Court annuls an educator’s unsatisfactory annual performance rating after finding the rating arbitrary and capricious and lacking a rational basis.

Court annuls an educator’s unsatisfactory annual performance rating after finding the rating arbitrary and capricious and lacking a rational basis.

2013 NY Slip Op 51868(U), Supreme Court, New York County, Judge Michael D. Stallman [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports] 

A tenured teacher [Educator] at a New York City public school received an overall unsatisfactory rating (U-rating) for the school year. Educator appealed his U-rating to the Chancellor's Committee. Following hearings, the Chancellor's Committee recommended that Educator’s U-rating be sustained.

The Chief Academic Officer, as the Designee for Chancellor Dennis M. Walcott, denied Educator's appeal, stating that “the appeal of [the Educator’s] rating of Unsatisfactory' for the period … has been denied and the said rating is sustained as a consequence of [Educator's] failure to demonstrate professional growth

Educator responded by filing an Article 78 petition seeking a court order annulling the U-rating.

In the words of State Supreme Court Judge Michael D. Stallman, “The issue presented is whether [the New York City Department of Education] acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that [Educator] should receive an overall U-rating based on three incidents (and related unsatisfactory comments), even though [Educator] received otherwise satisfactory comments in his annual professional performance review and satisfactory ratings in all his formal classroom observations.”

The Judge Stallman said that the Chancellor's Committee found that Educator failed to follow protocol, but not for the specific reason set forth in "the disciplinary letter," i.e., that petitioner did not request a personal day two days in advance. Rather, said the court, the Committee found that Educator did not follow protocol by not reporting to the Assistant Principal of Organization that he might need a Personal Business Day the next day, even though he had informed his immediate supervisor that he might not be able to work on that day.

Further, the court found there was uncontroverted testimony that Educator's daughter suffered an illness the night before Educator's absence. Thus, said the court, Educator could not have given two days' advance notice and, therefore, the determination that Educator failed to follow school protocol was taken without regard to the facts, and thus was arbitrary and capricious.

Accordingly, said the court, Educator’s overall U-rating for the school year must be evaluated based on only two incidents and the issue presented is whether these incidents constitute a rational basis for an overall U-rating for the entire school year.

The Department of Education did not claim that criteria exists for determining whether one or two unsatisfactory comments on a teacher's annual professional performance review may justify an overall U-rating nor did the Human Resources Handbook, "Rating Pedagogical Staff Members" contain any criteria on that issue. Further, the court explained, the Department “offer no explanation as to why [Educator], who received otherwise satisfactory comments in his annual performance review and satisfactory ratings in all his formal classroom observations, warranted a U-rating for the entire school year.

Although substantiated misconduct in the workplace, such as a lack of civility in dealings with school personnel and supervisors, or insubordination, may support an overall U-rating, the Department did not contend that the incidents giving rise to the U-rating themselves were so egregious as to warrant an overall U-rating.

Judge Stallman also noted that the Chancellor's letter denying Educator’s appeal was “at odds” with the circumstances here in that Chancellor appears to fault the Educator for not having demonstrated "professional growth" while Educator’s ”U-rating for the entire year is based on three separate incidents, with no documented recurrences.” The absence of further similar, documented incidents, said the court, would suggest improvement in Educator's conduct, i.e., "growth."

While “disciplinary letters” placed in Educator's file warned Educator that "this may lead to further disciplinary action, including an unsatisfactory rating which may result in your termination," Judge Stallman ruled that “to the extent that the overall U-rating was imposed as a penalty, based on the documented incidents, the overall U-rating is so disproportionate to [Educator’s] behavior on three isolated incidents as to shock the judicial conscience,” explaining that the overall U-rating for the entire school year was given “because of one absence, one lateness, and two words.”

Judge Stallman held that the determination of the Chancellor sustaining Educator's U-rating "based on three incidents … was arbitrary and capricious” and granted Educator’s petition and annulling the U-rating.

The court said it was not remanding the matter to the Department as “Remand is not warranted because this is not a situation where the U-rating was annulled due to procedural deficiencies in the review process that are capable of being corrected upon remand.”

In his “Conclusion,” Judge Stallman said that the Department “offered no explanation as to why two incidents in the face of otherwise satisfactory ratings and satisfactory comments are sufficient to warrant an overall U-rating. The lack of an explanation under these circumstances renders the determination arbitrary and capricious and lacking a rational basis. To the extent that [Educator’s] overall U-rating was imposed as a disciplinary measure, the overall U-rating was a penalty so disproportionate to the subject incidents that it shocks the judicial conscience.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_51868.htm

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Reassignment of unit work to nonunit employees an improper practice under the Taylor Law

Reassignment of unit work to nonunit employees an improper practice under the Taylor Law

Monroe County v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2013 NY Slip Op 07362, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The Monroe County Deputy Sheriff's Association, Inc. [MCDS] filed an improper practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board [PERB] alleging the Monroe County Sheriff's Office [Sheriff's Office] assigned non-MCDSA members to perform certain security screening work at the Monroe County Jail and the Monroe County Correctional Facility that had previously been performed exclusively by MCDSA members.

Following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] determined that the Sheriff’s Department had violated Civil Service Law §209-a (1)(d) by assigning the duties of security screening at the jail and at the correctional facility to non-MCDSA employees. The Sheriff’s Department appealed but PERB denied the exceptions it filed and affirmed the ALJ's decision.

According to PERB’s ruling, the Sheriff’s Office had violated Civil Service Law §209-a (1)(d), in that [1] the work in question had been reassigned to non-MCDSA members, [2] that the reassigned tasks were substantially similar to those previously performed by MCDSA members, and [3] that the qualifications for the job at issue had not changed significantly

The Sheriff’s Office filled a CPLR Article 78 petition challenging PERB’s decision.

The Appellate Division sustained PERB’s determination, indicating that it was supported by substantial evidence, rejecting the Sheriff’s Office’s “public policy” argument. The court then provided for the enforcement of PERB’s order.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07362.htm
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Police officer terminated after being found guilty of possessing and ingesting cocaine

Police officer terminated after being found guilty of possessing and ingesting cocaine
2013 NY Slip Op 07262, Appellate Division, First Department

The Appellate Division confirmed the disciplinary penalty imposed on a New York City Detective – termination from the force - found guilty of possessing and ingesting cocaine.

The court said that there was substantial evidence supporting finding the detective guilty of the charges, including a positive random drug test results, and there was no basis for  “disturbing the Hearing Officer's credibility determinations.”

Citing Trotta v Ward, 77 NY2d 827, the Appellate Division said that the penalty imposed did not shock its sense of fairness as the detective "is accountable to the public for the integrity of the Department."

The Appellate Division also noted that it had considered the individual’s concerns about the impact his disciplinary termination has on his retirement benefits and found them “unavailing.” Section 13-173.1 of New York City’s Administrative Code requires an employee to "be in service" on the effective date of his or her retirement or vesting of retirement benefits. If the employee is not "in service" on that date, he or she forfeits his or her retirement benefits.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07262.htm

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A municipality may rescind its decision to defend and indemnify an employee being sued for acts or omission that occurred performing official duties if the individual fails to cooperate

A municipality may rescind its decision to defend and indemnify an employee being sued for acts or omission that occurred performing official duties if the individual fails to cooperate
Lancaster v Incorporated Village of Freeport, 2013 NY Slip Op 07652, Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that a municipality, here the Village of Freeport, may withdraw from its defense and indemnification obligations otherwise required under provisions of the Freeport Village Code §130-6 adopted pursuant to Public Officers Law §18* in the event current and former municipal officials and officers being sued in a civil action decline to accept a reasonable settlement offer. Further the court said that “First Amendment concerns with respect to the settlement's nondisclosure clause do not warrant a different conclusion.”

However, §130-6 of the Code provided that the Village's duty to defend and indemnify "shall be conditioned upon: . . . the full cooperation of the employee in the defense of such action or proceeding against the Village based upon the same act or omission"

According to the decision, the Freeport Board of Trustees authorized the Village to defend and indemnify the employees named in the civil action and retained separate counsel to represent the Village and employees in the litigation.

Subsequently the Village's counsel began settlement negotiations with the plaintiffs and an agreement whereby the plaintiffs would dismiss the actions against the Village in return for $3,500,000 paid over six years. In addition, the settlement agreement included a “nondisparagement clause” and required the employees to "agree not to ever interfere, nor challenge or criticize the terms of either Stipulation [of Settlement] in any manner."

The employees’ counsel indicated that, in his opinion, “the nondisparagement clause constituted a "concerted effort by the Village and the plaintiffs to silence any comment by [the employees] in this matter of public concern, particularly as to those who hold public office, is misguided at best and could be construed as a threat to [the employees’] First Amendment rights.” The employees’ suggest revisions “to avoid even the impression of an effort to impinge on anyone's right to express themselves or to coerce any public official from fulfilling his/her responsibilities.”

The Village's counsel replied indicating that: the proposed settlement did not violate employees' free speech rights; the settlement was advantageous for employees §18; and refusal would be patently unreasonable and a breach of their duty to cooperate under the Public Officers Law** and Village Code.

The employees refused to settle. The Board subsequently met in executive session and resolved to withdraw providing for the employees’ defense and indemnification. However, the employees continued to litigate the actions at their own expense and subsequently initiated a “hybrid Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking a judgment (1) vacating the withdrawal; (2) directing [the Village] to provide a defense; and (3) declaring invalid the Village's disclaimer of any further obligation to defend [the employees].”

Supreme Court denied the petitions and dismissed the proceedings, rejecting the employees’ arguments that “the Village had infringed their First Amendment rights, improperly withdrawn the defense and indemnification for lack of cooperation, or violated the Open Meetings Law.” The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court ruling and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of Appeals rejected the employees’ argument that (1) the Village violated their free speech rights by withdrawing the defense and indemnification; (2) their refusal to settle did not constitute a failure to cooperate justifying revocation of the defense and indemnification under Public Officers Law §18; and (3) the Board violated the Open Meetings Law by withdrawing the defense and indemnification in executive session.

The Court of Appeals said that the employees had advance two argument: [1] the requirement of a nondisparagement clause was an impermissible prior restraint on free speech, and [2] penalizing the employees for refusing to refrain from criticizing the settlement was unconstitutional retaliation. The court found neither argument persuasive.

The court noted that the evidence does not show the Village to have actively sought to restrict the employees’' speech. If, on the other hand, were there. for example, that as part of the settlement, the Village induced the plaintiffs to include the nondisparagement clause in the settlement with employees, said the court, this might be a different case.

The Court of Appeals explained that the plaintiff’s inclusion of the nondisparagement clause in the settlement offer was not a prior restraint on speech as plaintiff was a private party and entitled to offer settlement on whatever terms it saw fit. Had employees accepted the settlement and breached its terms, only the plaintiff, not the Village, could have sued to enforce it.

As the employees’ claim that the Village's "threat" to withdraw the defense and indemnification a prior restraint on speech, the Court of Appeals noted that "[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from encouraging the suppression of speech in a manner which can reasonably be interpreted as intimating that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action will follow the failure to accede to the official's request." Here, however, the reason the Village threatened to withdraw funding was to end the litigation and save public funds, rather than to suppress speech.

The court also observed that the withdrawal of it obligation to provide for the employees’ defense and indemnification was not a prior restraint on speech but rather a response to employees' failure to cooperate. It was not a restraint on what petitioners could say in the future as the employees were free to continue litigating and criticize the settlement as they pleased.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, Judge Pigott dissenting.

* Presumably the same ruling would control with respect to officers and employees of the State as the employer seeking “defense and indemnification” pursuant to §17 of the Public Officers Law in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or is alleged in the complaint to have occurred while the officer or the employee was acting within the scope of his or her public employment or duties

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** §17.5 of the Public Officers Law provides, in pertinent part, “The duty to defend or indemnify and save harmless prescribed by this section shall be conditioned upon: … (ii) the full cooperation of the employee in the defense of such action or proceeding and in defense of any action or proceeding against the public entity based upon the same act or omission, and in the prosecution of any appeal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07652.htm
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Police Department's policy of requiring a police officer who discharges a firearm causing death or personal injury to submit to a Breathalyzer test sustained

Police Department's policy of requiring a police officer who discharges a firearm causing death or personal injury to submit to a Breathalyzer test sustained

Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., v New York City Police Department, Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner, US Circuit Court of Appeals, 2^nd Circuit, Docket No. 12-3089

The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., appealed the District Court’s granting summary judgment dismissing its petition challenging the New York City Police Department’s [NYPD] administration of a Breathalyzer test to any officer whose discharge of his firearm within New York City results in death or injury to any person.

The Circuit Court of Appeals denied the PBA’s appeal, holding that such testing “is reasonable under the special needs doctrine" and that [the PBA’s] Fourth Amendment challenge "fails as a matter of law.”

The “Special Needs” Doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Typically when law enforcement seek to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, “reasonableness” generally requires the officer first obtaining of a judicial warrant supported by probable cause.

The court said that “neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance” and “[w]arrantless, even suspicionless, searches can be constitutionally reasonable where 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement' are present." However, warrantless, suspicionless searches is “closely guarded” and a court must conduct a “close review of the scheme at issue” in light of “all the available evidence” to determine its “primary purpose.”

The tests applied by the Circuit Court in holding that the “Special Needs Doctrine” applied in this instance were:

1. Sobriety is a fitness-for-duty condition of employment with the NYPD and a sobriety determination serves special needs distinct from criminal law enforcement, specifically, personnel management of, and maintaining public confidence in, the NYPD;

2. NYPD's interest in these special needs is not compatible with the warrant requirement applicable to criminal investigations; and

3. NYPD's interest in these special needs sufficiently outweighs the privacy interests of tested police officers as to render warrantless, suspicionless testing constitutionally reasonable.

The court’s conclusion: these special needs “greatly outweigh officers' reduced expectation of privacy with respect to alcohol testing at the time of any firearms discharge causing death or personal injury,” thereby rendering warrantless, suspicionless testing constitutionally reasonable as a matter of law.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/8f207a1c-113c-4011-b240-6e49dc649f4e/2/doc/12-3089_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/8f207a1c-113c-4011-b240-6e49dc649f4e/2/hilite/

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Employee demoted after being found guilty of misconduct

Employee demoted after being found guilty of misconduct

2013 NY Slip Op 07363, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

In this action an employee asked the Appellate Division to annul a determination by the appointing authority finding the employee guilty of specified acts of misconduct and demoting the employee to a lower grade position.

The court rejected the employee's claim that the appointing authority’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence, explaining that substantial evidence is "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact," citing 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176.

Further, said the Appellate Division, the penalty imposed by the appointing authority, demotion, “is not so disproportionate to the offense[s] as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, and thus does not constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07363.htm
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Applying the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Applying the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Marsico v Armstrong, 2013 NY Slip Op 07487, Appellate Division, Second Department

Education Law §2510(2) provides that “Whenever a board of education abolishes a position under this chapter, the services of the teacher having the least seniority in the system within the tenure of the position abolished shall be discontinued [emphasis supplied].*

The Board of Education abolished Business Education teacher positions in accordance with Education Law §2510(2) and then established a preferred eligible list pursuant to Education Law §2510(3) for use in the event a vacancy became available and the Board elected to fill the position.

Donna Marsico was granted tenure as a Business Education teacher by the Board effective September 1, 1994. Upon the abolishment of her positions, the Board placed Marsico’s name on the appropriate preferred list as “the most senior teacher for rehiring purposes.” The Board, however, later concluded that Marsico’s service with the school district as an Adult Education teacher from 1993 to 2007 should not have been considered in determining her seniority for placement on the preferred list.

The Board then adopted a resolution establishing a new preferred eligible list listing the names of two other teachers as having greater seniority in the tenure area than Marsico. One of those teachers was later appointed from the preferred list.

Marsico filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 [1] seeking a review of the resolution establishing the new preferred eligible list, [2] seeking an order to compel the Board to restore “her reinstatement rights pursuant to the initial preferred eligible list” and [3] directing the Board to appoint her to the position to which the other teacher had been appointed.

The Board moved to dismiss Marsico’s petition based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.** Supreme Court granted the Board’s motion to the extent that it  “stayed the proceeding and referred the matter to the Commissioner of Education”

The Commissioner subsequently decided Marisco’s administrative appeal challenging the Board's several determinations and agreed with the Board, dismissing her administrative appeal on the merits. [Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision 16,158].***

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The Supreme Court then denied Marisco’s petition and dismissed the proceeding.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s ruling explaining that “Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court either should have dismissed the petition upon the [Board’s] motion, pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or, upon the Commissioner's determination of the administrative appeal, should have permitted Marsico to amend her petition so as to seek review of the Commissioner's determination and to join the Commissioner as a party.”

As Supreme Court elected to await the Commissioner's determination rather than dismiss the petition, the Appellate Division remitted the matter Supreme Court “to permit Marsico to amend her petition and join the Commissioner as a party and, thereafter, for a determination of the amended petition.”

* In contrast, in the event positions in the competitive class in the classified service are abolished [educators are in the unclassified service], §80.1 of the Civil Service Law provides that the incumbents of such positions shall be laid off “in the inverse order of original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service in the service of the governmental jurisdiction in which such abolition positions occurs [emphasis supplied]. §80-a(1) of the Civil Service Law so provides for employees in the noncompetitive class employed by the State as the employer[emphasis supplied].

** The doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied by a court in order to permit an administrative agency an initial opportunity to decide an issue in a case in which the court and the agency have concurrent jurisdiction.

*** The Commissioner's decision is posed on the Internet at: http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume50/d16158.htm

The Appellate Division's decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07487.htm

======================

The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645 page e-book reviewing the relevant New York State laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/5216.html

=====================

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Employee has a duty of loyalty to the appointing authority

Employee has a duty of loyalty to the appointing authority

56 N.Y.2d 656

An employer is sometimes confronted with a situation in which an employee’s duty of loyalty to the employer is called into question or there appears to be a conflict of interest with respect to the employee’s performance.

In this action, the employee sued the agency after it had discharged him for “disloyalty and conflict of interest.”

At the time of his dismissal, the employee served as an associate counsel to the agency. The agency alleged that while its employee, the individual was also actively assisting one of the organizations that the agency was established to regulate.

In the words of the Court of Appeals, “Given the nature of the attorney-client relationship and petitioner's position as associate counsel to [agency] ... it cannot be said that reports of [the employee's] active assistance to two public interest lobbying groups regulated by the [agency] were an improper basis for the [agency's] decision to terminate petitioner's employment (cf. Arnett v Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134; Cooper v Johnson, 590 F.2d 559). Nor was petitioner entitled to a due process hearing* inasmuch as he never alleged that there was public dissemination of the reasons for his dismissal. Finally, petitioner, a nontenured employee, has demonstrated no procedural violation in the manner in which his employment was terminated.”

* Presumably the court was referring to a "name clearing hearing."
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Retirement System not required to explain the tax implications of its response to an employee’s question

Retirement System not required to explain the tax implications of its response to an employee’s question

Hauser v. Comptroller, 83 A.D.2d 649

From time to time Personnel Officers receive questions from employees that may require extensive analysis or speculation because of the fact that there may be different results depending on the course of action followed by the employee. It seems that as long as the answer is correct, the Court will not impose an unreasonable burden on the administrator to explain the implications of the answer.

The case arose when a retiree sought to change the basis for his retirement from “service retirement” to “ordinary disability” retirement.

Max Hauser contended that the Employees’ Retirement System should have advised him of the possible federal tax benefits were he to elect “ordinary disability” retirement rather than the service retirement option.

In rejecting the argument, the Court indicated that the information given Hauser regarding the amount of benefits was correct and “to require the Retirement System to advise every applicant of the tax implications of their retirement would impose an unreasonable burden on the system”.
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Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending November 16, 2013

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending November 16, 2013

Click on text highlighted in color  to access the full report

DiNapoli Announces New In–State Private Equity Investment Through Softbank Capital

On Friday, November 15, 2013 State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Friday announced the New York State Common Retirement Fund’s In–State Private Equity Program investment in The Dodo Inc., a start–up website focusing on animal issues, through investment manager SoftBank Capital.

DiNapoli: Former Fire District Treasurer Accused of Stealing More Than $50,000

The former Crystal Beach Fire District treasurer was arrested Thursday, November 14, 2013 for allegedly stealing and spending more than $50,000 of public funds on tanning, TV and shopping sprees, according to State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Wednesday announced his office completed audits of the

Northern Onondaga Public Library District and the

Town of Sidney.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases State Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced Wednesday, November 13, 2013 the following audits have been issued:

Plaza College;

Dowling College;

Mercy College;

Department of Health;

New York State Energy Research and Development Authority;

State University of New York Farmingdale State College; and the

State Education Department.
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Employee terminated after being found guilty of “excessive absence”

Employee terminated after being found guilty of “excessive absence”
2013 NY Slip Op 07430, Appellate Division, First Department

The Appellate Division sustained the termination of a Senior Court Officer [Appellant] employed by the Unified Court System following a disciplinary hearing. The hearing office determined that that Appellanthad engaged in misconduct by missing 197 days of scheduled work assignments in the course of a 14-month period and recommended that he be dismissed from his position.

The appointing authority adopted the findings and recommendation of the hearing officer and terminated Appellant. .

The Appellate Division sustained the appointing authority’s decision, noting that substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s determination.

Noting that Appellant’s absences “were not caused by his psychological disorders,” court said that the penalty imposed by the appointing authority, termination, did not shock its sense of fairness, citing Dickinson v NYS Unified Court System, 99 AD3d 569.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07430.htm
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Replacement of a 55-year-old Webmaster by a younger “web guru” in course of a business reorganization did not constitute a violation of the ADEA

Replacement of a 55-year-old Webmaster by a younger “web guru” in course of a business reorganization did not constitute a violation of the ADEA

Source: Employment Law Daily - a Wolters Kluwer publication

Decision summarized by Majorie Johnson, J.D.

A 55-year-old website coordinator who was laid off during a restructuring in which his employer adopted a web-based multimedia marketing model, and hired a younger “web guru” to rebuild the website with the latest technology, could not advance his ADEA and state law claims of age bias, a federal district court in New York ruled. Dismissing the employee’s pro se claims on summary judgment, the court held that the disparity in age between him and his “replacement,” standing alone, was insufficient to prove age discrimination.

The full text of Ms. Johnson’s article is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/no-age-bias-when-55-year-old-webmaster-replaced-by-younger-web-guru-in-restructuring-failed-to-advance-age-bias-claims/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CCH-Workday+%28WKL%26B+WorkDay%29
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Audits issued by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli posted on the Internet

Audits issued by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli posted on the Internet

Source: Office of the State Comptroller

On November 13, 2013 the State Comptroller issued the following audit reports.

Click on text highlighted in color  to access the full report

Statewide Travel Audits:
As part of a statewide initiative to determine whether the use of travel money by selected government employees was appropriate, auditors looked at travel expenses for the highest-cost travelers in the state for the following state entities: 

State University of New York Farmingdale State College, Selected Employee Travel Expenses (2012-S-137)
Auditors selected one State University of New York Farmingdale State College employee with travel expenditures totaling $212,573 for audit. Most of the travel expenses were appropriate. However, college officials could not provide documentation to support 21 travel charges totaling $8,386.

State Education Department, Selected Employee Travel Expenses (2012-S-97)
Auditors examined the travel expenses of three State Education Department employees with outliers in the areas of train fare and fuel expense. They also reviewed and considered the possible tax implications of travel and work locations for one of the three employees. In total, auditors examined $100,908 in travel costs associated with these three individuals. Auditors found the travel expenses for two of the three SED employees selected for audit adhered to state travel rules and regulations. 

However, the travel expenses for one employee implicated the Internal Revenue Service "tax home" rules for 2009 and are taxable as income. As a result, the travel reimbursements made to the employee were reported to the taxing authorities and an amended W-2 was issued.

Tuition Assistance Program, Plaza College (2011-T-2)
Auditors determined that Plaza College was overpaid $549,316 because school officials incorrectly certified students as eligible for TAP awards. Incorrect certifications include 18 students who received awards but did not meet the requirements for full-time status, nine students who did not maintain good academic standing, and four students who did not meet the requirements for accelerated TAP. Many of these disallowances result from Plaza students enrolling in courses not required for their programs of study.

Tuition Assistance Program, Dowling College (2012-T-2)
Auditors determined that Dowling College was overpaid $191,020 because school officials incorrectly certified students as eligible for TAP awards. Incorrect certifications include five students who received awards but did not meet the requirements for full-time status, four students who did not maintain good academic standing, two students who were not credited with their awards, and one student who had not declared a major by the beginning of her junior year.

Tuition Assistance Program, Mercy College (2012-T-3)
Based on a preliminary sample of certification transactions, auditors determined that Mercy College’s certification procedures were appropriately designed and were substantially complied with during the audit period. Auditors therefore concluded that there is a low risk that a significant number of students certified by Mercy College for TAP were not eligible for awards. Nonetheless, tests did disclose 14 awards totaling $25,011 that school officials certified in error.

Department of Health, Unnecessary Managed Care Payments for Medicaid Recipients with Medicare (Follow-Up ) (2013-F-15)
An initial audit report, issued in April 2012, examined whether inappropriate Medicaid payments were made for selected providers who also received payments from Medicare. For the two year audit period ended Dec. 31, 2011, auditors determined that, although DOH implemented the new automated crossover system to reduce Medicaid overpayments, it was flawed. As a result, auditors identified potential and actual overpayments of $100,387 for 12,715 duplicate claims. In a follow-up, auditors found the DOH and Office of the Medicaid Inspector General officials have made progress in correcting the problems identified in the initial report. However, improvements are still needed.

New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, Compliance With Executive Order 111: Agency Energy Efficiency Goals and Practices (2012-S-159)
E.O. 111 required that, by 2010, all affected state agencies (ASEs) seek to achieve a reduction of their energy consumption by 35 percent as compared to 1990 levels. NYSERDA was designated the lead entity responsible for coordinating implementation and assisting other ASEs to fulfill their responsibilities under the order.

Auditors found NYSERDA made significant efforts to provide guidance, and to directly and indirectly assist ASEs in meeting their energy reduction goals, but was deficient in its oversight and monitoring of the statewide progress toward the goal, and these deficiencies likely hampered the effort's outcomes. As a result no one can be certain what was accomplished on a statewide basis and whether program goals were achieved by anyone except a few select agencies that chose to comply.

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Statutory presumption that the employee suffered a disability in the course of his or her employment may be rebutted by credible evidence that the claimed disability was not work-related

Statutory presumption that the employee suffered a disability in the course of his or her employment may be rebutted by credible evidence that the claimed disability was not work-related
2013 NY Slip Op 07254, Appellate Division, First Department

A number of statutes providing disability retirement include a rebuttable presumption that the claimed disability was incurred in the performance of the applicant’s official duties. For example, General Municipal Law §207-kk provides that with respect to a disability “caused by cancer” by certain firefighters constitutes “presumptive evidence that [the cancer] was   incurred in the performance and discharge of duty unless the contrary be   proved by competent evidence.”

In this appeal a New York City police officer, [Applicant] challenged the denial of her application for World Trade Center [WTC] accidental disability retirement benefits based on her claim to have suffered the disability as defined by Retirement and Social Security Law §2(36) as a result of a qualifying condition is presumed to be caused by his or her exposure at the WTC site.

One of arguments advanced by Applicant was that Supreme Court “improperly” shifted the burden of proof to her.

The Appellate Division ruled that the lower court had not shifted the burden of proof to her, explaining that Applicant “was not entitled to the statutory WTC presumption that her condition or impairment of health was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty” because, she failed to demonstrate that she was present at the WTC site and she failed to demonstrate a qualifying WTC condition as defined by Retirement and Social Security Law.*

The Appellate Division said that there was credible evidence that Applicant “was not present at the World Trade Center (WTC) site during the requisite time period” in that the appointing authority had shown that ”there were no contemporaneous records, roll call or command logs, records of the Medical Division, or exposure logs, indicating that [Applicant] was present at the WTC site.”

* Further, §13-252.1 of New York City’s Administrative Code was amended by adding a new provision, §13-252.1[1], the so-called “World Trade Center Law.” This amendment established a rebuttable presumption that "any condition or impairment of health . . . caused by a qualifying World Trade Center condition" as defined in the Retirement and Social Security Law, "shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty and the natural and proximate result of an accident . . . unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07254.htm
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Statutory presumption that the employee suffered a disability in the course of his or her employment may be rebutted by credible evidence that the claimed disability was not work-related

Statutory presumption that the employee suffered a disability in the course of his or her employment may be rebutted by credible evidence that the claimed disability was not work-related
2013 NY Slip Op 07254, Appellate Division, First Department

A number of statutes providing disability retirement include a rebuttable presumption that the claimed disability was incurred in the performance of the applicant’s official duties. For example, General Municipal Law §207-kk provides that with respect to a disability “caused by cancer” by certain firefighters constitutes “presumptive evidence that [the cancer] was   incurred in the performance and discharge of duty unless the contrary be   proved by competent evidence.”

In this appeal a New York City police officer, [Applicant] challenged the denial of her application for World Trade Center [WTC] accidental disability retirement benefits based on her claim to have suffered the disability as defined by Retirement and Social Security Law §2(36) as a result of a qualifying condition is presumed to be caused by his or her exposure at the WTC site.

One of arguments advanced by Applicant was that Supreme Court “improperly” shifted the burden of proof to her.

The Appellate Division ruled that the lower court had not shifted the burden of proof to her, explaining that Applicant “was not entitled to the statutory WTC presumption that her condition or impairment of health was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty” because, she failed to demonstrate that she was present at the WTC site and she failed to demonstrate a qualifying WTC condition as defined by Retirement and Social Security Law.*

The Appellate Division said that there was credible evidence that Applicant “was not present at the World Trade Center (WTC) site during the requisite time period” in that the appointing authority had shown that ”there were no contemporaneous records, roll call or command logs, records of the Medical Division, or exposure logs, indicating that [Applicant] was present at the WTC site.”

* Further, §13-252.1 of New York City’s Administrative Code was amended by adding a new provision, §13-252.1[1], the so-called “World Trade Center Law.” This amendment established a rebuttable presumption that "any condition or impairment of health . . . caused by a qualifying World Trade Center condition" as defined in the Retirement and Social Security Law, "shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty and the natural and proximate result of an accident . . . unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07254.htm
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A candidate improperly disqualified for appointment from the eligible list does not have a right to be appointed to the title in the event he or she successfully challenges the disqualification

A candidate improperly disqualified for appointment from the eligible list does not have a right to be appointed to the title in the event he or she successfully challenges the disqualification

2013 NY Slip Op 07250, Appellate Division, First Department

 
An individual seeking an appointment as a New York City Correction Officer [Candidate] filed an administrative appeal challenging the removal of his name from the eligible list. He successfully argued that he had been improperly disqualified for the appointment and his name was again placed on the eligible list for appointment.

However, Candidate’s claim that his winning the administrative appeal “entitled him to an appointment as a correction officer” was rejected by Supreme Court.

The Appellate Division agreed.

Restoring the name of a candidate to an eligible list, even one improperly earlier removed from the list, does not obviate the application of the so-called Rule of Three, Civil Service Law §61(1). The Rule of Three authorizes the appointing authority to select of any one of three persons with the highest rankings on an eligible list willing to accept the appointment or promotion.

In the event there are more that three eligibles certified for appointment because of “tied-scores,” the appointing authority may select any one of the eligibles certified to it.

For example, in the event one candidate had a score of 95, a second candidate had a score of 90 and 20 candidates had a score of 85, the names of all 22 eligibles would be certified for appointment and the appointing authority could select any one of the 22 individuals so certified for the appointment.

In contrast, had there been 20 eligibles with a score of 95, one eligible with a score of 90 and one eligible with a score of 85, the appointing authority could select any on of the 20 candidates certified have a score of 95 but could not “reach” either the candidate with a score of 90 or with a score of 85 unless there were 18 or 19 "declinations" of the offer of appointment, as the case may be, among those eligibles attaining a score of 95..

In some instances, a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law [Civil Service Law Article 14] may require the appointing authority to observe the “Rule of the List” or “The Rule of One,”* and appoint the person whose name is listed first on the certification.

As the Court of Appeals held in Cassidy v Municipal Civil Service Commission of City of New Rochelle, 37 N.Y.2d 526, Civil Service Law §61(1) grants the appointing authority broad discretion in the selection of candidates, including that of appointing a lower-scoring candidate over a higher-scoring one.

However, should the appointing authority be faced with a mandatory eligible list, it must either select one of those certified to it as standing highest on the eligible list within the meaning of the Rule of Three or elect to keep the position vacant.

Another issue considered by the Appellate Division in Candidate’s appeal focused on the refusal of DOC to have the circumstances underlying Candidate’s not being appointed to the position expunged from the record before DOC as well as expunging that portion of  DOC’s  record that indicated that that it did not to appoint him notwithstanding his name being restored to the eligible list and considering him, along with other eligibles, for appointment on three occasions.

The Appellate Division ruled that DOC’s rejection of Candidate’s request to expunge the material to which he objected from his record was neither arbitrary nor capricious and dismissed his appeal.

* Preferred and special military lists are subject to the “Rule of One” by operation of law. In this instance the appointing authority must either appoint the persons whose name is certified as "first" on the preferred or special military list or elect to keep the position vacant.

The DOC decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07250.htm

Employee's request for a laptop computer to use at home after surgery ruled not an accommodation request within the meaning of the ADA

Employee's request for a laptop computer to use at home after surgery ruled not an accommodation request within the meaning of the ADA

Source: Employment Law Daily - a Wolters Kluwer publication

Decision summarized by Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

"An employee’s request for a laptop so he could work from home while recovering from surgery was a “far cry from a ‘sufficiently direct and specific’ request for an accommodation” that would put his employer on notice that he wanted assistance for his disability, the Tenth Circuit ruled in an unpublished decision.

"Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer on his ADA failure to accommodate claim.(Dinse v Carlisle Foodservice Products, Inc, November 6, 2013, Holmes, J)."

The full text of Ms. Kapusta’s article is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/request-for-laptop-after-surgery-not-ada-accommodation-request/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CCH-Workday+%28WKL%26B+WorkDay%29

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Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending November 9, 2013

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending November 9, 2013

Click on text highlighted in color  to access the full report

Comptroller DiNapoli noted that onMonday, November 11, we will celebrate Veterans Day across the country, remembering and honoring the individuals of all ages and backgrounds who have served in the United States armed forces since our nation was born. November 11th marks the end of World War I, then known as the Great War, in 1918, a conflict intended to make the world safe for democracy in which some 4 million Americans served, 200,000 were wounded and 100,000 gave their lives. After World War II, Armistice Day was renamed Veterans Day and reconceived as a day to celebrate the dedication, patriotism and fighting spirit of all U.S. military veterans.

At local parades and other gatherings, and in our homes, Veterans Day is an opportunity for us to come together to thank the men and women who have served for their sacrifice and bravery, and to reflect upon the principles they upheld in defending the United States of America.

Comptroller DiNapoli & A.G. Schneiderman Announce Arrests of Former Monroe County Public Officials and Business Executives in Elaborate Bid–Rigging Scheme

On November 6, 2013 Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman announced the indictment of four individuals for an elaborate scheme to rig the bidding process for several multimillion–dollar contracts. Nelson Rivera and Robert Wiesner, both former Monroe County public officials, along with John Maggio and Daniel Lynch, two local business executives, have been charged with a total of 43 felony counts, including Money Laundering, Conspiracy, Falsifying Business Records, Offering a False Instrument for Filing, and Combination in Restraint of Trade and Competition.

DiNapoli: Immigrants Continue to Play Key Role in New York City Economy

Immigrants in New York City accounted for $210 billion in economic activity in 2011, or about 31 percent of New York City’s gross city product, according to a reportreleased Thursday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. While immigrants were hit hard by the recession, their wages rebounded strongly and exceeded pre–recession levels two years later.

DiNapoli: Former Clerk Admits to Stealing Village Funds

The former clerk–treasurer in the Steuben County village of Riverside was arrested Friday and charged with stealing more than $40,000 in village funds, State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced.

DiNapoli: $4 Million Availabile for Veterans to Expand Their Businesses

With Veterans Day coming, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Wednesday spotlighted the availability of $4 million in competitive fixed–rate small business loans for military veterans through the New York Business Development Corp.

DiNapoli Announces $500 Million Investment in Opportunistic Portfolio Asset Class

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced on November  8, 2013 that the $160.7 billion New York State Common Retirement Fund has made the first investment in its opportunistic asset class with a $500 million separate account commitment to Blackstone Tactical Opportunities Fund.

DiNapoli Releases Quick Start State Budget Analysis for 2014–15

State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli projects the state’s tax revenues will grow by 2.5 percent to $90.1 billion in state fiscal year 2014–15, according to the Comptroller's annual Quick Start reportreleased Tuesday in accordance with the Budget Reform Act of 2007.

DiNapoli’s Office to Audit SUNY Upstate Medical University’s Contracts with MedBest

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced Friday that his office has scheduled an audit of the State University of New York Upstate Medical University’s contracts with MedBest Medical Management Inc.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Wednesday announced his office completed audits of::

the Caton Volunteer Fire Company;

the Town of Deerpark;

the Town of East Hampton; and

the Ethelbert B. Crawford Public Library.
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What's in a name? that which we call a rose

What's in a name? that which we call a rose…*

Source: Professor Michael Froomkin, Laurie Silvers & Mitchell Rubenstein Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law

Professor Michael Froomkin, Laurie Silvers & Mitchell Rubenstein Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, referring to a response to a motion submitted to the court by an assistant attorney general for the State of Tennessee, states “I’ve seen half-a-dozen links to this unique and amazing pleading but the world will be a better place with one more.”

Here is yet another link to the pleading. 

Professor Froomkin summaries the situation as follows:

“The setup is that the prosecutor wanted the Judge to order the defense ‘not to refer to the Assistant District Attorney General as “the Government” during trial.'" Seems they thought being called “the government” was prejudicial or derogatory or hurt their feelings or something. Defense hits it out of the park. The really good stuff starts at the bottom of page two.” 

* William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet

The defendant’s attorney’s Response To Government's Motion In Limine II is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/180035586/Response-to-Government-Moving-to-Ban-the-Word-Government
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State sued for alleged defamation after publishing information depicting the plaintiff as a “sexual offender/predator”

State sued for defamation after publication of information depicting the plaintiff as a “sexual offender/predator”

2013 NY Slip Op 51814(U), Court of Claims, Judge Judith A. Hard [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports.]

In this action filed in the Court of Claims, the plaintiff [Anonymous] sought damages for alleged defamation arising out of “the State’s implementation, organization, publication, portrayal and dissemination of photographs and materials” which depicted Anonymous to third persons as a sexual offender/predator even though Anonymous was never charged with a sexual offense or convicted as a sexual offender/predator.

In her decision Judge Hard found that Anonymous proved liability by a preponderance of the credible evidence and explained the relevant law with respect to the issue before her, i.e.,  Did the publication of those statements constituted defamation? 

Defamation, said the court, "is defined as the making of a false statement which tends to ‘expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society.' [while] [d]efamation is the injury to one's reputation, either by written expression (libel) or oral expression (slander)."

In the words of Judge Hard “The elements of defamation are: (1) a false statement; (2) the publication of said statement without privilege or authorization to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) the statement causes special harm or constitutes defamation per se. Publication of a photograph constitutes dissemination of information.”

In this case, the Court concluded that a State law enforcement agency's employee’s speech to the press, a press release, a media advisory and “the display of the [Anonymous’] mug shot on the wall of shame,” all of which wrongly imply that Anonymous was a sexual predator, constitute false statements. In addition, the court concluded that “the publication of said statements was not authorized.”

The issue for the court to determine: “Whether the statements were privileged, whether the fault amounts at least to negligence on the part of defendant, and whether the statements caused special harm or constitute defamation per se.”

As to “privilege,” a public official being sued for alleged slander or liable may claim an “absolute privilege” or a “qualified privilege.”

Absolute privilege protects "communications made by individuals participating in a public function, such as executive, legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings" but only extends to comments "made in the context of official communications by a principal executive of State or local government [or] those entrusted by law with considerable administrative or executive policy making responsibilities.” 

Further, Judge Hard said that “Absolute privilege attaches to actions performed by delegation on behalf of a department head of an agency, but not to those actions undertaken by an employee on their own behalf in the discharge of their own official duties.”

As to “qualified privilege,” Judge Hard said that “Press statements made by governmental representatives concerning governmental affairs are covered by such a qualified privilege. To establish such a [qualified] privilege, defendant needs to submit proof establishing that it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that its conduct was appropriate under the circumstances. A [qualified] privilege will attach to statements in which the communicating party possesses a legal duty to communicate information about another, if the communicator has a good-faith belief that the information is true.”

In this action, the State did not claim an absolute privilege.

As to any “qualified privilege,” Judge Hard indicated that although a qualified privilege may apply to press statements made by governmental representatives concerning governmental affairs, the State defendant cannot avail itself of the qualified privilege defense here  because the State defendant did not submit any proof that its behavior was even remotely reasonable under the circumstances or that it had a good-faith belief that Anonymous was an online sexual predator. To the contrary, Judge Hard said that it was clear that State, through the actions of it employees, was aware that Anonymous was charged with a crime - criminal possession of a controlled substance. However, noted the court, Anonymous had not been charged with any of the internet crimes that was the subject of the press conference or press release.

Judge Hard found that “no privilege attaches to any of the alleged defamatory statements,” and then commented “… even if a qualified privilege did exist, it would be overcome by malice as [the State] recklessly disregarded the truth (i.e. that [Anonymous] was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance) when affixing [Anonymous’] photo to the wall of shame designed to highlight online predators.”

The Court’s conclusion:

1. The State’s “fault rises at least to negligence, and further that the defamatory statements constitute defamation per sebecause they would naturally import a criminal or disgraceful charge to the mind of an intelligent person.”

2. Anonymous has proved [the] case by a preponderance of the credible evidence.

Holding that the State “is 100% liable for the defamation,” Judge Hard said that a trial on damages “shall be scheduled as soon as practicable.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_51814.htm
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An employee’s Constitutional right against self-incrimination does not give the individual the right to answer questions untruthfully

An employee’s Constitutional right against self-incrimination does not give the individual the right to answer questions untruthfully

2013 NY Slip Op 07104, Appellate Division, Third Department

An individual [Claimant]employed by Ulster County was arrested and charged with felony and misdemeanor counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance after heroin was found in the car she was driving. The County suspended Claimant without pay from her employment pending the resolution of the criminal charges.

Claimant then applied for unemployment insurance benefits and told the Department of Labor investigator that she was on disciplinary suspension because of her arrest and that she was "not guilty of any wrongdoing in connection with the arrest." Claimant was approved to receive unemployment insurance benefits based on this information.

Subsequently Claimant was convicted of two misdemeanor counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree arising out of the arrest and Ulster County terminated her employment.

Following Claimant's termination by the County, a Labor Department Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disqualified her from receiving unemployment insurance benefits on the ground that she had been separated from employment due to her misconduct. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and ultimately Claimant was held subject to a recoverable overpayment of unemployment insurance benefits in the amount of $31,935 and a reduced right to receive future benefits by 16 effective days on the Board’s finding that she had made willful misrepresentations to obtain benefits.

Complainant appealed contending that her statement to the investigator constituted “an exercise of her constitutional right against self-incrimination for which she could not be penalized by the Board.” The Appellate Division rejected this argument, explaining that although Claimant had the right to refuse to respond to any inquiries related to her possible guilt in connection with her arrest and the criminal charges then pending against her, "neither the text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment confers a privilege to lie."*

In the words of the Appellate Division, “By her response to the investigator's inquiry as to whether she was, in fact, guilty of the crimes she was charged with, [Claimant] “took a course that the Fifth Amendment gave [her] no privilege to take’ and the jury's verdict convicting her of knowingly possessing heroin at the time of her arrest conclusively established the falsity of her statement denying any wrongdoing.”

The Appellate Division sustained the Board’s determination, ruling that substantial evidence supported its finding that Claimant's affirmative statement to the Labor Department's investigator that she was "not guilty of any wrongdoing in connection with [her] arrest" was a willful misrepresentation made in order to obtain benefits.

* In Bryson v. United States, 396 US 64, the Court said “Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Government’s right to ask questions – lying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he [or she] cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_07104.htm
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