Submitting a memoranda amicus curiae in an appeal to the Commissioner of Education

§275.17 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education permits interested persons to file applications to submit memoranda amicus curiae.* 

In this appeal to the Commissioner of Education the aggrieved party [Petitioner] submitted a proposed amicus curiae brief prepared by “an attorney whose work has focused on human rights and immigration law.” 

In considering Petitioner's application to submit the proposed amicus curiae brief, then Interim Commissioner of Education Betty A. Rosa noted that historically the standard applied by the Court of Appeals in such situations has been followed by the Commissioner of Education.

Citing Appeal of Touré, et al., 54 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,660, the Commissioner indicated that Court of Appeals' standard requires establishing at least one of the following criteria:

(1) That the parties are not capable of a full and adequate presentation and that the amicus curiae brief could remedy this deficiency;

(2) That the amicus curiae brief could identify law or arguments that might otherwise escape the Commissioner’s consideration; or

(3) That the amicus curiaebrief offered would otherwise be of assistance to the Commissioner.

Commissioner Rosa declined to accept the proposed amicus brief into the record, explaining that she found no basis upon which to conclude that the Petitioner was not capable of a full and adequate presentation of his case requiring remedy by an attorney's "proposed amicussubmission."  

The Commissioner, after reviewing the proposed amicus submission, said that she found "it fails to identify law or arguments that might otherwise escape [her] consideration" nor that it would otherwise be of assistance in this case.

* An impartial adviser to a judicial or quasi-judicial body in a particular case, often serving pro bono.

Click here to access full text of the Commissioner's decision.

 

Court finds a probationary employee terminated without explanation presented evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact concerning his alleged deficient job performance

A probationary police officer [Plaintiff] terminated by the appointing authority [Town] filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 challenging his termination. Plaintiff contended that he performed his duties as a law enforcement officer "in an exemplary manner," as reflected by the numerous community policing awards for which he had been nominated during his 18-month probationary period. Plaintiff alleged that his employment "was nevertheless terminated by the Town Board four days before the expiration of his probationary period, without explanation."*

In the course of the proceeding Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to compel the disclosure of certain "in-car video recordings." The Town opposed the motion, calling it "a fishing expedition" and argued that it was unnecessary to disclose these videos because its Chief of Police had reviewed them and "determined that the vehicular stops were not being properly made."

The Supreme Court directed the Town to produce a copy of the videotapes that Plaintiff  had requested for his in camera review.** Supreme Court, after the in camera review,  denied Plaintiff's motion to compel the disclosure of the video recordings. The court said that the videos were not "relevant" and subsequently held that the record supported the Town's assertion that Plaintiff's employment had been terminated due to poor performance. 

Supreme Court also held that Plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of raising a triable issue of fact as to whether his employment was terminated in bad faith and summarily dismissed his Article 78 petition.

Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's decision. The Appellate Division, reversing the lower court's ruling explained:

1. "As relevant here, a probationary employee may "be dismissed for almost any reason, or for no reason at all." This broad discretion is not unlimited, however, and "[t]he employment of a probationary employee may not be terminated "in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible or an illegal purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law."

2. In a judicial review a determination to terminate a probationary employee's employment, "[t]he burden of presenting legal and competent evidence to show a deprivation of petitioner's rights or bad faith or other arbitrary action ... must be borne by petitioner."

3. In the event the court finds that the record presents triable issues of fact as to whether the employer was acting in good faith in terminating the probationary employee's employment, a trial must be held.

The Appellate Division, noting that the Town made the positive assertion in the course of the Article 78 action that Plaintiff's employment had been terminated due to his poor performance as a police officer, observed that the Town "did not present any contemporaneous documents or other evidence" to substantiate its claim that Plaintiff had performed his duties in a substandard manner.

Further, in a verified reply to the Town's "new" assertion that Plaintiff was dismissed "for poor performance," Plaintiff said that the Chief of Police "had never advised him that his arrests were improper or illegal during the probationary period" but that the Chief had told him that "the Town Board was unhappy" with a certain arrest Plaintiff had made.

With respect to the Town's failure to produce "any contemporaneous records to support its assertion that [Plaintiff] had performed poorly as a police officer," the Appellate Division's decision notes that "the evidence in the record showed that [Plaintiff] had been given at least nine tours of overtime duty, and had been honored at a regional awards ceremony and received a commendation for his performance as a law enforcement officer during his 18-month probationary term."

The decision also noted that the single written evaluation of Plaintiff's performance signed by the Chief of Police about two months before the termination of Plaintiff stated that Plaintiff's did not need improvement in any area, and that his overall performance was "above standards." Significantly, said the court, the evaluation specifically stated that Plaintiff "[m]akes good arrests," and that he had "grasped the job well" and was "an asset to the department."

Citing Higgins v La Paglia, 281 AD2d 679, the Appellate Division concluded that on this record, Plaintiff's "evidentiary submissions were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether his job performance was satisfactory and whether the Town's proffered explanation of poor performance was pretextual."

Under the circumstances, said the Appellate Division, Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to the extent that he sought disclosure of the video recordings that are referenced in the Town's answer and remanded the matter to the lower court for "an immediate trial."

* In York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760, the Court of Appeals held that “After completing his or her minimum period of probation and prior to completing his or her maximum period of probation, a probationary employee can be dismissed without a hearing and without a statement of reasons, as long as there is no proof that the dismissal was done for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law, or the decision was made in bad faith.”

** A "private review" of material sought by a party by the court, typically taking place in the private chambers of the judge, with the press and public excluded.

The decision is posted on the Internet at https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/appellate-division-second-department/2020/2017-11383.html

 

Evaluating a request to place a position in the exempt class of the classified service of the state or a political subdivision of the state

§44 of the Civil Service Law provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he competitive class ... shall include all positions now existing or hereafter created ... except such positions as are in the exempt class, the non-competitive class or the labor class."

With respect to jurisdictionally classifying a position* as a position in the exempt class, §41.2 of the Civil Service Law provides that "No office or position shall be deemed to be in the exempt class unless it is specifically named in such class in the rules. Upon the occurrence of a vacancy in any position in the exempt class, the state or municipal civil service commission having jurisdiction shall study and evaluate such position and, within four months after the occurrence of such vacancy, shall determine whether such position, as then constituted, is properly classified in the exempt class. Pending such determination, said position shall not be filled, except on a temporary basis."

The New York State Department of Financial Services [DFS] requested that the New York State Civil Service Commission [Commission] place five new Special Assistant positions in the exempt class. The Public Employees Federation [PEF] objected to jurisdictional classification of the positions as DFS had requested.  The Commission considered the views of DFS and PEF with respect to jurisdictionally placing the five positions in the exempt class and ultimately adopted a rule placing the five positions in the exempt class. 

PEF then initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a court order annulling the Commission's determination. Supreme Court dismissed PEF's petition. 

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's ruling, explaining "[A]ppointments and promotions within the civil service system must be merit-based and, when practicable, determined by competitive examination". However, continued the court, a position for "which competitive or non-competitive examination may be found to be not practicable shall be designated as exempt."

Noting that a civil service commission's placement of a position in the exempt class is permitted when it determines that the nature of the  position is "confidential;" involves the performance of duties which require the exercise of authority or discretion at a high level; or the need for the appointee to have some expertise or personal qualities "which cannot be measured by a competitive examination," the Appellate Division said that its review of the Commission's determination "is limited to whether it was wholly arbitrary or without a rational basis".

Here, said the court, the record indicates that DFS requested exempt classification of the five positions was based, in part, upon the sensitive and confidential nature of the duties of the incumbent of the position and the ability of Special Assistants to influence policy and which appointees "were required to have a confidential relationship with DFS's superintendent and the full trust of the superintendent."

Noting that the Commission considered, among other factors, DFS summary memorandum explaining the basis for its request and the confidential character and the high-level responsibilities and duties of the incumbents of these five positions, the Appellate Division said that it could not conclude that the Commission's determination was arbitrary or without any rational basis.

* Article 1, §2.10 of the Civil Service Law defines the term "jurisdictional classification" as the assignment of positions in the classified service to the competitive, non-competitive, exempt or labor classes;" to be distinguished from "position classification" which is defined in Article 1, §2.11 of the Civil Service Law as "the grouping together, under common and descriptive titles, of positions that are substantially similar in the essential character and scope of their duties and responsibilities and in the qualification requirements..." for such positions.

Click here to access the text of the Appellate Division's decision.

 

A claimant seeking workers' compensation benefits must show a causal nexus between the accident underlying his claim and his employment

A Chief of Police [Claimant] of a Village in New York State filed for workers' compensation benefits in connection with injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred while he was driving a police vehicle. The Village's workers' compensation carrier controverted the claim. Ultimately the Workers' Compensation Board [Board] awarded Claimant workers' compensation benefits and the Village's workers' compensation insurance carrier [Carrier] appealed the Board's ruling.

The record indicated that Claimant was involved in the accident in the course of his taking a weekend trip, about a 4½ drive from the Village. Claimant had testified that "he carried his work cell phone, that he was on call 24 hours a day and that he drove his police vehicle to his weekend destination so that he could return to the Village if needed." Claimant also testified that:

1. He was not recalled at any point during the weekend;

2. He was not in the course of returning to work at the time of the accident; and

3. He was he attending to any other police matter at the time of the accident. 

After considering some procedural matters, the Appellate Division said that it agreed with the Workers' Compensation Board [Board] that the Carrier was precluded from submitting evidence on the issue of whether Claimant's injuries arose out of and in the course of Claimant's employment having waived such defenses.

The court, however, pointed out that the Carrier's waiver of its defenses did not relieve Claimant of his obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to establish that he suffered a compensable injury in the course of his employment. According, said the court, Claimant had the burden of demonstrating that "a sufficient causal nexus existed between his employment and the motor vehicle accident that caused his injuries" to support of his application for workers' compensation benefits.

The Appellate Division explained that the degree of control exercised by the employer over a claimant's activities at the time of the accident was a critical element "in determining whether the requisite causal nexus exists," a factual question for the Board. Further, the Board's determination regarding the required nexus will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.

As Claimant offered no other testimony linking his weekend activities to his employment by the Village, the Appellate Division opined that the evidence offered by Claimant "falls short of demonstrating the requisite causal nexus between Claimant's accident and his employment." 

Accordingly, the court held that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and remitted the matter to the Board for further proceedings.

Click here to access the text of the Appellate Division's decision.