Challenging a hearing officer's decision that concluded that an individual absent from work pursuant to §207-c of the General Municipal Law can perform certain light duty

Challenging a hearing officer's decision that concluded that an individual absent from work pursuant to §207-c of the General Municipal Law can perform certain light duty

Mankowski v Nassau County, 2018 NY Slip Op 02470, Appellate Division, Second Department

Stanley Mankowski, a correction officer, was injured by inmate and was absent from work due to the line-of-duty injury and continued to receive his salary and other benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c.* Treated by an orthopedic surgeon, in a police surgeon designated by the appointing authority to conduct examinations assessing Mankowski's capability of returning to work, found that Mankowski could return to work " in a restricted/light-duty capacity" such as in an administrative role with no supervision of inmates.

Mankowski's union filed a contract grievance and commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court, seeking a court order to enjoin the enforcement of the report of the police surgeon dated January 20, 2015, contending that "under the applicable collective bargaining agreement, it was the responsibility of the hearing officer, not a police surgeon, to determine the restrictions under which the petitioner was to return to work."

Supreme Court vacated the hearing officer's determination on the ground that the hearing officer exceeded or imperfectly executed her power such that a final and definite award was not made, and remitted the matter to the hearing officer to make the required determination. In a determination on remittal dated March 26, 2015, the hearing officer adopted the factual findings of the police surgeon and specified the the types of duties to which Mankowski could be assigned.

Again Mankowski challenged the hearing officer's ruling, filing a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking a judicial review the hearing officer's determinations dated January 20, 2015, and March 26, 2015, respectively, on the ground, among others, that they were not supported by substantial evidence. Supreme Court disagreed and determining that the hearing officer's determinations could be reviewed pursuant to both CPLR Articles 75 and 78, found that both of the hearing officer's determinations were supported by substantial evidence and denied Mankowski's petition. Mankowski appealed.

The Appellate Division, noting that as Mankowski's petition raises a question of whether the hearing officer's determinations were supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court should have transferred the proceeding to Appellate Division. However, as the "complete record is now before" the Appellate Division, the court treated the matter as one which has been transferred to it and reviewed the hearing officer's determinations de novo.

The Appellate Division said that a municipality is entitled to require an injured officer to submit to a medical examination and, if the physician determines that the officer is able to perform specified types of light duty, the municipality may discontinue payment of the officer's full salary or wages if the officer refuses to return to work when a light-duty post is available and offered to the officer. In the event the individual challenges the medical finding and submits evidence from his or her treating physician to support a claim of "continued total disability," however, the termination of benefits payable under General Municipal Law § 207-c and an order to report for duty may not be enforced until an administrative hearing has been held

In this instance the correction officer sought such an administrative hearing. As the hearing officer's determination following that hearing was subject to review pursuant to CPLR Article 78, "[j]udicial review of a determination of an administrative agency made after a hearing required by law is limited to consideration of whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence."

Noting that substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact," the Appellate Division found that the hearing officer's determinations dated January 20, 2015, and March 26, 2015, respectively, finding that Mankowski was able to return to work on restricted duty, were supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that the hearing officer's determinations must be confirmed, denied Mankowski's petition dismissed the proceeding on the merits; and awarded one bill of costs to the employer.

* General Municipal Law §207-c requires certain municipalities to continue to pay law enforcement personnel who sustain a disability in the course of their employment their salary and certain other benefits while on "leave for disability." General Municipal Law §207-a provides for the payment of similar benefits to firefighters injured in the performance of their duties.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_02470.htm

Terminating the services of a public officer following the expiration of his or her fixed term of office serving as a "hold-over" employee

Terminating the services of a public officer following the expiration of his or her fixed term of office serving as a "hold-over" employee

Phillips v Town of Glenville, 2018 NY Slip Op 02702, Appellate Division, Third Department

§5 of the Public Officers Law addresses situations in which an incumbent is continues to be employed in the position after expiration of his or her term office and provides, in pertinent part, that "Every officer except a  judicial officer, a notary public, a commissioner of deeds and an officer whose term is fixed by the constitution, having duly entered on the duties of his office, shall, unless the office shall terminate or be abolished, hold over and continue to discharge the duties of his office, after the expiration of the term for which he shall have been chosen, until his successor shall be chosen and qualified; but after the expiration of such term, the office shall be deemed vacant for the purpose of choosing his successor." §5 further provides that "An officer so holding over for one or more entire terms, shall, for the purpose of choosing his successor, be regarded as having been newly chosen for such terms."*

In Phillips v Town of Glenville the Appellate Division addressed the a number of issues resulting from a "holdover" employment situation.

George J. Phillips was appointed to the office of Comptroller for Town of Glenville in 2001 and was subsequently reappointed to the position biennially, the last such appointment being for the period January 1, 2008 thru and including December 31, 2009. In January 2010 the Town Board notified Phillips that he would not be reappointed to the office of Comptroller, but that he could continue on as Acting Comptroller pending the appointment of his successor. In December 2012 in the course of a Town Board meeting the Town Board authorized the Town Supervisor terminate Phillips employment, effective December 31, 2012.

The Town Supervisor met with Phillips on December 28, 2012 and advised him that his employment was being terminated as of December 31, 2012 and later that same day Phillips was given a from the Town confirming his termination. Notwithstanding receiving notice of his termination, Phillips submitted an email to the Town's Deputy Supervisor on December 31, 2012 indicating his intention to resign and requested payment for certain accrued sick time. On January 2, 2010 Phillips submitted a notarized letter to the Town Clerk, resigning from his office with the Town.

Ultimately Phillips initiated a lawsuit contending that [1] his termination from employment was without legal effect as it was contrary to law; [2] improper and taken in bad faith; by operation of law he continued in the office of Comptroller as a hold over pending the appointment of his successor; and in consideration of the submission of his, he is entitled to recover his accrued sick time, personal time, vacation time and salary, including longevity, through January 2, 2013.

Phillips submitted a motion for summary judgment on his petition to Supreme Court, which the court denied but did grant the Town's motion for summary judgment. Phillips appealed but the Appellate Division affirmed, explaining that with respect to the Town's cross motion for summary judgment, it was Town's burden to establish a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering sufficient evidence demonstrating the absence of any material issue of fact.

The Town did so, said the court, by submitting affidavits by the Town Clerk and the Town's Deputy Supervisor.

These affidavits, among other things, recited Phillips' employment history with the Town, indicated that, upon expiration of Phillips' 2008 appointment he was not reappointed as Comptroller and, instead, accepted the position of Acting Comptroller, a position with no fixed term or tenure that serves at the pleasure of the Town Board and the events involving the Town Board's meeting which specifically included an item calling for the Town Board to meet in executive session to discuss a personnel matter.

In particular, the Deputy Supervisor's affidavit stated that "even assuming that [Phillips']  position as Acting Comptroller qualified him to receive a cash payment for unused accrued sick time pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the Civil Service Employees Association and the Town, inasmuch as the Town terminated [his] employment, he was ineligible to receive any such payments.

Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Division ruled that the Town had met its initial summary judgment burden, effectively shifting the burden to Phillips to raise a triable issue of fact.

Considering Phillips' argument that in accordance with Public Officers Law §5, he was entitled, as a matter of law, to continue occupying the office of Comptroller until such time as his successor was chosen and qualified, which he contended did not occur until after he had resigned from office on January 2, 2013 and thus he was entitled to payment for certain accrued benefits the Appellate Division said that it found that argument unavailing.

The court explained that Phillips conceded that he was not reappointed to the office of Comptroller after the expiration of his 2008 reappointment. Accordingly, by operation of law, he no longer held the office of Comptroller and the position was considered vacant for purposes of appointing a successor as of January 1, 2010.

As to Phillips' reliance on his employment status with the Town on and after January 1, 2010, whether as a hold over within the meaning of Public Officers Law §5 or in consideration of the fact that he accepted the Town's offer to continue as Acting Comptroller in a temporary capacity, such employment status was immaterial because, in either case, Phillips' employment status was that of an at-will employee and, as such, he served at the pleasure of the Town Board. Further, observed the Appellate Division, in the absence of any specific limitation on the Town's authority to terminate Phillips, the Town Board was within its discretion to terminate him, as an at-will employee, at its December 2012 meeting. Significantly, the court said that "as a terminated employee, [Phillips] was not eligible to receive an award of any accrued benefits."

Another argument advanced by Phillips was that Town Board's December 12, 2012 determination to terminate plaintiff's employment was rendered null and void based on a violation of the Open Meetings Law. This claim was rejected by the Appellate Division.

The court said even assuming that the Town Board's December 12, 2012 meeting was procedurally defective and violated the Open Meetings Law for failing to sufficiently particularize the subject to be considered during executive session, its actions with respect to Phillips' employment were "not void but, rather, voidable." As there was nothing in the record before the Appellate Division establishing that the Town intentionally violated the Open Meetings Law and, "given that timely notice of the subject meeting was disseminated prior thereto and the undisputed fact that plaintiff was not reappointed to the office of Comptroller and, therefore, served as an at-will employee," we find that, under the circumstances presented, Phillips "failed to demonstrate sufficient good cause to warrant exercising our discretionary authority to invalidate [the Town's] determination terminating [Phillips'] employment."

* §5 further provides that in the event a term of office is truncated by reason of a predecessor holding over, the successor appointee shall serve for "the residue of the term only."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_02702.htm

Suspension of an educator without pay upon being served with disciplinary charges of misconduct constituting physical or sexual abuse of a student after June 30, 2015

Suspension of an educator without pay upon being served with disciplinary charges of misconduct constituting physical or sexual abuse of a student after June 30, 2015

New York State Education Law §3020-a

On October 6, 2018, the Albany Times Union*reported that an elementary school teacher will resign from his position when he is sentenced after pleading guilty to a misdemeanor charge of child endangerment. The educator was placed on leave with pay in April 2018 upon school officials learning that he was under investigation for allegedly "having inappropriate contact with a young girl during the 2010-11 school year.

It should be noted that §3020-a.2.c of the Education Law provides, in pertinent part, "Where charges of misconduct constituting physical or sexual abuse of a student are brought on or after July first, two thousand fifteen, the board of education may suspend the employee without pay pending an expedited hearing pursuant to subparagraph (i-a) of paragraph c of subdivision three of this section."

§3020-a.2.c  further provides that:

1. The Commissioner of Education "shall establish a process in regulations for a probable cause hearing before an impartial hearing officer within ten days to determine whether the decision to suspend an employee without pay pursuant to this paragraph  should be continued or reversed;"

2. In the event the hearing officer determines that no probable cause supports the charges, he or she shall reverse the decision of the board of education to suspend the employee without pay and reinstate such pay and [a] may also reinstate pay upon a written determination that a suspension without pay is grossly disproportionate in light of all surrounding circumstances; and [b] such an employee shall be eligible to receive reimbursement for withheld pay and accrued interest at a rate of six percent compounded annually if the hearing officer finds in his or her favor, either at the probable cause hearing or in a final determination pursuant to the expedited hearing held pursuant to subparagraph (i-a) of paragraph c of subdivision three of this section;

3. Such a suspension without pay "shall last no longer than one hundred and twenty days from the decision of the board of education to suspend the employee without pay and such suspension shall only relate to employee compensation, exclusive of other benefits and guarantees;" and

4. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law or regulation to the contrary, any provision of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the city of New York as of April first, two thousand fifteen, that provides for suspension without pay for offenses as specified in this paragraph shall supersede the provisions hereof and shall continue in effect without modification and may be extended." 

* The article is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Guilderland-teacher-to-resign-in-December-13285113.php