To establish a prima facie case of an employer's failure to accommodate an employee's disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12101–12213 [ADA], the plaintiff must allege the following:
(1) The plaintiff is a person with a disability within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) An employer covered by the statute had notice of plaintiff's disability;
(3) With reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and
(4) The employer has refused to make such accommodation or accommodations.
In this action the parties disputed whether New York City Department Of Human Resources Administration [HRA] had refused to provide the employee [Plaintiff] with a reasonable accommodation of her alleged disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§12101–12213.
The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, noted that, for the purposes of the ADA, a reasonable accommodation “is one that enables an individual with a disability ... to perform the essential functions of that position or to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment.” However, observed the court, the ADA does not require employers to “provide a perfect accommodation or the very accommodation most strongly preferred by the employee.”
Plaintiff acknowledged that, in response to her request, HRA provided her with an ergonomic chair and footrest, but alleged that the ergonomic chair was “dilapidated” and the footrest "rocked." The Circuit Court, however, noted Plaintiff failed to identify any “benefits or privileges of employment” that she was not able to enjoy because of the chair and footrest that HRA provided to accommodate the employee's alleged disability.
The Circuit Court also commented that it agreed with the federal District Court that Plaintiff’s allegations in support of her claim that the accommodations HRA provided were inadequate were "too conclusory and thus fail to establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate a disability."
Plaintiff also contended that the District Court erred in dismissing her discrimination complaints pursuant to the ADA and Title VII. Addressing this claim, the Circuit Court opined that Plaintiff failed "to develop her legal theory in support of this argument," pointing out that "[it] is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived."
In addition, the Circuit Court noted that Plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to raise an inference that HRA's actions were taken because of her race or disability, citing Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District, 801 F.3d 72.
Considering Plaintiff's remaining arguments, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "that they are without merit" and affirmed the judgment of the federal District Court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.
Click HERE to access the Circuit Court's decision posted on the Internet.