Asserting rights not covered by the Taylor Law collective bargaining agreement
CSEA v Nassau Co., App. Div., 2nd Dept., 264 AD2d 798, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 94 NY2d 759
Clearly, a public employee union may, under appropriate circumstances, file a lawsuit, or demand arbitration, for an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement. May an employee organization representing public employees sue on the basis of alleged violations of rights not included in a Taylor Law agreement?
In Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Association v City of Geneva, 92 NY2d 326, the Court of Appeals said a public sector labor union may assert rights not covered in its collective bargaining agreement if it can show that:
(a) one or more of its members has standing to sue;
(b) the interests sought to be protected are sufficiently germane to the union to satisfy the court that the union is an appropriate representative of those interests; and
(c) Individual members of the organization” are not required to assert the claim in for the tribunal to provide complete relief.
In this instance, CSEA sued, seeking reinstatement and back pay for members of its collective bargaining unit laid off as a result of Nassau County’s 1992 budget difficulties. Its theory: the layoff was breach of its collective bargaining agreement with the county.
The Appellate Division affirmed a lower court’s ruling that CSEA lacked standing to maintain the action. While couched in terms of a contract violation, the court said that there was no underlying contract provision involved.
As to CSEA’s standing under the Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Association doctrine, the court found that it failed to meet the third test set by the Court of Appeals since the participation of the individuals affected was required in this instance.
The case arose as the result of the county administration terminating or demoting some 2,000 employees in response to its 1992 “budget crisis.” One employee who was affected by this, Joseph E. Torre, successfully challenged the action taken against him as violative of the doctrine of legislative equivalency [Torre v County of Nassau, 86 NY2d 421].
Simply stated, the doctrine holds that “a position created by a legislative act must be abolished by a correlative legislative act.” In other words, a county administrator may not unilaterally abolish a position created by the legislature.
A number of county workers affected by the abolition of positions in 1992 have attempted to interpose legislative equivalency claims in an effort to attain reinstatement and back salary.
When CSEA alleged a breach of the controlling Taylor Law agreement in an effort to win reinstatement for individuals in the collective bargaining unit laid off in 1992, the court said that “it is clear that, in reality, the CSEA is attempting to assert a Torre legislative equivalency claim on behalf of all aggrieved employees.” Since it is “the nature and origin of the wrong, the substance and not the form, which controls,” the Appellate Division held that the lower court’s dismissal of CSEA’s petition was correct.
According to the ruling, “the claimed wrong and the rights sought to be enforced arise outside the four corners of the collective bargaining agreement.” Therefore, CSEA had to show that it satisfied the three-prong test set out in the Aeneas McDonald decision in order to maintain the action. The Appellate Division said that CSEA failed to meet the “third prong of the test.”
The Appellate Division ruled that the individual circumstances of each employee would have to be considered to determine whether or not the Torre rule was violated.
The court noted that it had earlier addressed the issue in Weitzenbergh v Nassau County Department of Recreation and Parks, 249 AD2d 538. It denied class action status in the Weitzenbergh case, noting that “there were numerous differences among members of the proposed class and no evidentiary support for the proposition that their positions were improperly abolished under the doctrine of legislative equivalency.”
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