Increasing a retired employee's contributions for health insurance premiums

The City of White Plains [the City] adopted an ordinance in 2010 that terminated the City's paying 100 percent of the premiums for health insurance on behalf of its retired police officers, requiring the retired officer to pay the difference, if any, between 85 percent of the cost of the premium for participation in the New York State Empire Health Insurance Program and the full premium for the health insurance plan in which the retired officer was enrolled.

Retired police officers appointed prior to July 1, 1995 and who had retired prior to May 24, 2010 [Retirees], contending that the ordinance violated Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, brought an action in federal district court challenging the City's action.

  

The federal district court granting summary judgment in favor of the City and the other municipal defendants named in the action and the Retirees appealed. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the district court's ruling.

Addressing the Retirees' "Contracts Clause" claim, the court said that the Retirees argue that the City’s 2010 Ordinance violates the Constitution's Contracts Clause because "their collective bargaining agreement [CBA] guaranteed that the City would pay the full cost of their health insurance premiums. However, said the Circuit Court, "this claim fails because [the Retirees] have forfeited any argument that the 2010 Ordinance constitutes an impairment, rather than a contractual breach." Further, said the court, the Retirees "also failed to contradict record evidence provided by the City that the 2010 Ordinance served a significant public purpose or that any contractual impairment of that guarantee was reasonable and necessary to effectuate that purpose."

Citing Buffalo Teachers, 464 F.3d at 369, the court noted that that it had held that “the legislative interest in addressing a fiscal emergency is a legitimate public interest”  and, at most, the Retirees "dispute that the City was in a “real fiscal emergency.”

As the District Court explained, "the City provided substantial unrebutted evidence that the 2010 Ordinance was passed to address a serious budget shortfall and impending credit downgrade caused by the global financial crisis that started in 2008 and, for the City, worsened considerably as of 2010 and the Circuit Court said it agreed "with the District Court that any alleged impairment caused by the 2010 Ordinance to address the City’s fiscal emergency was reasonable and necessary—a conclusion that the appellants in any event do not challenge on appeal.*  

Addressing the Retirees' Equal Protection Claim, the Circuit Court noted that the Retirees were all retired at the time the 2012–2018 collective bargaining agreement between the City and the representative of police officers then in service was executed and, agreeing with the district court, said that the Retirees were not similarly situated to active employees who could participate in collective bargaining, affirmed the dismissal of the Retirees’ equal protection claim.**  

* The decision notes that City "presented ample evidence that it passed the 2010 Ordinance only after pursuing a range of measures to increase revenue and cut expenses" and although New York law permitted the City to require the appellants to contribute up to 50 percent of the premium amount, the 2010 Ordinance required the Retirees to contribute substantially less.

** In McDonald PBA v City of Geneva, Ct. of Appeals, 92 N.Y.2d 326, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of a Taylor Law contract providing otherwise, a municipality’s past practice does not demonstrate any right to compel the municipality to continue providing the same level of health benefits to its retirees as it has in the past.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/a9a7d59f-59fc-4e77-a184-1fff3c5958dd/3/doc/18-1348_so.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/a9a7d59f-59fc-4e77-a184-1fff3c5958dd/3/hilite/

Eligibility for supplemental benefits being paid pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a terminates upon the disabled firefighter attaining his mandatory service retirement age

Plaintiff, a former City of Buffalo firefighter who was granted performance of duty disability retirement benefits in accordance with Retirement and Social Security Law §363-c received a supplemental benefit until the City of Buffalo [Respondent] discontinued paying the supplement upon Plaintiff's attaining age 62.*

Plaintiff initiated a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking reinstatement of the supplemental benefit, with back payment, contending that Chapter 585 of the Laws of 2008 amended Retirement and Social Security Law [RSSL] §384-d(i) and revised the mandatory service retirement age from age 62 to age 65. Plaintiff argued that he was being denied equal protection of the law in view of the fact that "other similarly situated firefighters" continued to receive the supplemental benefit from appointing authority beyond age 62.

Supreme Court denied the petition and Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling, noting that "[i]t is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature," citing Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205.

The Appellate Division opined that the plain language of the amendment and its legislative history  establish that the amendment was intended, as relevant to Plaintiff, to permit certain firefighter members of the retirement system who are "capable of performing the duties of their position" to continue working until the age of 65 while retaining the mandatory service retirement age of 62 for disabled firefighters receiving RSSL §384-d(i) retirement plan benefits.

In the words of the court, "[w]hen the terms of related statutes are involved, as is the case here, they must be analyzed in context and in a manner that harmonize[s] the related provisions . . . [and] renders them compatible," citing Matter of M.B., 6 NY3d 437. As it was undisputed that the Plaintiff is not "capable of performing the duties of [his] position ... the mandatory service retirement age applicable to him" is 62." Accordingly, the Appellate Division opined that Supreme Court "properly determined that [Plaintiff] was not entitled to the supplemental benefit after he attained [age 62]."

Addressing Plaintiff's contention that he had been denied "equal protection of the law" when Respondent discontinued paying him the supplement to his retirement allowance upon his attaining age 62, the Appellate Division said that Plaintiff had presented "no evidence . . . to support a finding that [he] ha[d] been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment."

Thus, ruled the Appellate Division,  "[Supreme Court] properly determined that the record did not support [Plaintiff's] contention that Respondent denied him equal protection of the law."

* General Municipal Law 207-a(2) provides for a supplement equal to the  difference  between  the  amounts  received  under   his   allowance  or  pension  and  the  amount of his regular salary or   wages  to be added the disabled firefighter's retirement allowance to equate which supplement is discontinued the firefighter attaining the mandatory service retirement age applicable to   him.

consistent with the relevant provision of the Retirement and Social Security Law.

upon the firefighter attaining the mandatory service retirement age applicable to   him.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_04534.htm

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Disability Benefits for fire, police and other public sector personnel - Addresses retirement for disability under the NYS Employees' Retirement System, the NYS Teachers' Retirement System, General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and similar statutes providing benefits to employees injured both "on-the-job" and "off-the-job." For more information click on  

http://booklocker.com/books/3916.html

The appropriate statute of limitations for commencing litigation of an issue depends of the nature of the redress being sought

In this action the Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court dismissal of the Plaintiff's CPLR Article 78  petition seeking to annul the appointing authority's termination of Plaintiff's on the grounds that it was untimely, explaining that CPLR §217(1) requires that an Article 78 proceeding challenging an individual's termination from government employment must be brought within four months from the date on which the appointing authority's decision to terminate the employee became final and binding.*

The court rejected Plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to the longer period for commencing his action available under the Family Medical Leave Act because, said the court, "the crux of [Plaintiff's] proceeding was to challenge and seek redress for the administrative decision to fire him, and not to make a claim under the FMLA.

* N.B. Submitting request to the appointing authority to reconsider its decision does not serve to toll the running of the controlling statute of limitations.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_04648.htm