ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL

October 31, 2019

PERB's authority to initiate "jurisdictional deferral" and "merits deferral" in considering an improper practice charge filed pursuant to §209-a(1)(d) of the Civil Service Law


New York State[State] and the Public Employees Federation [PEF], representing state employees in the Professional, Scientific and Technical Services Unit, were parties to a collective bargaining agreement [CBA] from April 2011 to April 2015. Certain employees working at the Rochester Psychiatric Center [RPC], a treatment facility overseen by the Office of Mental Health were in the collective bargaining unit represented by PEF.

RPC had implemented a policy in 1982 whereby employees were not routinely required to submit doctor certificates for absences from work due to illness or injury, with the exception of six specified reasons that "management will require that a doctor's certificate be submitted." In December 2012, RPC's director of nursing sent an email to the entire nursing staff stating that the coverage needs of its patients required a change of policy and that "[l]ast minute call [ins] will require documentation supporting the [rationale] for the absence" for specified time periods during the 2012-2013 holiday season.

PEF filed an improper practice charge with Public Employment Relations Board [PERB] alleging that petitioner violated Civil Service Law §209-a(1)(d) by, among other things, unilaterally imposing a requirement that all employees submit medical documentation for unscheduled absences from work during the holiday season — a disciplinary work rule restricting employees' access to sick leave.

Ultimately PERB, relying [1] jurisdictional deferral and [2] a merits deferral, sustained an Administrative Law Judge's determination that State had violated §209-a(1)(d) and ordered, among other things, that RPC cease and desist from implementing the new requirement and State initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul PERB's determination.

With respect to PERB's jurisdictional deferral policy, the Appellate Division noted that "PERB has consistently interpreted Civil Service Law §205(5)(d) to deprive it of jurisdiction over failure-to-negotiate improper practice charges when the underlying disputes are essentially contractual, in favor of resolving the dispute through the parties' grievance-arbitration machinery, or resort to the courts. Where the CBA provides the charging party with a reasonably arguable source of right with respect to the subject matter of the charge, PERB "has either dismissed the improper practice charge outright or conditionally dismissed the charge pursuant to its jurisdictional deferral policy."

The CBA is silent on the issue of requiring doctor certificates for sick leave during the holidays -- the thrust of PEF's improper practice charge. As PEF alleged that State had violated statutory rights under §209-a(1) (d) by failing to bargain over a past practice that was not specifically covered by the CBA the Appellate Division concluded that "the matter is not a breach of contract dispute and PERB's jurisdictional limitation was not triggered."

As to PERB's declining to exercise a merits deferral, which, in contrast to a jurisdictional deferral, "utilizes agreed-upon binding arbitration to determine contractual grievances in furtherance of the stated goal of the Taylor Law to encourage employers and public employees to agree upon dispute resolution procedures, the Appellate Division held that PERB's action was proper. Further, explained the court, such a decision merely results in a conditional dismissal and the improper practice charge remains subject to being reopened before PERB after the conclusion of the arbitration process."

As the "merits deferral policy has been judicially recognized in the past and the courts have generally deferred to PERB's interpretation in this regard, the Appellate Division ruled that "PERB's decision not to invoke such policy here was proper under the circumstances."*

Noting that a public employer violates §209-a(1) if it alters a past practice** that impacts a mandatorily negotiable subject, the court explained that "it is well-settled that sick leave is a mandatory subject of negotiation" as are the "procedures and policies for granting or terminating sick leave are mandatory."

Here, said the Appellate Division, the record demonstrates that, subject to certain exceptions, since 1982 RPC did not routinely require an employee to submit a doctor's certificate for each instance of unscheduled absence and none of these exceptions related to the new restrictions that RPC imposed. As the State has not presented any evidence demonstrating that it negotiated with PEF prior to altering this policy, substantial evidence supports PERB's determination that a past practice existed and that the State engaged in an improper practice by failing to engage in collective bargaining prior to altering the past practice to require medical documentation for individual days of sick leave.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that PERB had properly granted a remedial order*** in this matter which, among other things, mandated that the State to "cease and desist from enforcing the change in policy, except as detailed in RPC's original written policy."

* In reviewing these issues, a court's inquiry is "limited to whether PERB's decision was supported by substantial evidence which, in turn, depends upon whether there exists a rational basis in the record as a whole to support the findings upon which such determination is based.

** For a past practice to be binding, the Appellate Division said the practice must be "unequivocal and continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected bargaining unit employees that the practice would continue."

*** The remedial order also required the State to "[m]ake unit employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, as a result of [petitioner's] implementation of the at-issue sick leave usage policy concerning Christmas and New Year's holidays, with interest at the maximum legal rate."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


October 30, 2019

Napping during work hours


The appointing authority filed disciplinary charges alleging that an employee [1] failed to make required patrol checks at the work site and falsely reported that he performed the required checks on his screen station log sheet and [2] neglect of duty by sleeping in his car during his shift time, such acts or omissions being in violation of the Department’s Uniform Code of Discipline.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Joycelyn McGeachy-Kuls found the facility manager credibly testified that it was the practice to fill out the log sheet at the end of the shift and that he believed that the worker completed his checks at the required time.

Further, the ALJ concluded that the manager corroborated the worker’s testimony that he was on meal break and not required to be working when he was found sleeping in his car. It was not disputed that the employee was not required to perform work during their meal breaks even though they are paid during this break time. Credible testimony established that the employee was only required to keep his radios with him and stay on facility premises during the meal break. The ALJ found that the appointing authority has produced no evidence to establish that resting or even dozing off briefly during the meal break is prohibited or rendered the employee incompetent to perform his job.

Judge McGeachy-Kuls found that the appointing authority failed to establish that the employee engaged in the charged misconduct and recommended dismissal of the charges.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


New York courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider lawsuits involving disputes between and among rival factions of the Cayuga Nation


Certain members of the Cayuga Nation* [Petitioners] constituting one faction claiming authority to act on behalf of the Nation commenced this action, purportedly on behalf of the Nation, against certain individuals comprising a rival faction [Defendants] claiming similar authority.

To resolve these claims, said the Court of Appeals, New York courts would have to decide whether Defendants were, at various times, or remain legitimate leaders of the tribe, a question that turns on disputed issues of tribal law that are not cognizable in the courts of this state given the Nation's exclusive authority over its internal affairs.

Although Plaintiffs claimed otherwise, the court held that despite a limited recognition determination issued by the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs [BIA] that recognized the Plaintiff faction as the tribal government for the purpose of distributing federal funds, it held that New York courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider this dispute, noting that The Nation relies on "the Council itself" and not any "written law, court, or body other than the Council . . . for resolving disputes that arise within the Council."

Noting that "Supreme Court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims before it because 'the underlying allegations . . . are fundamentally founded upon the longstanding question of who has the right to lead the Nation' it could not adjudicate the dispute without interfering with tribal sovereignty and self[-]government'" and that the BIA urged the Nation to resolve the leadership dispute internally," reversed the order of the Appellate Division, with costs, "granted the motion to dismiss the complaint, and the certified question answered in the negative."

Opinion by Judge Feinman. Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera and Stein concur. Judge Garcia dissents in an opinion. Judge Wilson dissents in a separate dissenting opinion. Judge Fahey took no part.

*Footnote 1 in the court's decision states: "The Cayuga Nation is one of "[t]he [Six Nations of the Iroquois] Confederacy, or the Haudenosaunee' [People of the Longhouse], which refers to the historical alliance between the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora Nations."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

October 29, 2019

Publication of the findings made, and penalty recommended, after a disciplinary hearing by a New York City Office of Trials and Hearings Administrative Law Judge


At the close of a §75 disciplinary hearing held before the New York City Office of Trials and Hearings, the employee, a correction officer, moved to prohibit publication of the OATH Administrative Law Judge's report of findings and recommendation with respect to the penalty to be imposed, citing to §50-a of the Civil Rights Law. The correction officer contended that §50-a requires personnel records under the control of the Department of Correction be kept confidential.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kevin F. Casey denied the correction officer's motion as untimely.

In addition, Judge Casey explained that [1] because OATH, as an autonomous agency and independent tribunal, its records are not under the control of Department of Correction and [2] the correction officer failed to overcome the broad presumption under the First Amendment in favor of public access to OATH proceedings.

The ALJ's ruling cites Matter of Victor v New York City Off. of Trials & Hearings, 174 AD3d 455, in which the Appellate Division held that Victor's claim that a disciplinary report and recommendation issued as the result of an OATH disciplinary hearing is confidential under Civil Rights Law §50-a was moot, explaining that "[f]or several years, the report has been publicly available from multiple sources, including the OATH and LEXIS websites" and as the court "cannot afford petitioner any meaningful relief," it dismissed Victor's appeal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 
http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/19_cases/19-1663md.pdf.

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