ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL

March 30, 2019

April 2019 AELE publication alert


The April 2019 issue of AELE's Fire, Police and Corrections Personnel Reporter is now available online.

It includes material concerning age discrimination, arbitration procedures, defamation, the First Amendment, secondary employment [a.k.a. moonlighting], handicap/abilities discrimination, including handicap accommodation in general, pregnancy discrimination, racial harassment, and taxation.


March 29, 2019

A party not the individual's employer may not be held liable alleged adverse employment actions


The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Petitioner's complaint, explaining that Plaintiff's allegations relating to disability retirement recommendations of the Police Pension Fund's Medical Board are misdirected as [a] the Police Pension Fund is a corporate entity independent and distinct from the police department or the City of New York and [b] is not Plaintiff's employer.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division opined that "Defendants cannot be held liable for the Police Pension Fund's alleged adverse employment actions." 

Other procedural defects noted by the Appellate Division:

1. Petitioner's allegations of employment discrimination based on events that occurred before April 8, 2011 are time-barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations [see CPLR 214[2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502[d] and the Continuous Violation Doctrine does not apply in this instance; and

2. Plaintiff's timely allegations fail to state viable claims sounding in unlawful employment discrimination.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_09027.htm


March 28, 2019

Excessed educator claims back pay, benefits and pension credit based on the appointing authority's alleged failure to reinstate her from the preferred eligible list


The genesis of this appeal to the Commissioner of Education was a notice sent to petitioner [Appellant] that her elementary tenure area position would be abolished effective July 1, 2003 and that her name would be placed on a preferred eligible list. Appellant challenged a number of the actions taken by the appointing authority [Employer] in the course of processing her for reinstatement to a position in her tenure area. Essentially Appellant contended that the actions taken by Employer were inconsistent with her rights as an individual eligible to be reinstated to a position from a preferred eligible list.*

The issue  before the Commissioner concerned Appellant's assertion that Employer:

[1] unlawfully filled teaching vacancies by temporary appointment before recalling Appellant who was the most senior qualified teacher on the preferred eligible list; and

[2] her demand for back pay, benefits and pension credit to which she claimed she was entitled as a result of such alleged "unlawful appointments" and other actions by the Employer.

Employer, in rebuttal, contended that:

[a] It had acted in good faith;

[b] Appellant failed to meet her burden of demonstrating a clear right to the relief she sought in that she did not, or could not, demonstrate that she performed the duties one of the positions sought while serving in her former position within the meaning of the relevant law and regulations;

[c] Appellant's petition failed to state a cause of action;

[d] Appellant's petition was untimely and moot;

[e] Appellant did not attempt, or failed, to mitigate her damages; and

[f] Appellant failed to serve certain necessary parties with a notice of her appeal and copies of the complaint.

After addressing a number of the procedural concerns raised by the parties involving timeliness, service and verification of certain filings, the Commissioner ruled that they lacked merit, as did Employer's contention that Applicant had not named and served certain individuals as "necessary parties".

With respect to Employer's contention concerning necessary parties, the Commissioner explained that "[a] party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a Appellant is a necessary party and must be joined as such." Here, however, the Commissioner noted that the record indicated that both of the individuals Employer claimed were necessary parties had resigned from their respective positions with the Employer in 2008 and, therefore, would not be adversely affected by a decision in this appeal.  Further, opined the Commissioner, as Appellant is only seeking back pay, benefits and pension credit and not reinstatement to her former position, Appellant had joined all necessary parties.

The Commissioner also rejected Employer's argument that the appeal must be dismissed as moot because Appellant had retired in 2010.  Noting that an employee’s preferred eligible list recall rights do not survive his or her formal retirement unless it can be demonstrated that the individual's decision to retire was involuntary or made under duress the Commissioner found that the record showed Appellant did not claim that her retirement was involuntary or made under duress. Further, said the Commissioner, Appellant is not claiming a recall right to a vacancy that occurred or was created after her retirement, but rather she is claiming a right to back pay, benefits and pension credit based on Employer's alleged failure to reinstate her from the preferred eligible list her to a position in the elementary tenure area prior to her retirement that was the subject of pending litigation at the time of her retirement. 

Accordingly, the Commissioner, in consideration of an earlier court decision involving the same parties, that determined that "the Commissioner has primary jurisdiction over the issue of similarity of positions," declined to dismiss the appeal as moot.

Turning to the merits of the appeal, the Commissioner indicated that Appellant’s recall rights, if any, are to appointment to vacancies in a position similar to the position she formerly held.  On this record the Commissioner found that Employer had offered Appellant the positions that were in compliance with the recall requirements set out in Education Law §3013 and concluded that Appellant’s claim that she was justified in refusing to accept or ignoring offers of reinstatement to a teacher of pre-school position was meritless. 

The language that Appellant found "unacceptably ambiguous" in Employer' letter advising her that she was being reinstated from the preferred eligible list stated "[p]lease be advised, since you are on the preferred eligibility list, you may have rights to this position.  However, we do have to recall in order of seniority."

Clearly, said the Commissioner, the letter extended an offer of appointment to the position was conditioned only on Appellant having the greatest length of service of the persons on the appropriate preferred eligible list, a statutory requirements set out in Education Law §3013, and the record indicated that Appellant did, in fact, have the greatest seniority of the teachers on the preferred eligible list at issue.**

Noting that Employer's attorney had clearly and unambiguously confirmed in writing that Appellant would be appointed if she accepted the position, the Commissioner ruled that under the circumstances, Appellant, by failing to accept the position, "rejected Employer’s unconditional offer of appointment and could not claim a right to reinstatement to the ... position." As a result, Appellant could not assert a right to back pay, benefits and pension benefits based on Employer's failure to appoint her to that position.

Subsequently Appellate failed to respond to a second, similar letter from Employer's director of human resources requesting that she either accept or decline yet another position.  As was the case with the earlier event, the Commissioner found that Appellant, by failing to accept the position, rejected Employer's unconditional offer of appointment and could not claim a right to reinstatement to that position nor a right to back pay, benefits and pension benefits based on Employer's failure to appoint her to that position.

However, Appellant also claimed a right to back pay, benefits and pension credit based on Employer's failure to reinstate her to a third position in the "family literacy educator" tenure area for the 2006-2007 school year. As there was nothing in the record indicating that Employer offered to appoint Appellant to any of those positions in that tenure area from the preferred eligible list, Appellant’s right to relief depends on whether the position of family literacy educator was similar to that of Appellant’s former position.

In consideration of evidence in the record addressing the duties of these positions, the Commissioner concluded that Appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that 50 percent or more of the duties of the two family literacy educator positions available in the 2006-2007 school year were similar to the duties of her former position in the tenure area of "teacher of gifted and talented education."

The bottom line: the  Commissioner dismissed the instant appeal in its entirety.

* Employer's human resources director's sent Appellant a letter notifying her that a vacant position existed within the Employer and asked her to accept or decline the position.  Appellant responded, asserting that the letter was too ambiguous and was not a final determination that she would be appointed to the teacher position and asked for "a valid offer of re-employment to enable her to make an informed decision." Employer's attorney wrote to Appellant's attorney that if Applicant either signed the settlement agreement or indicated acceptance of the position in response to the recall letter, she would be appointed to the position. Appellant did not accept or decline the pre-school teacher position and the position was filled by another individual. Employer later sent Appellant an unconditional employment offer and requested that that she indicate her willingness to accept or reject this position by a specified date.  Appellant did not respond to the notification and, again, the position was filled by another individual. Ultimately Employer removed Appellant from the preferred eligibility list after seven years had passed from the date on which Appellant’s position had been abolished [see §3013.3]. 

** It should be noted that a preferred list for a particular title or position is a "moving target" as names are added to it to reflect the reinstatement rights of individuals excessed as the result of subsequent layoffs. Preferred eligible lists are revised to reflect "seniority rank order" of individuals added to, or deleted from, the list over time.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

March 27, 2019

The continuing violation exception when filing of a complaint alleging a violation of New York State's Human Rights Law is not triggered by a single event


Petitioner appealed Supreme Court's granting the New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities' [OPDM] pre-answer motion to dismiss the Petitioner's complaint alleging unlawful discrimination in violation of New York State's Human Rights Law based on OPDM's rejection of her application for employment as "time-barred".

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's ruling.

Noting that OPDM had the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that Petitioner's cause of action was untimely filed, the Appellate Division said that OPDM had established that the last discriminatory act set forth in the Petitioner's complaint occurred on August 30, 2013. Accordingly Petitioner's cause of action accrued, and the three-year statute of limitations for the Human Rights Law began to run, on that date. However, Plaintiff did not file her complaint until March 10, 2017, more than six months after the statute of limitations period had expired.

OPDM, having made a prima facie showing that Petitioner action was untimely, shifted the burden of going forward to Petitioner to establish that some exception to the limitations period applied in her situation that would allow her lawsuit to go forward. Petitioner attempted to do so by alleging that the continuing violation exception was applicable in her situation and thus her action had been timely filed.

The Appellate Division disagreed, concluding that Petitioner had failed to meet her burden of proof. Assuming, but not conceding, that the denial of Petitioner's application for employment constituted an act of unlawful discrimination, this constituted but a "single act" rather than evidence of "an ongoing policy of discrimination." 

The court explained that a single act of unlawful discrimination does not trigger the continuing violation exception and thus the running of the statute of limitations had not been tolled and had expired "six or more months" prior to the date on which Petitioner had filed her complaint.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


March 26, 2019

Judicial review of student disciplinary action taken by a private college or university is limited to whether the institution substantially complied with its own rules



A New York Supreme Court denied a petition filed by a student [Student] attending a private institution of higher education [Institution]. Student had asked the court to annul the Institution's decision affirming a hearing committee's suspending the Student for one semester based on its finding that Student had engaged in academic dishonesty -- forging an examination booklet. Student appealed the Supreme Court's decision, arguing that the disciplinary action taken by the Institution violated his right to "due process."*

The Appellate Division commenced its review of Student's appeal by observing that Student's "due process" challenge was misplaced. Citing Cavanagh v Cathedral Preparatory Seminary, 284 AD2d 360, among other decisions, the court explained that a student at a private university is not afforded the "full panoply" of due process rights that might be available to a student at a public institution of higher education.

Accordingly, in the absence of any "State involvement," the only issue for review by the court is whether the institution substantially complied with [1] its own rules; [2]  was made in accordance with its written disciplinary policy; and [3] was rationally based and not arbitrary and capricious.

Turning to the Institution's procedures, the Appellate Division observed that Student "had ample opportunity at the hearing to defend his conduct and explain his actions." However, said the court, the Institution's rejection of Student's explanation as not credible was not irrational nor was the denial of Student's internal appeal irrational. The Institutions' written policy provided for limited grounds for appeal, "none of which availed Student."

Citing Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale and  Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, the Appellate Division opined that there was nothing shocking or disproportionate about the one-semester suspension imposed on Student.

Addressing another issue, Student's allegation that the Institution had defamed him, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court's dismissal of his defamation claim was correct because:

1. The subject statements were true;

2. The statements had not been published to any persons outside the university; and

3. The Institution's statements were protected by a qualified common interest privilege.

As to Student's allegations of malice, the Appellate Division said that this amounted to little more than "mere surmise and conjecture" and therefore was insufficient to overcome the Institution's qualified common interest privilege.

Another issue addressed in this action involve Student's allegation that he had been defamed by the disciplinary action taken against him by Institution.

** The so-called "Pell Doctrine" defines a reasonable disciplinary penalty as one that is "neither arbitrary and capricious nor so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


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New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
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