Arbitration award challenged in a CPLR Article 75 proceeding confirmed

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed a Supreme Court's decision granting Plaintiff's petition challenging an arbitration award and remanding the matter for a new hearing before a different arbitrator. The court then reinstated initial arbitrator's determination and penalty imposed "on the law".

The Plaintiff in the instance action was the subject of a prior disciplinary action involving charges of violating his employer's attendance rules. These charges were resolved by a written stipulation and agreement. The stipulation provided that [1] the charges were sustained; [2] that the Plaintiff would accept a "30 day suspension";  [3] agreement constituted a final warning "on time and attendance violations" and [4] the authority of the arbitrator adjudicating "any time and leave violations occurring within eighteen (18) months of the [date of the] stipulation," would be "limited to review of the charged misconduct, which if sustained would result in dismissal."

Prior to the expiration of this 18 month period Plaintiff was charged with [1] failing to report to work for 12 days and [2] abandonment of his position, in violation of his employer's Time and Leave Rules, which require that employees obtain prior approval for all leaves of absence, "except for such emergencies as death in immediate family and other substantiated unforeseeable occurrences."*

At the hearing which followed the Plaintiff testified that he was absent to care for his daughter who is bipolar and had  attempted suicide on previous occasions.

However, the arbitrator found that the documents offered by the Plaintiff in justification of his absences consisted of [1] a note signed by a physician indicating  that the Plaintiff's daughter sought treatment at an urgent care on the dates of Plaintiff's absence; and [2] did not include a diagnosis or any specific supervision or treatment recommendations other than Plaintiff's daughter should "refrain from going to work and school for a certain number of days."

This, said the arbitrator, neither serve to substantiate the level of care Plaintiff's daughter required nor that she needed his constant presence.

The Appellate Division held that under these circumstances, "there was a plausible basis for the arbitrator's finding that Plaintiff's] excuse for his prolonged absence without prior approval was not sufficiently substantiated, despite the challenging circumstances presented by his daughter's mental health."

* Although Plaintiff "called in" to report he would be absent from work each day, he did not obtain prior approval for any of these absences.

Click HEREto access the text of Appellate Division's ruling.

 

A writ of mandamus seeking to compel a public officer to perform a certain act will not be issued if the act is discretionary in nature

Plaintiffs, who are teachers and professional staff employed by a school district [Respondent], commenced this CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of mandamus*to compel Respondent to offer courses and sequences in the arts during the school day and equitably throughout the school district "in accordance with regulations promulgated by the New York State Commissioner of Education.

Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiffs' petition and Plaintiffs appealed.

The Appellate Division, noting that a writ of mandamus "is available to compel a governmental entity or officer to perform a ministerial duty, explained that the writ "does not lie to compel an act which involves an exercise of judgment or discretion" and citing Matter of Brusco v Braun, 84 NY2d 674, explained that such a writ is "an extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited circumstances."

In this instance, opined the court, Supreme Court "properly determined that mandamus to compel does not lie" as the regulations relied on by Plaintiffs provide, in relevant part, that a school district "shall offer students the opportunity to complete a three- or five-unit sequence in ... the arts and must provide that opportunity beginning in ninth grade."

In the words of the Appellate Division: "Although the regulations provide that the District must offer students the opportunity for an arts sequence, [Respondent] may exercise discretion in how to do so." The court then explained that "because the actions that [Petitioners] seek to compel are not ministerial in nature but discretionary, mandamus to compel does not apply."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division sustained Supreme Court's ruling.

* A writ of mandamus is one of a number of the ancient “common law” writs and is granted by a court to compel an official to perform acts that such an official is duty-bound to perform. Other such ancients writs include the writ of prohibition, issued by a higher tribunal to a lower tribunal to "prohibit" the adjudication of a matter then pending before the lower tribunal on the grounds that the lower tribunal "lacked jurisdiction"; the writ of "certiorari," compelling a lower court to send its record of a case to the higher tribunal for review by the higher tribunal; and the writ of  “quo warranto,” which requires a person or body to show by what warrant, office or franchise, held, claimed, or exercised, with respect to that individual or entity performing a particular act or omission. New York State's Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] sets out the modern equivalents of the surviving ancient writs.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Educator pleads guilty to submitting false time cards

On May 6, 2022, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and the Onondaga County District Attorney William Fitzpatrick announced that a teacher [Educator] employed in a school district's "after-school program" [The Twilight Program] to assist students in need of support to graduate "on time" plead guilty to corrupting the government in the 3rd Degree, admitting his having submitted submitting false time cards to the school district.*

This investigation was the result of the coordinated efforts of the New York State Comptroller’s Office and the Onondaga County District Attorney’s Office.

“Abuse of public funds should never be tolerated, but is particularly egregious when an educator takes funds meant to improve students’ lives,” said Comptroller DiNapoli.  “I thank District Attorney Fitzpatrick for his continuing partnership in combating public corruption and for holding [Educator] accountable.”

Teachers participating in the district’s Twilight Program receive additional compensation for teaching classes to Twilight participants. As the program coordinator, Educator was in charge of the Twilight teaching schedule and also received additional compensation for his services at Twilight.

From 2016-2018, Educator regularly left his Twilight position early but submitted time cards that inflated the number of hours he had actually worked at Twilight. He also directed certain Twilight teachers to submit false time sheets that reported that  they were at work when they were not. 

Educator was arrested in May of 2021, together with two Twilight teachers. The  cases involving these other Twilight teachers are still pending.

* Educator also agreed to resign from his employment with the school district. 

New York Public Personnel Law Handbooks

The Discipline Book - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public officers and employees in New York State set out as an e-book. For more about this electronic handbook, click HERE.

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances- The text of this publication focuses on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information about this e-book click HERE.

 

 

A public retirement system of New York State is required to correct errors made in its administration of retirement benefits

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (W. Franc Perry, J.), entered May 11, 2021, denying the petition to annul a determination of respondent Board of Trustees of New York City Employees' Retirement System (NYCERS), which reclassified petitioners from Tier 4 to revised Tier 3/Tier 6 membership, and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner in the CPLR Article 78 action were members of various New York State stage and local had left their previous jobs within the various retirement systems and were hired as uniformed sanitation workers by the City of New York after April 1, 2012. These petitioners became sanitation workers and were placed in Tier 4 of the New York City Employees' Retirement System [NYCERS] based on their prior participation in public employee retirement systems.

In 2016, NYCERS determined that it had made an error, and reclassified Petitioners' memberships in NYCERS from the Tier 4 Sanitation 20-Year retirement plan [SA-20] pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law Article 15 to the revised Tier 3/Tier 6 Sanitation 22-Year retirement plan [SA-22] pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law Article 14.

The Appellate Division rejected Petitioners' contention that the doctrine of "equitable estoppel" barred NYCERS placing in SA-22. The court explained that NYCER "is mandated by statute to correct errors in administration of retirement benefits," and held that "estoppel may not be invoked to prevent [NYCERS] from reclassifying Petitioners' memberships in SA-22", noting that reading these provisions together determines whether a sanitation worker is subject to the SA-20 or SA-22 plan, based on the date that he or she becomes a sanitation member.

In the words of the Appellate Division, "The legislative history of the amendment supports the conclusion that "new . . . uniformed sanitation . . . members" such as petitioners, who were not sanitation members before April 1, 2012, would be given the "modified Tier 3 police/fire benefits" provided in SA-22."

Further, said the court, "The Retirement and Social Security Law transfer provision, which applies to two of the five individual petitioners, entitles them to credit for prior service. It does not affect the date that they became uniformed sanitation members...."

Finally, opined the Appellate Division, Petitioners' membership reclassification did not violate Article V, §7 of the New York State Constitution which, in pertinent part, provides that "After July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired", since "petitioners were never entitled to [SA]-20 benefits to begin with and, thus, did not have a contractual right to those benefits."

Click HEREto access the Appellate Division's posted on the Internet.