A public retirement system's denial of an application for retroactive membership in the System must be supported by substantial evidence

A public retirement system's denial of an application for retroactive membership in the System must be supported by substantial evidence

Sears v DiNapoli, 2018 NY Slip Op 08610, Appellate Division, Third Department

§803.a of the Retirement and Social Security Law [RSSL] addresses processing applications for retroactive membership in a public retirement system of New York State and provides, in pertinent part, that "A public retirement system shall have the authority to grant relief from a failure to file an application for membership in that system in connection with service rendered prior to April first, nineteen hundred ninety-three in accordance with the provisions of this [§803]."

Patricia Sears, a permanent employee of the Department of Taxation and Finance [T&F] from November 1977 until her retirement in July 2015 was enrolled in ERS as a Tier 3 member.  Prior thereto her permanent appointment in 1977, Sears had been employed by T&F as a seasonal employment on two occasions, initially from March 4, 1976 to June 30, 1976 and then again from January 6, 1977 until September 16, 1977. Prior to the commencement of her second temporary period of employment with T&F Sears signed a waiver dated December 28, 1976 acknowledging her right to join the Retirement System and elected not to do so.*

After RSSL §803 was enacted in 1993, Sears sought, but was denied, retroactive Tier 2 membership in ERS. Shortly before Sears retired in July 2015, she again sought to have her ERS membership in Tier 3 changed to a Tier 2 membership. Although ERS again denied Sears' request for Tier 2 membership, Sears challenged the decision via an administrative hearing and the Hearing Officer recommended Sears' application for retroactive Tier 2 membership be granted. The Comptroller rejected the Hearing Officer's recommendation and Sears filed an Article 78 petition challenging the Comptroller's determination.

The Appellate Division said the ERS conceded, and its review of the record confirms, that the underlying determination denying Sears' application to Tier 2 membership in ERS was not supported by substantial evidence. In words of the court, "As the Hearing Officer aptly observed, the waiver signed by [Sears] in December 1976 cannot be applied retroactively to encompass [Sears'] initial period of seasonal employment from March 1976 to June 1976, and Sears testified without contradiction that she was neither offered an opportunity to join nor declined membership in the Retirement System at that time."

The court explained that there was no information in Sears' personnel file regarding her membership options or opportunities when she was first hired in 1976, nor were there any current employees who could attest to the membership notification procedures that were in place when Sears was initially employed by T&F. Further, said the court, the documentary proof offered at the hearing was insufficient to establish, among other things, that Sears participated in a procedure that a reasonable person would recognize as an opportunity to join or decline membership in the Retirement System.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division annulled the Comptroller's determination, granted Sears application for retroactive Tier 2 status in ERS and remitted the matter to ERS "further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision."

In contrast, see Schuyler v New York State & Local Employees' Retirement System at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_00874.htm where the Appellate Division ruled that a "lack of documentation, coupled with information suggesting that petitioner's services were performed as an independent contractor rather than a state employee, supports the Comptroller's denial of petitioner's request for additional service credit."

* Frequently employees, other than employees in the Labor Class, eligible for membership in ERS but not required to become a member, declined becoming a member in order to avoid being required to make employee contributions to ERS and participating in Social Security. Employees in the Labor Class were required to participate in Social Security regardless of their membership in ERS.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_08610.htm

As a general rule, the determination of whether a person is “qualified” should be made at the time of the alleged discriminatory employment action

As a general rule, the determination of whether a person is “qualified” should be made at the time of the alleged discriminatory employment action

Smith v. Town of Ramapo, USSC, Second Circuit, Docket 18-148-cv*

The single issue before the court in this appeal was whether Raymond K. Smith’s inability to perform the essential functions of his job at the time of the alleged discrimination forecloses his claim of discrimination under §102(a) of the Americans with Disability Act [ADA].   

Due to an injury Smith could no longer work as a police officer and Ramapo approved his disability status under New York General Municipal Law §207-c.** Smith alleged that Ramapo treated him differently than nondisabled officers in violation of the ADA.   

After qualifying for §207-c disability benefits, Smith was not permitted to use vacation days he had previously accrued when working as a police officer; and, while disabled, Smith was unable to accrue new vacation time or to take bereavement leave. The district court concluded that Smith failed to plead a necessary element of his ADA discrimination claim, namely that he was qualified to be a police officer at the time of the alleged discrimination. The Circuit Court agreed, explaining that one of the elements of a claim under the ADA is that an employee was "qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation."

Smith’s injury, however, severely limited the use of his arm and shoulder and left him unable to engage in many daily activities and nowhere in his complaint did he claim that following his injury he could have performed the essential duties of a police officer, either with or without a reasonable accommodation. 

Citing Stevens v. Rite Aid Corp., 851 F.3d 224, the Circuit Court noted that where a disability renders an individual unable to perform the essential functions of the job, "that disability renders him or her unqualified.”

Thus Smith’s failure to plead that he was qualified to be a police officer is fatal to his claim. Although Smith cited Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, in contending he was "qualified' to be a police officer at the time he earned certain benefits, and that he is entitled to those benefits under the ADA regardless of his ability to serve as a police officer at the time of the discrimination, the court said that "Smith misreads Castellano, and his claim was properly dismissed," noting that Castellano hold that retired employees who were qualified to perform the essential functions of their jobs while employed remain entitled to receive post-employment benefits. The general rule, said the Circuit Court, is that the determination of whether a person is "qualified" should be made at the time of the discriminatory employment action and Castellano created a narrow exception to the rule for post-employment benefits intended to be used by retirees.   

In any event, the court indicated Smith’s claims were not about post-employment benefits, or any benefit used by a former employee., nor did he allege that he was ultimately deprive of the value of any previously accrued benefit, such as a payout for his accumulated vacation days.   

As the Castellano’s exception does not apply in Smith's situation and because Smith failed to plead that he was able to perform the essential duties of a police officer at the time of the alleged discrimination, the court ruled that he "failed to state a claim for disability discrimination."

Click here to Read a FREE excerpt from Disability Benefits for fire, police and other public sector personnel in New York State.

* The decision noted that it is a "Summary Order" and rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect.

** §207-c  provides for the payment of salary and medical expenses to a police officer who is injured in the performance of his or her official duties.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/5c82839c-7f0a-452f-8af6-8449599f621b/8/doc/18-148_so.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/5c82839c-7f0a-452f-8af6-8449599f621b/8/hilite/

Determining the liability of a government entity for an alleged negligent performance of a governmental function

Determining the liability of a government entity for an alleged negligent performance of a governmental function

Wilson v New York City Bd. of Educ., 2018 NY Slip Op 08534, Appellate Division, Second Department

Judith Wilson, an elementary school principal, allegedly was injured when a 12-year-old student grabbed a cell phone from Wilson's hand. Wilson commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against the New York City Board of Education and the City of New York, [BOE] alleging that a school safety officer failed to adequately protect her. The critical issue to be determined in this action was the liability of the BOE for the injury suffered by Wilson. However, Supreme Court granted BOE's motion for summary judgment and Wilson appealed.

Sustaining the lower court ruling, the Appellate Division explained that a school district may not be held liable for the negligent performance of its governmental function of supervising children in its charge in the absence of a special duty to the person injured. The court then indicated that there are three ways in which a special relationship with a municipal defendant can be formed with teachers, administrators, or other adults on or off school premises: 

(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons;

(2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or

(3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation" 

The Appellate Division further explained that with respect to a special relationship based upon a duty voluntarily assumed by the municipality, such a relationship requires proof of the following four elements:

(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured;

(2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm;

(3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and

(4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.

In addition, said the court, the "assurance" by the municipal defendant must be definite enough to generate justifiable reliance by [Wilson]" citing Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d 872.

Ruling that the Board of Education established, prima facie, that it did not owe Wilson a special duty and that Wilson failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Appellate Division said it agreed with the Supreme Court's determination granting BOE's motion for summary judgment dismissing Wilson's complaint.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_08534.htm