A party seeking a stay of arbitration alleging a violation of a term set out in a collective bargaining agreement must show that it has not agreed to arbitrate the issue or some other basis barring arbitration

Under what conditions may a party obtain a stay of a demand for arbitration was the significant issue in the litigation involving an alleged violation of a provision set out in a collective bargaining agreement [CBA] negotiated pursuant to Article 14 of the Civil Service Law, commonly referred to as the Taylor Law?

The CBA between the employer [City] and the employee organization [Union] provided that in the event an employee in relevant collective bargaining unit  was  "necessarily absent" from duty as the result of an occupational injury or disease and who was placed on [disability] leave pursuant to §71 of the Civil Service Law, the employee was to receive full salary for a maximum period of nine months during such absence notwithstanding the limitations set out in §71 with respect to "paid leave" while on such disability leave.*

A member of the Union in the collective bargaining unit [Employee] placed on §71 leave and was granted paid disability leave in accordance with the terms set out in the CBA. About a month later the City had Employee examined by its medical expert [Physician]. Physician found that Employee suffered from a mild impairment and that he was then fit perform sedentary work. The Physician also opined that Employee could perform "full duty" within two weeks.

Newburgh directed Employee to report for "sedentary work." When Employee filed to report for work as directed, City removed him from the payroll.

Employee was again examined by the City's medical expert and, again, the Physician found no disability and, again, the City directed Employee to return to work. Employee, again, failed to report for duty as directed.

Next the Union filed a contract grievance claiming that the City had improperly discontinued Employee's disability leave with pay. When the grievance was denied, Union demanded that the matter be submitted to arbitration. City thereupon obtained a court order from Supreme Court staying the arbitration on the grounds that "the issues raised by [Union] were not arbitrable."

The Appellate Division vacated the stay issued by Supreme Court, permitting the arbitration to go forward.

The court pointed out that a party to a collective bargaining agreement may seek a stay of arbitration on the ground that a valid agreement to arbitrate has not been made or under color of some other reason authorized by §7503 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. In addition, the Appellate Division explained that a court may stay the arbitration when the particular claim to be arbitrated is not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

Although City had contended that the matter that the Union sought to have submitted to arbitration was not within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the Appellate Division found that the City had not demonstrated any basis justifying staying the arbitration.

The court held that "[A] challenge to the propriety of the City's withdrawal of its grant of paid [disability] leave to [Employee] pursuant to ... the collective bargaining agreement is a claim within the scope of the arbitration clause" set out in the CBA as the agreement, by its terms, provided that "a claim of violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of the terms of a written collective bargaining agreement" was subject to binding arbitration."

The Appellate Division also observed that "the mere fact that the arbitration may entail the incidental interpretation or application of statutes does not compel a different result."

* §71, sometimes referred to as Workers' Compensation Leave, mandates that employees in the classified service be given a leave of absence without pay for at least one year unless the disability is of such a nature as to permanently incapacitate the individual for the performance of the duties of his position. The employee may use sick and other leave or compensatory time credits in order to be retained on the payroll while on §71 leave.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/1996787232ad2d5551237

Challenging the denial of an application for disability retirement benefits when the application is rejected by a "tie vote" by the trustees of the retirement fund

In Guidal v Trustees of the NYC Fire Department Article 1-B Fund, 275 AD2d 458, the Appellate Division demonstrated the difficult test that a claimant faces in attempting to have a court overturn a decision by the trustees of a pension fund denying his application for accidental disability retirement benefits. In Guidal's case the Trustees, by a tie vote, disapproved his application for accidental retirement benefits but approved him for ordinary disability retirement benefits. The court observed that:

"Where the Board of Trustees of the New York City Fire Department, Article 1-B Pension Fund ... denies an application for accidental disability benefits as a consequence of a tie vote, the Board’s determination can be set aside on judicial review only if it can be concluded as a matter of law that the petitioner’s disability was the natural and proximate result of a service-related injury."

In the instant CPLR Article 78 action the Supreme Court annulled the determination of the retirement system's Board of Trustees [Board] which, by a tied vote, denied Petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement benefits and remanded the matter to the Board for its further consideration.

The Board appealed and the Appellate Division unanimously reversed the lower court's ruling "on the law" and dismissed the proceeding.

Citing Meyer v Board of Trustees of N.Y. City Fire Dept., Art. 1-B Pension Fund, 90 NY2d 139, the Appellate Division explained that "[b]ecause the Board of Trustee's denial of [Petitioner's]  application for accident disability retirement was the result of a tie vote, the issue for the reviewing court was whether there was any credible evidence of lack of causation, i.e., evidence that the disability was not the natural and proximate result of the 1996 service-related accident."  

Other elements considered by the Appellate Division in making its ruling was the fact that :

[1] The record included "some credible evidence of lack of causation, namely, the conservative treatment [Petitioner] received after the accident and [Petitioner's] return to full duty for approximately 14 years before seeking further treatment;" and 

[2] The fact that "neither the Medical Board nor petitioner's physician were able to explain why the purported disabling injury did not prevent [Petitioner] from returning to full time duty for 14 years without further complaint."

The State Comptroller is the sole trustee of the New York State Employees’ Retirement System. Presumably the same analysis would be applied in cases where the determination concerning approving an application for accidental or duty-related disability benefits is at issue.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_06151.htm

Suspending an employee without pay while disciplinary charges are pending

  

§75 of the New York State Civil Service Law provides that an employee who has been served with disciplinary charges may be suspended without pay for up to 30 days.* If the disciplinary proceeding has not been completed by that date, the individual must be restored to the payroll.

Under certain circumstances, however, the court may decide that the appointing authority is not required to restore the suspended individual to the payroll even though the statutory 30-day period has expired. The decisions in these two cases provide examples of such situations.

First action:

The Plaintiff [Employee] in Decision 1 was served with charges of misconduct. During the §75 hearing that followed, the parties met in an effort to settle the matter.

According to the Respondent [Appointing Authority], an "oral settlement" was reached whereby Employee agreed to her resign from her position. Employee, on the other hand, said that no settlement had been reached. The fact that there was no document formalizing any settlement did not help the situation.

When the Appointing Authority failed to restore Employee to the payroll after she had been suspended without pay for 30 days, Employee sued. A New York State Supreme Court granted Employee's petition for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Appointing Authority from continuing "her suspension without pay" and the Appointing Authority appealed.

Was Employee entitled to the injunction? The Appellate Division thought not, commenting that a preliminary injunction should be granted only:

a. when the moving party has shown a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits;

b.  an irreparable and imminent injury if the injunction is withheld; and

c. that a balancing of the equities favors the moving party.

Deciding that Employee had failed to satisfy any of these elements, the Appellate Division reversed the lower Court's order granting injunctive relief.

What was the reasoning of the Appellate Division? The Court said that "if a fact finder ultimately concludes that [Employee] did resign as part of a disciplinary settlement agreement, she would not be entitled to back pay. As resolution of the question of the claimed settlement may be a determinative factor, since the issue is heavily contested, Employee has not shown a clear likelihood of success on her underlying claim.

Further, the Court decided that Employee did not demonstrate "irreparable injury." As she was only seeking monetary damages, the Court said were she to prevail on the merits her damages can be easily computed and she will be fully compensated for them.

As to the issue of the "balance of equities," the Appellate Division again noted that if Employee wins, she could, and would, be fully compensated for her loss by the Appointing Authority. If, on the other hand, should the Appointing Authority prevail after being forced to pay Employee's salary to her pending a final determination, the Court said that it is much less certain that the Appointing Authority will be able to recoup those payments.

The lesson here is that the terms and conditions of any settlement arrived at in the course of a disciplinary proceeding should be immediately reduced to writing and signed by the parties before they leave the proceeding.

Second action:

The ruling in Decision 2 concerned a related issue - restoration of an individual to the payroll if a court remands a §75 disciplinary determination for reconsideration by the appointing authority.

In this action the employee [Plaintiff] was terminated from her position after being found guilty of §75 disciplinary charges. She appealed and the Appellate Division returned the case to the Employer [Respondent] "for development of appropriate findings supporting the determination to terminate Plaintiff."

In a subsequent appeal Plaintiff contended that she was entitled to reinstatement and back salary retroactive to the date of her termination because the Appellate Division had remanded the appointing authority's original disciplinary determination "for the development of appropriate findings ...." In effect, Plaintiff, in effect, contended that this was the equivalent of a vacating of the determination.

The Appellate Division rejected Plaintiff's theory, indicating that neither the disciplinary determination nor the penalty imposed by the Respondent was  annulled as a result of its remanding the original administrative determination for further action by the appointing authority. Rather, said the Court, it had simply "withheld [its] decision" pending its receipt of the "requisite finding" by the Respondent.

Apparently satisfied that the "requisite finding" of the appointing authority supported its §75 determination and the penalty imposed, the Appellate Division sustained Plaintiff's termination.

In contrast, had the Court decided that the determination was not supported by the record or that the penalty imposed did not satisfy the Pell standard, i.e., dismissal was “so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness,” [see Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222],  it probably would have directed Plaintiff's reinstatement with all, or a portion, of her back salary.

* A collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to Article 14 of the Civil Service Law, the so-called Taylor Law, may provide for an alternative to this statutory provision for suspension without pay, in which case the provision set out in the collective bargaining will control.

The decisions are posted on the Internet at:

First action: https://www.leagle.com/decision/1997949238ad2d7111226; and  https://www.leagle.com/decision/19991078259ad2d8191315

           

Second action: https://www.leagle.com/decision/19951122213ad2d9091352

Representation rights of unions

Representation questions concerning negotiating terms and conditions of employment usually focus on which union is authorized to represent the employees in a particular collective bargaining unit. This case involved a union that claimed the provisions of a local law binding on one employer were binding on a second employer because both employers were party to a joint agreement with the union.   

The case involved the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation and the City itself, which are separate legal entities. Both the City and the Hospitals Corporation signed a Citywide Collective Bargaining Agreement with a union.

The Hospitals Corporation decided to "privatize" the security operations at its headquarters by replacing its then security personnel with private security guards.* The union challenged the Corporation's action, contending that it was subject to New York City Local Law 35 which regulated "the privatization of services performed by City employees."

When the Hospital Corporation signed the collective bargaining agreement, did the Corporation become subject to Local Law 35? And, if so, did the services covered include all services or only certain services?

The union cited Article I of the Agreement in support of its position. Article I provided that the union was "the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative [for employees of the City and the Corporation] on citywide matters which must be uniform for the [covered] employees."

The Appellate Division, however, did not view this provision as mandating uniformity in the terms and conditions of employment for all employees covered by the agreement.

The Court decided that Article I merely recognized the union as the sole bargaining agent for "matters which must be uniform"; it did not affect the autonomy of the Corporation with respect to its making personnel decisions affecting its own employees where city-wide uniformity was not required or implicated.

Dismissing the union's petition, the Court said that even assuming that the Corporation could elect to subject itself to specific laws or rules generally applicable to City employees, it did not do so by entering into the "Citywide Collective Bargaining Agreement."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/1997495238ad2d2573306

Vacating of an arbitration award barred absent a finding that the award violated "strong public policy"

Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules set out the limited grounds available to the courts for vacating an arbitrator's award. The major exception to this is that an arbitrator's award will be vacated even if it cannot be overturned on the authority of Article 75 if a court determines that it violates strong public policy. However, the party seeking to vacate the award on the grounds that it contravene a strong public policy has a heavy burden to meet to prove its claim.

In this action the arbitrator's award was challenged on the grounds that it infringed on the School District's responsibility to maintain "educational standards" in violation of strong public policy. The Appellate Division disagreed and declined to vacate the award.

At issue was the arbitrator's decision interpreting the agreement with respect to the qualification of two candidates for the position of Faculty Manager. The Court ruled that the award did not infringe on the District's responsibility because:

a. The District conceded that both applicants for the position were qualified for the appointment; and

b. The position of Faculty Manager did not involve a classroom assignment and thus did not infringe on the District's responsibility to maintain classroom standards.

Similarly in Matter of Martin ex rel Lekkas, 86 AD2d 712, the Appellate Division held that an individual’s failure to possess a valid license otherwise required for the position is not fatal to the employee’s continuation in service if he or she is not performing duties set out in the job description for the position for which the license is otherwise required.

Lekkas, a permanent Assistant Clinical Physician was employed by the then Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, was never licensed to practice medicine in New York or in any State of the United States or in the Dominion of Canada. Summarily terminated from his position pursuant to §6522 of the Education Law,*Martin, representing the estate of Lekkas, initiated an Article 78 proceeding alleging that both the Federal and State Constitutions as well as §50.4 of the Civil Service Law required that Lekkas should have been given a pre-termination hearing or, alternatively, the opportunity to respond to the reasons given by the State for his discharge.

The Appellate Division, noting that the duties of an Assistant Clinical Physician were both defined and changed by administrative fiat, found that at the time of Lekkas' termination he was not practicing medicine without a license and, therefore, the court "must look to the Civil Service Law rather than the Education Law to determine his rights."

Conceding that Lekkas would not have been eligible either to take the required examination for the position or to be appointed if successful had the announcements for civil service examinations for positions as physicians in State hospitals had reflected the 1971 statutory changes, the Appellate Division, citing Civil Service Law §50.4, found that "it is equally clear that [the appointing authority] could not terminate [Lekkas] on the ground of disqualification, in the absence of fraud, more than three years after the date of such appointment".

Accordingly, the Appellate Division sustained Supreme Court's ruling annulling Lekkas' discharge and ordering his reinstatement with back pay and benefits.

* §6522 of the Education Law provided that "Only a person licensed or otherwise authorized under this article shall practice medicine or use the title physician."

The school district decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/19971182237ad2d9452234