 671 [1st Dept 2012])."

The decision reports that Cannao sought reinstatement with NYCHA following his retirement from NYCHA. As reinstatement of a former employee to his or her former position is a matter subject to the exercise of the discretion of the appointing authority, and absent such denial of the request for a discriminatory reason or unlawful purpose, the appointing authority's denial of the retiree's request for reinstatement is otherwise lawful.

Indeed, a retiree may be reemployed following his or her retirement subject to the limitations set out in §150 of the Civil Service Law. Further, §13-119 and 13-178 of the New York City Administrative Code addressed a retired member's eligibility to rejoin the relevant retirement system without any limitation based on "jurisdictional classification" of the position to which reemployment is sought.

The decision then continues:

"Despite petitioner's previous position as a "civil service" employee with the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), when he was hired by NYCHA in 1996, it was in a non-competitive position that was not eligible for civil service status, as NYCHA's records reflect." 

The Civil Service of the State of New York, in contrast to the "military service" of the State of New York, consists of positions Exempt Class [CSL §41]; the Non-competitive Class [CSL §42]; the Labor Class [CSL §43] and the Competitive Class [CSL §44], which positions are in the "Classified Service" and positions the Unclassified Service, which positions are set out in CSL §35. 

No explanation or justification is provided with respect to the representation that Canno "was not eligible for civil service status" with NYCHA.

As to the status of HPD and NYCHA, the list of "New York City Agencies" listed on the Official Website of the City of New York includes, among other agencies:

●  Housing Authority, New York City (NYCHA)  and

●  Housing Preservation and Development, Department of (HPD)

As Yul Brynner exclaims in The King and I, "is a puzzlement!" as to why Canno "was not eligible for civil service status" with NYCHA because of the jurisdictional class of the position.

Upon a review of records kept by HPD, NYCHA, and the Department of Citywide Administrative Services, respondents determined that petitioner's civil service status had not been formally transferred from HPD to NYCHA, and, since only those who have civil service status are eligible for reinstatement following retirement, rationally concluded that petitioner was not eligible for reinstatement.

This conclusion is troublesome as it appears that Canno resigned from his position in the "Civil Service" with HPD in favor of a de novo appointment to a position in "Civil Service" in the Non-competitive Class with NYHCA. The decision is silent with respect to the basis for the determination that petitioner lacked "civil service status" with NYCHA.

Further, there is no bar to the reinstatement of a retiree to his or her former position should the appointing authority approve such a reinstatement regardless of the jurisdictional classification of the position involved. 

The reinstatement, reappointment, reemployment or new appointment of a person otherwise qualified receiving a New York State public retirement system benefit is permitted at the discretion of the appointing authority, subject to the provisions and limitations set out in CSL §150 with respect to the suspension  of the individual's  pension  and  annuity and limits on compensation during such public employment.

The opinion continues:

While petitioner claims that certain NYCHA documents — including a notification of appointment and performance reviews he received in 1996 — reflect that he maintained his competitive civil service status, the record shows that he subsequently had many conversations with Human Resources and took actions to obtain a formal transfer. Moreover, attached to the petition is a 1996 memo from Human Resources informing petitioner that he did not, in fact, possess this status. As the court found, this is not a rare or extraordinary case in which the doctrine of estoppel or laches should be applied against a government agency (see Matter of New York State Med. Transporters Assn. v Perales, 77 NY2d 126, 130 [1990]).

With respect to the noting that Canno "took actions to obtain a formal transfer" as here relevant [see NYCRR 1.2(b)(1)], assuming, but not conceding, that such was, in fact, the case, a transfer from a position under the jurisdiction of one appointing authority to a position under the jurisdiction of a different appointing authority requires the approval of both appointing authorities.

In contrast, as indicated by 4 NYCRR 1.2(b)(2) , the placement of an individual under the jurisdiction of the appointing authority to another position under the jurisdiction of the same appointing authority having the same title is a "reassignment" not a "transfer."

The bottom line: A individual who retired from a position in the Classified Service is not barred from being reinstated to his or her former position if available and otherwise permitted by the controlling provisions of the Civil Service Law regardless of his or her pre-retirement "appointment status" in such position, i.e., permanent, contingent permanent, temporary, provisional, military substitute, or term and regardless of the jurisdictional classification  or budgetary status of the position in question if otherwise available for appointment thereto. 

We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: MAY 24, 2018

CLERK

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_03740.htm