In 2018, Petitioner commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a resolution of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Muttontown [Respondents] which provided that certain funds held in a fund for the acquisition of parkland were to be transferred into a general capital improvement fund. The petition also sought to annul Local Law No. 2-2018 of the Village of Muttontown to the extent that it provided for the indemnification of Village employees in the amount of any judgment obtained against them for punitive damages and for damages arising out of intentional wrongdoing or recklessness, based upon their acts as employees.
Petitioner asserted, inter alia,*that the resolution and the local law were passed in violation of various laws, including the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA).
Respondents moved to dismiss the proceeding, inter alia, on grounds of lack of standing. Petitioner opposed the motion, and cross-moved for leave to amend the petition and for leave to file a late notice of claim.
The Supreme Court granted the Respondents' motion, denied Petitioner's cross motion, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. Petitioner appealed the court's rulings.
The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court's ruling, explaining that the Respondents' motions were "properly granted", explaining:
1. Generally, to establish standing to challenge governmental action, a petitioner must show that it would "suffer direct injury different from that suffered by the public at large, and that the injury asserted falls within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted" [See Matter of Riverhead PGC, LLC v Town of Riverhead, 73 AD3d 931].
In this instance, the Appellate Division opine Petitioner did not adequately demonstrate that she suffered "direct injury different from that suffered by the public at large" and thus "failed to establish standing to challenge the resolution and the local law pursuant to CPLR article 78.
The Appellate Division also concluded that Supreme Court also correctly determined that the petitioner lacked standing to assert SEQRA claims. "To establish standing under SEQRA", said the court, "a petitioner must show (1) an environmental injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and (2) that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected or promoted by SEQRA," citing Matter of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Tuxedo, 112 AD3d 726 and other decisions.
Further, noted the Appellate Division, "[t]o qualify for standing to raise a SEQRA challenge, a party must demonstrate that it will suffer an injury that is environmental and not solely economic in nature.
Thus, Supreme Court had properly granted Respondents' CPLR 3211(a) motion to dismiss the petition, denied the Petitioner's cross motion for leave to amend the petition and for leave to file a late notice of claim, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding.
* Latin for "among other things."
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