Reviewing a determination of the State Comptroller denying petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement benefits

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement benefits.

In September 2015, petitioner — a police detective — filed an application for accidental disability retirement benefits alleging that he was permanently disabled as a result of injuries to, among other things, his right hip and back that, in turn, were sustained while pursuing a fleeing suspect in October 2014. The New York State and Local Police and Fire Retirement System denied petitioner's application upon the ground that the incident did not constitute an accident within the meaning of Retirement and Social Security Law §363.

Petitioner acknowledged that, as a police officer, he had a duty to respond to an accident or a crime that he witnessed — even if he was "on [his] own personal time" — and the record reflects that, after the suspect fled the scene of the initial collision, petitioner immediately reported the event to his employer, sought assistance and gave chase. Petitioner acknowledged that "[p]ursuing and subduing a fleeing suspect is an ordinary employment duty of a police officer" (Matter of Quartucio v DiNapoli, 110 AD3d 1336, 1337 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]), and he agreed that such pursuits could entail "chasing [suspects] across all different types of terrain, uneven ground, jumping fences" and the like (see Matter of Sweeney v New York State Comptroller, 86 AD3d 893, 893-894 [2011]; Matter of Neidecker v DiNapoli, 82 AD3d 1483, 1484 [2011]).

Additionally, the particular hazard encountered by petitioner, i.e., the elevation change lying beyond the third fence, "could have been reasonably anticipated" (Matter of Stancarone v DiNapoli, 161 AD3d 144, 148-150 [2018]; see Matter of Scofield v DiNapoli, 125 AD3d 1086, 1087 [2015]), notwithstanding petitioner's testimony that vegetation partially obscured his view of the terrain.

Hence, even setting aside the inconsistencies between petitioner's testimony and the description of the incident as set forth in the relevant incident reports, which presented credibility issues for the Hearing Officer and respondent to resolve (see Matter of Verille v Gardner, 177 AD3d 1068, 1070 [2019]; Matter of Angelino v New York State Comptroller, 176 AD3d at 1379; see also Matter of Harris v New York State & Local Retirement Sys., 191 AD3d at 1086), substantial evidence supports respondent's finding that this incident was not an accident within the meaning of Retirement and Social Security Law § 363.

The full text of the Appellate Division's decision is posted on the Internet at: https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_04409.htm

 

The Freedom of Information Law's application to evidence collected in a criminal action

To the extent that petitioner's contentions on appeal relate to the cotton swabs stored in evidence box number seven, we reject petitioner's contentions. In order to meet his burden on his motion, respondent was required to provide documentary evidence that "utterly refute[d] [petitioner's] factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law" (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; see Matter of Nassau Community Coll. Fedn. of Teachers, Local 3150 v Nassau Community Coll., 127 AD3d 865, 866-867 [2d Dept 2015]). 

Here, in support of his motion, respondent established that Executive Law § 838-a deals with sexual offense evidence kits, whereas the only cotton swabs in evidence box number seven had been used to collect a "grease-like substance [found] on the washer/dryer" in the home of the victims, and thus no sexual offense evidence existed in petitioner's criminal case. 

Because respondent was "under no obligation to furnish [materials that he did] not possess" (Matter of Rivette v District Attorney of Rensselaer County, 272 AD2d 648, 649 [3d Dept 2000]; see generally Matter of Council of City of N.Y. v Bloomberg, 6 NY3d 380, 388 [2006]), the evidence submitted by respondent "utterly refute[d] [petitioner's] factual allegations" with respect to the cotton swabs in evidence box number seven, thereby "conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law" thereto (Goshen, 98 NY2d at 326; see generally Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v Superior Well Servs., Inc., 20 NY3d 59, 63 [2012]).

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at: https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_04416.htm

 

Elements considered in a court review of the denial of certain records demanded pursuant to the Freedom of Information

The Agency [Custodian] of certain records demanded in a Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] request appealed a Supreme Court judgment that, among other things, directed the Custodian to disclose certain documents to petitioner [Plaintiff].

The Appellate Division "unanimously modified on the law" the Supreme Court's judgment with respect to certain pages identified by "Bates stamp"* and certain emails attached to certain pages of documents that were otherwise subject to disclosure. In addition, with respect to certain documents containing identifying information of private citizens, the court ordered such personal information to be redacted from the documents. The Appellate Division then affirmed "as modified" the Supreme Court's judgment without costs."

Citing Gould v New York CityPolice Dept., 89 NY2d 267, the Appellate Division noted that "All government records are ... presumptively open for public inspection and copying unless they fall within one of the enumerated exemptions of Public Officers Law §87(2)", typically referred to as FOIL.  However, observed the court, FOIL permits an agency to deny access to records or portions thereof that are "inter-agency or intra-agency materials" that are (i) not "statistical or factual tabulations or data"; (ii) not "instructions to staff that affect the public"; (iii) not "final agency policy or determinations"; or (iv) not "external audits, including but not limited to audits performed by the comptroller and the federal government."

Further, said the court, the agency bears the burden of establishing that a document is exempt from disclosure.

Following an in camera** review of the documents in issue, the Appellate Division concluded that the lower court erred in ordering the disclosure of certain documents that it identified by its "Bates number". However, contrary to the Custodian's contention, the Appellate Division opined that Supreme Court "properly ordered disclosure of the remaining documents and portions of documents submitted for [its] review on the ground that the Custodian failed to establish that Public Officers Law §87(2 (g) exempted them from disclosure."

* Bates Numbering, also known as Bates Stamping, is an indexing method used for legal, business and medical documents (PDFs in most cases).

** "In private" and typically taking place in the private chambers of a judge, with the press and public excluded.

Click HEREto access the Appellate Division's decision.