The Plaintiffs in this action were formerly civil immigration detainees at the Orange County Correctional Facility [Jail] where they were treated for serious mental illnesses. Alleging that Orange County and some of its agencies and officials [Defendants] failed to provide planning for, or discharge plans upon release,* violated their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs initiated litigation in United States District Court seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint and Plaintiffs appealed .
The United States
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the Defendants were responsible for providing them with medical care while they were detained at a county detention facility [Jail] that houses civil immigration detainees pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement between Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] and Orange County
Defendants asked the Circuit Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' entire Complaint for failure to state a claim, contending that "there is no established substantive due process right to the post-release measures inherent in discharge plans." The Defendants argued that the government’s duty of care ends "the instant the inmate walks through the prison gates and into the civilian world, because that is when the inmate’s ability to secure medication or care on his own behalf is restored" to him or her."
Noting that "[t]his Court ... has never held that the state’s duties to an inmate or detainee extend beyond their release" ... Plaintiffs’ theory in this case is that “[d]ischarge planning is an essential part of mental healthcare in institutional settings” and “Defendants are constitutionally obliged to provide Plaintiffs with adequate medical care while they are confined to immigration detention.”
Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and drawing all reasonable, the Circuit Court said that it found that Plaintiffs "have plausibly alleged that discharge planning is an essential part of in-custody care" and concluded that despite the forward-looking nature of discharge planning, a claim for damages caused by the lack of it can be considered a claim for deprivation of in-custody care for purposes of the “special relationship” exception. However, on remand it will be necessary for Plaintiffs to prove to a fact-finder that "the care they complain of is the type that should have been provided to them during their detention."
Citing Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, the court explained that "those in civil detention, as were Plaintiffs in this case, are also afforded a right to be free from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs." Further, "in order to establish a violation of a right to substantive due process, such a plaintiff must demonstrate not only government action but also that the government action was so ‘egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.'”
While remaining the matter for factual development as Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim, this does not mean that Plaintiffs have established their entitlement to relief and the will need to provide evidence to support their allegations. Further, opined the court, "Defendants have raised significant factual issues that need to be fleshed out through discovery, including whether the discharge planning measures Plaintiffs identify should be provided as part of in-custody care (rather than undertaken upon or after release), the medical effects of a temporary deprivation of psychotropic medication, the causal relationship between the alleged interruption in Plaintiffs’ treatment and the consequences they complain of, and whether the circumstances of Plaintiffs’ release were so unexpected that Defendants could not have anticipated, and properly planned for, their release at the time it occurred."
However, at this, the pleading stage, the Circuit Court indicated that it has simply held that Plaintiffs have adequately stated a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim justifying vacating the district court's opinion and remanding the matter for "proceedings consistent with this opinion." The Circuit also noted that the district court, in addition, may consider various issues it did not reach in its opinion such as (1) whether the Plaintiffs adequately pled a county policy, practice, or custom for purposes of Monell liability***; (2) whether Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim against [a named Defendant]; and (3) whether [that named Defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity.****
* Plaintiffs alleged that discharge planning is a routine and necessary component of institutional mental health treatment.
** The decision notes that the policies and protocols governing Defendants and others providing treatment at the Jail themselves demand such discharge planning. Both ICE and Orange County
*** Under Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipal government can be held liable under Section 1983 if a plaintiff can demonstrate that a deprivation of a federal right occurred as a result of a "policy" of the local government's legislative body or of those local officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.
**** "Qualified immunity" protects a government official from lawsuits alleging that the official violated a plaintiff's rights, only allowing suits where officials violated a “clearly established” statutory or constitutional right.
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