Accidental disability retirement

Accidental disability retirement
Bloom v City of New York, NYS Supreme Court, 7/99, Justice Braun [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

Bloom, a guidance counselor for the New York City School District, filed a grievance contending that she was disabled as a result of her inhaling toxic substances that arose from construction, repairs, and renovation of her school. Former New York City Board of Education Chancellor Joseph Fernandez sustained her grievance, holding that Bloom had suffered “a line of duty injury.”

But when Bloom filed an accidental disability retirement application with the New York City Teachers’ Retirement System [TRS], TRS held that her injuries were not causally related to the alleged exposure to construction materials and rejected her application. TRS’ decision was upheld by the courts (Bloom v TRS, 233 AD2d 254, dismissed in part and denied in part, 90 NY2d 838.

Bloom then sued the district and the City for “a personal injury,” negligence and reckless conduct. The board of education moved for summary judgment, arguing that TRS’s determination “has a collateral estoppel effect.”

Bloom, also relying on “collateral estoppel,” asked the court for summary judgment based on the favorable grievance determination by the Chancellor, contending that the Chancellor’s determination constituted an admission of the district’s liability.

As to the board’s claim of collateral estoppel, the court explained that Bloom had “voluntarily chose to participate in the adjudicative resolution process of TRS by applying for benefits, and thus she may fairly be collaterally estopped by the TRS determination.”

With respect to Bloom’s argument, the court said that the Chancellor’s acknowledgement of the causal connection in the grievance adjudication normally would be a binding admission against the board.

Justice Braun said that although “... a quasi-judicial agency determination can have a collateral estoppel effect” that would bar further litigation; here there are “two conflicting decisions.” Therefore, the court concluded, “logically they must be held to cancel out each other.”

Since there is a significant issue of fact exists as to whether the actions and inactions of board was the proximate cause of Bloom’s injuries, granting summary judgment to either Bloom or the board would not be appropriate.

Accordingly, a trial was required.
.