Determining an employee's health insurance benefits upon his or her retirement

Determining an employee's health insurance benefits upon his or her retirement

Ames v County of Monroe, 2018 NY Slip Op 04886, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

In this decision the Appellate Division held that "although the collective bargaining agreements in effect at the time of an employee's' retirement are binding and enforceable agreements that dictate the retired employee's rights, the relevant collective bargaining agreements in this action did not require the County of Monroe [Monroe] to maintain for each Plaintiff fully-paid health insurance coverage equivalent to that in effect at the time such Plaintiff retired."

Plaintiffs had complained the Monroe failed to "to maintain fully-paid health insurance coverage equivalent to that in effect at the time each Plaintiff-retiree retired" and that the Monroehas breached those CBAs by failing to do so. 

Citing Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 NY2d 562, the Appellate Division disagreed, explaining that "It is well settled that "a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms," and whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Significantly, said the court, extrinsic evidence may not be considered unless the document itself is ambiguous.

The various CBAs at issue provide "retirees" with certain health insurance benefits, but did not define the term "retirees." Plaintiffs interpret the term "retirees" to mean all retirees, even those who are eligible for or enrolled in Medicare. That interpretation is supported by other provisions of the CBAs, such as one that provides such benefits to spouses of deceased retirees "for the lifetime of the surviving spouse or until remarriage" (emphasis added in the decision). 

Monroecontended that the CBAs do not provide for health insurance for those Plaintiffs  eligible for or enrolled in Medicare because of the realities of Medicare, the CBAs' prohibition of duplicate coverage, and the fact that the specific insurance plans in effect at the time of the individual Plaintiffs' retirement were not available to individuals who were eligible for Medicare.

Indicating that the CBAs were ambiguous with respect to whether retirees who are eligible for, or enrolled in, Medicare are entitled to fully-paid health insurance coverage that is equivalent to the insurance coverage in effect at the time they retired, the court turned to "extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent with respect to the health insurance coverage to be provided to those retirees who are eligible for or enrolled in Medicare."

Where, as here, it is determined by a court that "a contract is ambiguous, its interpretation remains the exclusive function of the court unless determination of the intent of the parties depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence."

Noting that "for decades" Monroe's retirees who were not yet eligible for Medicare were provided with health insurance benefit. In contrast, its retirees enrolled in Medicare were only provided with Medicare supplement plans. No objection was made to this arrangement and, until recently, the union representing Plaintiffs never sought to negotiate any additional benefits for retirees eligible for or enrolled in Medicare.*

 

Considering the conduct of the parties "after the contract is formed" the Appellate Division concluded that Monroe had established as a matter of law that it and the union formerly representing Plaintiffs** did not intend that the County be required to maintain fully-paid health insurance coverage equivalent to that in effect at the time of retirement for those Plaintiffs who were eligible for or enrolled in Medicare."

* Presumably such negotiations for additional benefits upon retirement must be effective before, and are only applicable to, employees before their retirement. In Burnham and UFT, 28 PERB 4590, PERB ruled that the union's "duty of fair representation" runs only to employees; there is no such duty with respect to former unit members such as retirees [See, also,  McDonald PBA v City of Geneva, 92 N.Y.2d 326; Kolbe v Tibbetts, 22 NY3d 344].

** Retirees are not employees for the purposes of collective bargaining for the purposes of Article 14 of the Civil Service Law [the Taylor Law] 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_04886.htm

Qualification for office

Qualification for office

Reeves v County of Onondaga, 89 N.Y.2d 901

The New York State Court of Appeals ruled that if an individual is qualified to be appointed to the board of directors of the Central New York Regional Market Authority at the time of appointment, he or she may continue in that position even if he or she does not meet the qualifications at a later date.

§827 of the Public Authorities Law mandates that two members of the three-person board "must be persons engaged in farming who derive a greater part of their income therefrom and who actually sell all or part of their produce on the [Central New York Regional] Market." Timothy D. Reeves sued the Onondaga County Legislature contending that a "farmer-producer" member of the Authority had retired from farming and therefore could no longer serve in that capacity.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that if the farmer-producer members of the Authority were qualified persons at the time of appointment, nothing in §827 required the individual to be terminated "upon a change in his [or her] status as a farmer-producer."

The Doctrine of Unintended Consequences?

The Doctrine of Unintended Consequences?

Source: Albany Time Union

In its decision in Janus v American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et al, 85 U. S. ____ (2018), the United States Supreme Court ruled that employees of a state or a political subdivision of a state may not be required to pay an agency-shop fee to a union unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay such a fee.

In what may be an illustration of the Doctrine of Unintended Consequences, on July 27, 2018, Albany Times Union reporter Rick Karlin states that New York State United Teachers President Andy Pallotta said that in the first two weeks after the Janus decision just nine members left the union, but about 1,200 people who were agency-fee members joined up.

A broad arbitration clause may trump an "exclusion from arbitration" set out in the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure

A broad arbitration clause may trump an "exclusion from arbitration" set out in the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure

Onondaga Community Coll. (Professional Adm'rs of Onondaga Community Coll. Fedn. of Teachers & Adm'rs), 2018 NY Slip Op 04878, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Although Supreme Court granted the Onondaga Community College's [OCC] petition seeking to stay arbitration, the Appellate Division unanimously reversed the lower court's order and granted the Onondaga Community College Federation of Teachers and Administrator's [Federation] cross-motion seeking to compel arbitration.

The Federation had filed a grievance on behalf of one of its members after OCC served the member with a letter notifying her that her position was being retrenched, i.e., eliminated. In its grievance and subsequent demand for arbitration the Federation alleged that OCC had "violated, misinterpreted, and/or inequitably applied the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Among the Federation's claims was that OCC had violated the CBA provision providing that dismissal of an employee having a continuing appointment "shall be for just cause" and was subject to "the grievance procedure of the CBA" as OCC deprived the member of work and benefits without just cause by constructively discharging her in under the guise of a retrenchment.

Concluding that Supreme Court should have denied OCC's petition staying arbitration, the Appellate Division explained:

1. It is well settled that, in deciding an application to stay or compel arbitration under CPLR 7503, the court is concerned only with the threshold determination of arbitrability, and not with the merits of the underlying claim.

2. There is a two-step test to determine "whether a grievance is arbitrable" whereby  [a] the court first determines whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance and [b] if there is no such prohibition, the is to determine whether the CBA demonstrates that the parties agreed to refer this type of dispute to arbitration.

As OCC conceded that arbitration of the grievance is not prohibited pursuant to the first step of the test, the Appellate Division said that "[t]he sole question presented on this appeal is whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue" consistent with the second step of the test.

A court's review under the second step, said the Appellate Division, "is limited to the language of the grievance and the demand for arbitration, as well as to the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom."

Here the Federation alleged that OCC "violated, misinterpreted, and/or inequitably applied the CBA in dismissing the member without just cause" by constructively dismissing the individual under the guise of a retrenchment.

In the words of the Appellate Division, "[i]nasmuch as [Federation] alleged that the ostensible retrenchment of the member's position was actually a dismissal without just cause, we agree with [Federation] that the court erred in concluding that [Federation had challenged OCC's] decision to retrench."

Although, said the Appellate Division, the CBA specifies several exclusions from the definition of a "grievance" that are therefore not subject to arbitration, including a decision by OCC to retrench a position, all other grievances remain subject to arbitration, in this instance the arbitration clause at issue here is broad, and there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the parties' [CBA]. Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled the matter arbitrable, and "the arbitrator will then make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the [CBA], and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them."

In other words, the grievance at issue concerns whether the member was improperly dismissed without just cause under the guise of retrenchment, and there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the grievance and the general subject matter of the CBA. Accordingly, "it is for the arbitrator to determine whether the subject matter of the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration provisions of the [CBA]."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_04878.htm

Employee's resignation after being found guilty of disciplinary charges forfeits his or her right to demand arbitration

Employee's resignation after being found guilty of disciplinary charges forfeits his or her right to demand arbitration

Matter of the Arbitration between Unit 8251, Local 842, CSEA v City of Troy, 169 AD2d 871

 Under the terms of a Taylor Law agreement, an employee against whom disciplinary charges had been filed was entitled to a three step disciplinary proceeding. The third step was arbitration.

In the Matter of the Arbitration between Unit 8251, Local 842, CSEA v City of Troy, the basic issue was the effect of an employee's pre-arbitration resignation on his or her right to demand arbitration.

The worker was found guilty of four acts of misconduct. The hearing officer recommended that the employee be terminated. A few days later the employee submitted his resignation.* On the same day that the employee submitted the resignation the union filed a demand for arbitration. The City refused to submit the issue to arbitration on the grounds that the individual, having resigned from his position, was no longer an employee and thus was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement.

The Union filed a legal action seeking a court order compelling the City to submit the matter to an arbitrator. The Union alleged that the employee had been coerced into submitting the resignation and thus it was null and void. Accordingly, it argued, the individual, not having lawfully resigned from his position, was still covered by the Taylor Law agreement.

The Appellate Division rejected the Union's claims regarding coercion. The decision notes that a union official and a city official simultaneously spoke to the individual regarding the ramifications of his decision to resign and that "[the individual] persisted in this course of action and signed a formal, written notice of resignation, witnessed by both officials."

Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division found that there was no evidence of coercion and that having resigned from his position, the individual was no longer covered by the Taylor Law agreement.

As to the issue of a resignation being coerced from an employee or obtained under duress, the courts have concluded that where an appointing authority has the right, if not the duty, to take disciplinary action against an individual, "it was not duress to threaten to do what one had the legal right to do" [Rychlick v Coughlin, 63 NY2d 643].

Rychlick, in the presence of a union representative, was told that unless he submitted his resignation formal disciplinary charges would be filed against him. Although allowed to confer with his union representative, he was told that he would not be given additional time to confer with an attorney. He was also then advised that unless he resigned, charges would be filed. Rychlick submitted his resignation.

A few days later Rychlick asked to withdraw the resignation on the grounds that it had be "forced" from him. When his request was denied, Rychlick sued, claiming the resignation had been obtained under duress and thus was void.

Ultimately the Court of Appeals upheld the agency's refusal to allow Rychlick to withdraw the resignation, indicating that the "threat to file formal charges ... if [Rychlick] did not resign does not constitute duress."

* N.B. The Rules of the State Civil Service Commission, which apply to State officers and employees, provide that "every resignation shall be in writing" [4 NYCRR 5.3]. Most local commissions and personnel officers have adopted a similar rule or regulation.

Considering the employee’s history of misconduct, her inappropriate treatment of patients, and other factors, the hearing officer recommended termination of employment

Considering the employee’s history of misconduct, her inappropriate treatment of patients, and other factors, the hearing officer recommended termination of employment

NYC Office of Trials and Hearings, OATH Index No. 486/18

The Appointing Authority served disciplinary charges against an employee alleged the employee, a service aide:

1) made disrespectful comments to her supervisor;

2) announced that there was going to be a fight and instigated a verbal altercation with a co-worker;

3) used profanity while snatching a meal tray from a patient; and

4) took a meal tray from a patient before he had finished eating and rudely commented to the patient that he was inadvertently exposed.

After a three-day trial, OATH Administrative Law Judge Joycelyn McGeachy-Kuls found that Appointing Authority had proven the charged misconduct.

Taking into consideration service aide's history of misconduct, the disruption that she caused in the workplace and her inappropriate treatment of patients, Judge McGreach-Kuls recommended that the aide be termination from her position.

The Appointing Authority adopted the ALJ's findings and recommendation and terminate the service aide from her position.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/18_cases/18-486.pdf