Canceling COBRA coverage
Geissal v Moore Medical Corp., USSC, 524 U.S. 74
If an employer discovers that an individual participating in its health insurance plan under COBRA is also covered as a dependent under a different health insurance plan, may it cancel his or her coverage?
It all depends on the date on which the individual’s coverage as a dependent in the other plan took effect.
According the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in the Geissal case, the employer may not cancel its coverage if the individual was covered as a dependent under the other plan before he or she made the COBRA election.
The court noted that 29 USC 1162(2)(D)(i) allows the employer to cancel an individual’s COBRA participation in its health plan only if the individual became covered as a dependent in the other plan after making his or her COBRA election and then only if the new plan does not exclude “pre-existing conditions.”
The Geissal case involved an employee who was covered under both his employer’s health insurance plan and as a dependent under his spouse’s health insurance plan at the time he was terminated from employment and made a timely election to continue in the employer’s group health plan as provided by COBRA.
The fact that both plans provided similar coverages was held irrelevant. The high court decided that because Geissal was covered by his wife’s policy as a dependent before he elected COBRA, his former employer could not cut off his participation in its plan even though the benefits in both plans were essentially the same.
In other cases involving the discontinuation of COBRA coverage by employers on the basis of “alternate coverage as a dependent,” some U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal had applied a “significant gap” test. These courts held that continued coverage under COBRA was available to an eligible employee only if there was a “significant gap” between the individual’s COBRA benefits and the benefits available to the individual under his or her spouse’s plan. Eligibility for continuation of COBRA coverage based on such a distinction was rejected by the Supreme Court.
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