The anatomy of a student disciplinary hearing conducted by a public institution of higher education

Following the student's [Student] administrative disciplinary hearing and the Students administrative appeal of the hearing decision, a unit of State University of New York [SUNY] suspended Student  for three years and noted Student's college transcript accordingly. Student initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a court order annulling SUNY's actions.

Among the elements of SUNY's administrative disciplinary procedures challenged by Student, and considered by the Appellate Division, were the following:

1. Due Process: 

Citing Matter of Sharma v State Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo, 170 AD3d 1565, among other decisions., the Appellate Division concluded that SUNYsubstantially adhered to its procedural rules with respect to the administrative disciplinary proceedings involving Student and that the alleged violations of those rules did not deny Student"the full panoply of due process guarantees to which he was entitled or render ... the finding of responsibility or the sanction imposed arbitrary or capricious".

2. Discovery: 

The Appellate Division rejected Student's contention that SUNY denied him due process with respect to his judicial appeal, explaining that "[i]n a disciplinary proceeding at a public institution of higher education, due process entitles a student accused of misconduct to a statement detailing the factual findings and the evidence relied upon by  [SUNY's] decision-maker in reaching the determination of [Student's] guilt ... and here the record reflects that [Student] was provided with the documents that were relied on by [SUNY]" in making such determinations.

3. Assistance of counsel: 

The court dismissed Student's claim that he was denied the assistance of counsel at his hearing, noting Student was, as authorized by SUNY's administrative hearing procedures, assisted by an attorney advisor throughout the disciplinary process, including such assistance at the hearings.* 

4. Prosecuting an effective appeal: 

Notwithstanding Student's contention to the contrary, the Appellate Division opined that SUNY's written determinations did not violate Student's right to due process as they contained sufficient detail "to permit [Student] to effectively challenge the determination in administrative appeals and in the courts and to ensure that the decision was based on evidence in the record," nor did the record support Student's claim that the determination with respect to his administrative appeal was based on matters outside of the record.

Finding that SUNY's determination was supported by substantial evidence, the Appellate Division said it perceived no basis to disturb SUNY's decision. 

* The Appellate Division also rejected Student's claim that he was denied due process as the result of SUNY's alleged failure "to call live witnesses or to accept questions to be asked of such live witnesses."

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_04628.htm

Defending and indemnifying employees of the City of New York being sued in a civil action

§50-k(3) New York State's General Municipal Law provides that New York City must, if certain conditions are satisfied, defend and, if necessary, indemnify, an employee being sued in a civil action related to the employee's conduct performed in compliance with the rules and regulations of the employee’s agency at the time the plaintiff was injured, so long as the injury to the plaintiff did not result from the employee’s intentional wrongdoing or recklessness.*

Two New York City police officers [jointly Defendants] had arrested an individual [Accused] and charged him with disorderly conduct, harassment, obstruction of governmental administration, and resisting arrest. After obtaining video footage of the incident, prosecutors dismissed all charges.

The Accused then filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, the use of excessive force, denial of the right to a fair trial, a failure of a police officer to intervene in the course of the incident, and First Amendment violations, as well as malicious prosecution in violation of New York state law, against the City of New York [City], the Defendants, and another New York City police officer. A federal district court jury found for the Accused and Defendants appealed.

One of issues raised by Defendants in the district court was the City’s decision not to provide for their defense and indemnification under color of General Municipal Law §50-k(3). The Circuit Court held that "the district court did not err" in denying Defendants’ request for an evidentiary hearing" addressing the City's decision not to provide for Defendants' defense and indemnification.

The Circuit Court held that whether the employee's act or omission was in violation of an agency rule, or was within the employee’s scope of employment was a factual determination to be made in the first instance by the City's Corporation Counsel, whose determinations may be set aside only if they are not supported by the evidence or are in some other sense ‘arbitrary and capricious.” Further, the Circuit Court noted that the City is not required to indemnify a defendant for “intentional wrongdoing or recklessness.

The Circuit Court opined that the fact that Defendants may have certain employment rights meriting a hearing prior to termination** "says nothing of their right to indemnification after trial." The Circuit Court's decision also observed that "Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to present their defense in court, yet failed to convincingly do so." 

In addition, said the court, in any event, the City "maintains discretion to indemnify officers" and, in consideration of the substantial factual support for the City’s decision, "the district court did not err in denying Defendants’ request for an evidentiary hearing. In the words of the Circuit Court, "The City’s assessment of Defendants’ wrongdoing or recklessness was supported by the findings of the City's Civilian Complaint Review Board, the videotape of the incident, and the federal district court's jury’s findings of liability and awarding of punitive damages."

* See, also, Public Officers Law §17 [defense and indemnification of State officers and employees] and Public Officers Law §18 [defense and indemnification of officers and employees of public entities]. Public Officers Law §19.2(a) addresses the duty of the State, as the employer, to pay reasonable attorneys' fees incurred as the result of a State officer or employee appearing before a Grand Jury or in a criminal proceeding arising out of any act which occurred while such individual was acting within the scope of  his public employment or duties.

** Subdivision 5 of §50-k(3) provides that "[i]n the event that the act or omission upon which the court proceeding against the employee is based was or is also the basis of a disciplinary proceeding by the employee's agency against the employee, representation by the corporation counsel and indemnification by the city may be withheld (a) until such disciplinary proceeding has been resolved and (b) unless the resolution of the disciplinary proceeding exonerated the employee as to such act or omission."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/59c1a0cd-0da0-4f63-a556-2e35a1e5f76c/1/doc/19-769_so.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/59c1a0cd-0da0-4f63-a556-2e35a1e5f76c/1/hilite/

Denying an individual an "on-street parking permit" did not violate the individual's equal protection rights under the circumstances

In an action to recover damages for alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC §1983, Plaintiff appealed Supreme Court's granting the Town's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff had contended that Plaintiff's right to equal protection was violated because Plaintiff was denied an "on-street parking permit" for a specified location in the Town on the ground that Plaintiff was not a resident at the location involved.

The Appellate Division said that the Town had established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and that Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition.

With respect to Plaintiff's cause of action for recovery under 42 USC §1983 on equal protection grounds, the Appellate Division explained that recovery under 42 USC §1983 is triggered where a defendant has denied the plaintiff a constitutional or federal statutory right, and that such denial was effected under color of state law. Here, said the court, Plaintiff "is not a member of a suspect class and no fundamental right is implicated. Thus the challenged action need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."

Further, opined the Appellate Division, a local law limiting the issuance of on-street parking permits to residents of that street is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of alleviating an on-street parking shortage on that street.

Citing Village of Willowbrook v Olech, 528 US 562, the Appellate Division also rejected Plaintiff's claim that Plaintiff is a "class of one" for purposes of prosecuting an equal protection claim, explaining there has been no showing that Plaintiff had been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.

The court also noted that the individually named Town defendants "are entitled to qualified immunity, as they are government officials performing discretionary functions, and their conduct did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Finally, the Appellate Division said it agreed with the Supreme Court's determination directing dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of action alleging retaliation in connection with the issuance of a parking ticket. In the words of the court: "While retaliation claims alleging an adverse employment action because of a complaint of discrimination are actionable under 42 USC §1983 [Plaintiff] has no employment relationship with the Town and the statute does not apply in this context.

The bottom line: the Appellate Division agreed with Supreme Court's decisions [1] denying Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint, and [2] granting the Town's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_04503.htm