Employee terminated for mishandling cash transactions

A City School District School Board [School Board] charged its cashier [Petitioner] with misconduct based on allegations that she failed to record various purchases of milk and juice by students as well as purchases of food by adults. In addition, she was charged with failing to account for "pre-identified bills."

Testimony was provided by Petitioner's co-workers, who had been instructed to observe her handling of "cash transactions" for a period of time by their supervisor. The Appellate Division said that this testimony, together with certain documentary evidence in the record of the disciplinary hearing, "provided the necessary substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's finding of misconduct and incompetency" and the adoption of  those findings by the School Board.

The Appellate Division also ruled that dismissal was not disproportionate to the offenses committed, citing the Pell standard. The Court said that "having violated her position as an employee entrusted with School District money, termination in all respects was proper."

An employee may claim that his or her theft of money from an employer was the result of a disability. If, indeed, the misconduct can be attributed to a disability in some degree, must the appointing authority refrain from disciplining the individual?

No, according to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which opined that "an employer may discipline an employee with a disability for engaging in misconduct if it would take the same disciplinary action against an employee without a disability.*

Further, 8 FEP Manual 40-5.7259 indicates that "an employer does not have to excuse ... misconduct, even if the misconduct results from an impairment that rises to the level of a disability if it does not excuse similar misconduct from its other employees."

* See EEOC 915.002.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/19971076238ad2d8381281

Click here to Read a FREE excerpt from NYPER's

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances

Employer's personnel policy manual setting out reasons why an employee could be subject to dismissal does not constitute a "written contract" of employment

The Board of Trustees of the Library System [System] dismissed an employee [Plaintiff] from her position with the System. Plaintiff sued, contending that her termination constituted a breach in her contract of employment.

A New York State Supreme Court judge found that Plaintiff was an employee at will and dismissed her complaint. When Plaintiff appealed, the Appellate Division sustained the lower court's ruling, explaining that Plaintiff did not demonstrate that she had a written contract of employment with the System, much less that it had been breached.

While the Library System's "Personnel Policy and Procedure Manual set out a number of reasons why an employee could be terminated such as "unfitness, incompetence, and mental or physical disability, the Appellate Division concluded that this was not a "written contract of employment." Accordingly, the setting out of such reasons for termination in the policy manual "did not limit ... [the System's] right to discharge an employee at will to just and sufficient cause only."

The decision also notes that absent an agreement establishing employment for a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party.

Finding that Plaintiff was an employee at will and thus she could be terminated at any time, for any reason, except an unlawful reason, or for no reason whatsoever, the Appellate Division said Plaintiff's "complaint sounding in breach of contract and detrimental reliance was properly dismissed" by Supreme Court.

In contrast, as the Court of Appeals held in Antinore v State, 40 NY2d 6, where an individual is within the ambit of a statutory disciplinary procedure such as Civil Service Law §75 or §3020-a of the Education Law, or a contract disciplinary grievance procedure set out in a collective bargaining agreement, the employee is entitled to administrative due process.

In Antinore the Court explained that a union could bargain away the employee’s statutory disciplinary rights in favor of an alternative disciplinary procedure so long as the alternate procedure provided constitutional due process protections equivalent to those available under the statutory procedure that it replaced.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/1997611239ad2d3722272

Employer fined and held liable for lost wages and benefits for violating certain New York City's Earned Safe and Sick Time Act provisions

A law firm and its founding partner [Respondents] were charged with violating New York City's Earned Safe and Sick Time Act (“ESSTA”) when it terminated an employee allegedly for exercising his rights under ESSTA, required him to provide details of his medical condition, and failed to maintain "sufficient written sick leave policies."

New York City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings [OATH]  Administrative Law Judge Kevin F. Casey found that the employee’s use or attempted use of his sick time was one of the motivating factors for his firing and he did not credit the Respondent’s claim that the termination was for non-medical reasons.

Finding the firm’s founding partner and the law firm to be jointly liable for the violations, Judge Casey ordered the Respondents to pay a fine of $1,500 and $172,215.30 in relief to the former employee. 

The ALJ's decision, OATH Index No. 514/19, is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/19_cases/19-514MD.pdf

Violating New York City's Earned Safe and Sick Time Act (“ESSTA”) results in a fine and the payment of damages to the employee

A law firm and its founding partner [Respondents] were charged with violating New York City's Earned Safe and Sick Time Act (“ESSTA”) when it terminated an employee allegedly for exercising his rights under ESSTA, required him to provide details of his medical condition, and failed to maintain "sufficient written sick leave policies."

New York City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings [OATH]  Administrative Law Judge Kevin F. Casey found that the employee’s use or attempted use of his sick time was one of the motivating factors for his firing and he did not credit the Respondent’s claim that the termination was for non-medical reasons.

Finding the firm’s founding partner and the law firm to be jointly liable for the violations, Judge Casey ordered the Respondents to pay a fine of $1,500 and $172,215.30 in relief to the former employee. 

The ALJ's decision, OATH Index No. 514/19, is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/19_cases/19-514MD.pdf

Legacy Contaminants of Emerging Concern: Lead (Pb), Flint (MI), and Human Health

Source:  This article by Robert A. Michaels, PhD, CEP was published online by the Environmental Claims Journal.  The full text of this article is available at no charge at:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335432817_Legacy_Contaminants_of_Emerging_Concern_Lead_Pb_Flint_MI_and_Human_Health_published_online_12_September_2019_print_expected_January_2020.    

ABSTRACT

As a heavy metal industrially mined for millenia, lead (Pb) is a legacy contaminant. It is also a contaminant of emerging concern because of its persistence, toxicity, and recent discovery of its resurgence in drinking water serving homes and schools, recently and most notoriously in Flint, Michigan. Concern about lead, however, has reemerged beyond Flint, exemplifying adoption of bad science policy despite availability of relevant good science. Much is known about lead toxicity, and profiled here. Whereas adults chronically exposed to lead may experience peripheral neuropathy, infants and children are more susceptible. They constitute sensitive subpopulations because their blood-brain barriers are immature, making them susceptible to central nervous system effects, most notably reduced IQ, when lead penetrates to developing brains. Failure to protect disadvantaged populations in Flint and beyond despite availability of proven science and inexpensive technology also exemplifies instances of environmental injustice. Emerging concern about lead thus illustrates failure of social as well as science policy. A critical lesson to be learned is that vigilance must be maintained, as knowledge about lead exposure and toxic effects provided by science does not automatically result in consistent and evenhanded legal and regulatory protection provided by government.

Contact Dr. Michaels via e-mail at ram@ramtrac.com.

Direct dealings with members in a negotiating unit

"Direct dealing" involves an employer establishing or attempting to establish a negotiating relationship with one or more unit members to the exclusion of the employees' exclusive bargaining agent.

In Local 650 and the City of Buffalo, 30 PERB 3020, PERB decided that the City of Buffalo had not engaged in "direct dealing," but PERB concluded that the city had unlawfully interfered with an employee's statutory right to representation.

A part-time administrative program aide, [Aide] was initially hired  and scheduled to work from 10 a.m. until 3 p.m. Her supervisor allowed her some flexibility, but a dispute eventually arose about her hours. The City eventually abolished the Aide's position and terminated her.

PERB found that the record demonstrates that Aide would not have been terminated nor her position abolished had the Local agreed to her starting at 10 a.m. Indeed, PERB's decision reports that the City admitted that Aide was terminated "because [the Local's] proposals on her behalf in negotiations regarding work schedule were 'unacceptable' to the City."

PERB decided that Aide's termination violated §209-a.1(a) of the Civil Service Law [the Taylor Law] regardless of whether her work schedule was a mandatory or non-mandatory subject of negotiations, explaining that the City's action violated Aide's right to have union representation within the meaning of §202 of the Taylor Law.

It seems clear that an employer does not have a legal duty to negotiate with a union if a subject matter proposed for discussion is non-mandatory. But the absence of a legal duty to bargain does not mean that the employer is allowed to take action against an employee because of the nature of  the help extended to that employee by the union. Simply put, PERB held that Buffalo based its action on an impermissible reason.

The City could have taken action against Aide for not complying for its directive regarding her reporting to work. But it could not lawfully terminate her simply because the local had pursued a negotiating position that the City considered impossible.

PERB ordered the City to recreate Aide's former position and reinstate her to it, with back salary and benefits.

State employees sued in a civil action for deprivation of rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 assert a qualified immunity defense

The Second Circuit United States Circuit Court of Appeals' decision summarizes the events giving rise to this litigation as follows:

1. In 2008 an educator [Plaintiff] was investigated by the New York State Education Department [Department] and charged committing acts of sexual misconduct  in 1989 and 1992 with former students, resulting in a one-year suspension of his state licenses;

2. In 2011 Plaintiff obtained employment as a substitute teacher with another School District [District] in New York State;

3. In 2012 the Department informed the Districtʹs superintendent that it "had opened an ethics investigation" into Plaintiff's conduct;

4. Plaintiff was terminated from his substitute teaching position with the District;

5. Employees of the Department [Defendants] ultimately concluded that there were no grounds for an investigation.

Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 with respect to the termination of his employment by the District against the Defendants, whereupon the Defendants asserted a qualified immunity defense.*  

The district court denied the Defendantsʹ motion for summary judgment without addressing the Defendants' claimed qualified immunity defense.  In response to Defendants' motion for reconsideration, the district court, addressing that issue for the first time,  concluded that the Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff had demonstrated that Defendants "had violated clearly established law."

Defendants appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment based on the claim of having qualified immunity.  The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, sustained Defendants' appeal, explaining that:

[a] Plaintiffʹs due process claim failed because he did not show a clearly established right to the meaningful opportunity to utilize his teaching license;  and

[b] Plaintiff also failed to demonstrate that the Defendantsʹ conduct was sufficiently stigmatizing under clearly established law so as to give rise to his  ʺstigma-plusʺ claim.  

Accordingly, the Circuit Court ruled that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that the district court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment.

As the coda to the decision, the Circuit Court opined that "We are not unsympathetic to [Plaintiff], who may have been unfairly treated by the [Defendants] with unfortunate results.  But for the reasons set forth [in its opinion, Defendant's] behavior did not give rise to a cause of action under section 1983 that could survive the [Defendantsʹ] qualified immunity defense." **

* In Doninger v. Niehoff, USCA, Second Circuit, 642 F.3d 334, writ of certiorari denied, 132 S.Ct. 499, the court addressed the issue of determining if a public officer may claim a qualified immunity from civil lawsuits. The Second Circuit said that two tests are involved in determining if a claim of qualified immunity is available to the officer or the employee. The first test: considering “the facts" in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do they show that the [individual's] conduct violated a constitutional right. If the plaintiff’s cause of action survives this test, the court then applies a second test: whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of [the official's] alleged misconduct.” If the court finds that the public officer’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, or if it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that his or her conduct did not violate such a right, then the official is protected by qualified immunity. 

** See https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2018/02/sovereign-immunity-absolute-immunity_12.html addressing Sovereign Immunity, Absolute Immunity, Qualified Immunity, Use Immunity, Transaction Immunity and Qualified Privilege claims that may be advanced by public officers and employees involved in litigation and, or, administrative hearings.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/6fedbfbb-bee0-4f8a-9932-91f93897f8a5/4/doc/18-1298_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/6fedbfbb-bee0-4f8a-9932-91f93897f8a5/4/hilite/